Search

Indonesia is a net debtor country, meaning typically more investment flows into Indonesia than goes out. This is an important driver of growth, but can also create strategic and economic liabilities as foreign creditors establish claims on Indonesian assets. This paper uses the concept of defensive economic statecraft to explain how the Indonesian state has taken actions to mitigate these vulnerabilities by deepening domestic capital markets, accumulating foreign exchange reserves, intermediating inflows through SOEs and forcing investment into strategic sectors. Although foreign investment involves risks and trade-offs, this paper analyzes some of the mechanisms by which net debtor countries like Indonesia can mitigate such risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the importance of non-state actors in international relations is now widely acknowledged, formal state-to-state ties remain an essential measure of a state's strength in the international community. When traditional components of sovereignty are eroded, what options remain open to states seeking to forestall international isolation? Drawing on a case study of Taiwan, this paper explores the potential and the pitfalls of using paradiplomacy as a substitute for traditional diplomacy. I argue that Taiwan uses paradiplomacy for three primary purposes: as a 'hedge' against weakness in the central-level US-Taiwan relationship; as a tool for developing long-term relationships with rising political stars; and as a performative strategy for asserting Taiwan's statehood by showing others that it acts like a state. While paradiplomacy enables Taiwan to strengthen ties to US policymakers, these efforts have become increasingly complicated as mainland Chinese influence on local US politics increases. This paper thus sheds light on paradiplomacy in the US-Taiwan relationship, but also on the ways in which American federalism can complicate US foreign policy toward East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that amid intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry, middle powers in East Asia have contributed towards regional peaceful change through the exercise of good regional citizenship, a concept which draws on and modifies from the more commonly known good international citizenship which is closely associated with middle powers. Specifically, good regional citizenship involves proactively strengthening inclusive multilateralism, enhancing the rules-based order, and contributing to bridging efforts in East Asia. The paper examines the good regional citizenship of two middle powers, namely Australia and Indonesia. It finds that while both countries have exercised good regional citizenship, their specific strategies or the outcomes of their initiatives on regional dynamics have varied as a result of their relations with the respective major powers and their general foreign policy approaches. Australia's good regional citizenship has supported the preservation of U.S. leadership in East Asia vis-à-vis the rise of other regional powers, while Indonesia's good regional citizenship has helped to narrow the gaps among regional actors through mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractDespite a clear and common threat from North Korea, why has the security cooperation between Japan and South Korea been less developed than the security cooperation between Australia and Japan? This paper explains this puzzle by focusing on policymakers’ perceptions of the rise of China. The paper concludes that, not only historical issues between Japan and South Korea, but different threat perceptions of China between Australia, Japan, and South Korea can best explain why Australia-Japan security cooperation has developed more than Japan-South Korea security cooperation in terms of the degree of institutionalization and the scope of cooperation. Throughout the post-Cold War era, Australian and Japanese policymakers were increasingly concerned about the rise of Chinese power and influence. This has ultimately led Tokyo and Canberra to strengthen their bilateral and trilateral cooperation with the United States as a means of hedging or balancing against the rise of China. On the other hand, South Korean policymakers were less concerned about China and more concerned about North Korean threat. Indeed, some Korean policymakers understood China as the indispensable power to maintain peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. Thus, many Korean policymaker were reluctant to enhance security cooperation with Japan in areas beyond Northeast Asia. However, with rapidly changing security environments and the intensifying U.S.-Sino rivalry, as well as deteriorating relations with China, Korean policymakers’ perceptions of China have become increasingly closer to those of Australia and Japan. Accordingly, there has been growing momentum for stronger security cooperation between Japan and South Korea not only in Northeast Asia, but also in broader Indo-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Middle powers were visible actors in Myanmar's peace-donor landscape, from the beginning of that country's peace process in 2011 until the 2021 coup. Considering Myanmar's longstanding dependency on China and generally difficult relationship with larger powers, this appears to be significant. However, the literature on middle powers remains incapacitated by a definitional opacity that makes application of the term difficult, despite consistent references to their mediating capabilities. Recent scholarship has applied an 'entrepreneurial' lens to understanding middle power behaviour, implying middle powers are driven by a confluence of material and ideational factors. Based on fieldwork interviews with over fifty informants examining Norwegian, Japanese and Australian engagement with peacemaking in Myanmar 2011–2021, this paper expands on the entrepreneurial label and argues that middle powers in Myanmar acted as peacemaking entrepreneurs—as actors that traded upon their peacemaking reputations to secure concomitant material benefits. Nevertheless, this paper argues that engaging in peacemaking entrepreneurship proved to be problematic in Myanmar's context, given it tended to favour incumbent power. Indeed, in stark contrast to theoretical assumptions of these actors as neutral intermediaries, this paper raises serious questions about the contribution of middle powers in peacemaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractDuring the Second Abe Administration (2012-2020), Japan intensified its efforts to strengthen economic ties with Africa. This paper explores the reasons behind this shift and its implications for Japan’s African policy. Challenging the prevailing ‘Reactive State’ model of Japanese African policy, the study argues that the shift resulted from political and bureaucratic reforms that centralized power in the Prime Minister’s office (Kantei) and Abe’s favoritism toward the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). As a result, METI gained greater influence over African policy. Unlike the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, METI views Africa as a promising market with a limited Japanese presence and advocates for a more business-oriented approach. The paper concludes that Japan’s new policy provides a convincing reason why Japan must engage with Africa. However, Japanese companies do not always follow as the Government intended. Despite government efforts, the Japanese private sector remains hesitant to expand investment in Africa due to challenging business environments and the absence of legal frameworks between Japan and African countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis paper provides an in-depth analysis of Japan’s evolving cyber defense capabilities and explores its future challenges. National security has transformed in the twenty first century, with cyberspace becoming a key conflict domain. Japan, like other nations, has adapted to these changes. In 2022, the Japanese government introduced its active cyber defense concept. The National Security Strategy of 2022 stated the government’s posture for active cyber defense, which pre-emptively neutralizes adversary computers. This marked a turning point in Japan’s security and defense. This strategic shift, which occurred notably between 2000 and 2022, exemplifies Japan’s transition in the cyber domain. The scope of protecting cyberspace has evolved from primarily safeguarding civilian infrastructure to adopting proactive measures. This evolution is analyzed in the paper, which contrasts Japan’s approach with Western nations’ military-driven cyber policies. Additionally, the multifaceted challenges and opportunities arising from this paradigm shift in cyber capability development are explored. The analysis encompasses key aspects, including the policy formation, international cooperation, budgetary allocations, and the progress of organizational structures regarding the cyber domain. Furthermore, the study explores Japan’s future trajectory in cyber defense, with a particular focus on its role within the ‘Multi-Domain Defense Force’ and the dynamics of the Japan-US alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China remains reluctant in claiming unilateral economic sanctions as a valid form of statecraft. China has consistently withheld official acknowledgment of its use of unilateral sanctions despite using them in different disputes. This has resulted to observations arguing that China is increasingly approaching the use of sanctions in a stealthier, therefore, more aggressive manner. It begs to ask, how does China's reluctant attitude towards its use of unilateral economic sanctions fit into China's overall foreign policy logic? More specifically, how does China's victimhood discourse justify unilateral sanctions and at the same time, promote a positive identity of itself in light of coercion? This paper argues that China's consistent vague acknowledgment and denial in claiming a direct hand on unilateral sanctions comes from its broad foreign policy objective of maintaining a positive identity through its discourse of victimhood. To uncover this understanding, this paper analyzes China's official positions in six bilateral disputes where China has resorted to unilateral sanctions. While existing observations only stop at 'plausible deniability' as primary explanation for China's vague rhetoric, analyzing China's predication strategies provides a necessary nuancing in terms of how this peculiar behavior remains consistent with China's overall foreign policy logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China and the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative have intensified regional great power competition. Seemingly, China and Japan have been competing over the export of infrastructure projects and access to the Southeast Asian market. Against this backdrop, this paper sheds light on recipient states' agency. Specifically, this paper explores how Indonesia has responded to Sino-Japanese competition through the perspective of economic hedging. In the realm of domestic railway development and the need to establish connectivity on Java, why did the Indonesian government decide to work with China to develop the Jakarta-Bandung High-speed Rail project and Japan on the North Java Upgrading Line, as the two lines are not interoperable? Railway policy in Indonesia is strategic and pragmatic. On the one hand, Sino-Japanese competition diversifies Indonesia's options as it continues striving to strengthen infrastructure development. On the other hand, the need continually to strike a balance between the two great powers requires skill and flexibility. Therefore, maintaining policy autonomy and accepting economic costs make-up secondary states' responses to great power competition in turbulent times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a review of scholarship found in the pages of The Pacific Review over the last 30 years. It does so in three ways: (1) it highlights issues in the theory and practice of the international relations, strategic studies, political culture and political economy of the Asia Pacific region. (2) It looks at change in the region over time by an analysis of the shifting fortunes of the major regional powers, namely Japan, China and Indonesia and the challenges they, and China in particular, post to US regional hegemony. (3) It looks at regional process reflected in the fate and fortunes of the regional integrative project in the key policy domains of trade, finance and the environment. The paper concludes with a reflection on the strains on the regional political and economic orders by the rise in nationalist politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractRecent studies have documented the profound effects that democratic backsliding generates on various realms of governance. However, foreign policies remain an exception in this trend despite the notable emergence of non-traditional foreign policy positions backsliding governments around the world took in recent years. To address this gap, this paper examines South Korea’s policy toward Japan during its recent period of democratic backsliding, focusing on the making of the Comfort Women Agreement in 2015. The case study reveals that the Park Geun-hye government (2012-2017) pursued a policy position that defied social and institutional constraints. The paper suggests that this case represents how democratic backsliding can destabilize foreign policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte government (2016–2022). During this period, Philippine foreign policy is widely acknowledged to have undergone dramatic shifts, with the government making friendly overtures towards China at the cost of its traditional alliance with the US. From a foreign policy analysis perspective, this paper explicitly focuses on the role of political leadership in guiding national foreign policy. This paper argues that the Duterte government made strategic use of political marketing in promoting its populist foreign policy. Thus, political marketing is used as an analytical lens with which to examine much of the rhetoric and behaviour of the Duterte government, particularly in regard to its response to the US–China rivalry. By engaging in this supposedly diplomatic game, the Duterte government tried to sell its foreign policy promises and outcomes as products even when its rhetoric was at times disconnected from its actual performance. Overall, this paper develops an alternative perspective from which to add to our understanding of the role of populist foreign policy initiatives in a fragile democratic setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'China threat' has been identified as an important driver of Japan's security agenda and discourse. The threat posed by China has been discussed either as a given factor determining the trajectory of Tokyo's security approach, as a product of identity construction, or as an expression of securitizing processes that facilitate institutional and policy change. This paper contributes to this debate by offering an alternative explanation of the process through which the Abe government constructed China as a threat. Building on securitization theory, the paper examines the modes and strategies employed by the Abe Administration to successfully securitize China. The paper argues that, while Beijing was labeled a 'concern' rather than an 'existential threat,' it was still securitized through a process of securitization that involves an association with those domains in which China engages assertively, namely the maritime commons. The paper suggests calling this type of securitizing pattern 'transversal securitization' and explores how this indirect strategy allowed the Abe government to pragmatically pursue its objectives both domestically and at the international level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes a novel contribution by examining the puzzle of one Southeast Asian nation, Myanmar, and its dramatic shift of 'fortune' in its international status and the domestic consequences of that shift during the decade of 2010–2020. It highlights how the country's changing international relations affected its domestic political decision-making process. It puts forth the argument that the amount of international attention the country received since 2011 as the target of competitive courtship between China, United States, and the West in general, and the consequent feeling of being valued as a geostrategic asset, created strong conditions for overconfidence on part of Myanmar's government and military. This favorable international environment also coincided with perceived progress in democratization domestically. Similar to its past patterns of behavior toward ethnic minorities, the Myanmar military and the government overestimated their likelihood of success in dealing with the Rohingya minority while underestimating the likelihood of punishment by the international community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political economy impacts and influences a state's military strategy. This article focuses on how the integration of the US political economy in the Indo-Pacific drives US Navy officers and the broader national security state to establish the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Investigating the strategic thought of senior Naval officers shows that they think far beyond military threats and engage with the United States and the Indo-Pacific political economy. Even as the US Navy competes with China's military, its FOIP strategy benefits corporate elites in both China and the US, whose cooperation creates a mutually supportive economic relationship. This argument leads to the finding that the US hegemony in the region is a strategy that avoids a bipolar 'New Cold War' of an entirely de-coupled US and China. The FOIP supported by the US Navy continues to integrate China into regional and global economies, even as it attempts to push back against China by gathering allies and partners. The emphasis on international political economy highlights how the region is a network of 'patchwork' relations, where states rely on one another for economic prosperity. Through investigating speeches and strategic papers from US Naval officials, this paper demonstrates how the US competes and cooperates with China in the context of relations in the region that are in constant flux. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contrasts agricultural protection of Japan and Korea with the West and identifies major differences between them. It characterizes agricultural protection of Japan and Korea (net heavy food importers) as "tariff-based and scarcity-sensitive" aimed at promoting survival and the West (net food exporters) as "subsidy-based and surplus-inducing" aimed at enhancing farm income. We then identify factors underlying the coevolution and divergence in the extent of agricultural trade liberalization between Japan and Korea since the launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986. Korea accepted deep cuts in agricultural tariffs in bilateral FTAs with the US and EU during the 2000s while Japan continued to protect farm interests by concluding low levels of FTAs with politically sensitive products excluded from tariff concessions. The two countries' stances reversed since 2013 with Japan becoming proactive in pursuing high levels of FTAs with major agricultural exporting countries and Korea decelerating its opening of agricultural markets. To explain such divergences, this paper develops a political economy framework in which the incumbent political leadership would consider both national interests and sectoral (farm as import competing industries and business/manufacturing as exporting industries) special interests. Our analysis shows that President Roh (2002–2007)'s embracing of neoliberal paradigm in formulating foreign trade policies that would promote national interests underlies the unprecedented level of agricultural trade liberalization in Korea during the 2000s, while Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's determination not to be outcompeted by the rising China and Korea's ambitious FTA strategies underlies Japan's proactive bilateral and mega-FTA drives since 2013. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan has historically been a major player within the Indo-Pacific region due to its rapid post-war economic expansion, technological advancement, massive overseas development aid as well as its cultural outreach. As the Indo-Pacific today is marred with various challenges in the form of maritime and energy security, border conflicts, booming population, developing economies, and rising carbon emissions, among others. The region requires a multipolar balance of power wherein nations can lead by example and concerted action towards creating a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable future for an extensively dynamic Indo-Pacific. This paper focuses on one of the critical variables of the region, i.e., the energy sector, and attempts to place Japan's role and contribution to the region's ongoing energy transitions. The extent and means through which Japan can propel itself and the region towards a just transition with the help of regional and international cooperation have been analysed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of 'revisionism' has caught the attention of international relations scholars amid intensifying rivalry between the United States and China. It is a trademark of rising powers, and China was likewise expected to become a revisionist power, intent on changing the status quo. However, history tells us that not all rising powers necessarily become revolutionary states, seeking to overturn the prevailing order and replace it with another through hegemonic wars. This paper presents a novel understanding of revisionism by distinguishing between strategic 'contestation' and 'challenge'. In the context of declining unipolarity, a dissatisfied rising power will contest the rules and principles of issue-specific regimes and demand legitimate adjustments that better reflect the new distribution of power. A challenge emerges when demands are rejected, and a contestation leads to 'deconcentration' and 'delegitimation' of the established order. The establishment of the AIIB can be examined as an example of contested multilateralism that falls short of a challenge. This paper concludes that China is 'contesting', not 'challenging' the liberal international order and suggests a set of countermeasures that the U.S. can think of: selective accommodation, reinforcement of alliances and partnerships, and overcoming domestic challenges such as populism that undermine the liberal values, constitutive of the liberal international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing inspiration from a Chinese proberb, this paper offers an alternative interpretation of regionalism, with a special reference to its membership. This alternative interpretation provides insights into the exclusionary aspect of regionalism, for which mainstream international relations theories lack a certain efficacy in providing plausible explanations. We hypothesize that a state forms a regional group in which it can be a leader, excluding states that are more powerful than it is. A state values the leading position in a regional group, even in a small regional group. To test the hypothesis, this paper investigates regionalism launched in Asia during the second half of 20th century, with special attention to the inclusion and exclusion of the US. By analyzing diplomatic records obtained at four national archives (Australia, Japan, the UK, and the US), as well as memoirs by retired officials and other studies, this paper shows that regionalism in Asia was often pursued in an exclusionary manner, mainly by Japan, and to a lesser degree by Indonesia. The paper also discusses whether and how regionalism in Europe can be explained with this alternative theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Chinese paradiplomacy has received growing academic attention, little is known about how different provinces within China act as international relations players of their own accord. This paper adopts a comparative perspective to address this gap. It develops three dimensions of international actorness (authority, motivation, and instruments) to examine whether and how Chinese provinces have satisfied the criteria for being international relations actors through their engagements in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Using Guangdong and Yunnan as examples, this paper casts light on the plural occasions in which the de-centralized state control of foreign affairs and the growing external activism of provincial entities have worked in tandem to widen the footprints of said provincial entities in the countries of the BRI. Drawing on Guangdong-Hong Kong competition and Yunnan-Guangxi rivalry, this paper unpacks the motivations of provincial engagements in the BRI by exploring the utility of imitation tactics used to gain comparative advantages vis-à-vis their domestic counterparts. While comparing the Guandong and Yunnan's leveraging of strategic instruments, this paper also reveals Guangdong's strong globalist, mercantile mentality in its external interactions, in contrast with the more regionalist and stability-oriented approach of Yunnan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Southeast Asia has gone through a remarkable transformation in recent decades and seen peaceful change since the end of the Cold War era despite great power interference and rivalry and ongoing territorial disputes including the South China Sea conflict. The region has transformed its image from the so-called Balkans of the East in the 1960s and 1970s to an economically competitive and peaceful region today. Despite these accomplishments, the record of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in maintaining regional peace and security has also been seriously challenged, particularly at the domestic and transnational level. The paper argues that the Southeast Asian experience of peaceful change calls for a different framework of analysis that goes beyond the traditional International Relations theories which do not provide a compelling answer to whether regional peace has prevailed. It reviews ASEAN's approaches to managing peace and security in Southeast Asia and brings close attention to domestic and international dynamics. The paper claims that the Southeast Asian states' approach to positive peace, reflected in the notion of comprehensive security and the building of national and regional resilience, is instructive in understanding peaceful transformations in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's influence in the global South has both material and ideational aspects. In the era of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), material aspects include trade in goods, infrastructure-building, and imports of raw materials and energy. Ideational aspects include political influence and attempts to diffuse Chinese norms, some of which differ from those enshrined in the so-called 'liberal international order'. This paper posits that China's norm diffusion in the global South is attempted via practice-based normative diplomacy which includes both discursive and non-discursive practices. In theory, Chinese norms are supposed to be co-constituted by partners in a process we call 'earning recognition'. In practice, the Chinese government expects partner countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to model their behaviour and discourse on the example set by the People's Republic of China (PRC) without significant contestation. Our analysis demonstrates that the PRC's normative diplomacy has achieved a degree of earned recognition and influence, in that actors in the global South have begun to alter their behaviour along the normative lines expected by Beijing rather than those enshrined in the Western-led liberal international order. However, Chinese discursive practices have not met with the same degree of recognition as non-discursive ones, leaving space for counter-initiatives from the Western powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's shift to balancing through the deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) in 2003 is not solely accounted for by the structural incentives in conventional realism. Rather, it is because of a dynamic interaction of the structure and domestic politics, which is more nuancedly captured by neoclassical realism. This paper posits that the concept of 'vested interests' such as economic ones, and not necessarily leaders' perception of threat, plays a crucial role as a hidden driver of Japan's remilitarisation regarding BMD. The existing literature does not accurately capture 'how' Japan chose the option of BMD as a means of balancing, 'why' Japan shifted to balance and 'when' it completes the shift and begins balancing. Therefore, by supplementing the existing realist paradigms, the paper intends to establish a theoretical bridge between structure and foreign policy outcome with unit-level variables, the value of which lie in the level of maintenance of theoretical rigour with strong explanatory power. The paper contributes to the substantive debate on why, when and how Japan's shift occurred to begin balancing from its previous behaviour, with further contributions to a broader theoretical debate on how a major state responds to a rising power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the first academic attempt to critically bridge the politics of sustainability fix with social conflict theory (SCT) focusing on Indonesia's foreign-sponsored development of Ultra Supercritical (USC) coal power plants. I examine the contradictory development of 'green' projects in Indonesia and specifically unpack: how transnational politico-economic forces have secured a stable sustainability fix for the USC and how they have tamed opposition forces and reshaped governance strategies for intensified accumulation. I attempt to empirically demonstrate how such process unfold through two case studies – Cirebon II developed by Japanese and Korean companies and the Java 7 project funded by China. Albeit each have different alliance formations and strategies, both cases demonstrate that the safeguarding of stable conditions for sustainability fixes of USC power plant development is primarily determined by contestation, conflicts, and compromises between socio-political forces – international fractions of capital, state apparatuses, Indonesia's PLN and coal oligarchy as well as broader civil society actors. They reshape governing strategies that are ultimately organised through the Indonesian state and react to the selectivity of state strategies which privilege dominant forces. The paper contributes to the existing literature on the political economy of infrastructure and serves to take state transformation into account and to dispel the 'methodological nationalism' view that presupposes policy outcome and institutional features are inherent to the mode of capitalism of the investor's country of origin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been the subject of extensive analysis since late 2013. Most of this views it as a manifestation of China's approach to global issues under Xi Jinping, whether economic, geopolitical, or as a bid to reshape globalization. There has so far been less research into the domestic dynamics of the BRI, including at the sub-national level in China. Based primarily on an examination of provincial-level policy documents and research, this paper explores the ways in which policy makers in the southwestern province of Yunnan have responded to the BRI, and what this might mean for the implementation and shaping of the initiative. It identifies the promotion of externally-oriented development as the main response in Yunnan to the BRI, structured around the idea of making the province a 'pivot' to south and southeast Asia. This provincial-level response is shaped by pre-existing policy goals in Yunnan and reflects more continuity than change in policy substance. This is consistent with interpretations of the BRI as an 'omnibus' policy which can incorporate multiple objectives and act as a framework within which provincial actors can compete for influence or which they can use to make progress towards achieving local objectives in the context of national strategy. The paper concludes that in the case of Yunnan and the BRI, broad alignment between provincial and central government objectives suggests that on this issue, Yunnan is more of an 'influencer' and 'interpreter' than 'ignorer' of national policy goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this introduction to the special issue, we establish the overarching objective for the collection; to investigate the salience and efficacy of conceptions of Economic Statecraft (ES) and Geoeconomics for understanding and explaining shifts in state-market relationships in a number of regional political economies. After a very short overview of different generations of ES research, we establish the set of common questions that each of the papers address, and how we arrived at them as the research project evolved. We point to the importance of ensuring that ES is not just thought of as something that the more powerful regional states engage in, and the need to adopt a three-part analytical distinction between different components of ES: motivations and objectives; actions and tools; and outcomes and consequences. This allows us to trace the relationship between goals and effects, provides a basis for comparative studies, and makes it easier to make a distinction between ES and other forms of state involvement in the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper highlights the highly contingent and constrained possibilities for states concerned with gaining and maintaining economic and, relatedly, strategic advantage in East Asia in a world dominated by global value chains (GVCs) owned and controlled by transnational capital. While the reorganisation of production has given rise to new contender states such as China, challenging the economic and strategic positions of others, the ability for states to engage in non-market conforming behaviour designed to reduce technological dependence, accumulate reserves and embolden national positions against competitors is far more constrained than it once was. Prioritising the relative power and leverage of states operating in various contexts over time, three types of state are identified within contemporary East Asia: former developmental states under persistent competitive pressures compelling very different policy agendas to those that underpinned their respective development stories; a somewhat exceptional constrained "aspirant state", attempting mercantilist strategies to achieve strategic upgrading under the spectre of systemic exclusion and formidable domestic challenges; and, finally, relatively vulnerable "eke-out" competition states, attempting to leverage labour cost, geography and regulation to maintain economic relevance within the context of hyper competitiveness while also engaging in forms of quarantining and patronage. Our overarching argument is that the latitude to both pursue and leverage ES strategies common in the past is all but gone, even for the most powerful of contender states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For nearly four decades, Australia's domestic and international economic policies were anchored by the promotion of open, transparent, and rules-based market exchange. This was considered the best way to increase both Australia's prosperity and its security, and that belief guided Canberra's approach to economic statecraft. However, emerging concerns about the vulnerabilities arising from economic interdependence, and the increasingly blurry line between economics and security amid great power rivalry between China and the United States, have placed Australian policy orthodoxy in a difficult position. In this paper, we investigate how these dynamics are shaping change and continuity in Australia's economic statecraft, and in doing so offer three contributions. First, to advance the emerging comparative economic statecraft research agenda, we propose a modified concept of economic statecraft that captures a wider range of activities undertaken by non-great powers and a distinction between state-based and market-based actions which allows for within- and cross-case comparisons. Second, empirically, we sketch the historical evolution of Australia's approach and examine three salient domains in which it has recently pursued new economic statecraft initiatives. Finally, in evaluating recent change and continuity, our third contribution is to identify new variables that may illuminate the conditions under which states adapt their prevailing approach to economic statecraft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic statecraft (ES) has been playing an increased role in affecting the international relations. While armed conflicts decline, states have been weaponising trade, investment, and other economic ties to gain leverage over their counterparts. In the contemporary world, ES is not only used to galvanise countries' influence in specific issue areas but also part of their grand strategy to achieve broad power-maximisation goals. Despite a proliferation of ES literatures in recent years, extant research tended to focus on great powers' ES, leaving small states' ES under-examined. Also, previous studies usually looked into how countries unilaterally employ ES. Hence, insufficient attention has been paid to how regional states work together to collectively alter multilateral frameworks to advance their ES. Against this backdrop, this paper investigates small nations' roles in the development of multilateral cooperative frameworks. Using the ES lens, it explores how these countries leverage these schemes to push forward their collective ES. The main argument is that regional states worked together to craft the terms of multilateral economic agreements to galvanise their clout over certain governance areas. I validate this argument by using the case of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). This study makes contributions to the research pertaining to ES, small states' strategies, and economic regionalism. It also yields practical implications for policymakers involved in fostering international economic governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A 'majoritarian turn' identified by scholars of Asian democracy in the 1990s saw the rise of mixed-member majoritarian electoral systems and more centripetal party competition across both Northeast and Southeast Asia. In this paper, we argue that since the 2000s, the institutional pendulum has shifted, with more consensual approaches to democracy appearing to better represent key identity cleavages of gender, ethnicity, and territory—a trend evident not just in East Asia but South Asia as well. This new 'Asian model' typically involves increasing the proportional components of existing electoral formulas and grafting gender quotas, multiethnic party lists, and quasi-federal elements onto ostensibly majoritarian state structures. We show that these reforms have, as intended, mostly increased female and ethnic minority representation and decentralized governance structures. At the same time, however, these de jure changes are not associated with de facto political development in terms of greater democratic quality, counter to theoretical expectations. Indeed, democracy has declined across most of Asia at the same time as its democratic institutions have become more consensual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indonesia has developed an internal model of reconciling the values of democracy and Islam; therefore it could pursue international activities for bringing the West and the Islamic world together. However, Indonesia's international role as a bridge-builder between democratic values and Islam has limited effectiveness. In this paper the attempt is to investigate why Indonesia's international activity as a bridge-builder between the West and the Muslim world is ineffective? The analysis shows, and this is the argument, that its limited effectiveness results from a conflict between the country's conception and prescription roles. The assumptions are that Indonesia's underlying objective in its foreign policy is to provide a tool for reconciling the West and the Muslim world (role conception); however an enactment of this role is affected by a dissonance between the authors of this role. The paper examines three empirical case studies at different levels of Indonesia's external engagement: (1) civilizational and interfaith dialogues at the international level; (2) the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Developing-8 at the inter-regional level; and (3) the Bali Democracy Forum at the regional level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the possibility of a partnership between foreign aid donors and South Pacific NGOs. This partnership focus emerged out of the 2011 Busan Outcome Document. Drawing on 51 interviews of donors and Pacific-created NGOs in four countries (Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu), this paper finds limited donor–NGO partnership. Reasons include insufficient donor interest in a partnership, capacity and accountability concerns for Pacific NGOs, and scarce core funding. While global agreements to encourage partnership are important components of development effectiveness discussions, donor–NGO partnership is not yet possible within the Pacific context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing theories on real exchange rates predict a significant undervaluation of the Korean won (KRW) in the early and mid-1990s. The paper demonstrates why this expectation did not materialize and instead an unprecedentedly large degree of overvaluation took place. Focusing on three variables, namely, financial repression, devaluation pass-through, and policy exhibitionism, the paper examines how the unraveling of the developmental state eventually gave rise to the 1990s’ overvaluation. It argues that the policy exhibitionism of the new civilian government amplified the influence of Chaebol on monetary policies, which in turn created a strong appreciative force to KRW. It also contends that the increasing exchange rate pass-through onto the prices of imported intermediate goods explains why Chaebol did not desire to tame the excessive appreciative trend despite its detrimental effect on their exports. The paper offers policy implications for other state-led, emerging economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the middle power identities of Australia and South Korea during the Kevin Rudd/Julia Gillard (2007–2013) and Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) administrations. Considering the problems in the existing position, behaviour, impact and identity-based definitions of middle powers, examining how self-identified middle powers have constructed such an identity would offer useful insights into the middle power concept. Relying on a framework that captures an identity's content and contestation, this paper argues that while Australia and South Korea have assumed a middle power identity, their visualisations of this identity are slightly different. Australia has understood its middle power identity in both economic and security terms, whereas South Korea appears to have connected such an identity more with the economic dimension. These differences affect how they envision their respective middle power roles in international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the notion of state security inform national approaches to managing cross-border in-migration in the increasingly interconnected but volatile Northeast Asian region? This paper explores this question by focusing on the intermestic politics of labor importation. Specifically, it theorizes the multidimensionality and multifunctionality of security fears that inform Japan's and Taiwan's approaches to the admission of low-skilled foreign workers. The paper proposes a comprehensive conceptual framework that explicates these relationships and argues that Northeast Asian labor importation regimes were formed at the intersection of a threefold logic of state security. Whereas economic security acted as an enabling (inclusionary) factor in both Japan and Taiwan and motivated the acceptance of foreign workers, internal security in Japan and external security in Taiwan acted as constraining (exclusionary) factors, which directly and distinctively conditioned the resulting policies. Moreover, ever since their inception in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the divergent policy regimes have been interlocked in these economic-internal and economic-external dynamics of state security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractIn this paper, I read the creation of the ASEAN human rights regime, the development of SOGIESC rights claiming (where this denotes sexual orientation, gender identity & expression, and sex characteristics), and the social conflict associated with homophobia and the backlash to LGBT rights through modes of participation analysis. This framework is used to interpret the different uses of rights and values-denominated language and institutions in the context of advocacy for sexuality and gender diversity rights protection. I first explicate the modes of participation approach and reprise how I have previously used this to analyse SOGIESC rights claiming. I then show its utility for understanding the emergence of the elite level human rights regime in ASEAN, before indicating how it can also be used to analyse non-elite resistance to SOGIESC rights. Both elite and non-elite resistance can be linked to the older anti-rights discourse of “Asian Values”, which I illustrate with refence to three states: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Taken together, these examples illustrate the capacity of modes of participation analysis to provide a persuasive account of the often contrasting and competing politics of human rights in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThe United States has tightened its technical embargo against China since the Sino-US rivalry began in the mid-2010s, especially in the semiconductor sector. It also has repercussions for China’s relations with US allies such as South Korea (or the Republic of Korea, ROK). As China’s technical growth is securitized, Sino-ROK collaboration in semiconductor technology becomes politicized, according to a securitization-politicization nexus derived from securitization theory. Under the pressure from Washington, even Korean semiconductor businesses may be forced to ‘choose sides’. However, Seoul’s pragmatic approach to Beijing prevents the politicization of Sino-ROK technological ties. While demanding security guarantees from Washington, Seoul is unwilling to enhance ties with the US at the price of those with China. Among three scenarios figured out in this paper, South Korea is likely to consolidate its ties with China in semiconductor industry in some form of ‘smart’ collaboration Ceteris paribus, and this is also in the interest of Beijing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis paper contributes to our understanding of China as a major/great power by analysing visual narratives in the Chinese Central Television (CCTV) political documentary Daguo Waijao (Major Country Diplomacy, DGWJ). It develops an analytical framework to tease out visualized role claims and demonstrates how those of constructive competitor, cooperative partner, norm-maker, economic power and responsible power are conceptualized in DGWJ through its narratives. The study concludes that China refuses to take on the pre-defined roles projected onto her by the United States and instead attempts to reinterpret them according to her own goals and views. In this vein, DGWJ can also be understood as an attempt at strategic altercasting. While the US identifies China (and Russia) as challengers and opponents to the liberal international order, DGWJ presents China’s promotion of ‘alternative’ multilateral institutions and initiatives—such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the (BRICS) New Development Bank or the country’s engagement in regional peace- and trust-building measures—as a sign of genuine commitment to the global commons. Key emphasis is on maintaining peace and cooperation and avoiding conflict between a rising China and the existing leading power (namely, the US) while at the same time actively promoting new norms and approaches (together with Russia). The study highlights the importance attached in DGWJ to the recognition of China’s role claims by significant others. In this context, the ability to rise as a great power is increasingly defined not only by material power recourses but also by the ideational dimensions of global leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

COVID-19 has disrupted social, economic and political life across the Asia Pacific region, with particularly deleterious impacts on women. Rather than equitably affecting all, COVID-19 has brought about a "patriarchal reset", exacerbating women's health and care labour burdens and heightening the physical violence against women and other threats to women's human rights. This paper examines global health governance in the region from a feminist political economy perspective. We ask how has the pandemic and associated lockdowns affected women's safety and access to economic resources and services on the one hand, and 'women, peace and security' (WPS) practitioners' capacity to safeguard women's rights in fragile settings on the other hand? We examine the gendered impacts of COVID-19 based on two surveys of WPS practitioners during 2020. Significant rises in domestic and gender-based violence, reduced access to reproductive health services, and increased income insecurity were all perceived and/or experienced during COVID-19 restrictions. WPS practitioners delivered services to mitigate these effects of COVID-19 despite overall less funding than before COVID-19. With the benefit of primary data, we explore how a more radical approach is needed to understand and transform gender relations in light of gender-based violence and depletion of women's labour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a non-state-owned Chinese company LONGi as a case study, this paper analyses the motives, impact and acceptance of Chinese investment in Malaysia. The paper compares Chinese investment in manufacturing sector with the ones in infrastructure sector to obtain a more rigorous assessment than previous studies. In contrast to the narrative depicting Chinese investment into a single superstructure that generates a monolithic and deleterious impact couched under the Belt and Road Initiative, I argue that the motives and impacts of Chinese investment vary significantly with business nature and practices, and thus generating different acceptance level towards Chinese-funded project in host-site. LONGi's case elucidates why Chinese investment in manufacturing encountered little political upheaval, while BRI projects in infrastructure sectors are often disputed. The analytical benefits and policy implications arising from this specific case study of Malaysia should be helpful to deepen our understanding of Chinese outward investment in not only other emerging economies in ASEAN but also broader region of the Asia-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its inception in December of 2015, scholars and policy-makers have been debating the motivations behind the design of the AIIB. This paper advances this debate by exploring whether and how the AIIB's structure follow the design pattern of other leading MDBs, and how well did it manage to integrate institutional effectiveness considerations with promoting its largest shareholders' geo-economic interests. It does so by comparing the design of the AIIB with that of the ADB and the World Bank, while integrating several approaches to institutional design. I argue that the AIIB's architects identified certain functional deficiencies in the performance of existing financial institutions and attempted to establish an alternative that will better address these deficiencies. To achieve that, they tried to balance between certain structural features that promote institutional performance with features that promote powerful creditors' geo-economic interests, as well as invest in AIIB's attractiveness vis-à-vis other financial institutions. This paper finds that in multilateral development banks power considerations tend to overshadow issues of institutional effectiveness, while sometimes these are successfully integrated. And, that powerful actors are able to politicize certain functional design features and reassign their purpose from solving cooperation problems to advancing geo-economic interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2010, ASEAN has made efforts to increase its coherence and visibility as an actor in regional infrastructure development, under the umbrella term of connectivity. Its most recent strategy, 2016's Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025, is notable for its more focused agenda as well as a tableau of institutional innovations, including new policy coordination mechanisms and a project preparation pipeline. Nonetheless, ASEAN struggles to maintain coherence in the implementation of its connectivity agenda, both internally as well as towards its dialogue partners. Utilizing the concepts of centrality and hedging as parts of a unified theoretical framework, this paper analyzes ASEAN's efforts to mobilize and manage external resources in connectivity. ASEAN's resource dependence and its failure to establish institutional centrality creates issues at the regional and the national levels. Regionally, ASEAN's lack of centrality and its perpetuation of ASEAN+1 relations have contributed to the emergence of contesting agendas and institutional frameworks by external actors. Nationally, the hedging strategies of ASEAN member states are at odds with the regional vision, highlighting a lack of intra-ASEAN coherence. The perpetuation of contesting institutional frameworks by external actors at the national level solidifies existing incoherence in ASEAN's connectivity governance, further undermining its centrality. ASEAN's efforts to assert centrality and execute a hedging strategy in connectivity are emblematic of its attempts to extend its reach into new policy areas, but also of its persistent governance constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The liberal security order in the Indo-Pacific led by the US has been transitioning to one managed by a US-led security network. As a result, the geostrategic competition between the US and China has also been transforming to one between this US-led network and China. In the process, Japan, Australia, and India have emerged as major 'nodes' of the network. In this context, this paper adopts the concept of 'network power' to claim that South Korea—while it still favors being a part of the network—is concerned that it would be relegated to the status of a small peripheral node mainly 'tied' to Japan, the regional hub of the network in Northeast Asia. To mitigate this concern, South Korea attempts to avoid unnecessarily seeming to exclude China while still favoring the network; aligns with other regional nodes in the network, whether Australia, India, or some ASEAN states; and increasingly frames its role as that of an active 'order-shaper' rather than a passive 'order-taker'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indo-Pacific region has become a central focus of great power competition. Not surprisingly, a rising China seeks to play an important, if not a leading role in the transformation of Asia's present regional order. The United States, meanwhile, as the unipole, has strong incentives to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. Facing certain structural and domestic constraints, China is disinclined to resort to the strategy of violent revision or subversion historically pursued by previous rising powers. Instead, China has pursued a gradual change of the existing regional order through a combination of internal balancing and external reassurance strategies. Specifically, China's quest for great power status in the region, particularly in response to the Indo-Pacific strategy adopted by the United States since the Trump administration, has prompted its proactive shift to counterbalance the US' vision of order in the region. This paper argues that the balance of power and the balance of alignment constitute two key variables that affect the prospect of Sino-US competition for a preferable regional order. Beijing's balancing strategies have significantly enhanced its economic and military capabilities, reducing the gap with the United States on the one hand and attracted certain regional states to join China-led regional initiatives on the other. However, owing to the complex balancing dynamics in the region and the agency of small and middle powers, the balance of alignment supports neither American nor Chinese dominance of Asia. Contrary to the 'new Cold War' narrative, the contest for order does not entail dividing the region into two rival blocs, but rather creating certain overlapping groupings and coalitions led by the two great powers. It consequently also signifies that the current order transition under a new bipolarity will be prolonged and relatively stable compared to the Cold War bipolarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper challenges the notion that Chinese maritime coercion in the East and South China Seas (ESCS) is best described as a grey zone strategy. The 'grey zone' notion raises two issues. Conceptually, it adds little to the existing literature on maritime coercion. Practically, it creates confusion over the understanding of maritime coercion by blurring the distinction between military and constabulary activities. The paper articulates this difference to elucidate the functional correlation between Beijing's strategic objectives and maritime claims. Within this context, the grey zone construct is particularly problematic since it uncritically assumes that the use of force is designed to remain below the threshold of war. By contrast, the paper argues that Chinese maritime claims to control 'rights and interests' are a function of a broader strategic intention to project military power within and beyond the confines of the ESCS, whilst preventing others to do the same. Thus, Chinese maritime coercion (military and constabulary) increases strategic competition and the risk of war, and is therefore better described as part of a 'hybrid' strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic led to a steep rise in demand for COVID-recovery lending and a decrease in capacity for infrastructure borrowing in many countries struggling to cope with its economic effects. This has presented a significant challenge to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as its project pipelines had been developed mainly for traditional infrastructure lending. This paper examines the strategies employed by the AIIB to adapt to the COVID-19 pandemic. The findings showcase how its institutional leadership effectively employed its authority, resources, and leadership competences to push for an adaptive response strategy. This was achieved by pitching a response based on the expansion of the AIIB's operational scope beyond traditional heavy infrastructure lending and the introduction of new policy instruments for funding COVID-recovery projects. The AIIB also engaged in collaborative partnerships with other MDBs to access their project pipelines and expertise. Thanks to these efforts, the AIIB not only managed to cope with the challenge, but its leadership also ensured the institution would come out of the pandemic having opportunistically benefited from it. The findings speak to the scholarship on IO resilience and bureaucratic politics. The analysis relies on official documents and original data from 20 interviews with IO officials and experts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For forty years, the East Asian regional order has delivered widespread peace and prosperity. That order faces possible upending by an economically and militarily more powerful China and a decreasingly robust and engaged United States. While accepting the possibility that such structural shifts could upend the regional order, this paper contends that three powerful counterweights are working to counter disruptive conflicts and to foster peaceful change, namely strong and rising economic interdependence, expanding institutionalization, and active preservation efforts by number of other Asian states, particularly the region's middle powers. This article analyzes the contribution of these three forces to creating the existing order and to their roles in its continuation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Challenging a popular view that China's rise will lead the United States and China to fall into the 'Thucydides trap'—a possible hegemonic war between the two—this paper proposes an 'institutional peace' argument, suggesting that the ongoing international order transition will be different from previous order transitions in history. Instead of using military means to change the international order, China and the United States have relied on various institutional balancing strategies to compete with one another for an advantageous position in the future international order. The discussion on the institutional competition between China and the US around the AIIB and the ARF-related multilateral security architecture supports the 'institutional peace' argument: institutional competition in the form of institutional balancing strengthens the dynamics and utility of international institutions, encourages states to offer new public goods, and could lead to a more peaceful order transition in the international system. However, this institutional peace argument is constrained by two caveats: the continued validity of the MAD nuclear deterrence and a limited degree of ideological antagonism between the US and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East Asia offers a fertile ground for applying dominant theoretical perspectives in International Relations and understanding their relevance and limitations. As this region has seen much conflict and cooperation historically and is re-emerging as a key theater of great power competition in the 21st century even when states maintain high levels of economic interactions, our understanding of the regional order will be enhanced by the theoretical tools available in the larger mainstream IR perspectives. The existence of a peculiar regional order of no war, yet a number of simmering disputes (along with high levels of economic interdependence) can be characterized as cold peace which deserves an explanation. The paper applies two variants of realism—balance of power and hegemonic stability – and the key arguments in liberalism to analyze the cold peace in Northeast Asia and normal peace in Southeast Asia from a historical perspective. It finds both grand theoretical approaches have partial applications for understanding the East Asian order. A hybrid approach is more valuable to better explain regional order during diverse time periods and different sub-regions of East Asia. Although the presence of both hegemony and balance of power can prevent major wars for a period, they do not help resolve the pre-existing disputes. Deepened economic interdependence mitigates some spiraling tendencies as states fearful of losing too much economically do not escalate crises beyond a point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the role of Islam in Malaysian foreign relations under the Premiership of Najib Razak. While most observers acknowledge the importance of Islam to Malaysian foreign policy making under Prime Ministers Mahathir Mohamad (1981 to 2003) and Abdullah Badawi (2004 to 2008), they tend to underplay its significance in Najib's tenure as leader of Malaysia. Departing from this, we suggest that Islam was significant in Najib's foreign policy in three ways. First, Najib utilized regional and international conflicts involving Muslims, particularly the Rohingyas and Palestinians, in order to construct Malaysia as a guardian of disenfranchised Muslims. Second, Najib relied on the notion of wasattiyah (the middle way) in order to buttress Malaysia's image as a moderate Muslim country. Finally, Najib rationalized Malaysia's alignment with Saudi Arabia in the Saudi-Iran geopolitical rivalry in religio-political terms. To make these arguments, we utilize a state identities approach to studying foreign policy. We unpack the notion of Muslim state identity into three manifestations: the activist Muslim state, the moderate Muslim state, and the Sunni Muslim state. The paper draws on both primary and secondary sources. We conclude with the conceptual implications of our argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]