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The 'China threat' has been identified as an important driver of Japan's security agenda and discourse. The threat posed by China has been discussed either as a given factor determining the trajectory of Tokyo's security approach, as a product of identity construction, or as an expression of securitizing processes that facilitate institutional and policy change. This paper contributes to this debate by offering an alternative explanation of the process through which the Abe government constructed China as a threat. Building on securitization theory, the paper examines the modes and strategies employed by the Abe Administration to successfully securitize China. The paper argues that, while Beijing was labeled a 'concern' rather than an 'existential threat,' it was still securitized through a process of securitization that involves an association with those domains in which China engages assertively, namely the maritime commons. The paper suggests calling this type of securitizing pattern 'transversal securitization' and explores how this indirect strategy allowed the Abe government to pragmatically pursue its objectives both domestically and at the international level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the first academic attempt to critically bridge the politics of sustainability fix with social conflict theory (SCT) focusing on Indonesia's foreign-sponsored development of Ultra Supercritical (USC) coal power plants. I examine the contradictory development of 'green' projects in Indonesia and specifically unpack: how transnational politico-economic forces have secured a stable sustainability fix for the USC and how they have tamed opposition forces and reshaped governance strategies for intensified accumulation. I attempt to empirically demonstrate how such process unfold through two case studies – Cirebon II developed by Japanese and Korean companies and the Java 7 project funded by China. Albeit each have different alliance formations and strategies, both cases demonstrate that the safeguarding of stable conditions for sustainability fixes of USC power plant development is primarily determined by contestation, conflicts, and compromises between socio-political forces – international fractions of capital, state apparatuses, Indonesia's PLN and coal oligarchy as well as broader civil society actors. They reshape governing strategies that are ultimately organised through the Indonesian state and react to the selectivity of state strategies which privilege dominant forces. The paper contributes to the existing literature on the political economy of infrastructure and serves to take state transformation into account and to dispel the 'methodological nationalism' view that presupposes policy outcome and institutional features are inherent to the mode of capitalism of the investor's country of origin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan is abandoning its once unidirectional foreign security policy towards the USA, two notable examples of which are its increasingly comprehensive and substantial security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. Putting these burgeoning Japanese security partnerships front and center, this paper asks the following questions: What are the characteristics of Japan's maturing security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam? What factors have driven and enabled their recent emergence? What promotes and constrains their future development? What do these maturing Japanese non-US security partnerships reveal about Japan's direction as a security actor in and beyond East Asia? The paper finds that these two Japanese security bilaterals, which have six basic characteristics in common, are fundamentally driven by the contemporary shift in the balance of power and the strategic challenge that China's emerging maritime power and ambitions present Japan. It moreover argues that the substantiation of these security partnerships have been pursued under American auspices and further invited by Japanese nationalism and security legislative reforms. Notwithstanding these encouraging factors, however, domestic and geo-strategic constraints and counter incentives lead this paper to expect further substantiation, but limited military significance in the future of these security partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the evolution of Sino-Japanese rivalry in the security sphere concentrating on the Chinese perspective, and placing it within the wider context of complex interstate rivalry between China, Japan and the United States. From a theoretical viewpoint, this research contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry from multiparty perspective, which has been overlooked in existing research. China–Japan–US complex interstate rivalry includes elements of positional, spatial and ideological rivalry simultaneously. When rivalries mix two or more rivalry types, they become more difficult to resolve. The two broad trends of China's military build-up and deepening US–Japan alliance evolve in tandem intensifying rivalry dynamics and increasing positional elements of rivalry. There are many indications on various levels that for China, controlling Japan's international ambitions has become less important and more attention is paid to ways in which Japan helps the United States in reaching its objectives in Asia through their alliance agreement. The cases analysed to display complex interstate rivalry include the Taiwan question, territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, and the North Korean nuclear issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue analyzes the evolving notion of Sino–Japanese rivalry and its effects on concrete foreign policy measures of both states in a global context. China's emergence as a great power and Japan's attempts to 'normalize' its foreign relations took place alongside both countries increasing their political engagement in world regions beyond Northeast Asia. As a result, there has been increasing mutual monitoring of and increasing concern expressed about the intentions and actions of the respective other on these different levels of world politics. This has largely been neglected in the literature. This special issue closes the gap in the literature by providing answers to the following questions: Is there a Sino–Japanese rivalry in the first place? Which factors define this rivalry? Are there different levels and/or kinds of rivalry? Which factors influence Sino–Japanese rivalry in different regions and on different levels of the international system? Do these factors differ across regional and institutional boundaries? Answering these questions requires us to conceptualize what is meant by rivalry as well as to focus on Sino–Japanese interaction in different world regions and on the level of international institution building. This special issue also contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry by challenging common understandings of the concept of rivalry and by adding new facets and interpretation of rivalry based on the concrete empirical cases. It will therefore provide a broadened perspective on the characteristics of Sino–Japanese relations, the mutual impacts of Japan's and China's globalizing foreign policies, and on our understanding of the determinants and mechanisms of interstate rivalries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses wedge strategies in the context of Russo-Japanese relations. In particular, it looks at how both countries have sought to generate a dis-alignment in the opposing side, preventing further steps toward the consolidation of potentially threatening partnerships: the US-Japan alliance for Russia, and the Russia-China entente for Japan. After identifying the respective goals of Russia and Japan, the article examines the conditions that enable the success of wedge strategies. Looking at the case of Russia-Japan relations from 2012 to 2020, the article argues that a strategy constituted of a mix of positive economic and political incentives and a limited amount of coercion can succeed in producing a degree of dis-alignment in the opposing camp. Russia's strategy seems to be more productive than Japan's since Moscow has managed to minimize the effect of sanctions imposed by Japan and it has reduced political differences to mostly bilateral and regional issues. A greater level of cooperation with established partners for both Russia and Japan, and limited costs of wedging strategies, have resulted in dis-alignment but not a reversal of existing alignments. The article also indicates that in this case credibility issues do not fundamentally affect the degree of success of wedge strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an increasing proliferation of bilateral strategic partnerships in and beyond the Indo-Pacific region. Yet such a partnership between Japan and New Zealand is underexplored. The central aim of this article is to fill the gap. This article first clarifies the definition of, and then provides an analytical framework for, a 'strategic partnership'. The article then analyses how these countries laid the foundation of their strategic partnership and how they have since built upon that foundation. In the implementation process of the strategic partnership, this article examines three elements: 1) the consolidation of their strategic partnership in official documents; 2) the institutionalisation of regular meetings; and 3) participation in defence and security exercises. Although the Japan-New Zealand strategic partnership is still in the early stages, this article argues that it has the potential to grow further given bipartisan support and positive perceptions in civil society in both countries. This article also analyses three factors that exert an impact on the development of their strategic partnership: China's continued assertive maritime presence, the rejuvenation of the US-New Zealand bilateral relationship, and Japan and New Zealand's ongoing commitment to the South Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The globalised Arctic has in recent years witnessed an influx of extra-regional actors, many of whom come from East Asia. Although there is an abundance of analysis of the roles of East Asian nation-states—including Japan and China—in Arctic governance and resource development, research on East Asian subnational governments' (SNGs) increased Arctic engagement has not drawn much attention. Leaning on the concept of paradiplomacy and being particularly inspired by Alexander S. Kuznetsov's explanatory framework for the study of SNGs' involvement in international relations, this study examines the motives behind East Asian subnational governments' involvement in Arctic affairs and the attitudes of national governments towards this involvement. Based on the study of Hokkaido Prefecture in Japan and the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning in China, this article argues that the East Asian SNGs' Arctic initiatives are mainly based on economic objectives, especially those connected with new transportation routes in the Arctic Ocean. Scientific cooperation also plays an important role in the evolving subnational Arctic engagement. At the national level, East Asian SNGs are actively interacting with their respective central governments, which have, in general, been supportive of their Arctic endeavours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has shown a keen interest in his country's relationship with India with an intention to protect Japan's stake in maritime affairs under the 'Indo-Pacific' concept. In evaluating Japan's India strategy, a particularly important factor is China's regional presence. This article, through an analysis of Japan's India policy during 2013–18, seeks to address the following two questions. First, how has Japan's India diplomacy under Prime Minister Abe in politics, security, and economics been influenced by its strategies towards China? Second, how can Japan's diplomatic policies towards India be evaluated in terms of key concepts in relation to a state's foreign policy responses? The exploration of the development of Japan's India diplomacy, the geopolitical and geo-economic factors behind it, and the strategic nature of the diplomatic policies enables us to understand the prospect of increasingly important Japan–India relations and their strategic implications for rapidly evolving regional politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes discursive strategies of China and Japan to integrate newly emerging Central Asian (CA) states into their internal and external policies, norms and concepts, according to which they justify both their actions in CA and CA responses to these policies. This article elaborates the concept that to a certain extent, the interests of China and Japan in CA are similarly focused on mineral resources and political stability. However, these countries employ different discursive strategies to frame their approaches and goals. This article also emphasizes that the discourse of competition for regional domination prevalent in the English language, Russian and some CA media is largely an imposition of a zero-sum vision of international relations that is not proven by any empirical evidence. On the contrary, many of the projects conducted both by China and Japan are compatible – if not supplementary – and do not necessarily imply exclusivity of interest. At the same time, both China and Japan have different ways of reasoning their CA engagements, resulting in a rivalry of discourses for the 'hearts and minds' of the CA population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates whether the People's Republic of China and Japan perceive each other as rivals in Latin America (LA; both the Chinese and Japanese governments tend to refer to the region as Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), but for the purposes of this article we focus mainly on LA), and what impact such a perception might have on their foreign policy decision-making. We take LA as a case study because China's and Japan's recent (re-)engagement there began almost simultaneously in the early 2000s, and has developed against the background of domestic leadership transitions, growing demands for energy and markets, as well as international political agendas in which LA might play a key role. Developing the work of Thompson [(1995). Principal rivalries. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39 (2), 195–223; (2001). Identifying rivals and rivalries in world politics. International Studies Quarterly, 45(4), 557–586] and Vasquez [(1993). The War Puzzle. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press; (1996). Distinguishing rivals that go to war from those that do not: Aa quantitative comparative case study of the two paths to war. International Studies Quarterly, 40 (4), 531–558] on rivalry, in combination with perception theory [Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press], the article suggests three indicators by which to measure the extent to which China and Japan might perceive each other as rivals. Drawing on content analysis of a range of Chinese- and Japanese-language official writing, news reports, and academic analysis, the article argues that, despite some media representation of China and Japan as competitors for resources and power in LA, in fact mutual perceptions concerning rivalry have not affected LA policy decisions of these two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, with the world in search for new economic engines, China and Japan have explicitly given their answer through their expansion of overseas infrastructure investments. This study focuses on the flagship sector of high-speed railways (HSR) and examines what kinds of development financing China and Japan have adopted in making these investments. It asks the following questions: What similarities are there in the Chinese and Japanese approaches to investments in overseas infrastructure, and how do they differ from traditional Western development financing? Also, in what ways have China and Japan changed their approaches to overseas infrastructure projects during this process? It argues that in the process of expanding overseas infrastructure investments and competing for infrastructure projects, China and Japan have become 'competitive partners' in challenging the traditional norms of development financing represented by the Washington Consensus and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). To be more specific, China and Japan have adopted each other's practices of tied commercial financing, heavy government involvement, focusing on physical infrastructure and industrialization, and showing respect for host-country forms of governance. In particular, by joining China in the new game of exporting infrastructure and through its own 'quality infrastructure investment' initiative, Japan has broken out of the constraints of DAC norms as an aid donor and endorsed some fundamental Chinese approaches to development and development cooperation, which in their turn were inspired by earlier Japanese practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since the so-called rise of China has started, Sino-Japanese relations have been increasingly described as a rivalry between both states. For the most part, this assumed rivalry has been analyzed on the global level or within the boundaries of the East Asian region, while the consequences of this rivalry for other world regions, such as the Middle East, have been largely neglected in the literature. In order to fill this gap, this article investigates how China's growing presence in the Middle East, and in particular regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, influences Japan's own foreign policy in this troubled region. It utilizes a modified concept of the strategic rivalry approach, called 'asymmetric rivalry', which challenges the widespread notion that rivalry needs to be mutually perceived by both sides and thus analyzes the assumed Sino-Japanese rivalry in the Middle East from a Japanese perspective. By focusing on the case of Japan's CEAPAD initiative, which aims at coordinating East Asian countries' developmental assistance towards the Palestinian Authority while deliberately excluding China, the present article shows that the perception of Japan's foreign policy elite of China as a rival decisively influences how Japan's foreign policy is shaped in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, the development of trilateral institutions among China, Japan and South Korea has begun to take shape. This study analyzes its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the nexus between trilateralism and bilateralism. A well-functioning trilateral grouping needs to overcome two structural limitations – dilution effects and bilateral constraints – both of which are triggered by embedded bilateral approaches. The critical juncture approach is effective in terms of elevating the payoffs of cooperative trilateralism during times of exigency. However, once common crises have dissipated, trilateralism has revealed starkly different performances with respect to functional and political-diplomatic cooperation. This article adopts a dichotomous approach between the two. Functional trilateralism has been steadily growing, and has proven to be less subject to fluctuations in the nations’ political relationships. Its outcomes are positive and worthy of praise. However, the outcomes of trilateralism have been less convincing in fields of middle and high politics. Trilateralism is overwhelmingly subject to fluctuations when its embedded bilateral relations change, and cooperative outcomes within a trilateral grouping are prone to being diluted by bilateral approaches. China–Japan–Korea trilateralism at diplomatic levels remains more an extension of bilateral relations than a mature form of minilateral arrangement. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

What kind of challenge did a rising Japan in the 1970s and 1980s pose to the United States, and how does that differ from the challenge that China has posed to US primacy in East Asia since the early 2000s? This article compares and contrasts US responses to these two shifts in relative power, in the process aiming to elucidate how changes that portend a power transition are understood and dealt with and how great powers manage the security order at times of disruption. In these respects, the article contributes to the empirical understanding of why some power transitions do not result in conflict given the tools available to great powers to manage relations at times of stress. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As most studies on Middle East–East Asian relations focus on the interregional dimension, the manner in which relations between East Asian powers influence, and are influenced by, their policies in the Middle East are largely overlooked. Attempting to add another layer to the study of Sino-Japanese relations, this article explores whether Sino-Japanese rivalry extends to the Middle East. This undertaking requires a conceptual distinction between measures related to Sino-Japanese competition in the Middle East and measures which are related to their rivalry. Building on a minimal definition of interstate rivalry, the article argues that neither the effort to secure energy supply nor their economic or political competition there is shaped by their rivalry. The only field that can be associated with that rivalry is Japan's quasi-military activity in the Middle East, which may enhance its security policy's revision. That, in turn, causes much concern and criticism in Beijing, thus assigning the region a certain role in their relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite continuing economic liberalization and social integration, relations between Northeast Asian governments are often tense and lead to enhanced military readiness. Alongside confrontation in all three dyads, however, trilateral cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea has been evolving. This study shows that history problems, territorial disputes and geopolitical concerns lock the Chinese, Japanese and South Korean governments into a constellation that creates political space for the emergence of cooperative frameworks. The very fixation on material power and bilateral relationships reveals that power is being exercised in non-material ways in effect foreclosing alternative futures and reproducing existing structures including the pertaining security dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since 1945, the United States (US) has served as a focal point of both Left-wing and Right-wing Japanese nationalism. Both sides argued that the US was an arrogant hegemon that unjustly robbed Japan of its autonomy, and prevented Japan from achieving its own ideal national identity. Both sides frequently demanded that Japan should be more ‘resolute’ and resist unfair demands emanating from the US. In recent years, however, both camps are increasingly using the same rhetoric to criticise the Japanese government's China policy. China is also being depicted as an overbearing state that unfairly browbeats Japan into making diplomatic concessions. Given the similarities between the portrayal of China and the US, has China now become a nationalist focal point forboththe Japanese Left and Right? Utilising constructivist insights, this article seeks to shed light on this question, by examining how the Japanese Right and Left portray China, and explores the implications for Japan's China policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Asia is narrated in Japanese foreign policy pronouncements as an opportunity as well as a threat. Despite the purported transformation from militarism to pacifism since August 1945, the reified images of Asia as an ‘entity out there’ remain resilient. The image of a dangerous Asia prompted Japan to engage in its programme of colonialism before the War and compels policy makers to address territorial disputes with Asian neighbours today. Simultaneously, Asia persistently symbolises an opportunity for Tokyo to exploit. Hence, despite the psychological rupture of August 1945, reified Asia remains a reality in Japanese foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]