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This paper will examine the Global Fleet Station (GFS) concept, first proposed in the Naval Operations Concept 2006 and implemented since then through a variety of US Navy (USN) and US Coast Guard (USCG) humanitarian assistance and foreign military training cruises. First, we will explore GFS missions, and the capability and materiel requirements that are derived from them. Next, relying on lessons learned from recent USN and USCG GFS and GFS-type cruises, and preliminary analysis of 20 US and foreign vessels potentially suitable for GFS missions, this paper will argue that to effectively implement GFS in a persistent, distributed, and affordable manner, greater attention must be given to ships specially built or modified for the mission, complemented by dual-use legacy ships used as necessary in augmentation roles. It is important to recognize that emerging GFS requirements differ greatly from requirements for ships built for major combat operations, but that the resulting cost savings actually make this a cost-effective and operationally effective trade-off for the USN.

The Ship to Shore Connector (SSC), a replacement for the Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC), is the first government-led design of a ship in over 15 years. This paper will discuss the changes that a government-led design presents to the design approach, including schedule, organization structure, and design methodology. While presenting challenges, a government-led design also afforded the opportunity to implement a new technique for assessing various systems and ship alternatives, setbased design (SBD). The necessity for implementing SBD was the desire to design SSC from a blank sheet of paper and the need for a replacement craft in a short time frame. That is, the LCACs need to be replaced and consequently the preliminary design phase of the SSC program will only be 12 months. This paper will describe SBD and how it was applied to the SSC, the challenges that the program faced, and an assessment of the new methodology, along with recommendations that future design programs should consider when adopting this approach.

Cruise ships often transit the littoral zone of developing countries where piracy thrives. The attack against Seaborne Spirit on November 5, 2005 was countered successfully by the ship's crew but the toll could have been a lot heavier that day. Nowadays, although international forces police high-risk waters, the risk map is constantly evolving, and there have been instances where even naval vessels had to change their route in order to avoid perilous areas. In the Seaborne Spirit attack approximately 100 miles off the Somali Coast, although the crew thwarted the pirates from coming any closer to the ship, the assailants managed to launch a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) that miraculously failed to explode when it hit the ship's side. This paper carried out the analysis of blast and impact in a fluid–structure interaction model with LS-DYNA solver. The aim of the present paper is to investigate the ballistic response of cross-stiffened panels, commonly used in ship and offshore structures, from the impact with an RPG warhead. It was found that although an RPG alone cannot threaten a highly redundant structure as a ship or an offshore platform, the developed jet from the shaped charge is certainly threatening to passengers and crew.

The Department of Defense has established guidelines and processes that have evolved over several decades for its acquisition community to ensure affordability of Navy ship and combat systems. A common challenge within the Navy combat systems cost-estimating community is the ability to utilize many of the guidelines and processes put in place by experienced entities such as the Government Accountability Office and the Naval Center for Cost Analysis because of the evolving environment associated with past, present, and future Navy combat systems. The purpose of this paper is to give a detailed insight on the challenges Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) cost estimators encounter when building cost models and estimates for the Navy. Many challenges include limited program definition because of emerging threats, new technologies, and collection and utilization of data to produce valid and credible estimates. Through combined knowledge, expertise, and evolving practice of incorporating lessons learned, the NSWCDD Cost Group has overcome many cost-estimating challenges. This paper will share the NSWCDD Cost Group's insights with the larger Navy community. Owing to the sensitive nature of cost, no specific estimates or project names are referenced. This paper is philosophical in nature and does not discuss mechanics of cost estimation in detail.

Through many a technical society paper and/or presentation, such as this, future high-power mission loads such as Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, Electromagnetic Rail Gun, and Free Electron Laser that will provide capabilities far greater than can be achieved by existing platforms, have been presented. With these high-power and energy mission loads comes the need for next-generation integrated power systems possessing higher voltage distribution systems (AC or DC), compact/ power-dense conversion modules, high-speed power-dense power generation modules, energy storage modules, and appropriate supervisory and machinery controls to provide and partition the available power and energy to the right load, with the right power and at the right time. This remains the vision for the "Navy after Next" all-electric warship (AEW). However, "Navy Now" and "Next Navy" platforms have challenges and needs that ongoing investments and advanced developments in power and energy technologies can help to meet. Such challenges include reduced dependency on foreign-supplied fossil fuel, increasing demand for installed ship power, controlling ship procurement and life-cycle costs. This paper will present planned and ongoing efforts that can be aligned to meet these nearer term ship challenges, and at the same time, with an eye on the future power and energy requirements when they materialize, be refocused to enable and support the high-power and energy demands of the AEW.

Reported in January 11, 2010 US Navy and Marine Corps Leadership continue to advocate a 38-ship amphibious fleet requirement to support 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelons (MEB AEs). Alternatively this paper presents a forward thinking concept for leadership to consider: the L 4 LCAC system whose employment will not only exceed the congressional mandate of 2.0, but sustain a 3.0 MEB AE in FY'12 at current ship levels. This paper traces the genesis of the L 4 LCAC system starting with the USN's interest in the SEABEE and concluding with a demonstration of an operationally available (Ao) 30 FY'11 ship amphibious fleet with the capability of delivering an excess of 2.7 MEB AE; and, when combined with the LHA 6, USS AMERICA, a 3.0 MEB AE 31 FY'12 Ao ship fleet is achieved. Lastly, technical feasibility is presented along with a future scope of engineering. To achieve the 3.0 MEB AE target, each vessel of the L-ship vessel class will require an L 4 LCAC system, similar to Figure 1 that shows the appended airborne cantilevers; and for the designated cargo variants, an inserted mezzanine deck to carry VTOLs or RORO vehicles in lieu of a well deck. The L 4 LCAC system's enabling feature is to transport the LCACs outside of the ships' hulls, on board the elevator and/or temporarily on the flight deck. With the increased MEB AE capability, the L 4 LCAC system appendage with accompanying ship conversions shows a substantial potential to markedly decrease the MEB AE's dependence on the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) seabase and its attendant challenging cargo transfers and force closure complications. The L 4 LCAC system appendage permits each such equipped ship to function as a virtual mobile landing platform.

In today's highly competitive fiscal environment, training organizations have to fight for and defend their need for a share of an organization's budget. As a result, training and training-related activities often are reduced drastically or eliminated—but at what ultimate cost? Training and performance support interventions are required to ensure peak levels of human activities during any situation, and are especially important to ensure personnel are properly prepared and ready to respond to crisis situations. To illustrate this point, this paper will discuss several catastrophes that were averted as a result of well-trained crews who were ready for the worst possible scenario, including the recent US Airways Airbus A320, which crash-landed in New York's Hudson River, and the remarkable survival of USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58), the crew of which refused to give up the ship after striking a mine in the Persian Gulf. In addition to examining these scenarios, this paper will discuss why it is important to blend emerging technologies with legacy training methods as a fundamental requirement for designing and developing highly effective learning and performance support interventions for training efforts. We will also discuss the importance of designing and implementing training that both motivates and engages the student, all with a goal of meeting the training needs of today's and tomorrow's 21st-Century fleet.

This paper describes the impact of heavier and larger United States Marine Corps (USMC) vehicles, equipment, and aircraft on amphibious ship structure and stability characteristics. The impacts described herein represent the results of an ongoing analysis and study as part of the air combat element (ACE)/ground combat element (GCE) integrated product team (IPT). There has been a growing concern regarding newer USMC GCE equipment and their effects on vehicle deck structural integrity and ship load limitations. Additionally, growth in the ACE and GCE has impacted the overall ship stability characteristics of in-service amphibious ships. This paper aims to provide the reader, whether a novice or an expert in the field of naval architecture, with useful information, describe tools in development, as well as outline the impacts that future designs of equipment may have on existing platforms.

During World War II, US cargo gliders were retrieved with surprising regularity using an unusual technique. A passing airplane would physically "snatch" the stationary glider into towed flight. Snatch pickup's modern reapplication would revolutionize expeditionary resupply by releasing the beachhead from resupply lines and turning supply ships into open ammunition boxes. Snatch pickup enables faster sea-based resupply and indefinite sustainment to warfighters ashore. Physics models of the snatch pickup technique, if they ever existed, are lost to history along with its wood and canvas icons. This paper develops physics models of the culmination of the operationally approved technique. A Newtonian modeling approach approximates a modern marinized capability toward estimating supply chain performance. It shows that snatch pickup's modern reapplication, without exceeding historical achievenzent, is both viable and highly desirable in the supply chain. Then a continuous physics approach uses Hook's Law to characterize the culminating technique toward future systems design. Using differential equations, this second modeling approach succeeds in matching a one-dimensional nonlinear continuous simulation with historical measurements. Because the exploratory models successfully indicate system viability, this paper recommends further developing these concepts of operations. Three-dimensional visualizations using the continuous physics model can demonstrate to the expeditionary maneuver community the value in developing marinized snatch pickup.

In response to the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, the US Navy conducted an alternative propulsion study (APS) for surface combatants and amphibious warfare ships. The study looked at current and future propulsion technology and propulsion alternatives for three sizes of warships. In their analyses they developed 23 ship concepts, seven of which were considered medium surface combatants (MSCs). The report to Congress was based on cost analyses and operational effectiveness analyses of these variants. Their conclusions did not consider a true representative sample of feasible, non-dominated designs in the design space. This paper revisits the APS for a fossil-fueled MSC. It applies automated design methods with a variety of design tools, including the Advanced Ship and Submarine Evaluation Tool (ASSET), a simplified ship synthesis model (SSSM), and Model Center (MC) to improve the APS approach. It examines a range of power and propulsion alternatives using operational profiles and requirements similar to the APS in a notional MSC (CGXBMD). The automated process and tools presented in this paper provide a rational and thorough method to search a design space for non-dominated concepts. These non-dominated concepts represent the best basis for assessing technologies over a range of possibilities considering effectiveness, cost and risk. This automated approach and new tools are evaluated in the context of a CGXBMD case study. A number of conclusions relative to APS propulsion technologies are made. Most support the APS results.

The next generation radar suite will include a radar that has sensitivity far greater than shipboard radars in use today. Most likely the radar will be a multi-faced, solid state, phased array system with each array consisting of thousands of individual radiating elements powered by transmit/receive (T/R) modules. It will likely need to be large, and the demands it makes on ship services will be unprecedented. Its electrical power demands could be larger than the total ship's load for present-day ships. Array size could significantly impact topside design. This paper examines top-level radar system design choices and illustrates the trends in the ship impact of those choices. Radar design options considered are aperture size and shape, coolant operating temperature, number of array faces, and power system architecture. These design options have an effect on the radar system's weight, footprint, power demand, and cooling load. The effects on ship design can be significant. The ship impact analyses consider a radar system that includes ship-provided equipment such as electrical power distribution equipment and chill water plants. An analysis of radar systems, all with the same performance, shows that radar system power demand can change by as much as four megawatts for a notional surface combatant depending upon the radar designer's configuration choices. Radar system weight can vary by more than 100 metric tons. There is a cubic relationship between T/R module power and array face area for a constant sensitivity radar system. This relationship is examined to show that there is often a choice of T/R module power that minimizes radar ship impact. The exact choice of T/R module power depends upon the customer's preferences, the manufacturer's capabilities, and choice of vendors. This paper does not convey any official US government position or US Navy endorsement of any particular radar architecture or design approach.

The Navy's Next Generation Integrated Power System (NGIPS) master plan calls for the evolution of the IPS system from its current medium voltage, 60 Hz state to a high-frequency, medium-voltage AC (HFAC) system in the next 10 years. Beyond that, and pending development of key protection components, a medium-voltage DC system will be considered for implementation. The master plan calls for power generation modules at three power levels across these systems: ▪A low power level (2–5 MW) driven by a fuel-efficient diesel prime mover, ▪A medium power level (10–15 MW) driven by a gas turbine, and ▪A main propulsion power level (20–40 MW) driven by a gas turbine. EMD is currently developing a high-speed, high-frequency, liquid-cooled generator under contract with NAVSEA that will effectively demonstrate the mid-level generator for the HFAC system. It will be coupled directly to the output of a GE LM1600 Gas Turbine to provide a TG set with power density four times more favorable than conventional ATG sets. The generator development is proceeding favorably, with testing at the Navy's land-based test site (LBTS) expected to begin in July 2008. The technology embodied in the high-speed generator can be easily extrapolated to main turbine generator power levels. Given the availability of prime movers at appropriate speeds, the power generation modules for the HFAC system, at all three power levels, could be provided in a much shorter time frame than noted in the NGIPS master plan. This paper will explore the combinations of prime movers and advanced generators that would suit the three power generation modules of the HFAC system. A description of the prime mover and the generator used for each module will be provided to demonstrate the modest level of development needed. The performance parameters for each generation module will be provided, along with key characteristics and dimensions for the set. In the end, the paper will make the case that demonstration of a HFAC power generation system can be made in the short term, allowing the shipbuilding community to take advantage of the benefits of state-of-the-art power dense electrical generation.

Advances in threats, geopolitical developments, and commercial technologies continually challenge combat system stability because they constantly create new demands and therefore requirements for the system. Because the life cycle of major Department of Defense (DoD) systems can last decades, long-fielded systems in particular are vulnerable to requirements creep. One technique to mitigate the impact requirements volatility can have on a system is through the implementation of technologies that have been developed to allow the system to adapt while minimizing the effect of change on the system as a whole. This paper investigates the application of one such technology-Rules Engine-to the Decision Automation domain of two Navy combat systems. This paper also proposes modifications to the systems engineering process given that using change-tolerant technologies affects the way a system can be developed and maintained.

"While defending our homeland and defeating adversaries in war remain the indisputable ends of seapower, it must be applied more broadly if it is to serve the national interest." This concept from A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Conway et al. 2007), stresses the importance of protecting the interests of the United States while promoting security, stability, and trust. This paper explains the challenges faced by the naval enterprise, methods for improving our force planning and acquisition processes, and the need for naval capabilities to be transformed through the co-evolution of technology and organizational cultures. A force structure framework that provides a flexible, adaptive, and affordable force without regard to the future state of the world is a critical requirement in the "Next Navy" and the "Navy after Next." The agility, scalability, and flexibility of an adaptive force provide commanders a range of options when responding to a crisis situation. This paper will identify characteristics and capabilities required to address the range of threats that exist today as well as threats expected in future environments.

Many naval ship acquisition programs have not been able to effectively implement cost as an independent variable (CAIV). With a CAIV approach, operational requirements provided by the customer are given in terms of threshold and objective values. The range between these two values provides the program manager with trade-space to match the available funds with the capabilities that can be bought for that amount-the total program cost remains a constant. In practice though, much of the final cost of an acquisition program is fixed early in the design process through basic design decisions on architecture and the allocation of operational requirements and derived requirements to systems. Unfortunately, while much of the cost is determined early in the design process, estimating that cost to any degree of certainty is nearly impossible. As the costs of the program are better understood, the remaining design flexibility to adjust to increasing costs may not be sufficient to enable the program manager time to take corrective action when the cost estimates indicate a possible problem. This paper describes the techniques, including the use of modularity, cost contingencies, and set-based design, to provide the program manager with sufficient flexibility to implement CAIV. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and are not necessarily official policy of the US Navy or any other organization. The intent of this paper is to foster dialogue to gain a better understanding of how to develop an acquisition strategy and systems engineering strategy to enable CAIV.

Traditional calculation methods used in naval architecture and marine engineering rely mainly on statistical approaches and regression analysis. A relatively new tool in this field is the use of artificial neural networks. Artificial neural networks possess a number of unique characteristics that make them particularly attractive in complex problems, such as the ship design process. In this paper, an overview of the application of neural networks to various aspects of the ship design process is examined. Representative examples in the literature are presented in order to illustrate the power and the versatility of such an approach. The paper aims to provide the reader, whether a novice or an expert in the field of artificial intelligence and naval architecture, with useful sources as well as outline the potential for the extensive use of neural networks in naval applications.

This paper discusses a practical and successful approach for Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Implementation Program (HFEIP) development and integration in the design of offshore installations. This HFEIP strategy has evolved over many years with numerous successes in the offshore industry. This paper focuses on: ▪ The different tasks that should be included in an HFEIP. ▪ Examples of the application of the different tasks in the HFEIP. ▪ HFEIP lessons learned. Note: The examples of the application of the HFEIP Program tasks in this paper have been reported by the HFE professionals principally responsible for the development of the HFEIP described herein. The examples are from current and past experiences involving major offshore Engineering, Procurement, Construction, and Installation projects. These projects include but are not limited to: Tension Leg Platforms, Spar's, and a Floating Platform for Storage and Offloading unit.

Wireless technology is the networking backbone in homes and offices worldwide. This same technology now offers a maintenance solution for Surface Force Atlantic tank and void material condition assessments. Wireless technology puts the power of a desktop computer into the hands of tank and void assessors as they enter these cavernous shipboard compartments. With a few taps on a personal digital assistant (PDA) touch-screen, assessors can record equipment configuration errors, annotate any one of over 100 possible tank condition abnormalities, or generate a repair work order with pre-written problem description and recommended solution statements. At the end of a typical workday, these PDAs are wirelessly connected to a mid-Atlantic regional maintenance center (MARMC) commercial off the shelf (COTS) server, where data export files are formatted for ship and shore 3M input. As Navy commands look to reduce operational and maintenance budgets, this automated and wireless business solution offers a means of maintaining the original tank and void maintenance goal of inspecting and trending degradation at a fraction of the previous required time and effort. Additionally, this process allows for the processing of assessment results to the SNAPSHOT database, the master tank, and void historical data repository. This automated process was successfully tested and implemented on 27 Norfolk-based ships in 2006. With significant cost and time savings realized, the next logical step was to develop a distant support capability for remote locations. The goal here was to incorporate these same standards and processes into southeast regional maintenance center (SERMC) ships while maintaining the MARMC-located COTS server as the main hub for work scheduling and PDA loading. To accomplish these goals, a process was developed using standard web technology for transferring PDA work assignment files (tanks and voids scheduled for assessment) from the main COTS server located at MARMC to the remote SERMC tank assessor equipped with a PDA. Once the assigned tank and void condition assessments are accomplished, files are then returned to MARMC using the same web technology. MARMC handles these remote files the same way as they do local files for data export to ship and shore 3M systems. This distant support capability was successfully tested and implemented on three Mayport-based ships in December 2006. This paper will detail the significant steps taken to automate a maintenance process that used a hand-scribed paper process and standard US Navy maintenance reporting infrastructures. The lessons learned during the upgrade process, maintenance advantages that maximize efficiency, cost effectiveness, and surface force ship reliability will be also be discussed.

For more than 10 years, Carrier Team One has effectively coordinated cross-organizational process reviews to improve the execution of carrier maintenance availabilities. As noted in the Team One charter, these improvement efforts are “mindful that a carrier must last 50 years.” In recognizing the challenges of a 50-year service life, Team One has adopted principles intended to ensure that an as yet unborn chief engineer on USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) can maintain high levels of ship material readiness in 2050. This paper reviews the “50-year” principles that influence Carrier Team One efforts, focusing on three such principles. This paper does not suggest that the submarine and surface communities do not observe similar principles; undoubtedly, they do. And admittedly, these principles are interrelated, but are reviewed separately to emphasize each principle's contribution to improving carrier availabilities. The three principles are: ▪Core values—how a 50-year service life influences decision making. ▪Process focus—how a 50-year service life influences long-term improvement methodologies. ▪Technical focus—how a 50-year service life influences technical improvement decisions. In examining these principles, the paper will consider their long-term contributions to carrier readiness and their influences on Team One's efforts to improve carrier maintenance.

One of the key elements for cost effective and efficient maintenance of today's Navy is the use of material condition assessments as part of the overall Navy's Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) philosophy. Through the use of material condition assessments, maintenance managers are able to detect, mitigate, and prevent potential costly and operationally debilitating equipment or systems failures. All Type Commanders (TYCOMs) use CBM assessments to help manage maintenance. This has been accomplished for CNSF N432 by the consolidated visit process, which has an established track record of proven success and is continuing to evolve with new technology and emerging processes, especially in view of the need to “do more with less.” One of the advances made in the material condition assessment process is the increased ability to accurately target problem maintenance objects for assessment. Much like the improvements made in missile technology, whereby the detection and seeker accuracy have evolved to permit pinpoint targeting (thus allowing warheads to become smaller and overall less costly), the improved use of maintenance history data and engineered risk priority business rules allows the material condition assessment process to zero in on problem maintenance objects. Modern missiles can now zoom in on specific buildings as designated targets and no longer need to be as destructive as in the past in order to achieve desired results, thus saving the cost and necessity for larger missiles and warheads. Likewise, today's precision material condition assessments can zoom in on those components within systems that are causing failures and not expend time, effort, and funding on collateral assessments for non-problem items. A process tool currently being used to provide the precision targeting for material condition assessments is the Maintenance Assessment Index (MAI). This paper will review the background of the MAI, the process by which precision material condition assessments are determined, and how that information is integrated with the consolidated visit process: Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical Readiness Assessment. Success of the MAI is measured by increasing the look-to-find and find-to-fix ratios executed during the visits. Good systems and components fall off the radar screen, while bad actors are specifically targeted. This paper will also cover the consolidated visit process from agenda building to task loading from the Integrated Class Maintenance Plan, from the use of work order management tools to metrics collection and measures analysis. The ability to adjust the targeting criteria of the material condition assessment has become a powerful weapon for the TYCOM's battle to accomplish more maintenance with fewer resources and yet ensure a high state of material readiness for the fleet.

Bulging is the process of adding a new skin to an existing ship to regain strength, reduce draft, and increase stability. A previous 1989 ASNE paper was entitled "Bulging Warships" and by its very name announced that it would not deal with applying bulges to non-military ships. This paper reviews the history of bulges being applied to merchant vessels. Bulges are most often applied to merchant vessels when the traffic is better than expected requiring a quick increase in carrying capacity or when regulatory authorities demand an increase in the stability standard to allow continued service. Rather than enduring the long and expensive process of buying a new vessel, the owner will send an existing ship into the yard to be cut and lengthened or, in the case of ferries, have more passenger spaces added topside. Such modifications cause weight and stability growth that requires additional hull strength, buoyancy, and waterplane area that only a larger dimensions hull can provide. The paper includes an appendix updating the 1987 warship bulge history and a second appendix on the post-1987 attempts to bulge modern US Navy ships.

The US Navy has been studying the technical and cost impacts associated with the availability and cost of fossil fuel contrasted with nuclear energy alternatives for surface combatants and amphibious warfare ships. Over the past 2 years these efforts have grown in maturity to examine the tactical and strategic implications of our Navy's dependence on fossil fuels from technical, economic, and military perspectives. This paper will present three major topics: ▪ Background research on alternative energy sources. ▪ A survey discussion of current and future power and propulsion system technologies. ▪ An overview of principal Naval Sea Systems Command studies on the integration of alternative power and propulsion system technologies into notional surface combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships. Given the US Navy's dependence on fossil fuels and the expected increase in cost and reduced availability of fossil fuel, propulsion system investment decisions made today will have a profound impact on the future tactical and strategic roles of the US Navy surface fleet. This paper lays the foundation for providing robust and flexible technology decision opportunities for the Navy's future.

A major component of the US Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) will be a fleet of eight different manned ground vehicles (MGV). There are promises that "advanced automation" will accomplish many of the tasks formerly performed by soldiers in legacy vehicle systems. However, the current approach to automation design does not relieve the soldier operator of tasks; rather, it changes the role of the soldiers and the work they must do, often in ways unintended and unanticipated. This paper proposes a coherent, top-down, overarching approach to the design of a human-automation interaction model. First, a qualitative model is proposed to drive the functional architecture and human-automation interface scheme for the MG V fleet. Second, the proposed model is applied to a portion of the functional flow of the common crew station on the MGV fleet. Finally, the proposed model is demonstrated quantitatively via a computational task-network modeling program (Improved Performance Research and Integration Tool). The modeling approach offers insights into the impacts on human task-loading, workload, and human performance. Implications for human systems integration domains are discussed, including Manpower and Personnel, Human Factors Engineering, Training, System Safety, and Soldier Survivability. The proposed model gives engineers and scientists a top-down approach to explicitly define and design the interactions between proposed automation schemes and the human crew. Although this paper focuses on the Army's FCS MGV fleet, the model and analytical processes proposed, or similar approaches, are appropriate for many manned systems in multiple domains (aviation, space, maritime, ground transportation, manufacturing, etc.).

In 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a series of alarming reports that outlined the likely consequences of climate change over the next 50 to 100 years. Subsequent to those reports, in early 2005, the Kyoto Protocol took effect, establishing modest targets for reducing emissions of global-warming gases by certain countries. Those targets are widely considered to be inadequate to do the job. » In 2007, the IPCC will issue its next series of reports, and it is widely anticipated that those reports will paint a grim picture of the future, possibly setting off another round of calls to action and negotiations for tougher treaty requirements. » Whatever the immediate reaction to the 2007 IPCC reports, determined action by developed and developing nations alike appears inevitable. That determined action will affect every economic sector, including the shipping and shipbuilding industries. » So it's coming time for the leaders, owners, operators, technologists, designers, and manufacturers in the U.S. domestic shipping and shipbuilding industries to begin contemplating what actions they will take to address possible legal requirements associated with global climate change. » Previous papers on climate change by this author have focused on ship technologies (Breslin & Wang, 2004) as well as DoN acquisition strategies (Breslin, 2003). The purpose of this paper is to outline where we are and where we are likely to be going relative to treaties and domestic legislation associated with climate change, speculate on the likely implications relative to shipping and shipbuilding, and outline a rough path into the future.

The FY-94 and FY-97 National Defense Authorization Acts amended the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) to require fleet-wide installation of Plastics Waste Processors by December 1998, and installation of Pulpers and Shredders by December 2000. These requirements translate to an acquisition program, which could rapidly develop, procure and deploy processing equipment on about 200 surface ships (over 24 ship classes) within three years. To date, this program has successfully completed the ship integration of the Plastic Waste Processor and is in the stages of implementing the Pulpers and Shredders. » A previous paper on this subject broadly described the development of the acquisition strategy, the development of the equipment and the fleet integration plan. This paper focuses on the ownership issues of the program and how they affect program decisions. It reviews how the Navy selected its current compliance strategy, including the consideration of its effects on marine environment through the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) studies. It details the various processes NAVSEA implemented to ensure the delivery of quality and affordable "turn-key" system to the fleet. These processes included a comprehensive installation design and review; rapid incorporation of lessons learned; timely deployment of Integrated Logistics Support to meet fleet operations to meet fleet introduction which included establishing interim spares; and instituting a comprehensive In-Service Engineering Agent assist and inspection program.

This paper presents the background for a method of calculating the energy demand for different ship types using only a relatively few, but important parameters. It is an empirical method, based on a statistical analysis of the main parameters of different ship types in order to establish representative relationships between the cargo capacity and the ships main dimensions. On this basis, it has been possible to calculate the necessary propulsive power by using well-established empirical power prediction methods (Guldhammer and Harvald (1974), Oossanen (1980), and Insel & Molland (1992)). » By combining the statistical analysis with a subsequent power prediction, it has been possible to develop a method which can calculate the energy consumption as a function of only 3 general parameters, namely the size of the ship (more precisely the capacity), the ship's speed and the average cargo utilization. » Having established a method for the calculation of the ships energy demand, it is relatively simple to calculate the exhaust emissions by using some well-established specific emission factors, i.e. figures for the exhaust emission pr. consumed energy unit (g/MJ). » In the paper, a comparison with road transport will also be presented focusing on the energy demand and exhaust emissions per transport unit, i.e. per ton cargo per km. » Finally, the energy and emission data will be used for an economical evaluation of sea transport versus land transport. This will be done by calculating the external costs to society caused by the negative effect of the different modes of transportation, i.e. costs due to air pollution, noise, accidents and congestion, which in total covers most of the external transport costs.

This paper presents the results of a study that targeted identification of statistical methods to characterize the failure rates and related probability distributions of sea valves across a broad range of hull classes. Beginning with maintenance records from sea valve assessment, the paper demonstrates the application of various statistical tools and the related strengths and weaknesses of each. These tools involve maximum likelihood estimators, empirical methods, and hypothesized distributions. Using these methods, failure rates and confidence intervals are estimated and compared. Finally this information is combined to formulate a cohesive view that allows a high level of confidence in predicting sea valve failure. This paper demonstrates use of statistical models as a tool to validate and improve maintenance systems, costs, and strategic maintenance management programs.

This paper discusses the main issues involved in developing a high level architecture (HLA)-based distributed simulation while presenting an application called Naval Surface Tactical Maneuvering Simulation System (NSTMSS), which is intended to serve as a testbed for HLA and distributed interactive simulation (DIS) research. NSTMSS provides a networked virtual environment (NVE) for naval surface actions in which new formations can be evaluated and tested and present ones can be practiced and analyzed. This paper also describes a development lifecycle for HLA-based distributed interactive simulations and reflects best practices.

This paper develops a model for fleet repair and maintenance based upon lean principles and current best practices. A few generalized implementation models are discussed first. A survey of existing lean implementation models for ship repair and maintenance is done to assess their effectiveness. A new implementation model is presented at the end of this paper. This model incorporates current best practices as well as Lean and Six Sigma principles.

In designing a lightweight torpedo, multiple performance criteria from many disciplines, including structures, acoustics, controls, and hydrodynamics, have to be satisfied in order to maintain a high probability of success for the mission. These criteria could conflict with each other as design requirements, in which case the final design will be the configuration that minimizes conflicts. Performance criteria depend on various design parameters that constitute the configuration of the torpedo and these are usually assigned deterministic values. However, in reality, the parameters would exhibit variations, and thus the design criteria could potentially violate the feasible design space. Therefore, this paper presents a robust torpedo design strategy that provides the designer insight into the safety of the final configuration, subject to variations in design parameters. In this paper a torpedo is modeled using finite elements and its static and dynamic characteristics are analyzed subject to variations in the design parameters structural problem. In this paper, a torpedo is modeled using finite elements and its static and dynamic characteristics are analyzed subject to variations in the design parameters.

The DoD Risk Management Guide requires risk assessment of acquisition performance, cost, and schedule through the identification, subsequent analysis and prioritization of adverse program events based on their probability and consequences. This type of risk assessment is very important in concept exploration and design when considering new technologies, unique processes, and novel concepts. Uncertainty associated with the design process itself and the definition and selection of specific design alternatives can also have a significant impact on performance, cost, and schedule risk. Inherent, statistical and modeling uncertainty and uncertainty because of human error, must be considered in the design process, but uncertainty analysis requires a more detailed and computationally intensive probabilistic approach. It is most appropriate for post-exploration design optimization, after specific cost and performance goals and thresholds have been set to maximize the probability of achieving these goals. In this paper, a two-stage concept design strategy is proposed that uses a multi-objective optimization and simplified risk event approach for concept exploration and a more rigorous multi-disciplinary optimization with uncertainty for concept development. Concept exploration identifies nondominated design concepts and establishes the optimum relationship between effectiveness, cost, and risk given a broad selection of technologies and design alternatives. In this context, non-dominated (N-D) refers to designs with the maximum effectiveness for a given cost and level of risk. This is a global optimization design problem that considers a wide range of performance, cost and risk possibilities. Risk is defined using a separate objective attribute, an overall measure of risk (OMOR), which specifically addresses the high-risk events associated with the selection of new technologies, processes, and concepts. With this perspective, decision-makers may establish ratio-nal requirements, select technologies, narrow the design space, and establish a non-dominated concept baseline design or set of designs. Once these early decisions are made, concept development and the remaining design phases add detail, refine requirements and reduce risk. Optimization continues into concept development, but a single objective optimization based on uncertainty analysis is used, maximizing the probability of success (POS) of satisfying cost and effectiveness thresholds and other constraints established in concept exploration. The methodology and a simple application of the multi-objective optimization and risk event approach are described in this paper.

During initial hull form design, a multitude of requirements needs to be met. Among these are mission, ship size, armament, communications, stability, speed, sea keeping, etc. Tools such as ASSET are used to arrive at a design solution that will satisfy all these requirements. However, at this early design stage, attention needs to be given to the hull form shape, and its impact upon fuel consumption. Rising fuel costs and the need to conserve energy have mandated that Navy designs become more “energy efficient.” This paper documents a new design metric “CPE” for evaluating the resistance of any hull design. A CPE database is developed from historic model test data residing in the U.S. Navy Hull Design Database System (HDDS). CPE compares the resistance of a hull form to that of a similar Taylor Standard Series hull form. The paper also introduces a new hull form optimization computer program developed by Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) and applies this program to show the potential for hull form improvement and fuel cost savings.

As the United States and other maritime nations move towards operating combatant ships with fewer people, human-systems integration (HSI), or human-centered design, is getting increasing attention in new ship designs. Aboard most ships operating today, damage control is a mostly manual, manpower intensive function. Consequently, it is a key area of concern for ship acquisition programs that need to produce ships that will operate with fewer people. Damage control also is critical to the survival of a warship and the safety of the crew. Consequently, it is very important to ship operators. It is no surprise, therefore, that damage control is a key function of concern when designing new ships to operate with fewer people. This paper discusses the state-of-the-art in HSI and damage control aboard ships today as evidenced by the damage control performance of some of today's ships. The paper draws conclusions about the importance of HSI for effective damage control in new ship designs. The successful application of a human-centered design approach in the development of a damage control supervisory control system for the U.S. Navy's Damage Control Automation for Reduced Manning (DC-ARM) Program is described. Finally, major challenges to achieving effective HSI in new ship designs are presented.

In 1992 a paper was presented entitled Patrol Craft Requirements and Technology for the Next Century. This paper updates that information to 2001. Patrol craft have been and will continue to be a part of world wide naval and coast guard inventories for decades. Their unique capabilities and the budget constraints of many navies including the U.S. Navy highlight the need for small surface combatants in future naval activity. This paper surveys patrol craft from 100 to 2,000-tons displacement with speeds over 20 knots and presents the patrol craft technology in terms of platform configuration, combat systems, and hull-mechanical-electrical systems. Evolving platform types and supporting technologies for the future are presented. The initial portion of the paper discusses patrol craft missions and markets based upon data for craft delivered since 1980. The trends for future patrol craft capabilities, design, construction, and operation are presented. The concluding portion of the paper discusses future opportunities for patrol craft design, construction, and for technology advancement of craft subsystems.

With general agreement among the government and commercial sectors on the importance of maintaining both naval supremacy around the world and viable maritime industries at home, the need for developing a critical mass of supporting science and relevant engineering practice should be apparent. Moreover, with increasing calls for partnership between government and industry as a key element in revitalizing U.S. shipbuilding, the existing public-sector infrastructure of research and development centers and their associated technology base are unique resources. More urgently, achieving the George W. Bush administration's goal for widespread transformation of the U.S. armed services - the Navy and Coast Guard among them - will require creating new, innovative technologies to support advanced naval platforms for the agile, survivable, and affordable sea-going forces of the 21st century. These factors create an urgent need to reemphasize the importance of a robust technology base in marine engineering for both national and economic security. This paper reviews the arguments for increasing government support for these important disciplines. It further proposes several alternatives - driven by national economic realities - for collaboration between the public and private sectors in creating and sustaining a focal point for maritime technology at the Carderock Division of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, currently the Navy's flagship facility for naval platform architecture and marine systems engineering. In his seminal work, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, Alfred Thayer Mahan traced a clear connection between the sea power of ocean-going nations and their civilian maritime infrastructure-the fishing fleets, merchant marine, shipyards, harbors, port facilities, and experienced manpower that create and maintain traditions of seafaring within the lifeblood of the state. He noted: Seapower in the broad sense... includes not only the military strength afloat that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests (Mahan 1957). While many aspects of Mahan's sea power theories - such as fleets in being-have been left behind by the events of the 20th century, this fundamental truth remains: naval power and ocean industries are deeply intertwined, each depending on the other for sustenance and survival. Particularly with growing globalization and the beginnings of a new world order following the breakup of the Soviet bloc, freedom of the seas both to facilitate ocean commerce and to guarantee access for upholding national interests has never been more important to the United States. But only a world-class navy that is attuned to technological change and is supported by an industrial base characterized by both innovation and high productivity can maintain freedom of the seas. This paper identifies a growing national deficit in the technologies required to sustain maritime industries responsive to both naval and commercial needs in the 21st century. It further proposes concerted government-industry measures to redress the current inadequacy.

This paper presents a reliability-based design methodology for primary seaway loadings on surface ships. The goal for such a design methodology is to have one consistent method for developing extreme primary hull girder loads for reliability-based strength design criteria as well as lifetime exceedance loads for reliability-based fatigue strength design criteria. The primary hull girder loads, i.e., vertical bending, lateral bending, and torsion, include contributions from both the low frequency (wave-induced) and the high frequency (slam-induced) domains for vertical and lateral bending. The contributions of secondary loads, such as hydrostatic and dynamic pressure loads, are important but are beyond the scope of this paper. A method is presented for calculating lifetime seaway loads as functions of ship and seaway parameters. The method is embodied in a PC based computer program called SPECTRA.