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In this article, with the help of Heidegger and Foucault's conceptual tools, as well as the achievements of the cognitive science, we try to examine the transition from paper reading to digital reading. This discussion can be a preparation for a philosophical understanding of the digital age. We show that Heidegger's analysis of the ready-to-hand beings and technology can help to understand the reading behaviors of paper and digital readers. We have also use Heidegger's analytical framework for text ontology. On the other hand, Foucault's reflections on the embodied technologies can explain the power-knowledge relationships that is constructed around the reader. In addition, the cognitive science has provided detailed empirical findings on the effects of reading behaviors on the human cognitive biases and skills by examining the various modes of reading. Embodied and skillful cognitive science, by going beyond the computational understanding of human beings, has noticed the various behaviors and states of the body in reading processes and highlighted their effects. To integrate these areas of research, we try to place the findings of the cognitive science within the framework of Heidegger and Foucault's technological understanding of the modern power-knowledge relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to explore the ethical implications of artificial intelligence (AI) in the realm of art. Drawing on the philosophy and ethics of AI, this study examines the ethical challenges that may arise in the art domain. Given the increasing use and penetration of AI in the field of art, there is a need for more careful attention to the ethical dimensions of this phenomenon by scholars of art and philosophy. To achieve the objective of the paper, concepts such as AI, some of its techniques, and the ethical issues of AI in art are explained and analyzed using the analytical-descriptive method. The findings of the study reveal that ethical issues such as privacy and surveillance, manipulation of behavior, opacity and transparency, bias in decision systems, and automation and employment can be investigated in the field of art. These ethical issues are sometimes in conflict and sometimes in direct relation with each other. This study suggests that addressing the ethical questions of AI in the field of art requires addressing the ethical questions of AI in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the “No Miracle argument” (NM), the predictive and explanatory success of science would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain unless mature scientific theories were approximately true, and the theoretical entities postulated by them exist. On the contrary, in his version of “the Pessimistic Meta-Induction argument” (PMI), Laudan, by providing a list of past successful and yet false theories, rejects any relationship between success of a theory and its truth. In response to Laudan, based on the referential approach, realists have tried to show that the central terms of many past successful theories refer after all, and their postulated entities do exist. Moreover, theses terms and their referents have been preserved in the successive theories. In this paper, first, NM and PMI will be explained. Then, the most important realists’ solutions to PMI in the referential approach will be evaluated critically. It will be shown that none of these solutions can rebut PMI conclusively. In the final part of the paper, however, it will be explained briefly that even if realists could not rebut the PMI challenge, the advantage of the referential approach is that still allows them to save a weak version of scientific realism, entitled “existential realism”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In addition to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and Philosophical Investigations (1951), Wittgenstein left a collection of notes. Some of his students have published edited versions of these remaining notes under various titles. One of the latest of these collections came to the market in 1969 under the title of "On Certainty". In this book, Wittgenstein discusses the issue of certainty from an epistemological point of view. He rejects scepticism and argues that certainty belongs to the category of non-epistemological concepts. And he adds that certainty, though meaningless, nevertheless is necessary for the formation of knowledge. A group of commentators, including Rom Harre´ and Moyal-Sharrock, have referred to this new approach of Wittgenstein as the Third Wittgenstein. The purpose of the present paper is to critically examine the development of Wittgenstein's thought from Tractatus to On Certainty with respect to the notion of certainty to show that contrary to the claims of philosophers like Harre´and Moyal-Sharrock, the Wittgenstein of On Certainty is not a new Wittgenstein, and that the basis of his discussions concerning scepticism and certainty and their meaninglessness could be traced back to his views in Tractatus and Investigations, and in particular, his discussion of private language and its denial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plato’s doctrine of ideas can be considered his most important doctrine. Throughout the history of philosophy, each philosopher, according to the problem he faced, has returned to this doctrine. One of the problems that Western philosophers have faced in the contemporary world is the nihilism and meaninglessness of western civilization. Martin Heidegger considers the root of this meaninglessness to be oblivion of Being and oblivion of truth as unhiddenness and disconcealment. Heidegger believes that Plato’s doctrine of ideas is the cause of this oblivion, Plato made ideas the foundation of beings, and this has no meaning other than oblivion of Being. Using phenomenology, Heidegger returns to Plato’s allegory of the cave to elucidate the nature of this oblivion. Heidegger’s interpretation of ideas changes over time, because in his later thinking, Heidegger passes through the phenomenology of Dasein and pays attention to the openness of Being. Later Heidegger explains the idea and the eidos based on the openness of Being and considers the presence of the present dependent on this openness. In this paper, we will try to examine the relationship between early and later Heidegger's view on Plato’s ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kripke in his famous book on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy argues, on behalf of Wittgenstein, that there can be no fact of the matter as to what a speaker means by her words, that is, no fact that can meet the Constitution Demand and the Normativity Demand. He particularly argues against the dispositional view, according to which meaning facts are constituted by facts about the speaker’s dispositions to respond in a certain way on certain occasions. He argues that facts about dispositions are finite and are incapable of constituting facts about what speakers mean by their words; they are also essentially descriptive, not prescriptive and, thus, cannot meet the Normativity Demand. Hannah Ginsborg has recently attempted to resist Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s arguments against dispositionalism by defending a new sort of reductive dispositionalism which can meet both demands at the same time. In this paper, I will argue that she would not be successful in her project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the second half of the 20th century, after the decline of logical empiricism, metaphysics was revived as analytic metaphysics. However, during the last two decades, significant naturalistic objections have been raised to analytic metaphysics. In the first chapter of their seminal book, Every Thing Must Go, Ladyman, Ross, and Spurrett, after taking a destructive approach to contemporary analytic metaphysics, presented a positive plan for appropriate naturalized metaphysics. For them, naturalized metaphysics is an activity to unify, under some constraints, the sciences. Analytic metaphysics, on the other hand, had its serious defenders. One of the enthusiastic advocates of metaphysics, as an inquiry with an independent method and subject matter, is Jonathan Lowe (1950-2014). At the end of his working life, he published various works in which he argued for a remarkable conception of metaphysics, that is, metaphysics as the science of the possible. In this paper, we claim that Jonathan Lowe's views on metaphysics provide a compelling stance for addressing the radical naturalistic objections raised by Ladyman, Ross, and Spurrett, and so it provides a thoughtful defense of metaphysics against those worries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Complementarity is the central component of the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which Niels Bohr first presented at the Como and Solvay Conferences in 1927. The content of Bohr's speech was published in an article entitled "the quantum postulate and recent development of Atomic Theory" in 1928. The purpose of this study is to formulate Bohr's philosophical approaches by content analysis of his paper (1928) related to complementarity. The research method is based on the conceptual analysis of the content and text of this paper (1928) from which conceptual inferences can be deduced, and based on them, philosophical approaches are tried to be formulated. Finally, the four philosophical approaches including Unificationism, empiricism (positivistic and metaphysical), anticausality and indeterministic, as well as anti-realism can be formulated. In addition, for more accurate inferences, we need to refer to the following works of Bohr, or in other words, "Bohr from Bohr's point of view". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an epoch considered by some as the eclipse of Islamic philosophy, debates, dialogues and often disputes either oral and written or in-person and in-absentia occurred between Ṣadr alDīn Dashtakī and Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī at Shiraz school of philosophy, which consequently brisked up Shiraz field of philosophy at that time and deepened Islamic philosophical discussions over succeeding eras. Interpretation of Hayākal al-Nūr (temples of light) was one among the discussed topics. The present paper specifically analyzes the two philosophers’ interpretation of Suhrawardian definition of body. It is observed that interpreters have differing opinions over the meaning of two terms qaṣd (intent) and ishāra (allusion). Further, the distinctive and similar aspect among bodies to Davānī is hyāt-i lāzim (dependent states), whereas Dashtakī refers to hyāt-i qayr-i lāzim (independent states). The third opposing point is juz’-i‘lā yatajazī (the indivisible). Davānī believes what receives sensory allusion divides into triple directions; however, as Dashtakī articulates, sensory allusion includes the possibility of division into triple directions. Drawing on the conflicts, the study takes a descriptive-analytical approach to examine the opposition between the two interpreters and ultimately discussions are weighed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Meaning therapy is a method that helps a person find meaning in his life behind difficulties and problems and answer to his fundamental questions. The main hypothesis of this paper is that the principles of semantic therapy can be found in Farabi's philosophical and political theories that are compatible with the views of Victor Frankl, the founder of the semantic therapy school, and these principles can be explained based his thought. Examining Farabi's system of thought in a descriptive, comparative, and inferential way, we find that he is not only a philosopher and political thinker but also a doctor who, by identifying the suffering of the people of his time, tries to cure the disease of his society by teaching philosophical and political principles to provide meaning. His method of meaning therapy to achieve a meaningful pattern of life, i.e. understanding happiness can be found in 1. doing valuable work, 2. creating empirical values 3. Value of high experiences, and its components: recognizing individual responsibility, creating moral virtues, forming a community, and Lovemaking, mentioned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the conditions which gave rise to the emergence of modern aesthetics was the claim that beauty could and must be studied independently of goodness and truth. However, in premodern philosophy, namely that of ancient Greece and the middle ages, the beautiful was not understood and explained independently of the good and the true. Before Christanity and in the middle ages, the relation of beauty with goodness and truth was elaborated by Dionysius. In his On the Divine Names, by a combination of theological perspective with the late neoplatonic framework, Dionysius explains the relation of beauty with goodness and truth as three fundamental Divine Names. This paper tries, through the analysis of Dionysius' treatise, to study and explain the nature of these three Names and their relationships. This paper shows that Dionysius while declaring the essential unity of beauty, goodness, and truth, affirms the theophanic aspect of beauty and its function to motivate the soul powers of knowledge and love towards its ultimate goal, theosis. As such, Dionysius can be regarded as the founder of a kind of theological-mystical aesthetics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Categorical Imperative is the normative expression of Kantian Ethics and it is the supreme principle of morality for unholy beings. In Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant introduces several characterizations of the Categorical Imperative. Kant’s commentators have no agreement on how many characterizations Kant has indicated, on which characterization plays a basic role, and whether Formulas are equivalent or not. The consequence of this paper is that though five versions are presented as characterizations of the Categorical Imperative or the Supreme Principle of morality, one of these characterization is the main expression, but the other four versions he introduces, in his view, would be equivalent and all of which would have a similar meaning according to the concept of "otherness as a rational subject" and together would propose the same system of duties. In this regard, it will be shown that not every version is to be used separately, but that all versions should be used together to understand each duty, and that each characterization can shed new light on duties of moral subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is devoted to examining Stanley and Williamson’s well-known and disputed argument in favor of intellectualism about knowledge-how. In the first section, I will give an overview of the linguistic argument. The gist of the argument is that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that because ascriptions of knowledge-how entail ascriptions of knowledgethat. Section 2 will focus on cross-linguistic data that Stanley and Williamson’s opponents employ to challenge their argument. In particular, I will take a look at ascriptions of practical knowledge in various languages such as French, Latin, Greek, German, Turkish, and Russian. As critics have shown, the ascriptions of practical knowledge in these languages are inconsistent with Stanley and Williamson’s syntactic and semantic analysis of ascriptions of knowledge-how in English. In section 3, I will examine Stanley and Williamson’s argument based on the ascriptions of practical knowledge in Persian. In light of this analysis, it will be clear that, despite appearances to the contrary, the data from Persian is fully consistent with Stanley and Williamson’s argument. Another conclusion which can be drawn from the analysis is the tentative suggestion that there is a methodological gap in the literature on cross-linguistic data in this debate. In particular, the debate has focused on the synchronic analysis and widely ignored the diachronic method of examination and explanation [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies Ervin Yalom's strategies in the treatment of death anxiety and his philosophical foundations. Yalom is a Sartre-type existential psychotherapist seeking to reduce the problem of death anxiety through existential solutions based on atheism and unbelieving in religions. He believes that man has accidentally been thrown into this nonmeaningful world and has no choice but to give it meaning. According to him, human beings face four existential concerns in this world: death, freedom, loneliness, and emptiness, death is the most important among them. As an existential psychotherapist, with a naturalistic and atheistic approach and a nihilistic view to death, he accepts the reality of death as a human existential concern and tries to reduce its anxiety by strategies such as thanatopsis, having an existential vision to death, thinking about Being, self-disclosure, increasing life satisfaction, desensitization of death, creativity, rippling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we try to study the relation of God and human being in the triple episteme of the book The order of Things. The main issue of Foucault in the book is how to form human being as the subject of science in the history of evolution episteme (from Renaissance to Modern) centered on the relation between words and things. On one hand, based on Episteme and dominant thought in each era, the possibility is provided to recognize that based on which order science and knowledge are formed and on the other hand, human being's different interpretations and his stand in each era of history of ideas are appeared. In the present paper, we are trying to contemplate the relation and relevance which human being establishes in this area with God as well as how to genesis the human concept as the subject of science. Additionally, since Episteme and epistemic space of each era is always making over and changing, the relation of human being and God can't also have a stable quality and remain in a single status. We make effort, therefore, to study the backgrounds that although slight, polish our understanding about the world around us and our relations to the nature, words and eventually our relations to God differently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral dilemmas have been philosophically interesting subjects for scrutiny. While some philosophers have claimed that genuine moral dilemmas are possible, others have argued to the opposite. McConnell takes the latter path and argues that in the presence of two following principles moral dilemmas would lead to contradiction: “Ought implies can” principle and the so-called agglomeration principle. McConnell claims, and Paske rejects, that (a) genuine moral dilemmas are impossible and (b) that moral dilemmas lead to logical incoherence. Paske argues that moral dilemmas are originated in conflict of incommensurable moral values. Paske believes that in this circumstance the “Ought implies can” principle does not hold. To block Paske’s objection, McConnell has proposed a disjunctive approach to moral dilemmas. In this paper, first I explain McConnell’s argument that moral dilemmas lead to contradiction. Then I explore Paske’s objection and McConnell’s reply. Finally, I raise a series of objections against McConnell’s counter-attack to Paske’s incommensurability argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary study of the mind and how it works. By contrast, Metaphysics deals with the study and discovery of objective structures of reality. Apart from the "metaphysics of mind", which is the point of reference for these two disciplines; there is not much connection between them. The "Naturalized Metaphysics" is a metaphysical approach in which contemporary philosopher, Alvin Goldman, seeks to show that the findings of cognitive science play an essential role in accepting or rejecting a metaphysical theory. In his view, although the study of the mind is only part of metaphysics, it plays a role in any metaphysical inquiry. He believes that the study of the mind is part of any metaphysical inquiry, even those metaphysical investigations that do not address mind and mental states. Our goal in this paper is to analyze the relationship between metaphysics and cognitive science based on Naturalized Metaphysics of Alvin Goldman. Accordingly, we will show that although the findings of cognitive science can play a significant role in the metaphysics of mind and conceptual metaphysics, their role in realistic metaphysics is dubious. In addition, we will show that the findings of cognitive science alone cannot play a role in metaphysical judgments without using a metaphysical background. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The epistemological discussions are directed to identify human’s mental abilities in modern time. Kant’s description and explanation on the cognitive and ethical judgments is completed with the description of the cognitive faculties including sense, imagination, understanding and reason. But the mental abilities of human beings aren’t limited to understanding and reason. Kant talks about genius and taste in the third critique. In the paper, Kant’s works and their interpretations are being analyzed in order to achieve an acceptable result about relationship between taste and genius With an emphasis on aesthetic experience in the formalistic approach. In this approach, the subject and object are involved in the production and perception of the artworks. Taste is essential in The perception and judgment of the artworks, that is, it strengthens objectivity, and genius is essential in their production, that is, it strengthens subjectivity. In the other words, taste is for the selection and genius is for the change of a thing. This reminds the fundamental assumption that sensory experiences without conceptions are blind and conceptions without sensory experience are empty. Accordingly, they are co-present in the evolutionary process in social and cultural contexts. The method of the research is analysis of the data derived from textual study of Kant’s works and his commentators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main purpose of this research is to disregard the most important reason for moral skepticism, regress argument that is obtained with the help of basic ethical beliefs through moral intuition. According to intuitionist Ethical fundamentalism, the chain of justification of moral beliefs leads to those basic beliefs which ultimately leads to one of the hypotheses of the regress argument to be answered. In this approach, rational and ethical intuition can be considered as the source of justification for these basic beliefs. not in the sense that these intuitions are one of the foundations of the inference. In this sense, the " subject predicate relation" is perceived and implicit in moral propositions evidently through moral intuitions and the basic beliefs derived from these intuitions are considered as intuitive ethical beliefs. In this paper, first, the basic ethical beliefs are explained, and then the origin and justification of such beliefs are explained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most essential and controversial terms in Art Theory is Mimesis. According to their philosophical views, Plato and Aristotle - who are among the first art theoreticians- each had his own interpretation of Mimesis; And this difference of views is one of the most important elements in evaluating of artworks in the aesthetic history. In this paper we tried to give an almost comprehensive understanding of the concept of Mimesis with contemplation in origins of this word and in its cognates in Greek language (mimos, mimema, mimeistai). Along that, we studied Greek texts that these words were used in them and thereby we tried to determine why these two philosophers - Plato and Aristotle – had adopted two different attitudes towards the concept of Mimesis. The outcomes of our analyses showed that mimrooted terms in pre-platonic texts signified on transference of meaning through "enactment". Their origin was ritual and their primary object was human or animal behaviors. Moreover, primary medium of this concept was dance and then it has been generalized to other types of art. What was common in all these words was the idea of correspondence or equality; In other words, these works or acts had chosen a hypothetical equivalent in real world as a role model. Yet this correspondence was not a pure copy but rather in some cases, this hypothetical pattern even had no concrete existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of the the authenticity of the existence, Mulla- Sadra believes that everything , whether subjective or objective, is real to the extent it exists. But non- existence is nothing and pure untruth. The question that is raised here is whether non- existence has any role in understanding and realization of existence. If yes, then what are those roles? Although existence is the subject matter of philosophy, and it is only existence that has real denotation, our focus on this subject has led us to neglecting of non- existence and its functions. Analyzing the role of non- existence in the emergence and understanding of plurality, and all depend on an understanding of non- existence, its meaning and realizations. Mulla-Sadra considers no authenticity for non- existence and defines it as the lack of existence, but he implicitly considers a role for it in understanding of existence. Addressing the definition of non-existence, its types and its applications in various areas, this paper studies the importance of non-existence in Sadra's philosophy. Accordingly, it is argued that as there is variations in existence, there seems to be degrees of intensity or weakness for non- existence in Sadra’s philosophy. In a sense, in one realization of existence, there is no non- existence while in a weak version of existence, non- existence is pervasive. Without an understanding of nonexistence, it is not possible to understand other philosophical concepts including paradox principle, authenticity of existence, variations in existence, substantive motion, and selfevolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his logical book, al-Qiyas al-Shifa, Avicenna proposed his theory on conditional syllogism and then posed a doubt on the validity of conditional Barbara by a seemingly counter-example with minor premise which has an impossible antecedent. He and his followers proposed at least five different answers: 1. falsity of the minor of the counter-example, 2. falsity of the major, 3. truth of the conclusion, 4. failure of repetition of middle term, and 5. invalidity of conditional Barbara. In this paper, we show that these five reactions are rooted in ambiguities in the meaning of “cogent conditional;” and to withdraw the ambiguities, it is needed to answer important questions. By the aid of these answers, we can achieve Sinavi logicians’ conceptual and judgmental foundations for conditional syllogism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophical skepticism about the external world is a philosophical view that questions our knowledge of the propositions that are about the external world. Some versions of philosophical skepticism use skeptical hypothesis to prove that we can’t know anything about the external world. One of the most famous skeptical hypothesis is the brain in a vat hypothesis. Putnam is the first philosopher who has tried to show that accepting semantic externalism refutes this kind of skepticism. Semantic externalism is the view that the meaning of a term in our language, or the content of our psychological state, is at least partially determined by factors that are external to the speaker. Putnam's argument seems to be epistemically circular; so it can't show that we know that we are not brains in a vat. By introducing new externalist arguments, Brueckner has tried to solve this problem. The evaluation of Bruckner’s simple arguments in refuting the skepticism is the main purpose of this paper. Having analyzed these arguments, it has shown that these arguments can’t prove that we can have knowledge about the external world. But Brueckner’s compatibilist argument shows that we can have justified believes about the external world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Descartes is famous for his various innovations in philosophy. He has been rightly regarded as the father of modern philosophy. His writings are taught at philosophy departments in all universities all over the world and different aspects of his thought are the subject-matter for so many books, articles, and dissertations and treatises which make among the epoch-making philosophers in the west. Among his predecessors, he has mostly been compared with St. Augustine, and among the past schools of philosophy, his system has been contrasted against the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition. In Islamic world, Descartes and His Meditations on First Philosophy, compared with Al-Ghazali and his Deliverance from error. The present paper tries to make a comparison among the Cartesian system and that of a roughly unknown Persian philosopher that, though being unknown, most of Cartesian innovative heritage in Western philosophy is preceded by his philosophy. The similarity among his teachings and Descartes' ones is so great that reader may supposes that Descartes or his medieval or renaissance predecessors have had some access to his writings or even read them. This philosopher, Afdal al-Din Kashani known as Baba Afdal, against the Islamic philosophical mainstream in his times that was in Arabic language, has written all of his works in simple, eloquent and accessible Persian prose. He not only in Persian-writing for the first time but also with regards to the subject-matter and the goal of philosophizing is such an innovator that no other Muslim philosopher can precede him. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Muḥmmad-Karīm Khān Kirmānī (1810-1873) in his Riṣala fī Tazyīf Kitāb Afranjī fī Ḥarakāt al-Aflāk (A Treatise on a European Book’s Fraud about the Celestial Motions -April 10, 1853), brings an Arabic summary of a Persian translation of a European book. This summary includes heliocentrism as well as Cartesian and Newtonian mechanics to explain it, followed by Kirmānī’s detailed criticism. Based on the metaphysical principles of space and movement, Kirmānī rejects the arguments of heliocentricity and its new mechanical explanations. In addition, he does not consider the empirical evidence sufficient to reject geocentrism. In his opinion, Cartesian and Newtonian explanations for heliocentrism are not compatible with the metaphysical principles of natural motion and the negation of vacuum. Kirmānī creates a change in the traditional concept of the orbs by changing the solidity of the heavens and accepting their rarity, to respond to heliocentric reasons. In addition, he believes that there is empirical evidence for denying the heliocentrism and mobility of the earth. He shows the flaws in the supporting experiments on the Earth's mobility. He even refers to the verses of the Qur'an. The philosophical-mystical system of Shaykhism was also a motivation to reject the new astronomy. Still, Kirmānī did not just emphasize his belief system for his opposition to the new astronomy, as did many of his Christian Aristotelian counterparts in the 17th century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Schopenhauer, awareness of death is based on Knowing the desire and abandoning the desire and self-willed death or canceling the desire for immortality. He denies any individuality in immortality. Therefore, his theory does not satisfy the desire for survival in man. According to him, awareness of death is achieved through intuition. Nietzsche looks from death to life. It is death that gives man the power to live. The ideal life of each person is determined by his characteristics. He wants man to live creatively and not passively. Nietzsche is a follower of individual natural ethics, but in explaining his belief, he ignores aspects of natural ethics that are based on things other than the struggle for survival. He also ignores the role of environmental factors and education in creating superhumans. What he introduces as a solution for the meaning of life requires having pure wisdom, while the common people lack it, therefore it does not work for everyone. Awareness of death is produced by all the natural forces. For him, the knowledge of death is of the type of understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary focus of this research centers on the analysis and critique of Moritz Shclick's perspective concerning the "relationship between free will and determinism." Its objective is to demonstrate the inadequacy of his proposed solution in a descriptive-analytical manner. According to Shclick, the purported dilemma surrounding free will and determinism is a pseudo-philosophical quandary stemming from a conflation of key concepts. He contends that disentangling these concepts through differentiation of terms in common sense, such as "normative law" from "descriptive law," "causality" (representing determinism) from "compulsion," and "non-causality" (indeterminism) from "freedom," will naturally dissipate this pseudo-problem. Shclick posits that "compulsion" falls within the realm of normative concepts, while determinism and the principle of causal necessity reside in the domain of descriptive concepts, thereby rendering any connection between "compulsion" and "determinism" non-existent. In this study, I illustrate through three innovative examples that: a) "compulsion" and "freedom" possess at least two distinct meanings in common sense, and Shclick's claim succumbs to the fallacy of reductionism. b) The crux of the issue surrounding free will revolves around the secondary meaning of these terms. c) Shclick's definition of freedom encompasses not only humans but also extends to animals, thereby not impeding others. These three critiques collectively demonstrate the untenability of Shclick's compatibilist perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present research seeks to explain and clarify the ontology of ethics and the existence of moral attributes such as good and bad based on the fundamental views of Aakhund Khorasani. At first glance, the opinions of Khorasani Aakhund use a kind of essentialist moral reductionism, in such a way that moral attributes such as good and bad are reduced to the compatibility of the act with the power of reason, and of course, this compatibility is because the act has expediency and existence and good effects are compatible with the inherent beauty and ugliness of his consideration. With some reflections on the discussions of Aakhund Khorasani, it is possible to present an amendment to his first opinion and distinguish between the truth of the act and the performance of the act. In this case, to act, the element of intention must be added to the expediency and existence capacity and compatibility with the intellectual power. The implications of Aakhund's moral reductionism include 1) Posterior moral knowledge, 2) absolutism, 3) Lack of moral independence, and 4) Inference of must and value from being. In this research, first, the moral reductionism of Aakhund is explained and analyzed, and then its implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant considers pure aesthetic judgment to be disinterested and in the minute of quality and interest is a pleasure (delight) that results from the representation of the existence. In a footnote (§3), Kant declares that beauty is neither based on an interest nor establishes an interest. In explaining the concept of interest, Kant acts negatively and only by distinguishing between the agreeable and the good, depicting the disinterestedness of an aesthetic experience. In the first critique, Kant does not consider existence to be a real predicate; therefore, it is necessary to refer to his other works to find the clear and correct meaning of interest. By referring to moral works, we realize that interest is a kind of inclination towards something based on a rational rule. In this article, an attempt has been made to provide a clear concept of interest by considering the whole of Kant's aesthetic thought, to deal with the connection of interest with existence, and to answer the question of how interest is connected with the representation of existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essence is the intuitable objective correspondent of a concept. Phenomenology is the science of these objects and the science about them. But is it possible for every concept to have an essence? This question is a crucial one since any concept without essence would be eliminated from phenomenology. The phenomenological meaning of such concepts would be a challenge. Excluding a subject matter from phenomenology is a consequence of the refusal to achieve a solid mindset about it because of the infeasibility of intuiting it clearly and distinctly. As a result, such a concept would be ambiguous, inconsistent, or incomprehensible and every conceptualization or standpoint about it would be ultimately an arbitrary appropriation. Arbitrariness here can mean insisting on a metaphysical and, of course, unreasonable position, a collective (cultural) belief, or a personal or artistic attitude. Furthermore, it is inconsistent with our expectation of phenomenology as an all-encompassing science that some categories could be identified outside of its domain. Notwithstanding, this ideation tends to be problematic and disputable for some categories. This possibility has been questioned for theoretical concepts, natural kinds, cultural concepts, and transcendent universals in one or another way. After elaborating on these problems, we attempt to figure them out. These criticisms have failed to comply with the phenomenological epoché, the unreality of the transcendental area, and the solipsistic nature of phenomenological research. Their failure is caused by relying on science in phenomenological research. According to our observations, intuiting an essence simply means determining an individual object’s belonging to the corresponding universal concept. Thus, the impossibility of ideation for a category implies that it is impossible to determine whether any individual object falls under the aforementioned category, while all the discussed criticisms acknowledge that determination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to our terminology, the mechanism people follow in moral judgments, which is far from the sayings and rules of moral philosophers, is folk morality. Above all, people in moral judgments regard human moral capacity and do not expect full morality of any one. People suppose that perfect moral life is an ideal which is beyond human abilities. This hidden presupposition forms the foundation of human moral behavior. On the other hand, it seems that the moral systems originating from moral philosophy have been constructed a priori and, assuming a perfect man, they expect people to become such a person. It seems that it is necessary for moral philosophers to change their way and begin speculation with respect to people's moral capacities. In this paper, we argue that minimal ethical speculation increases the level of morality in society. The basis of this turn is new progresses and findings in the field of psychology and the connection between psychology and moral philosophy; a connection which will be more and more important for moral philosophers parallel to scientific progresses. Of course, this is an immature idea and therefore confronts with some critiques. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the theory of the spirit of meaning, with the interpretation of Imam Khomeini, words have been established for common concepts; That is, they are not established for the concept bound to a certain reference, even if the establisher thinks that the concept is unique to one reference. Thus, there is a common component or spirit among all common words that are in a longitudinal relationship in different worlds. Therefore, from Imam Khomeini's point of view, in establishing the words for the spirits of meanings, what is comprehensive between people and the place of compatibility and sharing between them should be presupposed. But Wittgenstein expressed the idea of family resemblance when he abandoned his earlier essentialism and abandoned the determination of meaning. The concept of family resemblance is explained in the first place by reference to the concept of game. The late Wittgenstein argues that just as there is nothing unique in games that is common to all of them, there is nothing unique in the various uses of language that is common to all, but, just like games, there is a system of overlap and overlap of similarities. But the theory of the spirit of meaning, contrary to the idea of family resemblance, believes in the common essence or spirit that exists in words that have different meanings and are located in multiple worlds at the same time; The very thing that the idea of family resemblance seeks to abolish. Thus, criticizing the theory of the spirit of meaning based on the idea of family resemblance is the aim of this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenology is one of the most important nowadays’ philosophical movements. Although Husserl is the founder, you can find its roots in philosophers’ works like Descartes, Kant, and Bergson. Heidegger Learned phenomenology from his professor and used it as a way to understand Being. Phenomenology for Heidegger transformed from Husserlian simple form to a way to understand the truth. Part of this transformation is because of Bergson's influence on Heidegger. In Heidegger’s opinion, Bergson, with bolding the importance of consciousness for understanding life, had a part in establishing Husserl’s phenomenology. By translating Bergson’s works into German, Max Scheler played a crucial role in gathering attention to Bergson's philosophy. This effort led to Husserl’s important work, the investigations of internal time consciousness, which are partly published in Husserl’s later works. Furthermore, Bergson, by making a difference between common time and real-time or ‘duration’ in understanding life, showed philosophy a new way of understanding truth. For Heidegger, phenomenology without understanding the concept of time, and centralization of Dasein as temporality, is not conceivable. The phenomenology is one of the most complex topics in the philosophy of the 20th century, and the simplest way to understand it is to pay attention to the formation of its roots. Considering that not enough research has been done on the influence of Bergson's philosophy on the phenomenological movement, this article tries to cover as much of this need as possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-awareness as a philosophical and anthropological subject is rooted in anthropological foundations. In Islamic philosophy, the humanity of human is his soul; therefore, the main property of self-awareness is the human soul. In Allameh Tabatabai’s philosophical view, self-awareness is the knowledge of the presence of the self in its essence. Considering that from his view the definition of science is the presence of an incorporeal thing in the presence of another immaterial thing, in the self-awareness both are the human soul. Allameh believes that man is always aware of himself from birth to death, which includes awakening, sleep and anesthesia, and after death. Even if we do not remember anything about our self-awareness after anesthesia or sleep, it is not a reason for not having self-awareness. It seems that some of Allameh's arguments do not prove all the claims. Also, his view can be analyzed from the path of pure attention to the ontological definition of science and also the division of science into simple and compound types. It seems that the self-awareness that Allameh attributes to it during periods of anesthesia or sleep that is not remembered is a simple science and cannot be considered as a factor or criterion for human perfection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is a research on Gilgamesh tragedy which is a search of deathlessness Based on Irvin D. Yalom (1931) whom is an American existential Psychiatrist – ideas on death and one’s self defense mechanism against anxiety caused by fear of death. Gilgamesh was the fifth king of Sumeria. He ruled Uruk city for 125 years after Noah’s flood. People complain to the gods about his oppression and gods create Enkidu to defeat him. The two become friends after a head-to-head fight. Gilgamesh, with the help of Enkidu kills the Bull of heaven and Humbaba the guardian of the cedar forest. In the aftermath, Enkidu dies and sad Gilgamesh seeks immortality, but in the end, the death embraces him. In this study, with Relying on descriptive-analytical method and comparative approach, The Gilgamesh tragedy has been compared with Irvin D. Yalom’s opinions that the main goal of his existential psychotherapy is to increase a person's awareness of existential concerns by expanding his perspectives on life and the world around him. The result of this study shows that Irvin D. Yalom’s ideas on death anxiety and giving a solution for overcoming fear of death are consistent with Gilgamesh tragedy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of human happiness has been analyzed and evaluated by different philosophers and thinkers from different viewpoints. This article seeks to look at this issue once again on the horizon of the originality of existence. And show that the basis of terms that have long been used to explain this concept, such as the terms: pleasure, goodness, perfection, and understanding, is the term existence. The principle of the originality of existence as the most important achievement of transcendent wisdom along with some of its branches such as hierarchical unity of existence, substantive movement, the union of knowledge, and the known and dynamic and hierarchical nature of human existence and human being in the world in enlightening and deepening the truth of human happiness plays the most important role. The result of this article is that: true happiness requires moving in the path of perfection and intensification of existence, and concerning the presence and consciousness in the higher levels of existence, the kind of pleasure and perfection and happiness that will result, will intensify and be perfected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract. According to the dominant methodology of contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophical intuitions play evidential roles for or against philosophical theories. However, intuitions can play the supposed role successfully only if they are justified. Phenomenalism, as one of the proposed theories that aims to explain and argue for justifiedness of intuitions, claims that intuitions are justified because they have a certain phenomenal character: Intuitive contents seem to be true. Furthermore, it argues that sensory perception has similar phenomenal character, in virtue of which it is justified. This analogy confirms the justifiedness of intuitions. In this paper, however, we shall argue that there is at least one another epistemological feature of sensory perception which is relevant to its justifiedness, that is self-correction. Although sensory perception is highly self - correcting, intuitions normally resist self - correction , even in the case of further recalcitrant evidences. The disanalogy threatens phenomenalist analogy for justifiedness of intuitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of Absar is one of the important epistemological issues in which Plato and Aristotle have presented a special view that is the basis of the theories of later Islamic philosophers on this issue. On the other hand, Ibn Sina, following Aristotle, has explained the truth of Absar based on the theory of "printing of images", according to which they define sensory perception as the passivity of the sensory penis from the sensible. On the other hand, Sheikh Ishraq, by rejecting the two theories of radius departure and impression, tries to express a new point of view. That is, it is not possible to provide an accurate analysis of the absars based on the "radius exit" and "image printing"; In fact, nothing comes out of the eye and nothing enters it, but it is by enlightening the soul over what is observed (provided, of course, that it is opposed) that obsession is realized. It seems that the intellectual background of Sheikh Ishraq in explaining the theory of Absar can be evaluated as such that "Ishraq" in Suhrawardi's intellectual system can be proposed in proportion to "Attention" in Ibn Sina's intellectual space and its alternative; Because the approach of the Peripatetic philosopher has been in the context of acquired science, the wisdom of illumination has been interpreted as illumination in the space of present knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Equilibrium is one of the central ideas in Simone Weil's intellectual history, which can be examined to recognize the bias of her attitude in all aspects of her life. Through the expression of equilibrium, Simone Weil, by preserving human values, tries to create a harmony between man and the forces that govern nature, as well as between man and the forces that govern society. With the help of the meaning of work, she examines the equilibrium in order to achieve justice in the context of society in such a way that the human personality remains intact. Through the idea of equilibrium, she analyzes concepts such as power, prestige, and oppressed society, and considers the revolution ineffective in saving an oppressed society. Simone Weil shows how man, by changing his attitude to life, can free himself from domination with the help of the element of satisfaction; and how man, through connecting with impersonal matter between man and all the ruling forces (both social and natural), can make an equilibrium between himself and them. In this way, the equilibrium which she puts forward is not only dependent on any party or policy, but also free from reliance on science, which is the human achievement of making life easier. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main problem of Cartesian Dualism which turns it to an outdated view is mental causation; If mental and physical substance have no mutual property, how we could explain the causal relation between them. Jonathan Lowe reconsiders Cartesian view and introduces his Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism which maintains that I, as a subject of my own experiences, literally can have some physical properties of my body. However, I think his afford is not consequent; By introducing a distinction between negative and positive possibility, first I argue that he needs positive possibility for his view. But as he committed to this idea that the identity of a property depends, at least in part, on its substance, he cannot use the idea of having a property derivatively to show this possibility. However, by resorting to the idea of spatiality of mind, I think we can maintain his core idea and believe that mind literally could has some physical properties. At the end, I will also try to answer to Kim's critiques about the idea of spatiality of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does freedom, without the concept of truth, have a meaning? The idea is that deceiving people can be considered as an attack on their freedom. How can you detect deception without Truth? Rorty's famous answer to this question is that if we take care of freedom, the truth will take care of itself. For him, freedom comes before truth. Conant, unlike Rorty, believes that the concept of truth is the fundamental basis of freedom. He refers to Orwell's novel 1984. Conant sees the cruelty of the world of the novel 1984 as the result of removing the concept of truth in this world. Conant, according to the framework of postmodern thought, tries to argue with Rorty non-Realistically. This essay examines the confrontation between these two thinkers and the special strategy that Conant has adopted to present his criticisms against Rorty. It seems that Conant is not successful in designing his critical structure. Because he introduces cryptoRealist statements in his discussion, which is against his critical structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Here, an attempt is made to answer this question in a descriptive-analytical way: Baumgarten is known as the German founder of aesthetics, But Can he properly justify the independence of aesthetics from other fields? In order to achieve this goal, instead of considering the historical course of his treatises, we have followed the discussion according to precedence and conceptual order. Among this conceptual arrangement, the focus is on the discussion of "perfection". Also poetry as the central issue of Baumgarten's aesthetics is considered. For Baumgarten, perfection is an object of inner coherence. Perfection in the subject refers to the perfected degree of sensible high when arousing sensible representations. In fact, Baumgarten believes that beauty and perfection are intertwined. In this way, beauty is in the chain of sensible perception. According to Baumgarten, perfection and beauty do not just depend on objective Cohesion and coordination in the object or artistic work, it is perceived through the subject. The subject receives the sensible effect as the degree of pleasure and displeasure. Beauty is, intuitively and undistinguished moral and, indirectly related to moral concepts through symbols (or signs). Logic is correlated to rational principles and rules over the aesthetics. With Baumgarten's effort, taking into account the more flexible function of rational laws in reason, a regin is opened to accept aesthetic due to the relation with moral domain and etc, rules Despite Baumgarten`s deeply efforts, the field of aesthetics is not autonomous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the oldest theories about the nature of art is the theory of "imitation". For the first time, Plato discussed the theoretical foundations of this theory from a philosophical point of view. What is central in the Platonic position regarding the nature of mimesis is the existential distance between the original and the copy. This approach has caused different reactions in the history of philosophy. In the contemporary era, Hans-Georg Gadamer has evaluated the issue of mimesis and the Platonic approach based on his philosophical hermeneutics. Contrary to Plato, he does not place the status of copy in a lower position compared to the original, rather, the copy itself can play the role of the original in terms of "increase in being". Based on this attitude, instead of measuring the copy based on the original, it is the copy that can transform our perspective about the original itself and even ourselves. According to this, the work of art, even if it is a copy of something, can still cause "recognition". In this article, while describing Gadamer's anti-Platonic position on the relationship between the original and the copy, we will evaluate his attitude and show that, despite his emphasis on the independent being of the copy, he sometimes unintentionally returns to the Platonic position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first formulation of the theory of mimesis is based on the assumption that art and literature represent the real world, or nature. In later analyzes, although the scope of the object of mimesis expands to include the general, beautiful nature, human action, and the ideal, the assumption remains that literary representation is realistically concerned with external objects or the state of affairs. Thus, what the theory of imitation yields, in spite of the diversity of the subject matter of mimesis, ultimately entails the neglect of two fundamental issues; that is, ignoring the construction of reality and also the effect of the subject's epistemological construction on the quality of representation. For this reason, in this research, while accepting the basic assumptions of the theory of imitation, we first clarify the limits of the concept of mental image. We then assume that the mind is able to represent a primitive reality through images that are sometimes fundamentally alien to the situation. Finally, by emphasizing Searle's distinction of institutional and brute facts, while modifying his view, we clarify the importance of applying this distinction to the theory of mimesis and explain how language is involved in the regulation of the construction of reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the importance of trust in epistemology, there is no consensus about its nature and issues. Some consider it a cognitive attitude and some think it an emotional attitude. The combination of cognitive and emotional elements is another point of view chosen by Linda Zagzebski. The combination of the two elements of belief and feeling, plus the element of behavior and its explanation in the context of virtue theory, distinguishes Zagzeski's view from the rest. This article focuses on Zagzebski's point of view and analyzes the nature, scope, and applications of epistemic trust. While accepting two types of self-trust and trust to others, she established a special commitment between these two and extended the scope of cognitive self-trust as a pre-reflective feature, according to the principle of equality, to trust others. Validity of testimony in justifying beliefs, exemplarist theory, and a new interpretation of the Consensus Gentium argument is among the applications of epistemic trust discussed in the article. Despite Zagzebski's effort to provide a more accurate explanation of epistemic trust and its application in various fields of epistemology, philosophy of religion, and moral philosophy, there are still ambiguities and weaknesses in her view that make it difficult to justify the role of epistemic trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mullā Ṣadrā is today the most famous thinker in Muslim world to whom origin of the well–known fourth dimension – i.e. Eternalism– is historically attributed by many writers. But we will show that he has given up the four–dimensionalism. Although he has summarized and almost repeated some points of Mīr Dāmād in Sharḥ al–Hidāyat al–Athīrīyyah, he has not dealt with the current fourth dimension and not used any explicit passage in favor of the four–dimensionalism in his other works to allow us to attribute it to him in them. It is todays usually immediately insisted on Ṣadrā’s substantial movement and the expression of “extension” (Imtidād) in the case of physical natures as evidences of his four–dimensionalism; but even this is absolutely irrelevant to the current fourth dimension. Rather, the evidences show that Ṣadrā – except in Sharḥ al–Hidāyah – has given up the four–dimensionalism of the ancestors in his other works. So, we will continue to try to inquire the very giving up. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The need for philosophy in science and utilizing philosophy in research works have been emphasized consistently by many experts. In recent decades, with the increasing growth of new technologies, the explanation of the relationship between these technologies and philosophy and the situation of philosophy in identifying these technologies have become vital. Transhumanism is a technological and futuristic movement its experts acknowledge their ideas to be the philosophical inheritors and revivers of the ideals of the Enlightenment. The present study aims to understand and analyze the philosophical origins and hotbeds of transhumanism in the context of humanism and the Enlightenment, as two significant intellectual-philosophical west currents, and perfectionism as a philosophical idea. Considering this origin, one can also find the philosophical foundations of transhumanism under humanistic ontology, pragmatist epistemology, and technological values; which are the basis of their attitude toward man and the enhancement of his nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of the possibility of the value of truth and falsehood about moral propositions, based on the type of answer to it, builds the discussion of cognitivism and non-cognitivism in the philosophy of ethics. As a proponent of non-cognitivism, Richard Mervyn Hare, by proposing the theory of prescriptivism, on the one hand denies the value of the truth and falsity of moral propositions, and on the other hand, enumerates four conditions for the morality of propositions, which are: prescriptivism, rationality, generalizability and principles. In contrast, cognitivists who have criticized this view for decades try to challenge Hare's prescriptivism by using the problem of thick moral concepts that make them feel influenced by the world. While skeptical of the issue of thick moral concepts as a critique of prescriptivism, the authors considers it a tendency towards a kind of relativism that is itself questionable. In addition, the authors believe that Hare's theory has important Difficulties, such as the possibility of unnecessarily turning predicative propositions into a comprehensive and prescriptive one, And the comprehensiveness and non-obstruction of his proposed conditions for the morality of propositions are among them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most significant issues and challenges of human existence since the emergence and advancement of technology is "being human." The meaning of "being human" (in this research), as opposed to machines, is existence with passion. According to the Danish philosopher "Søren Kierkegaard," passion is the most critical driver of human life. There is a belief that with the advancement of technology, human beings are getting closer to machines. Humans are entering the era of artificial intelligence and "transhumanism," which "Max Tegmark" calls "Life 3", not only the survival but also the existence of humans is endangered.. About two centuries ago, Kierkegaard, in his diaries and the book "Two Ages: A Literary review" pointed out that man is moving away from the passion in the modern age. The current research seeks to find the relationship between passion as the driving force of human life and the position of humans with machines and living in the era of transhumanism and artificial intelligence by examining Kierkegaard's opinions about the present age and human passion. As a result, by referring to Kierkegaard's theories, it is possible to understand that the best way to escape passivity for humans in the age of technology is to choose the authentic self and prove the spiritual existence of humans in the moral and religious stages, provided that such an idea is converted into action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I, firstly, articulate a particularistic metaphysical ground and stress that it is plausible: the moral relevance of act-descriptions is variable according to the particular situation; positive valence and negative valence of act-descriptions can change in different situations. But, secondly, I explain against the particularist that moral principles are compatible with the context-dependence of the moral relevance of act-descriptions in at least two respects. a) Moral principles are indeterminate in acting on them because practical principles fundamentally do not (completely) determine the action. In each particular situation we should judge which act-token to do or which way of avoiding an action to implement. Applying moral principles requires context-sensitivity. b) Moral principles are defeasible. Defeasibility of practical principles, of which moral principles are a kind, means that we can block following them in a particular situation. Moral principles as extended determinations are not abandoned or refuted if we cannot in a particular situation act on them. Blocking moral principles is acceptable at least under two conditions. First, when a moral principle does not include some situations. Second, when acting on a moral principle is in conflict with acting on another moral principle or principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]