Search

ABSTRACT We can often find in the literature (both popular and academic) ascriptions of complex collective duties to extensive unstructured collections of individuals. By ‘complex collective duties’, I mean collective duties that, plausibly, require that the individual members of an extensive unstructured collection should enact different contributory act-types to achieve an end jointly - for example, the alleged universal collective duty to end global poverty. In this paper, I argue that these duties are not action-guiding. The reason is that they do not pass what I call the ‘test of action-guidance’. This test assumes the intuitive belief that a moral duty is action-guiding only if it is clear to the duty-bearer the act-type that she should enact after the ascription of the duty. Complex collective duties ascribed to extensive unstructured collections fail to pass this test because, even though each duty-bearer (that is, each member of the collection) receives guidance on the end that they should achieve jointly, it is not clear to these agents the act-type that each of them should put into practice.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the role that the notion of political obligation has in the thought of the Italian philosopher of politics and law Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves (1902 - 1985), especially in its relationship with the democratic regime and forms of resistance on the part of citizens. By analyzing the author’s main arguments in this regard, it seeks to demonstrate the flexibility of the author’s concept of State, and the importance of philosophy as a point of intersection between morality and law, constituting itself as an instrument of phenomenological approach to the forms of human association.

ABSTRACT This paper aims to map the different theoretical options related to the Precautionary Principle (PP). Great part of the literature on it can be systematized by answering to three different questions: is there a basic structure in the PP? If so, in which interpretation of the PP does this structure express itself? Finally, are its damage or knowledge conditions fixed or adjustable? The first question separates realist from non-realist approaches. The second question allows us to discriminate monist, dualist, or pluralist positions in relation to the three interpretations of the PP: decision rule, procedural requirement, or epistemic rule. Finally, the third question distinguishes rigid from non-rigid formulations of the principle. Based on this mapping, one can not only navigate through the different formulations of the PP present both in official documents and in specialized literature, but also deflect some of its common objections, and understand Hans Jonas’ eventual connection with PP. Notwithstanding, this mapping does not capture other important themes attached to PP, which motivates a final distinction between narrow and broader forms of PP.

ABSTRACT According to one influential argument against the existence of a priori knowledge, there is no a priori knowledge because (i) no belief is immune to revision, and (ii) if there were a priori knowledge, at least some beliefs would be unrevisable. A version of this argument was famously advocated by W. V. Quine, and is still popular among many naturalist philosophers. The aim of this paper is to examine and reject this argument against the a priori. The paper starts by discussing the thesis (i) and its role in Quine’s Web of Belief model. It is suggested that this thesis faces some important challenges that might jeopardize its use in the above argument against the a priori. Premise (ii) of the argument is then discussed. Philip Kitcher has famously defended a version of premise (ii). His arguments are assessed and rejected. The conclusion is that we have no good reason to accept (ii), and, with it, this argument against the a priori. The paper ends by proposing an account of the a priori that is perfectly compatible with (i).

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to show that "traditional" and "resolute" interpretations have not freed the "Tractatus" from the apparent paradoxical self-defeat. I argue that these readings only give it new clothing. Hacker's "traditional" reading ends up ascribing a metaphysical conspiracy to the "Tractatus", which is incompatible with the aims of the book. The "resolute" reading of Diamond and Conant ascribes an authorial conspiracy to Wittgenstein, which contradicts his views on authorship and method. Grounded in the difficulties found in both sides of the current debate, I conclude this paper by proposing several requirements that the correct interpretation of the "Tractatus" should fulfill.

ABSTRACT This paper presents a solid normative approach in military ethics, which justifies the rule of law in a constitutional regime capable of fixing the proper role of the Armed Forces in Brazil. Deploying this ethical framework, it analyzes the relevant literature, especially authors who defend civilian supremacy for the good functioning of a democratic society. Afterwards, some models of civil-military relations are introduced to establish the parameters and indicators of proper democratic consolidation. These parameters are applied to recent events, revealing that Brazil is regressing in its civilian control over the military. Finally, some practical proposals for reversing this tendency are put forward in pursuit of a fully democratic regime in Brazil.

ABSTRACT The paper intends to build a dialogue between Nāgārjuna and Schelling on Self, world, and standpoints, taking as main references Nāgārjuna's The Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way and Schelling's Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. Whereas Nāgārjuna criticizes the substantialization of beings by resorting to the discourse of the dependent co-origination in order to overcome suffering, Schelling, on his turn, refutes the fanaticism based on dogmatism's tenets in favor of the criticism interpreted according to its spirit, and not according to its letter, in order to emancipate humanity. Starting with a succint contextualization of the Eastern and Western philosophical discourse, proceeding further to discuss the philosophies of both thinkers, the paper is concluded by assessing their theories.

ABSTRACT This paper reconstructs the discussion about biopolitics in the thoughts of Foucault and of Negri and Hardt, in order to emphasize the importance that can be acquired, in this context, by the notion of agonistics. At first, we approach Foucault’s concepts of biopower and governmentality in an introductory way, as well as their relationship with liberalism and neoliberalism. We also examine the ambiguities that mark the practices of freedom and the possibilities of resistance in a world governed by biopower. Then, we explain the meaning of the concepts of cognitive capitalism, Empire and multitude in the works of Negri and Hardt. In this point, we seek to fill a gap in their analysis, which is not found in Foucault, regarding the question of agonistics: the multitude’s willingness to fight intensifies itself when we realize that life as such is agon. Finally, we argue that, in principle, in the neoliberal work environment, it is possible to convert self-entrepreneurship processes into micro-experiments of resistance and non-alienated freedom.

ABSTRACT This paper is an attempt at connecting the emergence of second order observation in critical philosophy with the theory of aesthetic autonomy as developed by Early German Romanticism. In outlining the genesis of an autonomous art system from the reception of critical philosophy, my intention is to show how those apparently overly hermeneutical philosophical developments relate to the birth of a system of production and reproduction of artworks, which – as I will argue – are the very materialization of the system’s code.

ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that Hume’s commitment to mind-independent objects is based on two types of realism or system of realities: (a) a naïve realism based on an unjustified vulgar belief which identifies perceptions and objects, and (b) a representational realism or philosophical system of double-existence. Firstly, I emphasize that the philosophical question “Whether there be body or not” cannot be considered a full case of unmitigated skepticism, because Hume accepts a mitigated skepticism compatible with both vulgar and representational realism. Furthermore, I argue that, while the vulgar belief in bodies is based on an unjustified assent, the double-existence theory is based on both an unjustified assent and a rationally justified assent (that corrects the former). Considering all these points, I conclude that Hume’s mitigated skepticism allows and requires a belief in or supposition of continued and distinct existences, and that this must, as a practical matter, take vulgar and philosophical forms at different times.

A partir da ideia de que filosofar é duvidar, o artigo examina a relação do ceticismo de Montaigne com o ceticismo antigo. De um lado, mostram-se os elementos do ceticismo antigo de que Montaigne se apropria, como a divisão da filosofia em três seitas e o método cético da oposição. De outro lado, identificam-se as inovações introduzidas por Montaigne nesses mesmos elementos céticos. Finalmente, procura-se mostrar que Montaigne, com o projeto de pintar-se a si mesmo, desenvolveria uma maneira própria de duvidar.Starting from the view that to philosophise is to doubt, this paper compares Montaigne's scepticism to ancient scepticism. On the one hand, it is shown that elements from ancient scepticism are used by Montaigne, such as the division of philosophy in three sects and the sceptical principle of opposition. On the other, the paper focuses on the novelties introduced by Montaigne into these sceptical elements. Finally, it is investigated to what extent Montaigne's project of a self-portrait allows him to develop a new kind of doubt.

A interpretação padrão da filosofia de Hume o apresenta como um cético radical acerca das pretensões da razão em fundamentar adequadamente nosso sistema de crenças e, ao mesmo tempo, como um naturalista que procurou sustentar que nossas crenças, embora racionalmente infundadas, não podem ser abandonadas na vida comum, em função da ação de sentimentos e impulsos naturais. Este trabalho pretende mostrar que o naturalismo de Hume pode e deve ser interpretado como uma metodologia de abordagem de conceitos filosóficos (ideias e crenças, no vocabulário de Hume) que incorpora elementos irrefletidos da vida comum (como sentimentos e impulsos naturais) e atribui a tais elementos o mesmo estatuto teórico que processos abstratos como raciocínios e argumentos. Uma filosofia que legitima mecanismos não-reflexivos no tratamento de problemas filosóficos é chamada por Hume de "filosofia verdadeira". Tal espécie de filosofia é incompatível com formas radicais de ceticismo, pois mecanismos irrefletidos que originam ideias são imunes à dúvida. Para exemplificar as teses aqui defendidas e tornar minha caracterização do naturalismo mais convincente, faço uma rápida descrição, ao final do artigo, da abordagem abrangente dos agentes morais por Hume.The standard interpretion of Hume's philosophy presents him both as a radical skeptic regarding rational claims about the adequate foundation of our belief system and as a naturalist who maintained that our beliefs (though rationally ungrounded) cannot be given up in ordinary life, due to natural drives and sentiments. This paper purports to show that Hume's naturalism can and should be interpreted as a method for addessing philosophical concepts (ideas and beliefs,to use Hume's jargon) that incorporates unreflected elements ofordinary life (such as natural sentiments and drives) and assigns to them the same theoretical status that abstract processes such as reasons and arguments have. A philosophy that warrants unreflected mechanisms in the treatment of philosophical problems is what Hume calls a "true philosophy". Such philosophy is compatible with the more radical forms of skepticism, because the unreflected mechanisms that bring about ideas are imune to doubt. To ilustrate the theses put forth here and so as to render my characterization of naturalism more persuasive, I describe briefly and in broad terms at the end of the paper Hume's view of moral agency.

This paper discusses the capital role that friendship plays in moral self-knowledge within Aristotelian Ethics. It focuses on the different ways in which a friend may shed light on the understanding of our behavior. Great attention is paid to the accounts of certain commentators (especially, of Richard Kraut and Anthony Kenny) on this subject. The paper tries to provide a conciliatory interpretation between views on self-knowledge that are, only in appearance, irreconcilable.Este artigo discute o papel fundamental desempenhado pela amizade no processo de autoconhecimento moral dentro da Ética aristotélica. Ele se concentra nas diferentes vias pelas quais um amigo pode esclarecer o processo de compreensão do nosso comportamento. Dedicamos grande atenção às abordagens de alguns comentadores acerca deste tema, especialmente a de Richard Kraut e Anthony Kenny. O artigo procura propor uma interpretação conciliadora entre abordagens sobre o autoconhecimento que são, apenas aparentemente, incompatíveis.

O artigo trata da presença de St. Agostinho no pensamento heideggeriano. Agostinho não representa apenas uma fonte importante para a formação do jovem Heidegger (junto com a fenomenologia de Husserl e a filosofia aristotélica), mas também uma tendência fundamental, algumas vezes tácita, que Heidegger procura absorver e metabolizar em seu próprio pensamento. A interpretação das Confissões - em particular as leituras sobre memoria e temptatio no livro X e sobre o tempo no livro XI, realizadas durante o curso sobre Agostinho e o Neoplatonismo - é a oportunidade que tem Heidegger para tomar algumas decisões teóricas básicas. O homem é um "ser-aí" histórico e temporal que levanta a questão do ser, porque ele é em si mesmo esta própria questão. Enquanto para St. Agostinho o homem é o ente que pergunta diante de um Tu, no pensamento de Heidegger, a questão do homem - a pergunta que é o homem - é entregue ao "nada", porque o mistério de ser não pode mais se manifestar como uma presença. A possibilidade de uma confissão, entendida como um diálogo dramático entre o "Eu" e a presença do ser, torna-se para Heidegger o sinal de finitude do "ser-aí" e de impossibilidade do próprio ser. O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar a atenção de Heidegger (em alguns cursos e ensaios escritos no início dos anos vinte) em "salvar" a descoberta agostiniana de inquietudo, interpretando-a a partir da noção aristotélica de physis - o ente que traz consigo o princípio do movimento - como uma cinética autorreferencial da vida.The paper deals with Augustine's presence in Heidegger's thought. Indeed, Augustine is not only the main source for the young Heidegger's training (together with Husserl's phenomenology and Aristotle's philosophy), but is also the fundamental inclination, sometimes hidden, that Heidegger tries to absorb and metabolize in his own thought. The Confessions' interpretation - in particular the reading of book X on memoria and temptatio and book XI on time faced during the Lectures on Augustin and Neoplatonism - is the chance Heidegger has to make some basic theoretical decisions. Human being is nothing but an historical and temporal being-there who raises the question of being because he is in himself that question. While for Augustine the question is raised before a You, in Heidegger's thought the question of human being - i.e. the question that human being is - is handed over to "nothing", because the mystery of being can never become a presence. The possibility of a confession, as a dramatic dialogue between the I and the presence of being, becomes for Heidegger the sign of the finitude of the being-there and the impossibility of being in itself. The aim of the paper is to show Heidegger's attempt (in some lectures and articles wrote during the early Twenties) to "save" Augustine's discovery of inquietudo interpreting it on the ground of Aristotle's physis - i.e. that being which has within itself the principle of the movement - as a self-referential kinetics of life.

A relação entre direito e moral é a clef de voûte do problema da justificação do direito. De fato, a ocupação filosófica com a justificação do direito porta conexão com a moral, como, por exemplo, em Kant, Dworkin, Alexy, Rawls. Pretende-se apresentar o papel desempenhado pela ética discursiva na fundamentação do direito proposta por Habermas. Apesar de Habermas dispor de uma moral cognitivista e ter apresentado uma fundamentação para o princípio de universalização próprio para a mesma, tal princípio parece ter desaparecido do empreendimento tardio de fundamentação da correção jurídica. Tal acusação é endereçada a Habermas exemplarmente por Apel, Kettner e Heck. Pretende-se sustentar, no presente trabalho, especialmente contra Apel, que a moral discursiva não desaparece do empreendimento de fundamentação do direito, sendo apenas redefinido o papel que ela desempenha nesta tarefa, embora em um sentido mais forte do que Habermas pretende reconhecer. De fato, Habermas parece atribuir à moral um papel negativo na justificação do direito. Pretende-se defender que os direitos morais não cumprem uma função somente negativa no procedimento de justificação do direito, por mais importante que seja tal função assim concebida, seja porque tais direitos passam, de alguma forma, a compor a forma jurídica e mesmo os direitos básicos, seja porque a própria tese da complementaridade parece exigir que o direito positive a moral.The connections between the law and morality are the clef de voûte of law justifying problem. The philosophic preoccupation with those connections is well exemplified in the works of Kant, Dworkin, Alexy, Rawls. This paper aims to show the role discursive ethics plays in the foundation of the law, according to Habermas' perspective. Although Habermas had established a cognitivist morality and shown an argument for the principle of universalization, it seemed to have disappeared form his later intent of juridical correction foundation. This accusation, addressed to Habermas, was equally supported by Apel, Kettner and Heck. This article intends, especially against Apel's point of view, to demonstrate that discursive morality did not disappear, but have just traversed a period of conceptual modifications. Indeed, for Habermas, morality seems to play a negative role in the law justification process. Despite this underestimation of morality, the paper defends the relevance of moral rights for this process, which increases, even more, the importance of the connections between the law and morality in the discussion of Habermas' complementarity thesis.

O presente artigo pretende demonstrar como a Física foi imprescindível para o sistema filosófico estoico, o que permitiu a sua utilização na Antiguidade como fundamento de todo o pensamento do Pórtico. Objetiva-se inferir tal papel preponderante reservado à Física estoica mediante a análise de alguns dos seus principais temas, tais como a Ontologia corporalista que a informa e as noções de lógos, deus e mistura total, concluindo-se o texto com uma breve exposição da teoria das conflagrações.The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how Physics played a vital role in the development of the Stoic Philosophy System and allowed its use in ancient times as a basic element of the whole Portico's thought. This paper also intends to infer the significance of that role played by Stoic Physics, analyzing some of its main themes - the Ontology of the bodies, used, for instance, as an information source; and the notions of lógos, god and general mixture. Finally, the article provides a brief explanation of the conflagration theory.

O artigo examina a abordagem feita por Walter Benjamin da concepção de modernidade apresentada pelo poeta e crítico de arte Charles Baudelaire. Após o exame da ideia de beleza moderna nos textos de crítica de Baudelaire, são abordados os motivos da preferência de Benjamin pela apresentação da modernidade na poesia de Baudelaire, particularmente no poema alegórico "Le cygne". Por fim, o texto enfoca a relação entre a poesia moderna de Baudelaire e a concepção de experiência de Benjamin.The paper investigates the approach made by Walter Benjamin of Charles Baudelaire's conception of modernity. After examining the idea of modern beauty in Baudelaire's critical texts, the reasons of Benjamin's preference for the presentation of modernity in Baudelaire's poetry are analized, particularly, in the allegorical poem "Le cygne". At last, the paper focuses on the relation between Baudelaire's modern poetry and Benjamin's concept of experience.

El presente trabajo desarrolla distintas figuras que Carl Schmitt señala como formas de subjetividad antipolítica. Si desde la perspectiva del jurista alemán las operaciones que constituyen un modo de ser político son aquellas que producen o sostienen una forma representativa, lo propio de una subjetividad antipolítica son aquellas operaciones que erosionan o conducen a la destrucción de dicha forma política. El trabajo intenta mostrar que la operación fundamental en este sentido es la dilación, entendida como la postergación indefinida de la decisión. Así, bajo las diversas figuras de la antipolítica que Schmitt aborda, esta operación también adquiere diversas formas de aparición: en el caso de la subjetividad liberal se da bajo la forma de la discusión y el compromiso, en el caso del romántico político bajo la forma de la poetización.This paper develops various figures noted by Carl Schmitt as forms of anti-political subjectivity. Whereas, from the German jurist's perspective, the operations which constitute a political way of being are those which produce and care for a representative form, the specificity of a anti-political subjectivity is shaped by those operations which erode or wear that political form down. The paper aims to show that the main feature of the antipolitical way of being is the delay, meaning the indefinite postponement of the decision as such. Thus, under the various figures of the anti-politics that Schmitt deals with, this operation appears on different manners: the liberal form of postponing is the endless discussion and the compromise; the romatic form is the aesthetization of the world.

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar, a partir dos textos de Platão e de comentadores, a apresentação de argumentos a favor da utilização da matemática e da geometria como propedêutica à aprendizagem da filosofia, bem como investigar as reverberações da ontologia e da epistemologia platônicas nesse programa pedagógico. Pretende-se, ainda, apontar comparativamente similaridades entre crises nos fundamentos da matemática e seu impacto na concepção de racionalidade, tanto no universo grego antigo como na contemporaneidade.The aim of this paper is to analyze, based on Plato's and commentators' texts, the presentation of arguments for the use of mathematics and geometry as propaedeutics to philosophy learning, as well as to investigate the reverberations of platonic ontology and epistemology in this pedagogical program. The paper will also consider similarities between crises in the foundations of mathematics and the impact of these crises on the conception of rationality, both in ancient Greek universe and in contemporary world.

O presente trabalho examina um problema recorrente no pensamento de Friedrich Schiller: o da unidade da razão na autonomia das formas fundamentais da racionalidade. Ele é analisado aqui no contexto da correspondência de Schiller com o Príncipe de Augustenburg em 1793 e do ensaio "Sobre a utilidade moral dos costumes estéticos". O propósito do trabalho é discutir esse problema desde a perspectiva do nexo entre a esfera estética e a razão prática. Segundo Schiller, o gosto seria uma condição necessária da liberdade.This paper examines a recurrent problem in Friedrich Schiller's thinking: the unity of reason in the autonomy of the main forms of rationality. It is here analyzed in the context of Schiller's correspondence with the Prince of Augustenburg in 1793 and of the essay "The Moral Utility of Aesthetic Manners". The purpose of the paper is to discuss this problem from the perspective of the connection between the aesthetical sphere and the practical reason. According to Schiller, taste would be a necessary condition of freedom.

O presente artigo procura analisar a noção de fé em Montaigne, confrontando-a com as idéias de razão e de crença, e também em sua relação com o lugar que é conferido à autoridade pelo autor dos Ensaios. Discute-se principalmente a interpretação bastante estabelecida de que o ceticismo de Montaigne reduziria a fé à esfera das crenças e dos costumes.This paper analyzes Montaigne's concept of "faith", in comparison with the concepts of "reason" and "belief", and in relation to the place assigned to authority by the author of the Essays. The paper mainly discusses the traditional interpretation's claim that Montaigne's skepticism would reduce faith to the sphere of customs and beliefs.

Este artigo faz a análise de alguns aspectos do sistema de constituição do Logische Aufbau der Welt (A construção lógica do mundo) de Rudolf Carnap, tendo em vista duas possíveis interpretações da base autopsicológica escolhida pelo autor, ou seja, das vivências. Alguns autores, como Michael Friedman e Moulines, vêem o Aufbau como sendo um sistema estrutural cujas formas não são determinadas pelas experiências básicas - pelas vivências. Outros, como, por exemplo, Stegmüller, afirmam que as estruturas, as definições do Aufbau, resultam de relações que podem ser estabelecidas entre estas. Acompanhando os argumentos desses intérpretes e a proposta epistemológica do próprio Carnap, sustento a necessidade de pensar a base autopsicológica, as vivências, como determinantes das relações estruturais do Aufbau.This paper is an analysis of some aspects of the constitutional system of Carnap's Logische Aufbau der Welt. It considers two possible interpretations of the autopsychological basis - the elementary experiences - as this concept is used in Carnap's book. Some authors, like Michael Friedman and Moulines, see the Aufbau as a structural system whose forms are not determined by basic experiences - elementary experiences. Others, as for instance Stegmüller, say that the structures, the definitions, within the Aufbau are the result of relations which can be established among those experiences. Following the arguments of these interpreters as well as Carnap's epistemological proposal, I sustain in this paper that it is necessary to think about the autopsychological basis - the elementary experiences - as determining Aufbau's structural relations.

O presente estudo visa a demonstrar que o Estado legal, assim como concebido por Weber e Kelsen, não pode ser identificado com o Estado de direito, mesmo que a legalidade seja uma condição necessária deste. Isso acontece porque a legalidade não é uma condição suficiente do Estado de direito em razão de não resolver adequadamente o que Habermas nοmeia de dialιtica entre igualdade de fato e de direito. O texto apresenta, a seguir, a partir de Habermas, quatro fases de juridicizaηão: 1] o Estado absolutista burguês; 2] o Estado burguês de direito; 3] o Estado democrático de direito e 4] o Estado social e democrático de direito. As três últimas fases são figurações conceituais do Estado de direito, regulando, verticalmente, a relação dos indivíduos para com o Estado e, horizontalmente, a relação para com o mercado. Por fim, apresentam-se os efeitos colaterais advindos de cada uma dessas fases de figuração do Estado de direito. Defende-se a tese de que tais efeitos são decorrência de uma perspectiva substancialista do Estado de direito, que interpreta os sujeitos apenas como atores, ou destinatários de direitos. Tais problemas são melhor resolvidos por uma perspectiva procedimental do Estado de direito, a qual, ao tratar os sujeitos como autores, pode contar com uma perspectiva autocorretiva dos problemas decorrentes do que Weber chamou de materialização do direito.In this paper I argue that legal state as presented by Weber and Kelsen cannot be identified with the rule of law, because legality is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for making it possible. The ultimate reason for this is that it doesn't solve what Habermas calls the "dialectic of legal and factual equality". This paper presents three models of the rule of law, confronting them with the absolute state. These are the liberal, the democratic and the welfare state models. These regulate in different ways the relations both between the individual and the state and between individuals among themselves. Undesired effects of each model are also presented and discussed. It claims that these undesired effects stem from the fact that in each case we have to do with a substantive model of the rule of law, treating the subjects as mere addressees of the law Those problems are better solved by the procedural model of the rule of law proposed by Habermas, because it treats the subjects of rights as makers of the law.

ABSTRACT In this paper, I analyze Brentano’s fourth habilitation thesis, according to which the philosophical method should be none other than the natural scientific one. The meaning of this thesis can be initially assessed through an examination of Brentano’s views on the relationship between natural and human sciences. His arguments for methodological unity in this debate show that he actually argues for an overarching idea of scientific knowledge, which is not restricted to the fields already recognized as scientific, but which can also be applied to philosophical domain. A fuller comprehension of that idea is provided by Brentano’s writings on Comte’s positivism.

O artigo oferece um novo enfoque do conceito de categoria ontológica. O ponto de partida é a afirmação de que as "ontologias da substância" baseiam-se na aceitação do Princípio da Composicionalidade Semântica, o qual se mostra ter implicações ontológicas inaceitáveis. Este artigo delineia uma nova semântica baseada no Princípio de Contextualidade Sentencial (ou Princípio do Contexto) e, em concordância com ele, uma nova ontologia. A partir desse princípio uma nova categoria semântica denominada "estado de coisas primário" ("primestado", de forma abreviada) é derivada, e é mostrado que sobre essa base é possível desenvolver a categoria ontológica fundamental e, em um sentido, única chamada "fato primário" ("primofato", de forma abreviada).The paper offers a new approach of the concept of ontological category. The starting point is the claim that the "substance ontologies" are based on the acceptance of the Semantic Compositionality Principle which is shown to have unacceptable ontological implications. The paper delineates a new semantics based on the Principle of Sentential Contextuality (or Context Principle) and, in accordance with it, a new ontology. From this principle a new semantic category dubbed "prime state of affairs" ("pristate" for short) is derived and it is shown that on this basis it is possible to work out the fundamental and, in one sense, unique ontological category called "prime fact" ("prifact" for short).

ABSTRACT There is general agreement that Kant’s thought strongly influenced Heidegger’s. Nevertheless, there is still much work to be done in order to fully appreciate this influence. A central theme to disclose the relation between these authors is the role they give to the transcendental. In this paper I show that Kant’s account of intuition is the focus of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in his Die Frage nach dem Ding, since Heidegger interprets Kant’s treatment of intuition as a delimiting of the modern mathematical tendency to determine everything out of pure reason alone. I argue that this interpretation is at the basis of Heidegger’s appropriation of Kant’s synthetic a priori in this work, the aim of which is to take this notion away from the sphere of the objects of mathematical physical science, and place it in the realm of everyday experience. I claim that Heidegger thinks that this move can only be accomplished by removing universality and necessity (epistemic certainty) from Kant’s a priori. Finally, I show that Heidegger’s appropriation of Kant’s synthetic a priori goes together with and illuminates his understanding of transcendence as das Zwischen, ‘the between us and things’.

ABSTRACT Many prominent legal philosophers believe that law makes some type of moral claim in virtue of its nature. Although the law is not an intelligent agent, the attribution of a claim to law does not need to be as mysterious as some theorists believe. It means that law-making and law- applying acts are intelligible only in the light of a certain presupposition, even if a lawmaker or a law-applier subjectively disbelieves the content of that presupposition. In this paper, I aim to clarify what type of moral claim would be suitable for law if law were to make a claim to be morally justified. I then argue that legal practice is perfectly intelligible without moral presuppositions - that is, that the law does not necessarily make moral claims.

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to bring out, by means of a simple thought experiment involving demonstratives, a discrepancy between what is expressed and what is believed (which contradicts the Theory of Direct Reference), and to consider some consequences of this - most notably, whether we might hold, for example, that the ancients never believed that Hesperus is not Phosphorus.

ABSTRACT In a recent essay, Sören Stenlund tries to align Wittgenstein’s approach to the foundations and nature of mathematics with the tradition of symbolic mathematics. The characterization of symbolic mathematics made by Stenlund, according to which mathematics is logically separated from its external applications, brings it closer to the formalist position. This raises naturally the question whether Wittgenstein holds a formalist position in philosophy of mathematics. The aim of this paper is to give a negative answer to this question, defending the view that Wittgenstein always thought that there is no logical separation between mathematics and its applications. I will focus on Wittgenstein’s remarks about arithmetic during his middle period, because it is in this period that a formalist reading of his writings is most tempting. I will show how his idea of autonomy of arithmetic is not to be compared with the formalist idea of autonomy, according to which a calculus is “cut off” from its applications. The autonomy of arithmetic, according to Wittgenstein, guarantees its own applicability, thus providing its own raison d’être.

ABSTRACT The contemporary epistemological debate regarding the epistemic role of memory is dominated by the dispute between two different views: memory preservationism and memory generativism. While the former holds that memory only preserves the epistemic status already acquired through another source, the latter advocates that there are situations where memory can function as a generative epistemic source. Both views are problematic and have to deal with important objections. In this paper, I suggest a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge that overcomes objections raised for both preservationism and generativism. I shall call this view Memory Compatibilism. I argue that the proposed view better explains the generative epistemic character of memory.

ABSTRACT According to prioritarianism, an influential theory of distributive justice, we have a stronger (non-egalitarian) reason to benefit people the worse off these people are (Parfit 2012). Many authors have adopted a consequentialist version of prioritarianism. On this account, we have a consequentialist reason to benefit the worse off because the state of affairs where the worse off gains a given amount of utility is more valuable than the state of affairs where the better off gains roughly the same amount of utility. In this paper, we argue that the consequentialist approach to prioritarianism is problematic. However, it doesn't follow that the prioritarian doctrine per se is groundless. We then suggest that we can make sense of prioritarianism by appeal to a contractualist approach.

ABSTRACT This paper aims at exposing a strategy to organize the debate around physicalism. Our starting point (following Stoljar 2010) is the pre-philosophical notion of physicalism, which is typically formulated in the form of slogans. Indeed, philosophers debating metaphysics have paradigmatically introduced the subject with aid of slogans such as “there is nothing over and above the physical”, “once every physical aspect of the world is settled, every other aspect will follow”, “physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical”. These ideas are very intuitive but they are, of course, far from being a satisfactory metaphysical conception of Physicalism. For that end, we will begin with the definition of physicalism as the thesis that everything is physical, following Stoljar, we should be able to respond to one central question: how to interpret the physicalist claim that everything in physical.

ABSTRACT In “Die Verneinung” (1918), Frege discusses two types of negation, a semantic one and a pragmatic one. Semantic negation consists in the application of the logical function denoted by ‘it is false that p’ to a thought, and pragmatic negation in the act of asserting or judging a thought as false. According to the standard interpretation, Frege does not acknowledge pragmatic negation, because it is logically redundant. He therefore rejects the classical dualistic view that both truth and falsity are qualities of judgement and adopts instead the monistic view that to judge is always to recognize a thought as true. My aim in this paper is to show that this interpretation cannot be sustained. Though Frege does not endorse the classical view, he defends a dualistic conception that is characterized by the claim that judging is a binary operation that contains both the act of recognizing a thought as true and the act of rejecting the opposite thought as false. To make this interpretation plausible, Frege’s dualistic remarks on negation in three posthumous writings, which have received little attention so far, are analyzed in detail and their background is reconstructed. It is argued that Frege acknowledges negative judgements to account for the epistemic role of the act of judgement in the acquisition of knowledge.

ABSTRACT The problem that the "posthuman" must cope with is complex: how can one embrace both anti-humanistic problematization and deconstruction of the human subject by post-structuralism and, at the same time, link the capacity of techno-science for de-humanization with the possibility for inventing posthuman subjectivity? Consideration of the posthumanization of the human must expand further from the cyborgization based on the strengthening of human individuals' capacity, and there is need of a paradigm shift for us to rethink and reconceptualize the posthuman within the ontological and sociopolitical relational networking beyond the opposition of technocentric determinism and humancentric instrumentalism. Human beings were produced in the disciplinary society in the form of self-disciplined "individuals" and have been produced in the control society in the form of de-individualized "dividuals," respectively. If so, then what will the form of human beings be in the posthuman society outside or after the control society, which has yet to arrive? In this paper, pointing out the limitations of discussions on cyborgization and examining Deleuze's diagnosis of the control society based on digital technology, I argue that we can find a new possibility for posthuman subjectivity in Simondon's "transindividual relationship" complemented by Guattari's "transversality." I propose that it will be possible for posthuman society to be produced when the transindividual relationships based on the transductive operation of technological invention realizing the common natural potentiality are realized, and a high degree of transversal communication that prevents the subjugation of this collectivity is maintained.

ABSTRACT In this paper I will provide a reading of the relation between nature and spirit starting from an analysis of the movement of positing and presupposing, discussed by Hegel in the "Science of Logic" in his discussion of the transition between Being and Essence. 1) I will offer an analysis of the logical context within which this dialectical movement emerges. 2) I will show the role played by this dialectical movement in determining the relation between the spheres of nature and spirit in Hegelʼs "Encyclopedia". 3) I will then claim that a difficulty related to this movement arises in the "Logic", and that this difficulty reverberates in the relation between nature and spirit in Hegel's system. In particular, 4) an ambiguity arising at a logical level generates two different configurations of this movement, depending on whether the latter is meant to describe the relation of 4.1) the finite or of 4.2) the infinite spirit to nature. 5) I will finally focus on some problems deriving from my reconstruction and I will try to suggest - in very general and programmatic terms - in what sense the internal analysis of the relation between nature and spirit in Hegelʼs system can be fruitfully discussed against the dominant framework of the contemporary debate, i.e. naturalism. However, this suggestion does not necessarily imply an endorsement of Hegel's position.

ABSTRACT In the current debate between scientific realism and empiricism, both sides seem to embrace some sort of structuralism as an important component of their descriptions of science. The structural realism is generally presented in two versions: one ontic and the other epistemic. It has been argued that that epistemic structural realism (ESR) is close, if not identical, to a Kantian approach. We aim to show that this is not the case, since ESR, being fundamentally a realist position, cannot be fully consistent with a transcendental approach. Such a position is better called transcendental structuralism (TS), an alternative that we believe is worth being investigated on its own. In this paper, we will take Henry Allison's interpretation of transcendental idealism as a starting point to establish the distinctions between ESR and TS.

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, it is intended to articulate theses that are often assessed independently, thus showing that a strong version of epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge implies a transformative conception of rationality. This entails that individuals in skeptical scenarios could not entertain rational thoughts about their environment, for they would fail to have perceptual states. The secondary aim is to show that this consequence is not a sufficient reason to abandon the variety of disjunctivism presented. The argument for this claim depends on the assessment of rationality attributions to subjects in plausible cases of illusion and some clinical cases of hallucination.

ABSTRACT This paper is an analysis of the manner Nishida Kitarô (1870-1945), in the process of construction of his own philosophy of religion, enters into dialogue with Leibniz's thought concerning Pre-established Harmony. Although the philosophy of religion is an important theme and Nishida goes back to Leibniz at some points in his textual career, there are relatively few studies that touch on the relationship between these two thinkers. I study Nishida's approach under three headings. The first section concerns ten main aspects of the world of pre-established harmony. The second tries to show the manner in which such a world becomes a guide towards a philosophy of religion, placing the emphasis on three characteristically Christian aspects: a created, fallen, and Trinitarian world. The third section includes some elements such as the entrance into religion, metanoia, satori and a comparison between Christian agape and Buddhist maha-kruna. These are themes on which Nishida elaborates in his 1945 masterpiece, The Logic of Basho and a Religious Worldview.

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch on the way Nāgārjuna deals with the idea of 'relation'. The concept of 'relation' as expressed in the Pāli sources is here theoretically systematized according to three patterns: 1. (onto)logical, 2. strictly subordinative existential, 3. non-strictly subordinative existential. After having discussed Nāgārjuna's acceptance and treatment of these three patterns, particular attention is paid to the non-strictly subordinative existential relation. This kind of relation is meant to describe the way the factors of the conditioned co-origination are linked to each other and is exemplified by Nāgārjuna by means of the father-son bond. A possible way to explain the conditioned co-origination doctrine in the light of the father-son example is here suggested by having resource to the 'Cambridge change' theory. Even if in the Pāli Canon the non-strictly subordinative existential pattern is said to apply to all the other factors of the conditioned co-origination, there is no direct evidence that it concerns also the avidyā-saṃskāras link. It will be shown how Nāgārjuna, by applying it to the avidyā-saṃskāras link, seems to introduce a new perspective in the conditioned co-origination theory.

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to discuss how Bruno Bauch deals with the problem of the coordination between empirical concepts and spatiotemporal objects. We shall argue that Bauch reformulates the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions by means of a philosophical consideration of differential calculus and that he thereby explains the possibility of such coordination, avoiding certain difficulties of the Kantian doctrine.

As a discipline, logic is arguably constituted of two main sub-projects: formal theories of argument validity on the basis of a small number of patterns, and theories of how to reduce the multiplicity of arguments in non-logical, informal contexts to the small number of patterns whose validity is systematically studied (i.e. theories of formalization). Regrettably, we now tend to view logic 'proper' exclusively as what falls under the first sub-project, to the neglect of the second, equally important sub-project. In this paper, I discuss two historical theories of argument formalization: Aristotle's syllogistic theory as presented in the "Prior Analytics", and medieval theories of supposition. They both illustrate this two-fold nature of logic, containing in particular illuminating reflections on how to formalize arguments (i.e. the second sub-project). In both cases, the formal methods employed differ from the usual modern technique of translating an argument in ordinary language into a specially designed symbolism, a formal language. The upshot is thus a plea for a broader conceptualization of what it means to formalize.

In the German academies of Nietzsche's period of writing, the Kantian tradition was largely displaced in favor of two independent schools that have since been labeled "Neo-Kantianism." This paper presents four key theses about philosophy of history from four Neo-Kantian thinkers, how they follow from their adaptation of the Kantian tradition, and how Nietzsche critically engaged the very same issues in the formation of his own historical theory. Although there is little direct influence between orthodox Neo-Kantianism and Nietzsche, their comparison on these points will illuminate their unique adaptations of the Kantian tradition.

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar o conceito de vivência (Erlebnis) na filosofia de Nietzsche, desde o seu primeiro emprego em língua alemã, seu significado e a recepção que Nietzsche faz da palavra no interior da sua filosofia. O conceito de Erlebnis, particularmente caro à filosofia de Nietzsche, mas também à fenomenologia, possui originariamente uma tríplice significação: a) a imediatez (Unmittelbarkeit) entre homem e mundo; b) a significabilidade (Bedeutsamkeit) para o caráter global da existência; e c) a incomensurabilidade (Inkommensurabilität) do conteúdo da própria vivência, conferindo a ela também uma dimensão estética. A tríplice significação de Erlebnis implica na sua estreita associação a pathos.This paper aims to analyze the concept of experience (Erlebnis) in the Nietzsche's philosophy, since its first use into the German language, its meaning and reception of Nietzsche inside his philosophy. The concept of Erlebnis, especially dear to the philosophy of Nietzsche, but also to phenomenology, originally has a triple meaning: a) the immediacy (Unmittelbarkeit) between man and world, b) meaningfulness (Bedeutsamkeit) to the global nature of existence and c) incommensurability (Inkommensurabilität) of the experience's content itself, giving it also an aesthetic dimension. The threefold meaning of Erlebnis implies its close association with pathos.

O presente trabalho versa sobre o tema, central no projeto filosófico de Kant, da refutação do idealismo, concentrando-se em dois momentos da Crítica da Razão Pura (CRP): a Dedução Transcendental e a Refutação do Idealismo. Adoto duas hipóteses interpretativas: a primeira, de que a seção da CRP intitulada "Refutação do Idealismo" não esgota o projeto kantiano de uma refutação do idealismo, mas lhe fornece o acabamento, apresentando-se como um desenvolvimento de argumentos aduzidos na Dedução Transcendental. A segunda, de que a refutação kantiana do idealismo assume uma forma bipartida pelo fato de que são essencialmente duas as figuras do idealista que a argumentação implicitamente apresenta como adversário da teoria transcendental do conhecimento. Chamarei essas figuras de idealista cético e idealista da autoconsciência e procurarei demonstrar e discutir a presença, na CRP, de dois distintos movimentos argumentativos anti-idealistas que lhes correspondem nas seções da Refutação e da Dedução. Finalmente, esboçarei a pergunta sobre se e em que medida, entendida na perspectiva de sua forma bipartida, a refutação kantiana completa do idealismo na CRP apresenta uma prova suficiente contra o interlocutor que, apesar de admitir, por hipótese, tanto a possibilidade do conhecimento objetivo quanto seu primado epistêmico em relação à consciência do Eu (consciência dos estados internos ou autoconsciência), subordina o domínio da objetividade à instância transcendental de uma consciência de objetos.This paper concerns about Kant's refutation of idealism and focuses on two chief sections of the Critique of Pure Reason: the Transcendental Deduction and the Refutation of Idealism. I shall argue firstly that the first Critique's section named "Refutation of Idealism", instead of exhausting Kant's project of refuting idealism, constitutes its accomplishment, offering a final deployment for some arguments adduced in the Transcendental Deduction. Secondly, I sustain that the refutation-project has two argumentative stages, since the idealist which is implicitly elected as the opponent of Kant's transcendental epistemology has essentially two faces. I shall term the one "skeptical idealist", and the other "self-consciousness idealist", and I'll endeavor to demonstrate accordingly two anti-idealistic lines of argument, both in the Refutation and in the Deduction. Finally, I shall attempt to assign some meaning to the question if kantian complete refutation of idealism amounts to a sufficient proof against a hypothetical opponent who, even though conceding both the possibility of objective cognition and its epistemic primacy towards self-consciousness, subordinates objectivity to the transcendental instance of a consciousness of objects.

O objetivo do texto é propor uma interpretação do conceito de sublime na Teoria estética de Theodor Adorno, partindo do confronto com leituras significativas de outros comentadores, de modo a fornecer uma concepção que associe o movimento de transcendência e alteridade da forma estética à dinâmica histórico-processual das obras.The objective of this paper is to propose an interpretation of the concept of sublime in the Aesthetic Theory of Theodor Adorno, starting with the confrontation with meaningful readings of other commentators, in order to provide a conception that links the movement of transcendence and otherness of the aesthetic form to the process-historical dynamics of the works.

O presente texto tem como objetivo estabelecer algumas relações entre o poema de Parmênides e as Investigações Lógicas, de Frege. Mais especificamente, nosso objetivo é iluminar certos aspectos do poema de Parmênides por meio de uma comparação com certas noções utilizadas por Frege para caracterizar aspectos centrais de seu pensamento.The aim of this paper is to establish some relationships between Parmenides' Poem and Frege's Logical Investigations. More specifically, our objective is to illuminate some aspects of the Parmenides' Poem by comparing it to certain notions used by Frege in his Logical Investigations.

O objetivo deste artigo é examinar como Montaigne retoma, na sua crítica das filosofias morais e, especialmente, da existência de leis naturais, a proposta por Sexto Empírico acerca do mesmo tema ao final das Hipotiposes Pirronianas. Pretendo mostrar que, para além das consideráveis similaridades, o modo como Montaigne relaciona razão, natureza e costume, confere um perfil próprio à sua reconstrução do pirronismo, particularmente visível na sua compreensão da oposição entre critério de verdade e critério de ação. Igualmente, sustento que essa distinção, proveniente do pirronismo, ocupará um lugar central na sua reflexão moral.The aim of this paper is to investigate how Montaigne adopts, in his own discussion of moral philosophies (and, in particular, of the proponents of natural laws), Sextus Empiricus' criticism on the same topic, as exposed in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I want to show that, besides the deep similarities we can find between them, Montaigne's peculiarities show themselves throughout his way of dealing with relations between reason, costume and nature, as well as in his interpretation of the opposition between a criterion of truth and a practical criterion. I maintain also that this Pyrrhonism notion occupies a prominent place in his moral reflections.

O presente artigo consiste em uma leitura do capítulo "Sobre versos de Virgílio". A primeira parte compara o amor com a amizade, questionando a tese de que a superioridade da última em relação ao primeiro é afirmada sem reservas por Montaigne. A segunda parte desenvolve uma interpretação do capítulo guiada pelas noções de "regra", "lei", "norma" e seus correlatos e identifica, a partir das diferentes perspectivas com que Montaigne aborda o assunto, três tipos de "regra": as regras dos homens, as do amor e as do próprio autor dos Ensaios. Pretendemos mostrar que, embora fale muito das mulheres, o capítulo é, sobretudo, uma reflexão sobre a condição masculina.This paper presents a reading on the chapter "Upon some verses of Virgil". Its first part compares love and friendship and questions the thesis that for Montaigne the latter is superior to the former. The second part consists of an interpretation of the chapter guided by the notions of "rule", "law", "norm" and their correlates, and identifies, taking into account the different perspectives in which Montaigne develops the matter, three different kinds of rules - those of men, those of love and those of the Essays' author himself. It intends to show that, although "Upon some verses of Virgil" is a chapter that speaks much about women, it is mainly a reflexion about men and the masculine condition.

Este artigo investiga o ensaio "Que philosopher c'est apprendre a mourir", de Michel de Montaigne. Trata-se de um texto que é um bom exemplo da forma como o filósofo rejeita a tradição metafísica na qual o problema da morte sempre foi pensado. Mostramos que a originalidade deste ensaio reside no fato de Montaigne nos aconselhar a seguir a natureza, que, em seu pensamento, se confunde com o costume.This paper investigates the essay "Que philosopher c'est apprendre a mourir", by Michel de Montaigne. This text is a good example of how the philosopher rejects the metaphysical tradition in which the problem of death has always been thought. We expose that the originality of this essay lies in the fact that Montaigne advises us to follow nature, which, in his thought, is indistinguishable from custom.

A partir da correlação, postulada pelo pensamento de Michel Foucault, entre o exercício do poder e a manifestação da verdade, o presente artigo pretende retraçar as exigências políticas de sua filosofia, relacionando-as com a figura de um tipo intelectual que tem por função não mais a defesa da universalidade, mas sim sua transgressão política e teórica - quer dizer: "política" porque "teórica".From the correlation, postulated by the thought of Michel Foucault, between the exercise of the power and manifestation of the truth, this paper aims to retrace the political demands of his philosophy, linking them to the figure of an intellectual type who has no more basis for the defense of universality, but its political and theoretical transgression - it means: "political" because "theoretical".