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This paper studies the Rwandan case to address some of the challenges and pitfalls in defining pro-poor strategies. The paper first looks at the danger of a purely growth-led development focus (as in Rwanda's first PRSP), and evaluates the extent to which the agricultural sector has been a pro-poor growth engine. It then studies Rwanda's current rural policies, which aim to modernise and 'professionalise' the rural sector. There is a high risk that these rural policy measures will be at the expense of the large mass of small-scale peasants. This paper stresses that the real challenge to transform the rural sector into a true pro-poor growth engine will be to value and incorporate the capacity and potential of small-scale 'non-professional' peasants into the core strategies for rural development. The lessons drawn from the Rwandan case should inspire policy makers and international donors worldwide to shift their focus away from a purely output-led logic towards distribution-oriented rural development policies. In other words, the challenge is to reconcile efficiency in creating economic growth with equity, and perhaps, to put equity first. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are sensitive issues in relations between donor agencies and recipient governments, especially in a time when the responsibility for implementing aid activities is shifting towards recipients. This paper deplores that, so far, donors and recipients have adopted an overly technocratic approach to M&E, largely disregarding broader institutional and systemic issues. Using case study material from Rwanda, we illustrate that assessments regarding the quality of a country's M&E efforts may differ sharply depending upon one's perspective. At the core of the matter is 'the denial of politics', one of the most serious flaws in the new aid paradigm promoted in the OECD's 2005 'Paris Declaration'. We argue that while a narrowly defined technocratic vision of M&E may seem 'politically neutral', in fact it may jeopardise M&E's functions of 'accountability' and 'feedback'. This can eventually undermine the effective implementation of some of the key principles of the 'new aid approach'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sierra Leone has recently emerged from a long period of political instability and civil war, and is ranked among the world's poorest countries. Thousands of displaced people are in the process of returning to their villages to rebuild their mainly farming-based livelihoods, and many are growing food crops for the first time in a decade. With pressure on food production increasing in rural areas, the inland valley swamps have been identified by the government as a vital resource for sustaining rural livelihoods and achieving food security through the production of rice and other commodities. However, previous government policies directed at enhanced wetland production have largely failed to achieve their goals, and have been criticised for neglecting the institutional challenges of development. Drawing on recent fieldwork carried out in two rural communities in the Eastern Province, this paper considers how institutional arrangements function in Sierra Leone's swamp wetlands, and explores how stresses associated with a post-conflict environment are shaping land-use decisions and mediating access to resources in new ways. The findings of the enquiry have implications for Sierra Leone's recently adopted commitment to decentralisation, a move that has, in theory, seen the state strengthen its position at the local level, and will allegedly create new spaces for increased interaction between state agencies, traditional leaders and communities. Two institutional challenges are examined - access to land and access to labour - that must be addressed if decentralised reforms to resource management are to be effective for wetland rice production. The analysis concludes by considering one recent initiative at the forefront of efforts to decentralise the Ministry of Agriculture, the 'Agricultural Business Unit' (ABU) initiative, to elucidate some of the challenges faced in post-conflict wetland rehabilitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]