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This paper summarizes the state of affairs regarding formal and quantitative studies on decision-making in the Council of the European Union. We compare recent empirical studies in the field and distinguish between work that utilizes actors' ideal preferences, their revealed positions in the bargaining process, and their subsequent voting records in the area of EU legislative politics. We argue that document analysis remains an underemployed tool that could help formal modellers in confronting their theories with quantitative empirical information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the potential of the open method of co-ordination (OMC) and of laboratory federalism for policy innovation and learning in a multi-level system of jurisdictions. Our analysis shows that both can be seen as institutions that establish processes of generating and spreading new knowledge about appropriate public policies. However, the respective learning mechanisms are very different: in laboratory federalism learning takes place through a purely non-centralized process of experimentation with different new policies. In comparison, the OMC relies on a benchmarking process carried out on a higher-level jurisdiction from which, in a rather centralized way, policy recommendations are derived. In both cases, serious learning problems resulting from limited transferability of experiences gained with policies and from lacking or distorting incentives arise. We find that to fully use their potential the OMC should become an integral part of laboratory federalism, thus supporting the smooth working of yardstick, interjurisdictional and regulatory competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All political systems must have a means of deciding which issues to consider and which should be left alone. Further, governments must decide what particular conception of the policy they will consider, given that there are often several alternatives. The European Community is no different but has a number of characteristics that influence the manner in which agenda-setting occurs. The fundamental argument of this paper is that these characteristics permit the EC to consider a wider range of policies and policy alternatives than might an individual nation state. The principal factors discussed are the fragmentation of the policy-making system, the presence of a number of influential policy advocates, and the availability of a range of alternatives from member nations. This apparent ability to search for superior alternatives is in contrast to negative characterizations of the implementation in the EC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did two rounds of EU constitutional reform held within a five-year period yield very different results? The 2000 IGC resulted in the modest Treaty of Nice, whereas the 2002-04 round drafted the Constitutional Treaty which, although it did not involve major substantive changes, did mark a major symbolic step forward. This article argues that the change in outcomes can to a large degree be explained by the change in negotiating structure due to the use of a convention that drafted most of the Constitutional Treaty's text, creating a context which privileged MEPs. While the outer bounds of the possible were set by governments, the EP was able to build coalitions around ambitious yet realistic positions, leading to a final text that was a major symbolic step forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British government's position in the 1996 IGC will reflect long-standing policy positions that have been shared by both main parties. This consistency in policy was partly masked by the tone of British statements on Europe during the Thatcher premierships. However, there was a change of tone when Major came to office, and this was followed by successful British diplomacy in the 1991 IGC on political union, with the result that, on the issues that are under discussion in the 1996 IGC, Britain is largely a status quo state. The government will resist far-reaching changes to the Treaty on European Union, especially any erosion of the three-pillar structure and any further extension of the competences of the European Community. However, it will want to see institutional changes agreed that will pave the way to further enlargement. In these objectives it is likely to find allies because the European Union as a whole has been moving in the British direction since Maastricht, because of public hostility to further integration, the collapse of the federalist coalition, and the 1995 enlargement. However, the influence of Conservative backbenchers is making it more difficult for the present government to adopt the right tone in negotiations. The policies of the Labour Party do not differ markedly from those of the Conservatives, except on social policy, and if there is a change of government before the end of the IGC, the removal of the so-called 'Euro- sceptic' influence on the diplomatic tone of the government might help Britain to achieve its objectives even more successfully than the present government could. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the research agenda section of the periodical "Journal of European Public Policy.

This article examines the Commission's preferences and preference formation in relation to the Convention and the negotiation of the Constitutional Treaty. Opposing rational choice accounts, which explain Commission action in terms of the tendency of bureaucratic actors to seek to maximize power, status and opportunities, it argues that the Commission is best seen as an internally differentiated arena, from which preferences emerge as a result of complex interactions that entail the use of power, institutionalized myths and routines. It contends that the Commission was an ineffective performer in the debate on the future of Europe. As well as committing tactical and strategic mistakes, the Commission was disadvantaged by the explicitly political nature of the exercise and the opportunity structure of the Convention compared to previous IGCs. A third argument is that the ratification and post-ratification process reveal the current limitations on the Commission's ability to influence debates about the future of the Union. Its historic vocation as the engine of integration implies one course of action, while being cast as part of the problem suggests another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to liberal intergovernmentalism the outcome of EU negotiations is determined by the constellation of member state interests without needing any formal leadership. This article reviews this 'self-clearing thesis' in the context of the 2003-04 IGC. It further examines what impact the European Convention, which prepared a comprehensive draft Constitutional Treaty, has had on these negotiations. Three roles of the Italian and the Irish Presidency leading the 2003-04 IGC are analysed: managing the scope of the negotiations' agenda, brokering efficient deals and promoting specific interests. Little evidence is found that the Presidencies really made a substantial difference in brokering the eventual deals or in promoting their own interests. However, the presence of the Convention's draft allowed the Presidencies to adopt an agenda management strategy that changed the nature of the negotiations and the power configuration of interests and thus radically departed from those normally applying at IGCs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Did the Chairman of the European Convention, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (VGE), shape this body's deliberation toward an outcome that would not have occurred otherwise? I contend that VGE was able to influence the form of the Convention's outcome and to some extent its content on issues of minor importance, but not its very substance on institutional matters. Drawing on functional approaches to leadership, I argue that the Convention's rules of procedure constituted an original negotiation setting that allowed the Chairman to wield influence through setting the agenda. But the more the Convention approached institutional questions, the less he was able to generate the preconditions for his leadership. The Convention ultimately turned into an IGC-like, unanimous negotiation setting without any room for the Chairman's influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the impact of European integration on French political institutions. In particular, it assesses the way in which the scrutiny of European affairs has affected and changed relations between the legislative and the executive. Contrary to previous work, we show that simple principal-agent models are difficult to apply to the French case, provided there are two directly elected institutions. Together with the relatively low salience of European issues in French public opinion, this explains why the scrutiny of European affairs has not given way to any substantial renegotiation of legislative-executive relations in France. The overall weakness of the French Parliament has finally been demonstrated with regard to European affairs, despite a substantial formal increase in powers of scrutiny since the Maastricht Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Across a broad range of sectors, Europe is increasingly shaping global public policy. Existing research stressing the importance of market size for international regulatory influence cannot satisfactorily account for this. We contend that the rise of the regulatory state within Europe has significant international implications, augmenting Europe's ability to shape global market rules. The article develops an institutional explanation of regulatory influence stressing domestic regulatory capacity. An analysis of two hotly contested transatlantic policy fields - data privacy and financial market regulation - provides a first test of the argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The technical and institutional achievements of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (EMU) are just the necessary condition for its overall success: the sufficient condition implies a widespread acceptance of the spillover effects triggered by EMU for other areas of economic policy-making, such as possible redistributive effects across euro-area member states. The article notes that much of the recent academic debate on EMU's legitimacy can be reduced to differences in assumptions on those effects. It thus calls for resuming the debate with a specific emphasis on analysing data that would provide information on observable spillover effects from EMU and allow for more solid arguments in that debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the normative connotation of European foreign policy and makes three points. First, through the criteria of inclusiveness and reflexivity, it draws a distinction between ‘normative power Europe’ and Europe as a ‘civilizing power’. Second, the article puts forward a sociological institutionalist interpretation of the EU as a ‘civilizing power’. It suggests that much of the EU's action can be characterized as an unreflexive attempt to promote its own model because institutions tend to export institutional isomorphism as a default option. Third, the article shows the utility of a sociological institutionalist analysis by examining the case of the EU's promotion of regionalism in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Diplomacy as a framework of principles, rules and organized patterns of behaviour regulating interstate relations in the Westphalian system of states is challenged by the process of European integration. This article conceptualizes diplomacy and its change using two new institutionalist perspectives that provide us with complementary insights into the nature of diplomacy as an institution. These are then applied to the study of diplomacy in the EU. The process of European integration is shown as challenging the institution of diplomacy at three levels: (a) the intra-European bilateral relations; (b) the multilateral setting of the Council; and (c) the emerging capacity of the EU to conduct external diplomatic relations with third states. The article assesses change in and of diplomacy at these levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the debate on the domestic consequences of European integration by focusing on three aspects often neglected in the literature. First, while most works deal with the policy dimension of Europeanization, we develop a set of research hypotheses on its polity and politics implications. Its consequences on the institutions of the decision-making process, on élite conflictuality and on domestic power configuration are examined. Secondly, close attention is paid to the transmission mechanisms at work by comparing the effects of 'direct' and 'indirect' Europeanization to a control case where European influences are only minimal. Thirdly, we provide empirical evidence from a non-EU member country (Switzerland), a type of state for which the consequences of Europeanization are still little explored. Based on a quantitative network analysis, our empirical tests reveal some important differences in the effects of direct and indirect Europeanization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The volume examines changes in regulatory rules, organizations and policies across several European countries and policy domains, why these changes have taken place and their consequences. The 'regulatory state' hypothesis suggests that regulatory reforms involve a new mode of governance in Europe, with alterations in state functions, political arenas, institutions, actors and policy styles. The volume finds that although several features put forward by the 'regulatory state' model have spread, they remain limited and there is great diversity across countries and domains. It analyses the reasons for this, notably variation in international pressures for change and mediation by national factors. It looks at the effects of regulatory reform on participation in regulatory politics, relationships among actors, economic, social and market outcomes. An analytical framework based on different 'regulatory regimes' offers the best route forward to analyse regulatory reform across countries and sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do legitimating discourses matter for a country's successful adjustment to economic policy change? Or can adjustment more simply be explained by the interplay of economic and political interests, path dependency, or cultural framing? This article argues that discourse - defined as constituting both a set of policy ideas and values and an interactive process of policy construction and communication - matters, and that it can be shown in some instances to exert a causal influence over and above the interplay of interests, institutions, and culture. In illustration, the article examines critical shifts in the political-economic discourses and policy programs of France and Britain, presenting them as matched cases. It finds that while in Britain the presence of an effective legitimating discourse accompanying economic policy change proved transformative, in France the absence of such a discourse until relatively recently proved problematic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last decade the Dutch telecommunications regime has twice been radically transformed. The nature of these reforms and their implications for the autonomy of the nation state vis-a-vis the Commission as well as business are often the subject of dubious generalizations and high-level macro-analysis. By distinguishing between four micro-policy regimes (etatist, liberal, intergovernmental and supranational) and two cases of reform (terminal type-approval and interconnection), this article sheds light on the complexities of the process of liberalization and the Europeanization of public policy. While type-approval is a clear case of deregulation (fewer rules, freer markets), interconnection is an equally clear case of reregulation (more rules, freer markets). At the same time, while the case of type-approval reflects a diminution in the role of both the Dutch state and the European Commission, the case of interconnection reflects a situation in which both strengthen their capacities and therefore also their autonomy. The complexity of this picture does not mean that one should adopt a middle-of-the-road attitude to the issue of state power and autonomy. The future of the Dutch economy and of national competitiveness in the 'information age' still depends on the policies and capacities of the Dutch state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the employment title in the Amsterdam treaty, with the aim of uncovering the role of transnational coalitions. The perspectives of transnational coalition-building and policy-making, in the European Union, are combined to shed light on transnational strategies of influence. Such strategies were employed by political parties and trade unions. They are treated as linkage actors in a transmission system, or belt, linking the domestic and supranational levels to one another. Institutions in the European Union are conceived of as both carriers of their own strategies and access points. By identifying support and initiatives on the part of governments, an attempt is also made to assess the relative importance of intergovernmental and transnational channels. A temporal dimension is thus injected. In conclusion, it can be shown that the employment title was to a large extent a result of a transnational policy contribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Protecting diffuse interests has long been recognized as a central challenge in any system of governance, and has proven problematic in the European Community (EC) as well. Indeed, a number of analysts have argued that the EC is a 'businessman's Europe,' privileging concentrated and mobile capital over other interests and precipitating a deregulatory 'race to the bottom.' EC institutions, however, present opportunities as well as risks for diffuse interests such as environmentalists, consumers, and women. In particular, the institutions of the EC-characterized by both multiple tiers of government and by a separation of powers at the Community level - provide diffuse interests with multiple points of access, which they have used effectively to secure the adoption and the implementation of EC policies. These arguments are illustrated through a brief examination of EC policies in the areas of environmental protection, consumer protection, and women's rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This analysis of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) sets out to assess the CoR's external impact and its internal impact since it began to function in 1994. The article addresses these questions in two parts. The first and main part focuses on the external impact of the CoR with particular emphasis on inter-institutional relations and its impact on European Union (EU) policy-making. This part is mainly based on empirical evidence from interviews with European Commission officials. The second part analyses the CoR's internal impact in terms of the interplay between its heterogeneous membership, its diverse political cultures and socialization among its members. The article concludes that while CoR's formal impact on EU policy outputs has been minimal, its real added-value lies in its unique resources which could have potentially important implications for both the subnational and supranational levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central argument of this article is that the European Commission has consolidated its role as a 'policy entrepreneur' but that it must pay attention also to its role as a 'policy manager'. The Commission's capacity for management is much weaker than its power of initiative because it lacks sizeable bureaucratic resources and largely implements policies through a system of shared administration with the member states. The Commission's financial management reform programme which was launched by President Santer when he took over from President Delors provides the focus of this article. The expansion of the budget and the saliency of fraud underlined the need for the Commission to enhance its management of EU finances. The programme involves reform enhancing the self-regulation of the Commission (internal reform) and the development of administrative partnerships with the member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the link between fifteen national parliaments and decision-making in the EU Council of Ministers. The main purpose is to provide a comparative account of EU Affairs Committees and the national advisory processes of scrutiny and co-ordination that occur before a national government takes an official policy position in the Council. However, the variation that exists among the fifteen member states also raises the question of what explains it. In the second half of the article, it is argued that explanations of the variation should start from the complementary aspects of major interdisciplinary schools of thought such as culture theory, institutionalism and rational choice. This leads to a number of interesting new research questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France traditionally attempted to achieve its national objectives via the medium of European integration by means of a strategy of playing a leading role in shaping institutional and policy developments at the European level. Behind this strategy lay a tension between a desire for a strong Europe and an unwillingness to cede national autonomy to European institutions. However, at least until the end of the 1980s, this tension was successfully ignored and France's European policy proved to be relatively successful. Since that time, however, increasing pressures have brought this tension to the fore. Faced with a need to respond to altered circumstances within the European Union (EU), President Chirac has responded uncertainly. As a result, and for the first time since the 1940s, France faces the prospect of losing the leading role it has traditionally played within European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines some of the processes conditioning both policy stability and policy change. It focuses on how established policy communities (usually associated with policy stability) can exist alongside a powerful dynamic of change within the policy subsystem. By listing and analysing agents of exogenous and endogenous stability and change, it is concluded that the concepts of epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions and choice of 'image' and 'venue' are useful in explaining the co-existence of stability and change. In the case of British trunk roads policy, this stability and change can be explained by the development of the road and environmental lobbies as rival adversarial policy communities operating in separate and competing policy arenas. The article concludes that, although one of the adversarial communities may hold an advantage over the other at a particular time, the scope for action in a number of different policy-making arenas makes it unlikely that it will retain supremacy over time. Radical change is most likely to be brought about by factors exogenous to policy communities such as scientific and technological developments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two perspectives dominate in the debate on European integration policy in the unified Germany. The first focuses on domestic inter-institutional tensions and ideological inhibitions that restrict German leadership in the European Union. By contrast, the second highlights the dominant position of the German economy and the weakening of external constraints in the wake of unification. Both perspectives point to important aspects of integration policy, but neither takes sufficient account of the Europeanization of the German state. Europeanization suggests that over the past decades Germany's key public institutions have become progressively programmed for integration. This has implications for analysing German policy in the run-up to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Specifically, Europeanization calls into question the distinction between mainstream domestic policy and integration policy; the idea of a national interest that exists prior to, and independently of, an interest in integration; and the notion of external constraints on leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The completion of the internal market reduces the capacity of member states to shape the collective fate of their citizens through their own policies, while the policy-making capacity of the European Community cannot be increased sufficiently to compensate for the loss of state control at the national level. If European economic integration nevertheless depends on policy co-ordination, there is a need for co-ordination techniques which impose minimal constraints on the autonomous problem-solving capacities of member states. These depend, in turn, on the willingness of member states to pursue their own policy goals in ways which impose minimal constraints on free movement within the European market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]