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Its monopoly power to formulate policy proposals and set the European Union's (EU's) legislative agenda guarantees the European Commission considerable prominence in EU legislative studies. It is commonly conceptualized as a unitary actor, acting cohesively - often in its own supranational interest - in EU decision-making. Recent theoretical developments and empirical studies, however, cast doubt on this conceptualization. This paper takes up these matters and investigates the decision-making mechanisms and dynamics of the Commission's executive politics. Two case studies show that the formal division of power along portfolios puts formally responsible Commissioners in a privileged position to influence the content of legislative proposals in internal decision-making. This influence, however, is circumscribed by the opposition of other Commissioners. At least in the cases studied here, Commissioners' position-taking and conflict in internal decision-making follow a national and, to some extent, a sectoral rather than a partisan pattern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The indicators developed for the open method of co-ordination (OMC) in social inclusion might, according to their authors, serve to establish a common language for the discussion of social inclusion issues, set the agenda for inclusion policies, and provide benchmarks for the identification of best practices. To examine whether ‘learning by numbers’ is taking place, this paper scrutinizes the use of the indicators in the area of child poverty and exclusion. The discussion uses a theoretical account of the institutional preconditions for the transmission of OMC-based learning into the policy processes of member states which distinguishes between ‘normal policy-making’ and ‘paradigm shifts’. The indicators are designed to contribute to the advance of knowledge about normal policy-making, but it is shown that the OMC/inclusion disseminates a new policy paradigm which bears little relationship to the indicators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been an expansion of research on policy learning in different subfields. The methodological and empirical work continues to face challenges in determining the constitutive elements that foster such transformations in governance through learning. Careful attention needs to be paid to the regularities and patterns, as well as the limits, contingencies and incongruities that shape or hinder the diffusion of cross-national and cross-temporal rules, norms and institutions. In looking at the policy cycle, the process of policy learning focuses predominantly on the organizational environment, the modes of learning, and the implementation effects, without acknowledging the normative implications in terms of accountability and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the main temporal factors impacting on the European Commission and sheds light on its particular relationship to time. By way of illustration, it discusses two relatively recent, but increasingly significant, features of the Commission's work: its planning and programming cycle and its use of impact assessments. These two techniques are at the core of the Commission's quest for exemplary management and of its endeavour to promote 'better regulation' principles. Taken together, they can transform EU policy-making and bring about a greater predictability and transparency of EU action. They cannot, however, fully capture the more political and discretionary role of the Commission, which must adapt to a diverse and changing EU agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the potential of the open method of co-ordination (OMC) and of laboratory federalism for policy innovation and learning in a multi-level system of jurisdictions. Our analysis shows that both can be seen as institutions that establish processes of generating and spreading new knowledge about appropriate public policies. However, the respective learning mechanisms are very different: in laboratory federalism learning takes place through a purely non-centralized process of experimentation with different new policies. In comparison, the OMC relies on a benchmarking process carried out on a higher-level jurisdiction from which, in a rather centralized way, policy recommendations are derived. In both cases, serious learning problems resulting from limited transferability of experiences gained with policies and from lacking or distorting incentives arise. We find that to fully use their potential the OMC should become an integral part of laboratory federalism, thus supporting the smooth working of yardstick, interjurisdictional and regulatory competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commercial consultancies in the realm of public affairs and interest intermediation have become an important player within the European Union. This paper presents findings from a survey of commercial interest intermediation. It illustrates that the business has grown and established itself gradually as an accepted and legitimate route of monitoring and influencing European policy-making. Moreover, we perceive that a certain integration and concentration of the business is under way at the European and global level. It is argued that these developments have an impact on European interest intermediation, first, because this business makes public affairs and interest intermediation more systematic, plural and competitive, and, second, because the business serves as an interface between European and global, internal and external affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the dramatic restructuring of the telecommunications sector during the 1980s and continuing through the present decade. The European Commission has worked hard for that restructuring, but the activities of the Commission can hardly be explained using the standard analytical repertoire found in international relations or comparative political research. After a look at the state of current integration theory, the article analyses the role of the Commission in the field of telecommunications taking the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) initiative as an example. It argues that the Commission has worked eagerly and successfully to extend its prerogative. The Commission's approach, however, has swung between the impulse to develop industrial policies under the active guidance of the Commission and the aim of liberalizing and deregulating markets. Policy-making in the Community is not straightforward, but takes place in a system of multi-level governance. Levels of policy-making and interdependence are identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All political systems must have a means of deciding which issues to consider and which should be left alone. Further, governments must decide what particular conception of the policy they will consider, given that there are often several alternatives. The European Community is no different but has a number of characteristics that influence the manner in which agenda-setting occurs. The fundamental argument of this paper is that these characteristics permit the EC to consider a wider range of policies and policy alternatives than might an individual nation state. The principal factors discussed are the fragmentation of the policy-making system, the presence of a number of influential policy advocates, and the availability of a range of alternatives from member nations. This apparent ability to search for superior alternatives is in contrast to negative characterizations of the implementation in the EC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relation between policies, institutions and time by addressing the case of eastern enlargement policy and the European Commission. Our main question is how the special challenges and requirements of EU eastern enlargement policy impacted on the administrative level of the Commission, i.e. the level in charge of structuring, monitoring and steering the policy's implementation. We provide empirical data on institutional change in the Commission from the mid-1990s until 2004 and examine temporal categories at both the policy level and the institutional level. This analysis shows that - especially the temporal - requirements of enlargement policy drove the Commission to adapt its internal organization and time management; internal structures and procedures changed; actors were bound in a temporal grid. This allowed the mobilization of the actors and the in-time synchronization of their input. On the whole, our results open a new perspective on institutional change and time in the context of European governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers what light historical institutionalism (HI) may be able to shed on the European Union's (EU's) timescape. Drawing on Paul Pierson's work Politics in Time it reviews what HI has to say about the dual dynamics of path dependent incremental development and radical change (termed punctuated equilibrium or critical junctures) as well as relating to timing, sequencing and long-term processes. It then suggests three areas of EU studies for exploring these contrasting dynamics, namely the integration process as a whole, EU policy dynamics and Europeanization. Applications of HI in EU studies have tended to be empirical and have often neglected to engage with the temporal theorizing embraced by Pierson. The special issue's appeal for a new research agenda on the EU timescape offers the opportunity, it is argued, to rectify the insufficiency of theoretical reflection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classic partisan theory posits that political parties translate their electorates' preferences into policies. Accordingly, the recent changes in left parties' voter base, from predominantly working-class to middle-class voters, should have resulted in changing policy positions and policy effects of left parties. We test this expectation for economic policies (i.e., subsidies, product market regulation, and privatization) in 16 European countries between 1980 and 2012. We find the expected relationships for subsidies but not for regulation and privatization. This can be explained by the fact that only with regard to subsidies, preferences substantially differ between the working- and the middle-class. Thus, economic policy preferences of voters of left parties diverge less than could be expected. Methodologically, the study suggests that empirically testing the complete causal mechanism of classic partisan theory, assessing voters' preferences and investigating more than one issue area, are promising ways to study partisan effects on public policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the research agenda section of the periodical "Journal of European Public Policy.

Introduces the articles published in the April 2005 special issue of the periodical "Journal of European Public Policy," which serves as special tribute to the late Ernst B. Haas, one of the greatest European integration study thinker. Topics of the articles; Authors who contributed to the issue.

The last decades have witnessed a significant shift in policy competences away from central governments in Europe. The reallocation of competences spans over three dimensions: upwards; sideways; and downwards. This collection takes the dispersion of powers as a starting point and seeks to assess how the actors involved cope with the new configurations. In this introduction, we discuss the conceptualization of power dispersion and highlight the ways in which the contributions add to this research agenda. We then outline some general conclusions and end by indicating future avenues of research. Taken together, the collection contributes some answers to the challenge of defining and measuring – in a comparative way – the control and co-ordination mechanisms which power dispersion generates. It also explores the tension between political actors' quest for autonomy and the acknowledgement of their interdependence whilst revealing how, as power dispersion deepens, central governments have sought to both manage and limit it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The manner in which time is institutionalized is critical to how a political system works. Terms, time budgets and time horizons of collective and individual political actors; rights over timing, sequencing and speed in decision-making; and the temporal properties of policy matter to the distribution of power; efficiency and effectiveness of policy-making; and democratic legitimacy. This article makes a case for the systematic study of political time in the European Union (EU) - both as an independent and a dependent variable - and highlights the analytical value-added of a time-centred analysis. The article discusses previous scholarship on the institutionalization of political time and its consequences along the dimensions of polity, politics and policy; and then reviews dominant perspectives on political time, which centre on power, system performance and legitimacy. These perspectives tie in with diverse theoretical traditions in the study of the EU. Taken together, dimensions, perspectives and theories help to guide time-centred analyses of the EU political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pension privatization trend that swept Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) between 1998 and 2004 presents a conundrum when viewed from the perspective of European Union (EU) enlargement. While these reforms took place at around the same time as EU accession, the EU did not use its formidable membership conditionality to impose them on CEE accession states. This article reviews the major causal explanations for pension privatization in CEE and finds that a critical factor was the transnational policy campaign launched by the World Bank and allied organizations in the mid-1990s. Pension privatization appealed to CEE accession states because it was significantly more 'liberal' than EU social policy norms. Pension privatization enabled CEE liberals to out-liberalize the EU in an effort to further a low-wage, low-cost development strategy and attempt to exert leadership in EU economic policy-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inspired by the experience of Eastern enlargement, much of the academic debate on EU external relations and the European neighbourhood policy conceives of external influence in terms of the Union's ability to induce third countries' adaptation to predetermined EU norms and regulations. This article introduces a more structural perspective on EU external influence that scrutinizes the institutional extension of sector-specific governance frameworks beyond EU membership. Whereas the traditional notion of influence only focuses on the shift of the EU's regulatory boundary, extended governance involves also the opening up of organizational structures within the relevant policy field. These new forms of horizontal flexible integration are made possible through the internal flexibilization of the modes of policy-making within the EU, and, in particular, the advent of network governance. Despite its integrative potential, case studies from three policy sectors also document that, under current circumstances, extended network governance is not void of hegemonic traits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on selected pieces from the growing literature on international migration to Europe from a regional and policy-making perspective. The analysis identifies lessons from the European experience with respect to two issues: the relationship between policies of regional integration and international migration, and the conditions under which a common (regional) policy of incorporation of immigrants into the host societies might be agreed upon. The purpose is twofold: to provide a critical assessment of the state of the art and to advance the debate through the suggestion of new research venues. We argue that most of the selected literature misses the relation of mutual causation between migration and regional integration policies, partly due to an overemphasis on the benefits of supranational institutionalization, and partly due to the difficulties of conceptualizing the hybrid character of the EU institutional supranationality and the peculiar nature of its politics of migration. We also suggest exploring a distinctive process that characterizes the migration policy area: ‘hauled’ policy convergence; that is, the development of a common policy which occurs largely because it is necessary for other dimensions of the regional integration process to continue, but which countries are reluctant to engage in. In other words, hauled convergence is the minimum policy harmonization needed in a very sensitive policy area (such as migration) for regional integration to advance deeper and further in other areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The technical and institutional achievements of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (EMU) are just the necessary condition for its overall success: the sufficient condition implies a widespread acceptance of the spillover effects triggered by EMU for other areas of economic policy-making, such as possible redistributive effects across euro-area member states. The article notes that much of the recent academic debate on EMU's legitimacy can be reduced to differences in assumptions on those effects. It thus calls for resuming the debate with a specific emphasis on analysing data that would provide information on observable spillover effects from EMU and allow for more solid arguments in that debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU's ‘semi-pluralist’ policy-making processes have had a differential impact on its member states' policy-making processes as a matter of institutional ‘fit’, with greater disruption to the statist systems of France and Britain than to the corporatist systems of Germany and Italy. Such ‘macro’ patterns of adjustment to the EU are complicated, however, by the ‘micro’ patterns of policy-making in any given policy sector. These may differ from the ‘macro’ pattern at EU or national level. This raises the question of whether we can still talk about Europeanization in terms of ‘macro’ patterns of national policy-making. This article answers in the affirmative, demonstrating with the matched pairs of cases of France and Britain, Germany and Italy, that despite the fact that national patterns are less distinctive than in the past, they nevertheless remain distinguishable along a continuum from statist through corporatist, although pluralism has become a new default option in between the two. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and the various events following the negative referenda provide an excellent occasion for reconsidering the real meaning of European integration. Paradoxically, the integration process is often praised for its clumsy and ultimately unsuccessful attempts to mimic the nation state, while its truly important contribution to European civilization – the establishment of a supranational constitutional order – is belittled or even ignored. An example of this distorted vision is the debate on the so-called democratic deficit – a condition which could be easily corrected if a majority of Europeans supported a supranational federal state. Since it is obvious that no such majority exists, now or in the foreseeable future, the ‘democratic deficit’, however defined, is the price we pay for wishing to integrate our national economies while preserving the core of national sovereignty. The current crisis is methodological rather than systemic: it amounts to a rejection of the stealthy approach to European integration – cryptofederalism – which has entailed the triumph of process over outcome. The legitimacy problem of the EU can be solved by limiting, rather than continuously expanding, the competences of the supranational institutions.The institutional system established by the founding fathers was not designed for effective policy-making, but largely to pursue objectives of negative integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the debate on the domestic consequences of European integration by focusing on three aspects often neglected in the literature. First, while most works deal with the policy dimension of Europeanization, we develop a set of research hypotheses on its polity and politics implications. Its consequences on the institutions of the decision-making process, on élite conflictuality and on domestic power configuration are examined. Secondly, close attention is paid to the transmission mechanisms at work by comparing the effects of 'direct' and 'indirect' Europeanization to a control case where European influences are only minimal. Thirdly, we provide empirical evidence from a non-EU member country (Switzerland), a type of state for which the consequences of Europeanization are still little explored. Based on a quantitative network analysis, our empirical tests reveal some important differences in the effects of direct and indirect Europeanization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares the institutionalization of central ministerial executives in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland since the late 1980s. Under communism, the policy formation and arbitration function of the central state apparatus was weakly developed; at the same time, the state bureaucracy was comprehensively politicized, as personnel policy emphasized political loyalty and reliability. In policy terms, state administration was 'under-politicized', in personnel terms 'over-politicized'. Against this background, the key challenge of post-communist executive institutionalization has been to 'governmentalize' the executive, i.e. to build up its policy-making capacity and to professionalize its staff. Executive reform has, accordingly, centred on attempts to concentrate policy formation in the central executive; to create a capable core executive around the prime minister and the minister of finance; and to establish a career civil service. But this reform agenda has yielded mixed results and the configuration of central executives remains unstable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines domestic policy responses to processes of 'Europeanization' by discussing recent reforms in competition law in the UK and Germany. The article argues that the concept of 'lesson-drawing' can be usefully employed in the discussion policy reforms which use as their referent a 'European model'. The article provides a detailed account of the reform processes and investigates the extent of Europeanization in policy content. It is suggested that while the 'tunes' of competition policy may have become more similar, they remain nationally distinct. The analysis finally offers some suggestions about lesson-drawing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reform of the European Community's regional policies in the mid 1980s had its intellectual origins in theories of endogenous development and cumulative causation. These ideas shaped proposals put forward by the European Commission as early as the 1960s and provided the substance of the 1985 and 1988 reforms. The reforms were 'sold' politically, however, as part of the overall Single Market project, which was itself based on a very different economic model. The resulting contradiction goes far in explaining the perceived implementation failures of the regional policy reforms. In analysing this case, we seek to further and to refine the ongoing inquiry into the role of ideas and intellectual models in concrete policy-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do European policies affect national policy-making patterns and problem-solving capacity, and to what extent do national policy-makers seek to influence European politics? In particular, what impact does European road haulage policy have on national policy within the context of the Single Market Programme (SMP)? How can the domestic policy response of four member states - Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy - be explained with respect to the national policy background, problem-solving approach, policy instruments, and patterns of interest intermediation? While the policy responses of Britain and the Netherlands reveal congruence and confirmation, those of Germany and Italy indicate respectively change and resistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The word independent in the United States (US) context is most properly used in connection with the independent regulatory commissions. Those commissions are not independent of Congressional control. Both the commissions and the agencies of the regular cabinet departments live in a regime of statutory duties under which Congressional statutes not presidential policies control much of their behavior. Both are subject to judicial review. Commissions basically are independent in the sense that they are usually not subject to the complete control by commissioners of one political party. They are somewhat independent of the President in that no single President has appointed all the commissioners of a particular commission and commissioners may only be dismissed by the President for cause. American experience suggests that European Union (EU) independent agencies will create severe problems of co-ordination, legitimacy and control. These problems are not alleviated by the claim that EU agencies will have purely informational roles because information is a key element in policy-making and policy controversy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France traditionally attempted to achieve its national objectives via the medium of European integration by means of a strategy of playing a leading role in shaping institutional and policy developments at the European level. Behind this strategy lay a tension between a desire for a strong Europe and an unwillingness to cede national autonomy to European institutions. However, at least until the end of the 1980s, this tension was successfully ignored and France's European policy proved to be relatively successful. Since that time, however, increasing pressures have brought this tension to the fore. Faced with a need to respond to altered circumstances within the European Union (EU), President Chirac has responded uncertainly. As a result, and for the first time since the 1940s, France faces the prospect of losing the leading role it has traditionally played within European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The completion of the internal market reduces the capacity of member states to shape the collective fate of their citizens through their own policies, while the policy-making capacity of the European Community cannot be increased sufficiently to compensate for the loss of state control at the national level. If European economic integration nevertheless depends on policy co-ordination, there is a need for co-ordination techniques which impose minimal constraints on the autonomous problem-solving capacities of member states. These depend, in turn, on the willingness of member states to pursue their own policy goals in ways which impose minimal constraints on free movement within the European market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sets out a series of conditions for the successful transfer of an organizational or policy initiative from one country to another. It then assesses whether recent developments in the organization of British central government provide a model for transfer to other European countries which have also been concerned with a separation between policy-making functions and execution through service delivery agencies. The article concludes by suggesting caution in attempting to use the Next Steps initiative in Britain as a model for transfer to other European countries, since it lacks a valid theory of administration, has no clear operational blueprint to copy, is not the sole method used by British government itself, and would not necessarily map well on to countries with different relationships between ministers, agencies, the core bureaucracy and the legislature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To date many assessments of the influence of the European Parliament have been general in nature: dealing with parliament as an undifferentiated entity and its policy impact in generalised terms. What this article argues is that the policy contribution of the EP cannot be adequately assessed in aggregate or absolute terms. Instead, recognition of the contingency of EP influence needs to be acknowledged. If the measurement of legislative influence is an enormously complex under-taking at national level, it is even more so in the context of EC 'competitive federalism'. This article is concerned, therefore, with the 'how' - the extent to which the EP exerts policy influence within specific policy areas; and the 'why' - the variables that help to explain the variation in policy influence. Through case studies in the policy fields of the environment and research and technological development the differentials of influence exerted by the EP are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]