Search

The reform of the European Community's regional policies in the mid 1980s had its intellectual origins in theories of endogenous development and cumulative causation. These ideas shaped proposals put forward by the European Commission as early as the 1960s and provided the substance of the 1985 and 1988 reforms. The reforms were 'sold' politically, however, as part of the overall Single Market project, which was itself based on a very different economic model. The resulting contradiction goes far in explaining the perceived implementation failures of the regional policy reforms. In analysing this case, we seek to further and to refine the ongoing inquiry into the role of ideas and intellectual models in concrete policy-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article evaluates the merits of multi-level governance as an explanatory model of EU decision-making. Regional policy implementation is a particularly good case study for evaluating multi-level governance for two reasons. First, because regional policy, along with other EC structural policies, is considered to be at 'the leading edge of multi-level governance'. And, second, because 'Multi-level governance is prominent in the implementation stage' (Marks et al . 1996: 365). The article presents evidence to suggest that while multi-level participation is a feature of EC regional policy implementation in the UK, it is less clear that this constitutes multi-level governance: central government remains dominant. Thus, where the intergovernmentalist 'gatekeeper' notion is useful in describing the behaviour of national governments in EU policy-making, it makes sense to refer to an extended gatekeeper that can operate at all stages of the policy process, including the contested sphere of policy implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perhaps the most striking fact that emerges from a close study of various integration schemes, past and present, is their wide range of outcomes. At one extreme, the highly successful European Union has managed over the past forty years to establish an array of institutions and policies, as well as a broad and clearly defined set of rules. At the other extreme, projects such as the Latin American Free Trade Association, the Andean Pact, and the Economic Community of West African States failed to make any progress towards integration. Between these polar cases are a few integration projects with mixed results. What explains variation in integration outcomes? The study argues that two sets of conditions must be specified in order for integration to succeed, namely, demand side and supply conditions. Regional groups that satisfy both demand and supply conditions stand the greatest chance of succeeding, whereas groups that fulfill neither set of conditions are least likely to attain any significant level of integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise and integration of the regional level in the European Union (EU) multi-level system threatens to overload policy-making owing to a rising number of actors, levels and different institutional settings. Based on comparative empirical research on different types of region (less developed regions vs. city-regions) in both France and Germany, it is argued that adjustments of both intergovernmental and regional structures lead to the development of a multi-level framework in which dangers of overload and malfunctions can be successfully circumvented. Concerning the intergovernmental dimension of regional development policies, it is shown that the dynamic differentiation of decision-making structures as well as a balanced mixture of different modes of governance (co-operative networks, hierarchy and competition) can provide viable escape routes from potential deadlock. However, processes of structuring multi-level governance depend to a considerable degree on the national institutional setting which may provide favourable conditions for processes of adaptation, but may also impede them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last decade the Dutch telecommunications regime has twice been radically transformed. The nature of these reforms and their implications for the autonomy of the nation state vis-a-vis the Commission as well as business are often the subject of dubious generalizations and high-level macro-analysis. By distinguishing between four micro-policy regimes (etatist, liberal, intergovernmental and supranational) and two cases of reform (terminal type-approval and interconnection), this article sheds light on the complexities of the process of liberalization and the Europeanization of public policy. While type-approval is a clear case of deregulation (fewer rules, freer markets), interconnection is an equally clear case of reregulation (more rules, freer markets). At the same time, while the case of type-approval reflects a diminution in the role of both the Dutch state and the European Commission, the case of interconnection reflects a situation in which both strengthen their capacities and therefore also their autonomy. The complexity of this picture does not mean that one should adopt a middle-of-the-road attitude to the issue of state power and autonomy. The future of the Dutch economy and of national competitiveness in the 'information age' still depends on the policies and capacities of the Dutch state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a critical response to an article by Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz in the September 1997 issue of this journal in which they put forward a theory of European integration focused on supranational governance. We argue that this theory fails to address the key problem in current theorizing, namely the persistence of a supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy which dictates that integration is driven by either supranational institutions or national governments. As a result, we argue that supranational governance is essentially a mirror image of the liberal intergovernmentalist theory which it criticizes, and demonstrate that, by reducing integration to a particular form of governance, it fails to allow for different forms of integration in different policy domains. Instead, we propose that the focus of current theorizing on European integration be shifted away from institutional characteristics and toward processes of interaction and policy characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the employment title in the Amsterdam treaty, with the aim of uncovering the role of transnational coalitions. The perspectives of transnational coalition-building and policy-making, in the European Union, are combined to shed light on transnational strategies of influence. Such strategies were employed by political parties and trade unions. They are treated as linkage actors in a transmission system, or belt, linking the domestic and supranational levels to one another. Institutions in the European Union are conceived of as both carriers of their own strategies and access points. By identifying support and initiatives on the part of governments, an attempt is also made to assess the relative importance of intergovernmental and transnational channels. A temporal dimension is thus injected. In conclusion, it can be shown that the employment title was to a large extent a result of a transnational policy contribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes the factors involved in the European integration. Promotion of the core economic interest of Britain, France and Germany; Criticisms on the book 'The Choice for Europe'; Role of ideology or doctrine in European integration.

The debate on economic globalization suggests that the blurring of territorial boundaries shifts the power relations between nation-states and domestic market constituencies in favour of the latter. States have lost autonomy since policies are increasingly formulated in supranational or global arenas. Market actors seem to profit from economic and political deterritorialization. They may use their wider choice of geographic location in order to lobby for low regulated market environments. The article seeks to differentiate this common view considerably. It argues that economic internationalization tends to erode the legitimacy of self-binding agreements that had formerly solved regulatory problems. Networks of interstate collaboration in turn lack the ability to monitor and enforce negotiated agreements. Both developments impose new duties of market supervision on the nation-state. Empirical reference is drawn from the German stock exchange sector that underwent a process of fundamental transformation leading to an enhanced role of the nation-state in the model of sectoral governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under European competition law the Commission has far-reaching competences. The article asks about the conditions under which the Commission may use these rights against the member states, focusing on the most powerful provision - the right of the Commission under Article 90 to issue directives by itself in those cases where member state governments have endowed undertakings with rights conflicting with the Treaty's rules. In European telecommunications policy the Commission has used this competence very successfully, with all liberalization directives being based on Article 90. But for European electricity policy the Commission has shrunk away from using these powers in favour of initiating Council legislation. The article analyses the conditions of the Commission's ability to act under European competition law in a multi-level framework, drawing on a principal-agent approach. It presents Article 90 as an example of governments regaining control over their agent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) has issued hundreds if not thousands of directives and decisions over the last twenty-five years. Yet questions of compliance - to what extent do states comply, which states are likely to comply, what patterns of compliance exist within and across areas of regulation? - have not been extensively investigated and remain poorly understood. This article argues that compliance is a matter of state choice, and reviews current theoretical writings in international relations and comparative politics in order to better identify reasons for states' choices to comply with EU directives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas in other policy sectors, established, national policies have become progressively 'Europeanized', the EC was a major catalyst in the generation and extension of national sex equality laws. The origins of these policies lie in second-wave feminism during the late 1960s and 1970s which sought to 'reframe' the way in which policies affecting women were addressed. This article highlights the importance of the EC institutions, notably the European Commission and the European Court of Justice in supporting the rights of working women and forcing national policy change. The impact of these measures has nevertheless been limited by the existence of national 'policy hinterlands' based upon conflicting policy frames. The future development of EC sex equality policies is uncertain. 'Mainstreaming' is a potentially important development, but its success depends upon the willingness of policy-makers to consider routinely the gender dimension of policy options. The provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty relating to sex equality may prove important in this respect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The outcomes of regulatory decision-making at the level of the European Community are extremely heterogeneous. Many attempts at regulation are constantly blocked in the Council, and others have been significantly watered down by inter-governmental bargaining. However, there are examples in the regulation of occupational safety and environmental protection which demonstrate that the deadlocks of intergovernmental bargaining can be overcome. Examples of best practice tell us that there are six main factors contributing to a successful regulatory policy at a high level: (1) The institudorial interests of supranational actors, particularly the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Economic and Social Committee, in high-level regulation. (2) The influence of supranational actors on European decision- making procedures. (3) The role of advisory committees in the process of decision- making. (4) Legislative eclecticism as a strategy of gaining acceptance. (5) The inclusion of non-governmental actors from the member states. And (6) laxity in de facto implementation to ease acceptance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As integrated Europe will not turn into a federal state, rights of citizenship, including industrial citizenship, remain nationally based. The article explores some of the consequences of this for social policy, at both European and national level. For empirical reference, it reconstructs the evolution of European Union legislation on workplace representation, in particular its movement in two decades from company to labour law, from harmonization to co-ordination of national systems, from legal prescription to voluntaristic bargaining in the shadow of the market, and from a project of integrated European citizenship rights to the protection of the integrity of national systems. The article shows that national fragmentation of public power in an integrated economy, however internationally co-ordinated, exposes advanced national versions of industrial citizenship to economic competition. While thereby pressuring national systems to lower their standards, it even falls short of affording non-nationals equal rights in national systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has shown that regulatory competition does not necessarily lead to downward pressures on regulation, but may at times also push the level of regulation upwards. Extending David Vogel's 'California effect' argument, this article shows that such upward pressure may not only result directly from the dynamics of the competitive process but also from international co-operation. Evidence from two case studies on international capital market regulation is used to identify the conditions under which co-operation in the shadow of regulatory competition is likely to succeed or fail. The successful multilateral standardization of banking capital requirements in the BIS is compared to failed attempts to harmonize interest taxation across EC member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do European policies affect national policy-making patterns and problem-solving capacity, and to what extent do national policy-makers seek to influence European politics? In particular, what impact does European road haulage policy have on national policy within the context of the Single Market Programme (SMP)? How can the domestic policy response of four member states - Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy - be explained with respect to the national policy background, problem-solving approach, policy instruments, and patterns of interest intermediation? While the policy responses of Britain and the Netherlands reveal congruence and confirmation, those of Germany and Italy indicate respectively change and resistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Protecting diffuse interests has long been recognized as a central challenge in any system of governance, and has proven problematic in the European Community (EC) as well. Indeed, a number of analysts have argued that the EC is a 'businessman's Europe,' privileging concentrated and mobile capital over other interests and precipitating a deregulatory 'race to the bottom.' EC institutions, however, present opportunities as well as risks for diffuse interests such as environmentalists, consumers, and women. In particular, the institutions of the EC-characterized by both multiple tiers of government and by a separation of powers at the Community level - provide diffuse interests with multiple points of access, which they have used effectively to secure the adoption and the implementation of EC policies. These arguments are illustrated through a brief examination of EC policies in the areas of environmental protection, consumer protection, and women's rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conflict between the European Community (EC) and the US on the terms of an agricultural accord stalled the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1986-93) for nearly three years. This article examines the policy process that formed around the agricultural dossier in France, where the government has long championed co-operation and collaboration with professional farm syndicates. Recent analyses link this co- operation to the policy community model of decision-making. Through a detailed examination of the dynamics of the policy process during the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks' crucial years, this article argues that the French government's handling of the agricultural dossier contradicts the fundamental elements of this model. The analysis poses problems for both the current literature on French agriculture and the applicability of policy community theory more generally. The stage is set for a more broadly encompassing theoretical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay, the 1997 Jean Monnet Lecture at the London School of Economics, explores the relationship between nationality; democracy and European integration in the context of the debate on European citizenship. Citizenship, an integral part of the vocabulary of statehood, nationality and peoplehood, seems to run into conflict with the very Telos of European integration: a project which aims at a union among the distinct peoples of Europe and not the creation of a new European people. And yet, absence of such a European demos undermines the democratic legitimacy of the Union. This articles explores, inter alia, various models of multiple demoi as a way of addressing this conundrum. It also suggests some ideas for enhancing the mechanics of transnational citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 1 January 1999, the third and final stage of economic and monetary union (EMU) is scheduled to begin. Assuming that the member states of the European Union (EU) adhere to the terms of the Treaty on European Union, on that day a new European Central Bank will assume full responsibility for defining the monetary policy of the member states that have moved to the third and final stage of EMU and the conversion rates of the currencies of those member states will be irrevocably fixed against each other and against a new currency, the euro. This article examines some of the underlying imperatives and third-stage dilemmas of EMU. After considering some of the reasons why, despite the high costs associated with qualifying for the third stage, most if not all of the member states perceive EMU to be in the national interest, the article considers several of the economic, political, and institutional issues and dilemmas that are likely to confront the participating member states in the third stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-war decades, advanced capitalist economies have developed in symbiosis with democratic political systems with a high capacity for effective regulation and welfare-state compensations. As economic integration deepens globally and even more so within the European Community, national capacities to regulate and to tax mobile capital and firms are reduced, whereas governance at European or international levels is constrained by conflicts of interest among the governments involved. Nevertheless, as the contributions to this volume show, the effectiveness of problem-solving at the national as well as at the European and international levels varies considerably from one field to another. In this introduction, I attempt to identify the factors that could explain the varying intensity and direction of competitive pressures on national regulatory systems, as well as the greater or lesser political feasibility of European or international regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The environmental policy of the European Community is nested within a broader institution devoted predominantly to market integration. It also co-exists with the domestic environmental policies of the member states. This institutional arrangement has important consequences for environmental governance in the present Union. Not only does the wide scope for domestic environmental action generate different logics of harmonization for the regulation of products and processes, it also creates an institutional preference for European product standards because this type of regulation allows a trade-off between environmental and single market concerns. This effect is demonstrated by the development of the originally purely environmentally motivated and process-related directive on packaging and packaging waste adopted in 1994. During its preparation, this legislative project was supplemented with a strong product-related component that made a trade-off between policies possible and facilitated majority support in the Council. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the European Patent Office and how the political economy of intellectual property policy helps to explain the observed sluggishness of European patent filing activity compared to the US and Japan. The analysis also focuses on intellectual property (IP) policy tensions regarding the protection versus the dissemination of IP. The article shows that the protection function of the European Patent Office (EPO) is driven increasingly by big business pressure (from European and US multinationals) to improve pendency rates and lower costs. On the other hand, regarding the dissemination function, the EPO and national patent offices are under greater pressure to enhance awareness of IP rights and IP knowledge to interests, such as small business, that are more dispersed and weak. The analysis further shows that the relations between the EPO and national offices exhibit a delicate balance between co-operation and competition, financial viability and fee sharing, and concerns about translation and the language of commerce and the survival of national offices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This analysis of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) sets out to assess the CoR's external impact and its internal impact since it began to function in 1994. The article addresses these questions in two parts. The first and main part focuses on the external impact of the CoR with particular emphasis on inter-institutional relations and its impact on European Union (EU) policy-making. This part is mainly based on empirical evidence from interviews with European Commission officials. The second part analyses the CoR's internal impact in terms of the interplay between its heterogeneous membership, its diverse political cultures and socialization among its members. The article concludes that while CoR's formal impact on EU policy outputs has been minimal, its real added-value lies in its unique resources which could have potentially important implications for both the subnational and supranational levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central argument of this article is that the European Commission has consolidated its role as a 'policy entrepreneur' but that it must pay attention also to its role as a 'policy manager'. The Commission's capacity for management is much weaker than its power of initiative because it lacks sizeable bureaucratic resources and largely implements policies through a system of shared administration with the member states. The Commission's financial management reform programme which was launched by President Santer when he took over from President Delors provides the focus of this article. The expansion of the budget and the saliency of fraud underlined the need for the Commission to enhance its management of EU finances. The programme involves reform enhancing the self-regulation of the Commission (internal reform) and the development of administrative partnerships with the member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the Treaty of Rome allowed member states to establish policies governing the trade in and production of armaments at the national level, the European Union (EU) has gradually been expanding its influence in defense industry matters. This article traces the history of EU involvement in defense industrial policy, with an emphasis on events over the past decade. One significant finding is that the European Commission and Parliament have played key roles in expanding the EU's policy-making machinery to include defense industrial matters, while the Council of Ministers has tried to resist such actions. A second important conclusion is that the concept of spillover is particularly appropriate in describing how and why the EU's policy-making has expanded to include defense industrial policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the link between fifteen national parliaments and decision-making in the EU Council of Ministers. The main purpose is to provide a comparative account of EU Affairs Committees and the national advisory processes of scrutiny and co-ordination that occur before a national government takes an official policy position in the Council. However, the variation that exists among the fifteen member states also raises the question of what explains it. In the second half of the article, it is argued that explanations of the variation should start from the complementary aspects of major interdisciplinary schools of thought such as culture theory, institutionalism and rational choice. This leads to a number of interesting new research questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The word independent in the United States (US) context is most properly used in connection with the independent regulatory commissions. Those commissions are not independent of Congressional control. Both the commissions and the agencies of the regular cabinet departments live in a regime of statutory duties under which Congressional statutes not presidential policies control much of their behavior. Both are subject to judicial review. Commissions basically are independent in the sense that they are usually not subject to the complete control by commissioners of one political party. They are somewhat independent of the President in that no single President has appointed all the commissioners of a particular commission and commissioners may only be dismissed by the President for cause. American experience suggests that European Union (EU) independent agencies will create severe problems of co-ordination, legitimacy and control. These problems are not alleviated by the claim that EU agencies will have purely informational roles because information is a key element in policy-making and policy controversy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new European agencies have been denied powers normally granted to regulatory bodies. In most cases their functions are limited to providing information and networking with other institutions. Thus, they seem to be doomed to play an auxiliary role; but they could also turn their statutory limitations into opportunities by developing information-based modes of regulation more in tune with current economic and political conditions than the coercive powers denied to them. In facts a good deal of empirical evidence suggests that regulation by information is often more effective than direct regulation. However, information can change expectations and behaviour only if it is credible. In turn, credibility depends crucially on reputation. It is suggested that networking could help the agencies to enhance their reputation and independence. An agency that sees itself as part of a transnational network is more motivated to defend its independence and professional integrity: unprofessional or politically motivated behaviour would compromise its international reputation and make co-operation more difficult in the future. Actually, the network may be viewed as an intangible asset carrying a reputation that is beneficial for efficient information exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agencies in the European Community (EC) are a functional and politically important institutional phenomenon, yet almost completely ignored within the academic literature. In addition there is some evidence that EC agencies will fall victim to political considerations both within the main Community institutions and at the level of national and regional government where implications of the EC agency model may be misunderstood or misrepresented. The starting point for any discussion and interpretation of agencies within the EC context should be a reflection and consideration of the ten EC agencies currently operational in nine different member states. A comparative analysis of EC agencies reveals not only differences with regard to their mode of emergence but also in their formal status. Significantly, agencies can be placed into two categories (informational or executive). The EC agencies are an important phenomenon in both the vertical dimension (EC, state, regional) and the horizontal dimension (relations between the institutions) of the EC. Any discussion about the importance of EC agencies for the forthcoming institutional reform of the EC should keep in mind their inherent potential for EC integration and their capacity to integrate the administrative branch. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The institutional context of European policy-making, its redistributive content, sheer scope, and the need to accommodate diverse, and often conflicting, interests and goals, together tend to have a stalling effect on the policy-making process. Policy innovation continues despite this, owing to strategies of subterfuge; i.e. decision-making escape routes used by policy-makers to circumvent potential deadlock. Subterfuge is used across policy sectors and has an impact on the three interconnected polity issues of the accommodation of diversity, policy innovation and democratic legitimation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we identify the points of convergence, divergence and parallelism in the various security architectures on offer by the major powers; seek to place those architectures along the continuum of security system outcomes; and explore the issue of institutional choice in the contemporary European security order. We also address a set of questions derived from the institutional requirements of the European security order. Does the emerging European security order demonstrate the characteristics of regime congruence and interdependence? What lessons can be drawn from the institutional configurations within the economic and military-political components defining the security problematique in post-Cold War Europe? Must there be a parallel construction of the economic and military institutions of the European security order? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The establishment of the European single market, the Maastricht accords and the development of a pan-European firm have all contributed to the creation of a European political marketplace with a myriad of access points. Why the large firm has changed its locus of political activity towards the European Union (EU), and what form this new political action has taken are the focus of this article. Based on a study of ninety-four of Europe's largest firms, this article outlines how firms, as individual actors, have come to play such a prominent role in the EU policy process, and assesses their current lobbying preferences for political channels to the EU. In recognizing the political sophistication of firms, the article concludes that firms are now able to recognize and construct strategic alliances with rival firms and countervailing interests to create European identities and facilitate access to new European policy forums. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of scientific knowledge in European environmental policy. However, it does so with a wider interest in mind, namely the putative building of a European political culture. In order to do so it attempts to identify some underlying cultural dimensions of scientific discourses for policy of standardization, comparability and objectivity. We analyse one case in detail, that of nature classification under the European CORINE environmental information system. We argue that some basic assumptions made in the construction of this environmental information system have implications not only for science and policy in the sphere of the environment, but for broader debates about identifications with European political culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France traditionally attempted to achieve its national objectives via the medium of European integration by means of a strategy of playing a leading role in shaping institutional and policy developments at the European level. Behind this strategy lay a tension between a desire for a strong Europe and an unwillingness to cede national autonomy to European institutions. However, at least until the end of the 1980s, this tension was successfully ignored and France's European policy proved to be relatively successful. Since that time, however, increasing pressures have brought this tension to the fore. Faced with a need to respond to altered circumstances within the European Union (EU), President Chirac has responded uncertainly. As a result, and for the first time since the 1940s, France faces the prospect of losing the leading role it has traditionally played within European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European regulatory policy-making unfolds in the context of diverse interests and traditions of member states. These diverse policy traditions clash in the European arena and have to be brought into balance. In the course of this process, some common co-ordination patterns emerge which, embedded in European institutions, are typical of regulatory policy-making in Europe. These patterns include a 'first mover' strategy by member states, 'problem- solving', and 'negative co-ordination, bargaining and compensation'. The result of the dynamic of these co-ordination patterns in regulatory policy-making is a policy patchwork at the European level. The diverse co-ordination patterns and their typical paths and policy consequences are illustrated by discussion of European legislation in the field of clean air policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Employers' associations, and their influence on the economic transformation in Eastern Europe, have been largely ignored. In spring 1994, the Hungarian Parliament passed a law on Chambers which will render three new Chambers the supreme regulating source for all entrepreneurs' licensing, training and economic actions; membership will be compulsory. Drafters of the law claim the Austrian/German system as a model, but it is more reminiscent of the socialist structure of authoritarian/state corporatism. What prompted this development in a society with long exposure to market forces? As old normative patterns disintegrate, associations motivated by financial survival compete with the state for the power to dictate new norms. Co-evolutionary theory demonstrates the complex interaction of actors at the macro, organizational and micro levels of this competition and how it is translated into policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The turmoil that engulfed the European monetary system in 1992 and 1993 extinguished the sense of inevitability that the project for economic and monetary union had acquired. The exchange rate crisis led many to conclude that monetary union had been derailed once and for all. This article argues, in contrast, that the monetary crisis did not prove that monetary union was undesired or unworkable. The travails of the exchange rate mechanism did not undo the interests that originally drove the economic and monetary union project or erase the gains it would bring to some member states. The crisis did, however, highlight the formidable obstacles to achieving monetary union in Europe. The article examines four interpretations of the 1992-3 crisis in the European monetary system, focusing especially on the failure to agree on a co-ordinated realignment that might have avoided the turmoil. It then discusses the future course of monetary union in light of the contending (though not mutually exclusive) interpretations of the crisis. Finally, it discusses the basic outlines of an economic and monetary union that might avoid some of the problems brought into relief by the exchange rate turmoil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines some of the processes conditioning both policy stability and policy change. It focuses on how established policy communities (usually associated with policy stability) can exist alongside a powerful dynamic of change within the policy subsystem. By listing and analysing agents of exogenous and endogenous stability and change, it is concluded that the concepts of epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions and choice of 'image' and 'venue' are useful in explaining the co-existence of stability and change. In the case of British trunk roads policy, this stability and change can be explained by the development of the road and environmental lobbies as rival adversarial policy communities operating in separate and competing policy arenas. The article concludes that, although one of the adversarial communities may hold an advantage over the other at a particular time, the scope for action in a number of different policy-making arenas makes it unlikely that it will retain supremacy over time. Radical change is most likely to be brought about by factors exogenous to policy communities such as scientific and technological developments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two perspectives dominate in the debate on European integration policy in the unified Germany. The first focuses on domestic inter-institutional tensions and ideological inhibitions that restrict German leadership in the European Union. By contrast, the second highlights the dominant position of the German economy and the weakening of external constraints in the wake of unification. Both perspectives point to important aspects of integration policy, but neither takes sufficient account of the Europeanization of the German state. Europeanization suggests that over the past decades Germany's key public institutions have become progressively programmed for integration. This has implications for analysing German policy in the run-up to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Specifically, Europeanization calls into question the distinction between mainstream domestic policy and integration policy; the idea of a national interest that exists prior to, and independently of, an interest in integration; and the notion of external constraints on leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A crucial but relatively neglected area for the analysis of the role of the European Commission in European integration is the Commission's monitoring function. The examination of member states' violations of their Treaty obligations by state and by policy area indicates that non-compliance is a significant systemic phenomenon. The article concentrates on the processing patterns of the EC infringement procedure and advances a model for the analysis of the Commission's approach to non-compliance. It is argued that the analysis of the Commission's approach requires exploring the links between policy development, policy priorities and the exercise of the monitoring function. The Commission's strategic considerations which influence the evolution of monitoring in the European Union are examined with a co-operative 'enforcement policy game'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between the phenomenon known as 'globalization', on the one hand, and the regional integration process undertaken by European Union (EU) member states, on the other. Bearing in mind that the EU single market programme was a more deliberate and radical act of integration than the more haphazard globalization process, the article argues that the relationship between the two is a complex mix of convergence and conflict. The argument is applied to the financial services sector, and in particular the securities industry. The first conclusion is that the EU integration process is compatible with global financial integration. The EU single financial area has not led, and will not lead, to the emergence of a separate European 'bloc'. Indeed, on a number of regulatory issues, the combination of globalization and EU integration has induced convergence and a degree of harmonization between the EU and other jurisdictions such as the United States and Japan. The second conclusion is, however, that this progress towards convergence and harmonization is inherently conflictual and is currently blocked on the key issue of capital adequacy for securities firms. The US, supported by Canada and Japan, has resisted convergence, or indeed compromise, with what it views as unduly lax EU capital standards. Internal EU dynamics, domestic considerations within the US, market-driven pressures and the temptations of regulatory arbitrage have all contributed to the conflictual aspects of the convergence process. The EU and the Basle banking supervisors have now accepted the EU approach to capital adequacy, and the pressure is on the US regulatory authorities to conform to these lower standards or take the risk that trading activity will migrate to where standards, and therefore transaction costs, are lower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article assesses the impact of three distinct types of pressure for regulatory change on the two contrasting sectors of legal and medical service provision. These have been driven by both regional and global integration processes. The article focuses on the distinctive forms of regulatory competition which have developed at the European level, within the framework of a highly managed system of mutual recognition, and on the very different strategies for managing regulatory reform at the national level which have developed in two of the larger member states of the European Union (EU): France and Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paradoxically, though the Treaty on European Union underlines the power of EC central bankers, they have been neglected in the literature on European integration. Central bank independence provides the key connection between changes in global financial markets and the new Treaty provisions on economic and monetary union (EMU). In recent years EC central bankers have been subjected to ever more volatile and competitive markets and new political pressures related to EMU. Central bank independence has offered a means of reconciling these twin changes. This article seeks to explain why central bank independence has strengthened its grip in Europe and the nature of the role of central bankers in European integration. The adequacy of existing theories of central bank behaviour is examined - public interest, personality, public choice and bargaining theories. Emphasis is given to explanations that focus on external factors: the structural power of the 'anchor' currency in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM); deep-seated change in the nature of capitalism; the role of economic crisis; the policy style of the European Community (EC); and the unique relationship of central bankers to the state and consequent capacity to pursue their corporate interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States have chosen various international fora to negotiate on the disciplining of state aids through export credit insurance: the GATT, European Union (EU) and the OECD. Although on a global level the violation of the strict GATE rules on export credit insurance could be ignored, on the regional EU level, market integration and competition and common commercial policies created pressures to harmonize national credit insurance policies. In the resulting regional negotiating process, intergovernmental factors have prevailed over supranational/transnational factors. Neither transnational interest groups nor the European Parliament and the Commission have been important actors in this process. The real political issue of competition distortion between exporters of different member states has been taken care of by the member states in a special co-ordination group, set up by the Council. Although national preferences with regard to harmonizing official credit insurance policy have converged as a consequence of rising cumulative deficits on these insurance schemes in all member states and the pressure of market factors such as increasing cross-border co-operation, the harmonization process appears to be confined to transparency and harmonization of insurance techniques and limited co-operation among public insurers in the case of consortium exports. All proposals to create a European credit insurance facility or a binding, common credit insurance policy were turned down or ignored, because of the far-reaching consequences for the future policy autonomy of the member states. The question of whether the credit insurance policies should also be disciplined, i.e. whether the level of subsidy should be lowered, was not addressed, for fear of disadvantaging EU exporters against government-supported non-EU competitors. Consequently, the United Kingdom sought to turn from a regional to a more global arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The completion of the internal market reduces the capacity of member states to shape the collective fate of their citizens through their own policies, while the policy-making capacity of the European Community cannot be increased sufficiently to compensate for the loss of state control at the national level. If European economic integration nevertheless depends on policy co-ordination, there is a need for co-ordination techniques which impose minimal constraints on the autonomous problem-solving capacities of member states. These depend, in turn, on the willingness of member states to pursue their own policy goals in ways which impose minimal constraints on free movement within the European market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Renewed interest in theorizing about the process of European integration is reflected in recent scholarship on the political evolution of the European Union (EU). Meanwhile, a rich and growing literature has emerged on EU policy-making in specific policy sectors. Yet the gap remains wide between theoretical models which seek to explain broad patterns of European integration and those which seek to explain the EU's policy-making process. This article conceptualizes 'policy networks' as a tool for analysing EU policy-making. Its central argument is that the EU is a 'hothouse' for different types of policy network, for two reasons. First, the EU lacks 'off-the-shelf' institutions which can facilitate informal bargaining between different types of actor. Secondly, decisions taken at the policy formulation stage have become important determinants of eventual EU policy outcomes in recent years. The policy networks model is placed within a broader theoretical framework for studying decision-making in the European Union at different levels of analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sets out a series of conditions for the successful transfer of an organizational or policy initiative from one country to another. It then assesses whether recent developments in the organization of British central government provide a model for transfer to other European countries which have also been concerned with a separation between policy-making functions and execution through service delivery agencies. The article concludes by suggesting caution in attempting to use the Next Steps initiative in Britain as a model for transfer to other European countries, since it lacks a valid theory of administration, has no clear operational blueprint to copy, is not the sole method used by British government itself, and would not necessarily map well on to countries with different relationships between ministers, agencies, the core bureaucracy and the legislature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article draws three main lessons from recent regulatory developments on both sides of the Atlantic. First, deregulation and privatization have not meant an end to all regulation. On the contrary, newly deregulated or privatized industries lose their pre-existing statutory immunity from competition law and other regulatory requirements. Thus, privatization leads to the creation of new regulatory bodies and to a considerable widening of the scope of agencies to promote competition. Second, experience has revealed the fallacy of assuming that public ownership guarantees public control. The crisis of the nationalized industries is more a failure of regulation than a problem of productive efficiency. Public ownership not only reduced government's ability to regulate the economy, but also interrupted a policy learning process which could have produced, half a century ago, the kind of regulatory institutions which Europe is struggling to develop now. Finally, American deregulation has proved to be considerably more forceful than European privatizations in introducing competition and restructuring key economic sectors such as telecommunications. Differences in styles and methods of regulation explain these different outcomes. A style emphasizing professional independence and public accountability is needed not only to achieve all the benefits of privatization, but also to push through deregulation when economic and technological changes make public oversight no longer necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To date many assessments of the influence of the European Parliament have been general in nature: dealing with parliament as an undifferentiated entity and its policy impact in generalised terms. What this article argues is that the policy contribution of the EP cannot be adequately assessed in aggregate or absolute terms. Instead, recognition of the contingency of EP influence needs to be acknowledged. If the measurement of legislative influence is an enormously complex under-taking at national level, it is even more so in the context of EC 'competitive federalism'. This article is concerned, therefore, with the 'how' - the extent to which the EP exerts policy influence within specific policy areas; and the 'why' - the variables that help to explain the variation in policy influence. Through case studies in the policy fields of the environment and research and technological development the differentials of influence exerted by the EP are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]