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Based on an original protest event analysis (PEA) dataset covering 30 European countries, this paper provides three sets of results. Despite its unlikeliness due to lockdowns and social distancing measures, protest during COVID-19 has hardly been put to a halt even if, as a result of the restrictions imposed by the lockdown measures on the opportunities of public collective actions, protest occurred at significantly lower levels compared to pre-COVID-19 times, in terms of number of events and, above all, in terms of the number of participants. Moreover, protest was refocused on COVID-19-related issues, in particular on protest against the restrictions imposed by the government lockdowns, while non-COVID-19 issues, in particular economic issues, were crowded out. In addition, protest during the COVID-19-crisis also responded to highly contingent national context conditions which varied between the different regions of Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with the conflicts associated with the so-called 'Dieselgate' affair. It explains the interaction of civil society, law firms and political actors which reshapes the legal systems in Europe. Once the federal government in Germany had decided that European car owners should not get any kind of financial compensation, a transnational coalition of consumer organizations and law firms successfully initiated a legal mobilization campaign to counteract the political decision. As a consequence, collective litigation rights were strengthened in Germany and at the European level. Theoretically, the paper refers to the literature on adversarial legalism. Whether this judicialized style of conflict resolution is spreading to Europe ('Eurolegalism') has been a hotly debated topic in political science. Our main argument is that the Dieselgate case is a catalyst event to foster the transformation process towards 'Eurolegalism'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates which countries are seen as leaders in combatting AMR in Europe, and why they are seen as leaders. We do this by testing the explanatory capacity of three models specifying features of leaders attractive to followers. They are (1) performance, (2) power and (3) common interests. We use data from a survey among experts in the AMR field in 29 European countries, along with empirical indicators, to measure the three models. Our findings show that only eight of the 29 European countries are seen as leaders and that Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands are considered the three top AMR leaders in Europe. Denmark is the top leader in the animal sector and Sweden in the human sector. We also find demand for several possible types of leadership and followership in the AMR problem. Performance explains the leading role of the top three countries, as they all score low on indicators of the severity of AMR. Power and influence explain why France, Germany and the UK are seen as AMR leaders. We also find support for the role of common interests. This factor may explain why neighbouring countries are often seen as leaders in AMR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fear of falling behind has been a driving force of European integration. Historically, Europe's response to the looming angst of declining competitiveness has been more market-creation, not market-direction. Recently, however, Europe has – in the name of safeguarding Europe's technological sovereignty – taken on a much more active role in directing economic activity towards sectors and technologies deemed geopolitically or geoeconomically important. In this paper, we attempt to explain this 'geo-dirigiste' turn. We reconstruct the evolution of EU industrial policy through the lens of Europe's fear of falling behind, drawing not only on primary (including archival) and secondary sources, but also on original interviews and deep transfer learning applied to an original dataset of 66.548 documents. Focusing on Europe's changing technological and geopolitical context, its coalitional underpinnings, and the role of ideational politics, we document and explain the historic shift away from market-creation and towards supranational market-direction in EU industrial policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of trans-governmental policy regimes in Europe has fundamentally changed the role of National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs). Here we move away from the idea that there is a meaningful divide between the domestic and the European levels of governance and suggest that a different logic has emerged in recent decades, combining multiple chains of delegation and innovative coordination schemes. NRAs have come to occupy a 'broker' or intermediary position between domestic and European polities, that is no longer adequately described by the prevailing, mainly dyadic models of bureaucratic autonomy conceived just for national states. In this paper, we build the concept of entangled agencies to make sense of the linkages between NRAs and European Agencies (EAs) and provide some preliminary empirical evidence to show how they effectively articulate various levels of government, presenting empirical findings on the connections that ties NRAs representatives with EAs management boards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper follows European countries as they struggled through the first wave of the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic. We analyze when countries were confronted with the virus, how long it took until the number of new infections peaked and at what level of infections that peak was achieved via social distancing and lockdown policies. Most European countries were able to successfully end the first wave of the pandemic – defined as a two-week incidence rate smaller than 10 cases per 100,000 people. We find that countries in which the virus made significant landfall later in time enjoyed a latecomer advantage that some of these countries squandered, however, by not responding quickly enough and that an early lockdown was more effective than a hard lockdown. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the large literature on gender differences in politics, there have been relatively few empirical studies testing the effects of gender in public administration. This paper examines how male and female public managers show attitudinal differences toward innovation in the public sector. We hypothesize that male and female managers differ in three aspects. Firstly, female managers are more result-oriented than rule-following, and more oriented toward societal interests. Secondly, female public managers are more open to new ideas and creativity, and more willing to challenge the status quo. Yet, thirdly, female leaders are less eager to take risks when would-be innovations may put their organizations in peril. Thus, we argue that female managers are more prudent and entrepreneurial than their male counterparts. We test these hypotheses using a data set of 5,909 senior public managers from 20 European countries. The results of multilevel model analysis find statistically significant gender differences in attitudes toward innovation. Despite the small size of gender impacts, our findings challenge prevailing stereotypes on women's entrepreneurial attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The crises of the European Union and the geopolitical shifts in its international environment have generated a backlash against the post-Cold War 'debordering' of European integration. Whereas integration theories focus almost exclusively on the EU's internal boundaries and developments, this framework paper conceptualizes and theorizes integration as a process of internal debordering and external rebordering. It sketches the history of European integration in a bordering perspective and proposes general assumptions about the EU's bordering process. Accordingly, rebordering pressures result from widening boundary gaps at the EU's external borders, exogenous shocks to cross-border transactions, growing community deficits of debordering, and their politicization. Whether external rebordering succeeds and how it interacts with internal boundary formation, depends on EU-level boundary negotiations and the relative costs and benefits of external vs. internal rebordering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since they first entered the European Parliament in 1979, the EU has proven to be a strong legitimising tool for far right parties, providing them with funding, visibility and a higher degree of credibility and respectability. While recent literature has explored some of these dynamics, the role of the far right's ideological positioning on Europe as a source of public legitimacy has been neglected. This paper argues that as a relatively new and contentious political issue, Europe can function as a powerful ideological resource for far right parties by allowing them to convey a more acceptable political message. This argument is illustrated through a case study of two key aspects of the Rassemblement National's ideological approach to the European Union: the party's claim to be pro-European but anti-EU and its opposition to EU integration on grounds of sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When states over- and under-react to perceived transboundary threats, their mistakes can have equally harmful consequences for the citizens they mean to protect. Yet, studies of intelligence and conventional foreign policy tend to concentrate on cases of under-reaction to threats from states, and few studies set out criteria for identifying cases of under- and over-reaction to other kinds of threats or investigate common causes. The paper develops a typology of over- and under-reaction in foreign policy revolving around threats assessment, response proportionality and timeliness. Drawing on pilot case studies, the contribution identifies combinations of factors and conditions that make both over- or under-reaction more likely. It is hypothesized that three factors play significant causal roles across the cases: (1) institutions have learned the wrong lessons from previous related incidents; (2) decision-making is organized within institutional silos focused on only one kind of threat; and (3) actors have strong pre-existing preferences for a particular outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The European Union's response to the COVID-19 pandemic revealed changes and continuity in the structure and the functioning of the European project. In lieu of a conclusion to the Special Issue, this article discusses what those lessons tell us about how Europe responds to the following crisis. We compare European responses to the pandemic to those that followed the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We observe more differences than similarities. The same actors do not always play the central role, solidarity among Europeans is sometimes more challenging to engineer, and the requirements to make the overall project more resilient can point in different directions. Such findings show that any argument that Europe is forged through crisis is unlikely to tell us much about what Europe is or where it may be headed. In that sense, the EU is a sui generis multi-level, multi-faceted actor that can change shape in response to events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The free movement of people (FMP) was one of the first victims of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe. Calls for better coordination often remained unheard in the initial phase of hectic border closures and mostly resulted in soft EU recommendations. Nevertheless, most restrictions on the FMP were lifted after summer 2020 and could be largely avoided in later waves of the pandemic. We argue that the resilience of the FMP, a fundamental principle of the EU, ultimately depends on policies – borders, welfare, and health – that are still national competence and partly implemented at the regional level. We explain the resilience of the FMP and the observed variation between different border regions by the strength of pre-existing coordinative transgovernmental networks. Our analysis is based on a comparative case study of different German border regions and draws on quantitative data concerning cross-border workers and qualitative interviews with policy-makers and stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2006, the European Commission released its Global Europe Communication, in which it announced a shift from a multilateral to a bilateral trade strategy. One of the key pillars of this new strategy was to strengthen the bilateral trade relations with key Asian countries. In contrast to existing analyses that focus on European Union (EU) decision-makers’ agency, we propose an explanation for this notable shift in the EU's trade policy that stresses the political role of import-dependent firms. In light of the increasing integration of such firms into global value chains, the article argues that a plausible case can be made, both theoretically and empirically, that import-dependent firms had a clear stake in the signing of preferential trade agreements between the EU and Asian countries and that their lobbying efforts significantly affected the EU's decision to start negotiations on such agreements with South Korea, India and Vietnam. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent studies provide evidence that income inequality is a relevant driver for the electoral success of populist parties all over Europe. In this article, we aim to understand how exactly increasing income inequality can lead to support for populist parties. More specifically, we discuss four different attitudinal mechanisms from previous research: economic insecurities, trust in political elites, social integration, and national identity. We rely on eight waves of the European Social Survey and find that economic insecurities, trust in political elites, and national identity are linked to rising income inequality and populist support as expected. However, a causal mediation analysis shows that these mechanisms are not sufficient to fully understand the impact of income inequality on support for populists. This finding raises questions regarding the empirical support of existing theories to explain how macroeconomic changes in inequality became a pre-condition for the rise of populist parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 outbreak in Europe has brought attention to EU health policy as a focal point for solidarity, particularly as it concerns access to medicines. Against the backdrop of policy proposals for EU joint procurement of medicines, this article expands our understanding of public opinion towards this particular aspect of European integration. Drawing on data from a conjoint experiment in five EU countries, the study investigates the extent to which citizens' preferences concerning alternative policy designs for EU joint procurement of medicines are either structured along a pro-EU versus anti-EU or ideological divide, or are crisis driven by the perceived COVID-19 threat. The analysis reveals that individual preferences over the design of EU risk pooling for medicines are most strongly explained by Euroscepticism, while egalitarian ideology plays only a modest role. How citizens' perceived threat of COVID-19 affects their preferences for this form of EU risk pooling is dependent on the national context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thirty years after 1989 Europe is once again divided, despite 15 years of integration within the European Union. In contrast to the West's liberal conception of internationally constrained democracy rooted in the protection of individual human rights, Central Europe has developed an illiberal version centred on the popular sovereignty of the nation. I argue that these divergent understandings of democracy and the nation-state are rooted in collective memory. Whereas the West's historical imaginary is based on the traumas of Nazism associated with 1945, Central Europe's is dominated by the legacy of communism symbolically signified by 1989. These differing understandings of past teach strikingly different lessons for the present: one focused on the dangers of nationalism, the other on protecting national self-determination from external interference. The future of the EU depends on its ability create a broader historical narrative that can incorporate both the lessons of 1945 and 1989. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that internal inclusion requires external exclusion features prominently in many theoretical accounts of modern statehood and citizenship. In a similar vein, it has been argued that internal freedom of movement in the European Union requires strict immigration control at its external borders. This article sheds light on the relationship between internal de-bordering and external re-bordering, making two main contributions. First, we theorise the idea of an integration-demarcation conditionality based on the European Union's symbolic legitimacy and functional needs. Second, we test the common belief that public support for free movement within Europe depends on a restrictive border regime for non-European immigration. For this purpose, we assess how the external shock of the 2015 refugee crisis shaped the bordering preferences of European citizens. We find that the crisis primarily increased citizens' support for external re-bordering, and did not substantially undermine their support for internal free movement. Thus, the large-scale arrival of refugees has not led to a general backlash against open borders and immigration but has, rather, increased public support for the European model of combining internal freedoms with external controls. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the consequences and implications of the rise of European populist parties for European defense cooperation. Focusing on six of the most prominent populist parties in Europe today, we examine their positions along three important defense-related issues: recommended national force posture; integrated military forces; and main national security threats. To determine their position on these three issues, we examine every party manifesto and, if available, official party document on security and defense policy since 2010. We argue that the rise of populism in Europe does not represent an inflection point for the future of European defense cooperation. Instead, our analysis reveals the following three findings: European defense cooperation will continue to be essentially ad hoc, functionally driven, and issue specific; populist parties' attitudes and preferences regarding European defense cooperation both overlap with and diverge from those of other populists and non-populists in the EU; and populism over time may contribute to a shift in domestic preferences toward a Europe that more readily embraces military power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The right of citizens to live and work in any member state is a foundational pillar of the European Union. The views of EU citizens on free movement are characterized by a puzzle: the border-free Europe is seen as the most important achievement of European integration but also appears as a main driver of Euroscepticism. In this article, I argue that this is because of a tension between citizens' own mobility rights and the mobility rights of citizens from other EU countries. This idea of ambivalence towards free movement is tested with observational data and a survey experiment across 28 EU countries. The results suggest that many citizens hold ambivalent views towards free movement due to a tension between the value of one's own mobility and the fear of immigration. Their effective support depends on the relative salience of inward and outward mobility. This finding has important implications for the public support of international integration more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, several European states have moved to ban or restrict the wearing of Islamic face veils. Supporters of these bans maintain that they are necessary to ensure national security and cultural assimilation. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that prohibitions on the veil unjustly restrict the religious liberty of Muslim women. Interestingly, though, despite the controversy surrounding restrictions and bans on the veil and conflicting expectations on the effects of these limitations, little research has attempted to rigorously analyze their effect on radicalization. We seek to address this gap through a statistical analysis of the effects of these laws on Islamist terrorism in the states of Europe. We find that states that enforce veil bans are indeed statistically much more likely to experience more and more lethal Islamist terrorist attacks than countries where such laws do not exist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the solidarity discourse in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis and examines how meanings of solidarity are framed and which political parties participate in these debates. The discourse coalition and coalition magnet approaches are combined to study the two discourse dynamics of demanding solidarity (migration crisis) or being criticised for not showing solidarity (Euro crisis) in the German media discourse. By applying the discourse network methodology, the interdependence of framing and actor visibility is analysed. It is demonstrated that solidarity is linked to austerity by a conservative party discourse coalition in the Euro crisis. The migration crisis discourse is shaped by one large discourse coalition, arguing for political solidarity. In 2015, political solidarity is challenged by security and demarcation claims in the migration crisis. The study contributes to the ideational research framework and demonstrates the different trajectories of solidarity in Europe in hard times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classic partisan theory posits that political parties translate their electorates' preferences into policies. Accordingly, the recent changes in left parties' voter base, from predominantly working-class to middle-class voters, should have resulted in changing policy positions and policy effects of left parties. We test this expectation for economic policies (i.e., subsidies, product market regulation, and privatization) in 16 European countries between 1980 and 2012. We find the expected relationships for subsidies but not for regulation and privatization. This can be explained by the fact that only with regard to subsidies, preferences substantially differ between the working- and the middle-class. Thus, economic policy preferences of voters of left parties diverge less than could be expected. Methodologically, the study suggests that empirically testing the complete causal mechanism of classic partisan theory, assessing voters' preferences and investigating more than one issue area, are promising ways to study partisan effects on public policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the umbrella of Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD), the EU provides equipment and infrastructure to the armed forces of partner countries. The 2017 reform of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) to implement CBSD represents a remarkable integrative step at the interface of EU security and development policy. This article explains the IcSP reform through a neofunctionalist lens. It argues that the extension of the Commission's competences in EU security affairs can be explained by the interaction of functional and cultivated spillover pressures. Functional discrepancies between the CSDP framework and EU development policy created strong pressures for further integrative steps. Moreover, the Commission exerted strong pressures for adopting its proposal for implementing CBSD through the IcSP by drawing on a combination of strategic coalition-building, bargaining tactics and community framing. The case illustrates neofunctionalism's potential to explain external policy integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does media coverage of European Union (EU) politics affect the process of European integration? This contribution investigates the nature and logic of media coverage of EU affairs and identifies the news value criteria that underpin it. It subsequently confronts the key causal mechanisms and processes of grand theories of European integration with this media logic. This generates several key insights in which media impact the EU and European integration. Importantly, it functions to empower the intergovernmentalist nature of the EU, by providing a platform for member state governments, focusing on conflicts between them, reinforcing the primacy of national identity, and by amplifying the European Council as the main locus of EU decision-making. But media also create opportunities for new supranational entrepreneurship that is executive in nature, in policy fields where the EU has significant powers, facilitates action in public interest fields such as consumer policy and supports majoritarian rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While strong voices in the academic literature and real-world politics regard interest groups as biased representatives of the public, we know little about the scope and consequences of such biases for democratic governance. We conduct the first cross-national comparison of group and public preferences analyzing a new dataset of 50 issues in five West European countries. Despite the negative image of interest groups in politics, we find that their positions are in line with public opinion more than half the time. Moreover, while firms and business associations enjoy weaker support for their positions among citizens than public interest groups, they still enjoy the backing of a sizable share of the public. Additionally, we find no general pattern that communities with low interest group diversity are less likely to represent public opinion. Our findings have implications for democratic governance and discussions of how to conceptualize and measure biases in interest representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing body of research on the impact of the electoral system ‘ballot structure’ on the behaviour of politicians. We offer a clear, ordinal and rules-based three-way coding (closed, flexible, open) of the electoral systems used in European Parliament elections, taking into account both the ballot type and the intra-party seat-allocation rules. For the notoriously difficult group of flexible list-systems, we show how these operated in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections, and introduce an additional behavioural distinction between ‘weakly flexible’ and ‘strongly flexible’ subtypes at the party-list-level. We then illustrate how the type of ballot used in an election can influence individual policy representation by looking at the vote-splits between Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the European People’s Party in a vote on tackling homophobia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has convincingly been argued that in the United States, immigration is detrimental to welfare state support. In Europe, on the other hand, there is little evidence for such a negative relationship. This article examines whether a particular type of immigration - rapidly escalating intra-European Union (EU) immigration - reduces public support for the welfare state. We argue that because EU states cannot discriminate against resident EU nationals from other countries in the field of social security, intra-EU immigration will negatively affect attitudes towards welfare spending. To test this expectation, we use data from the European Social Survey of 2008, among other sources. The results of our multilevel analyses document a negative relationship between intra-EU immigration and welfare state support, supporting our hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of whether European democracy is in crisis is not new, but is posed in a new way in the shadow of the euro crisis. In the tradition of the studies of democratic support and disaffection and based on data from the European Social Survey 2012, this article analyses the conceptions and evaluations of democracy in the different regions of Europe under the impact of the euro crisis. It shows that the perceived poor performance of the economy and of the government in the crisis, indeed, leads citizens across Europe to evaluate the way their national democracy works more critically – especially in the hard hit regions of Central and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe, and in authoritarian countries. However, it also shows that this critical evaluation of democracy does not undermine the citizens’ support for democracy. Quite to the contrary: democratic principles are actually strengthened by the dissatisfaction of the citizens with the economic and political performance of their countries in the crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A core claim about agricultural policy making is that it is ‘compartmentalized’ and ‘exceptional’. In this picture, the policy process is insulated from other policy concerns, has a distinctive system of actors and institutional structures, and is rooted in extensive governmental intervention in the market and the redistribution of resources from taxpayers to food producers. Recently there have been suggestions that a ‘post-exceptional’ agricultural politics has emerged, which is more market-driven, has reduced state intervention, and where policies reflect influences relating to non-food issues such as the environment. This contribution discusses the concepts of compartmentalization and exceptionalism and then applies ‘indicators of change’ to a case study of the 2013 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It concludes that the reform provides evidence for ‘shallow’ post-exceptionalism where a historically persistent agricultural policy subsystem has opened up to new actors, incorporated some programme change but left the ideational framework largely intact. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Regarding the analysis of European economic policy choices since 2010, the literature has largely taken the path of intergovernmentalism, concluding that the member states were the key leaders of the economic and fiscal negotiations and relegating the Commission to the loser status. This article aims to open the black box of European economic policy-making through process tracing and embed a discussion on policy entrepreneurship by the Commission within an analysis of policy change in economic governance. It argues that the coupling of a high problem load with a high level of systemic ambiguity opens a window of opportunity for bottom–up entrepreneurship of the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs which is snuffed out by the political College and the member states when the problem load and the systemic ambiguity are low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A curious interconnectedness/consent conundrum marks today's world. Whereas states and societies are becoming more closely interconnected, increased proximity need not increase popular acceptance of federal democracy. Nowhere is this conundrum more apparent than in the European Union. The EU is engaged in a process of democratic federalization, but this process is clearly shaped by the interconnectedness/consent conundrum. In the EU democratic federalization unfolds under conditions of polity contestation. This article discusses what we may learn about democratic federalization from reflecting on the EU experience. For that we need adequate analytical tools because no ready-made analytical framework that fully captures democratic federalization is available, certainly not one that is amenable toward resolving the interconnectedness/consent conundrum. This article provides the bare bones of such a framework. The framework consists of the core components or dimensions of democratic federalization, which are devised to address the specific challenges that the interconnectedness/consent conundrum raises. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The recent economic crisis has brought into focus how even open and highly interdependent economies in the European Union try to govern their economies according to territorially defined interests. The aim of this article is to examine an area, online gambling, with the technological and legal conditions that challenge approaches that favour economic patriotism. The article compares two cases, the United Kingdom and Italy, that represent two different models of economic governance to argue that they are similar in which interests they seek to protect and at which level. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Similar to many international public administrations (IPAs), the European Commission has been delegated a range of tasks related to budgeting. The Commission administration enjoys a high degree of autonomy in routine annual budget procedures leading to the adoption of the draft annual EU budgets; it also has a visible influence on inter-institutional budget negotiations. The present contribution analyses how the Commission administration has responded to growing pressures on the EU budget following the recent financial crisis, focusing on changes to its administrative organization and budgeting procedures. Both scholarship on the Commission and previous research on the administrative dimension of budgeting under stress suggest increased centralization as a key response. We find some evidence to support this expectation for the annual budget processes after 2010. Centralization was most pronounced during discussions on the 2014–2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), when regular routines came under increased pressure in entangled budget negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On 29 August 2013, the British parliament voted against two motions to censure the Syrian government which were expected to lead to military action. The result was a shock to external commentators and quickly interpreted as a fiasco. This article charts the construction of the severity and agency involved in this fiasco and notes the extremely personal nature of efforts to attribute blame for the outcome. It argues that this process enabled policy-makers to ignore underlying trends impacting on foreign policy, including the breakdown of bipartisanship, increasing public scepticism about government use of intelligence and the utility of force, severe reductions in Britain's capacity to act, as well as a deeper identity crisis about what kind of actor Britain should be in the world. Constructing this event as a fiasco can be seen as a form of denial of Britain's loss of agency in global affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The analysis of policy failures is, by definition, not a neutral endeavour, since policy fiascos are not neutral events. Moreover, they are often, usually implicitly, but sometimes explicitly, permeated with prosecutorial narratives, blame games and a search for culprits. Fiascos do not just ‘happen’. They are constructed, declared, and argued over in labelling processes that are not necessarily ‘evidence–based’. This presents a challenge for any academic endeavour to identify, analyse and explain policy fiascos. Against this backdrop, we assess the study of policy failure as it stands today, and offer some reflections for its further development. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The contribution introduces narrative analysis as a discourse analytical method for investigating the social construction of foreign policy fiascos. Based on insights from literary studies and narratology it shows that stories of failure include a number of key elements, including a particular setting which defines appropriate behaviour; the negative characterization of agents; as well as an emplotment of the ‘fiasco’ through the attribution of cause and responsibility. The contribution illustrates this method through a narrative analysis of German media reporting on Germany's abstention in the United Nations Security Council vote on Resolution 1973 in March 2011 regarding the military intervention in Libya. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article investigates the influence of the institutions that aim to foster democracy in Europe, such as the European Union, European Court of Human Rights and Venice Commission on political party closure cases in Europe, through a comparative study on the Democratic Society Party (DTP) decision in Turkey and the Batasuna decision in Spain. Adopting the theory of communicative action, the arguments presented by the judges in the related reasoned decisions are analysed according to three categories: utility; values; and rights. It is argued that the European norms and principles constitute the main strand of justifications; hence, the European institutions have a considerable right-based influence on national courts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Much literature has analysed parties’ influence on public education spending. We challenge this literature on theoretical, methodological and empirical grounds. It is standard to regress expenditure on cabinet seat-share weighted party family dummies in time-series cross-section regressions using ‘country-year’ data. But using ‘country-year’ data artificially inflates the number of cases and leads to biased estimates, as governments usually do not change annually. Second, using party families as proxies for party preferences assumes that parties within families hold similar positions while they differ across families. But this is empirically often not the case. Finally, a historical institutionalist perspective suggests that we should not expect party effects anymore in the first place. Empirically, we propose a new design, using direct measures of party preferences in analyses on government-term level. We find that the partisan composition of government did not have any significant effects on education spending from 1995 to 2010 in 21 democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Ideas are at their most powerful as an explanatory variable when they lead agents to go against any broadly reasonable interpretation of their material self-interests. They become even more intriguing when they are instrumental in actuallycausinga crisis, in which actors undercut their own stated goals and then continue to make matters worse by sticking to those same ideas, even in the light of clear evidence that the policies they inspire are not working. This contribution shows two dynamics between power and ideas to explain Germany's behavior during the euro crisis. The first dynamic examines the changing macroeconomic consensus on how to conduct monetary and fiscal policy that governed the euro from 1999 to 2012. The second dynamic shows how a strict adherence to Germany's ordoliberal ideas of budgetary rules and structural reform turned a containable Greek fiscal problem into a full-blown systemic sovereign debt crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Norwegian energy policy is increasingly made by the European Union (EU), but as a European Economic Area (EEA) member only, Norway lacks representation in EU institutions. This article studies how key Norwegian energy companies and organizations deal with this challenge, asking whether Norwegian interest groups lobby directly in Brussels or lobby in Oslo to influence EU legislation. It finds that although Norwegian interest groups lack access to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, they have access to the Commission. Still, they mainly lobby in Oslo, even to influence EU legislation. When lobbying in Brussels, they lobby early in the decision-making process and together with ‘good friends’, mostly European associations. However, these lobbying strategies are insufficient to compensate for lack of representation in EU institutions – which therefore represents a great democratic problem. A case study of the EU 2030 Framework on climate and energy illustrates this democratic challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines whether European countries' collective labour standards are converging and if so why. It presents new data on labour protection in 45 European countries and shows that the EU is a labour standards convergence club. It reviews the soft and hard instruments which the EU adopted in order to promote labour standards. The article models the competition, emulation and learning convergence mechanisms using a spatial econometric approach, and shows that EU countries learn from each other's successes and emulate one another. The article thus presents new evidence of the mixture of domestic and cross-national factors which shape labour standards in Europe. It adds to the growing evidence of countries' spatial dependencies in various policy areas. Most importantly, it provides evidence showing that soft co-ordination is an effective instrument which has had a positive impact on labour standards, and has led to horizontal convergence in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Market deregulation has been integral to economic globalization, but we do not know very much about the comparative dimension of reform, i.e., the performance of liberal and co-ordinated market economies. Co-ordinated market economies are often assumed to perform poorly in deregulation reform, while such reform is path-dependent to the liberal market economy model. The article compares the trajectory of market deregulation in these different ‘varieties of capitalism’. Drawing on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's ‘product market regulation indicators', the analysis shows that co-ordinated market economies have implemented more extensive deregulation than have the liberal market economies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Drawing on an analysis of austerity reforms in Greece and Portugal during the sovereign debt crisis from 2009 onwards, we show how the nature of the linkages between parties and citizens shapes party strategies of fiscal retrenchment. We argue that parties which rely to a greater extent on the selective distribution of state resources to mobilize electoral support (clientelistic linkages) are more reluctant to agree to fiscal retrenchment because their own electoral survival depends on their ability to control state budgets to reward clients. In Greece, where parties relied extensively on these clientelistic linkages, austerity reforms have been characterized by recurring conflicts and disagreements between the main parties, as well as a fundamental transformation of the party system. By contrast, in Portugal, where parties relied less on clientelistic strategies, austerity reforms have been more consensual because fiscal retrenchment challenged to a lesser extent the electoral base of the mainstream parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers a first comprehensive overview of the workings of enhanced cooperation in the European Union (EU). Although this form of secondary law differentiation exists since the Amsterdam Treaty, it has only rarely been used so far. In the article, we formulate a theory of when and why enhanced cooperation is used in EU decision-making. Our theory builds on rationalist institutionalism focussing on institutions, preference constellations and the externality structure of policies. We test the plausibility of our theoretical claims by combining comparative and within-case analyses of nine cases. The empirical findings underline that the usage of enhanced cooperation depends to large degrees on the externality structure of the goods under consideration. The article ends with a short normative evaluation of the enhanced cooperation procedure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Orthodox integration scholarship failed to identify the factors leading to the euro area (EA) economic and financial crisis because of weaknesses that Horkheimer identified in ‘traditional’ theory: disciplinary splits and a tendency to idealize from particular instrumental perspectives. By contrast, critical political economy offered a plausible and coherent elucidation of the emergent properties and limits of finance-led capitalism and their concrete manifestation in the EA. This contribution both reviews state-of-the-art critical political economy research on the EA crisis and makes a distinct contribution to it. In addressing the puzzle of why not only the Economic and Monetary Union persists despite morbid symptoms but why crisis management is extending and deepening a discredited finance-led capitalism, the contribution synthesizes theories of transnational class formation and inter-state relations, and proposes that Europe is caught in an ordoliberal iron cage. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The last decades have witnessed a significant shift in policy competences away from central governments in Europe. The reallocation of competences spans over three dimensions: upwards; sideways; and downwards. This collection takes the dispersion of powers as a starting point and seeks to assess how the actors involved cope with the new configurations. In this introduction, we discuss the conceptualization of power dispersion and highlight the ways in which the contributions add to this research agenda. We then outline some general conclusions and end by indicating future avenues of research. Taken together, the collection contributes some answers to the challenge of defining and measuring – in a comparative way – the control and co-ordination mechanisms which power dispersion generates. It also explores the tension between political actors' quest for autonomy and the acknowledgement of their interdependence whilst revealing how, as power dispersion deepens, central governments have sought to both manage and limit it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political control of the bureaucracy is a major theme in public administration scholarship, particularly in delegation theory. There is a wide range of policy instruments suitable for the purpose of control. In practice, however, there are economic and political limitations to deploying the full arsenal of control tools. We explore the implications of the costs of control by examining cross-country patterns of fire alarms. We identify and categorize a set of control instruments and their rationale using accountability typologies. We then code the presence or absence of different instruments by drawing on an original dataset of 14 instruments in a population of 17 European countries. Using configurational analysis, we analyse cross-country patterns. In the conclusions, we reflect on the patterns identified, their implications for controlling bureaucracy in advanced democracies and the literature on administrative traditions. We finally propose how our empirical findings may be extended to further explanatory analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new European Union Directive (Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC) intends to liberalize the European defence market. This article investigates whether this Directive leads to a more liberalized European defence market and how the defence companies respond to these changes, by carrying out a set of interviews with a selected sample of some of the most important defence contractors in Norway and Sweden. The article points out two main results. (1) The defence companies believe that the liberalization of the European defence market will at best be partial and fear that the new regulations might end up favouring the larger nations (e.g., Germany, the United Kingdom and France) at the expense of the smaller countries (e.g., Norway and Sweden). (2) The companies' scepticism and response to the Directive vary according to the defence industrial policy regime they are part of and their position in the defence industrial value-chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]