Caroline Fohlin, I Emory University i A History of Decentralization: Fiscal Transitions in Late Imperial China, 1850-1911 A key question regarding the state building of late Qing China (1850-1911) is why a precarious central court led not to a collapse but to the remarkable transformation of its fiscal-military regime. Meanwhile, historical sociologists stress the role of a common geopolitical factor in Europe - international wars - in the making of fiscal-military states.[5] Furthermore, new institutional economics establishes a more coherent framework: the combination of historical and rational-choice institutionalism not only incorporates structural factors and shocks but also accepts multiple potential outcomes of institutional evolution; this enables the actors in the repertoire to rationalize their behaviors in a dynamic way.[6] The aforementioned literature broadly defines a "fiscal state": first, a unified legal and bureaucratic system with state sovereignty; second, monetized taxation with a broad tax base; and third, adoption of public credit tools with long-term commitment from the state. The rebellious regime failed to attract gentry elites and mass people, whereas the Qing state took this opportunity to strengthen its legitimacy and capacity. Opposing interests of different state actors can be pivotal in understanding fiscal modernization, tax structure, and labor coercion, so it is imperative to break open the black box of state capacity and analyze specific actors within the state. I Lijin i was an indirect tax on transported goods, usually levied at the transportation hubs on key roads and waterways.[17] The Qing regime survived the Taiping crisis with timely I lijin i income, and local governments firmly preserved their I lijin i funds in the postwar decades. [Extracted from the article]