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Hybrid dispute settlement mechanism is one of the characteristics of the UNCLOS. It is the combination of diplomatic measures and judicial proceedings. Among them, the ITLOS established in accordance with Annex VI, and two types of arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annexes VII and VIII are means for the disputes settlement firstly regulated in the UNCLOS. Especially, according to Article 287, an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII has default jurisdiction in case one or both parties to a dispute are not covered by a declaration in force, or the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement of the dispute. These means of dispute settlement have supplemented and enhanced the source of law for international dispute resolution more diversified. This paper clarifies some aspects of compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions under the UNCLOS, evaluates the applicability of these procedures to the case of Vietnam in the disputes settlement on interpretation or application of the UNCLOS raising among countries in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on the South China Sea Disputes was over on July 12, 2016, with a Merits Award in Philippine favor. Beijing rejected this arbitration and abstained from submitting written and oral arguments. Taiwan actively engaged in the debate with the Philippines since July 7, 2015. Not deemed as representative of China, Taiwan was considered capable of clarifying the meaning of the U-Shaped Line it first published in 1947 when seated in Nanjing, representing China then. The biggest maritime feature in the Spratly Islands, i.e. Taiping Island (Itu Aba), has been occupied by troops from mainland China since 1946 and then from Taiwan since 1956. The legal status of Taiping Island was the key to success of Philippine Submissions. The factual information from Taiwan became vital. This paper examines Taiwan's role in this arbitration and the degree to which it could actually speak for China at such legal proceedings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides detailed analysis of the so-called 'Rusk Letter' which has been generally referred to as an evidence of Japan's territorial claim to Dokdo island. The Rusk Letter is a diplomatic epistle which was drafted by Dean Rusk, the US Assistant Secretary of State and sent to the Korean Embassy in the US on August 10, 1951. This letter considers Dokdo as Japan's territory. However, the Rusk Letter has been legally and historically criticized from mainly two aspects. First, the Rusk Letter referred to the ownership of Dokdo only considering the Japanese position which was not true. Second, this letter was a confidential and unofficial document which was sent only to Korea; Japan and even the US Embassy to Korea did not know the Rusk Letter. It did not influence on the decision of Peace Treaty. Therefore, the Rusk Letter cannot be a critical evidence of Japan's territorial claim over Dokdo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's straight baseline regime deviates from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in a number of ways. Such discrepancies are likely to induce legal and political conflicts between countries, and also the settlement of which would not be easy, in particular, among the East Asian countries. In consideration of this point, the legal issues surrounding China's straight baselines and basepoints should be analyzed and evaluated not only from the perspectives of UNCLOS, but also through comparative analyses based on customary international law, State practices, and special circumstances. Many of China's State practices and laws based on straight baselines are neither in accordance with international laws, nor generally recognized as being in accordance with the international law of the sea. This paper provides important legal insights into China's straight baselines, which are unlawful from the perspectives of UNCLOS and State practices, and, in addition, suggest desirable ways to solve the problems in international laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The countries in East Asia continue to have problems in maritime boundary delimitation. The collision on September 7, 2010 between a Chinese fishing vessel (Minjinyu) and a Japanese patrol boat in the waters near Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is interesting to observe as a step in dispute settlement process. The differences between the PRC and Japan on maritime boundary delimitation for the East China Sea and the legal status of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are demonstrated by this incident. To see things in their context, it is necessary to observe the practices of East Asian countries in handling their maritime boundary delimitations, especially those involving islands with disputed legal status. The rules of international law relating to the pacific settlement of dispute and maritime delimitation dispute resolution, which involve a preliminary sovereignty dispute over islands, are also relevant as a much broader background. The author will examine why certain maritime delimitation cases are particularly hard to handle. The lessons drawn from this paper is inspiring for Taiwan, a long-time marginalized player in East Asian regional affairs. The author will examine the difficulties and opportunities for Taiwan in maritime boundary delimitation and offer a suggestion on how to accomplish such task with neighboring countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]