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Scholarly efforts to predict the future character of the U.S.-China relationship abound. Few however looks to leaders’ beliefs as valid explanatory variables. In this paper, we argue that state leaders’ belief systems are key to understanding both the states’ intentions and policy choices. We analyze China’s national defense white papers (1998-2015) published to date as the source material to gauge the core collective beliefs of three generations of Chinese leadership. The operational code framework is employed to conceptualize and measure these beliefs. Our results identified important crossgenerational changes in a few belief indicators. In the Xi Jinping era, for instance, the political world is seen as less friendly and cooperative strategies are viewed less favorably. In terms of tactics, the policy tools “threaten” and “promise” are viewed as significantly more useful by the current leadership than by past Chinese leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on China's political influence in international affairs, as mediated by Chinese economic integration with the BRI countries. We propose that the BRI plays a role in influencing partner countries to support China's presence in the international community, and the economic integration of the BRI positively mediates the willingness of partner countries to align with China in international affairs. This paper uses panel data from 147 BRI countries collected between 2009 and 2020, and the difference-in-differences method, to estimate the political influence of the BRI. The results suggest that the BRI motivates partner countries to support the growth of China's influence in international affairs. The results of the causal mechanism analysis indicate that a significant and positive association between the implementation of the BRI and China's influence is mediated by promoting Chinese contracts, trade overseas, and outward FDI. The examinations of heterogeneity demonstrate that BRI countries that are developing, non-landlocked, non-neighboring, having signed the memorandum of understanding or cooperation memorandum of understanding, or lacking a Chinese investment guide are more likely to support China's political presence. This paper concludes with insights into how China implements the BRI to enhance its political ascent in the global order by facilitating economic integration of the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper complicates the classic security dilemma by considering the notions of ontological security and relational deterrence. It studies how the ontological security dilemma has emerged between the US, China, and Taiwan from the relational perspective and how these spiral chains will further develop in the future. The paper incurs the literature on relational analysis to expound on how different ontological security concerns allude to relational deterrence between the three actors. Taiwan's separatism is more of a threat to China's relational self than to physical security because the separatist does not belong to any already agreed relationship. A geometric model and a few simulations yield three unconventional findings. 1) The less advantaged the US military is over China, the less likely armed unification will occur. 2) The US anti-Chinese tendency is irrelevant in determining the probability of armed unification. 3) What may escalate the spiral are China's anti-Taiwan independence and Taiwan's anti-unification. Case sensitivity indicates the ontological sensibilities of a security dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent years have witnessed a significant change in China–EUrope relations, with the EU's strategic positioning of China undergoing a fundamental shift from a "partner" to a "systemic rival." By applying a theoretical framework based on neoclassical realism, the present paper examines the determinant factors leading to such a shift. This study highlights three factors: first, a change in the US's strategy and governance capability; second, the power symmetries between China and EUrope, including salient changes in material strength and marked differences in norms; third, an emergent change in strategic culture, encompassing a striving China vis-à-vis a strategically autonomous EUrope. By following Götz's (2021) insights on neoclassical realist approaches that employ intervening variables as complementary factors, we identify the US factor as the most important international factor in structural terms, while the power symmetries and strategic culture act as complementary factors. The paper concludes that while maintaining engagement, China–EUrope relations will only see further intensified rivalry and contradictions in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been widely argued that China has prepared for launching cyberwarfare against the United States for long time. There are two reasons for this. First, the revolution of cyber technology changed the offense-defense balance, which will lead to frequent cyber conflicts. Second, with the relative decline of the United States and the rising up of China in recent years, there has been growing concerns about a Thucydides Trap between the two great powers, and cyberwar is very likely to happen. However, except for disputes on cyber espionage, China showed restraint on the offensive use of its cyberpower. This paper argues that China's strategic thinking on cyber offense, defense, and cyberwarfare has been evolving over the past decades. Through content analysis of official documents and academic writings, this paper sheds light on the recent discussions and development of China's cyber offense and defense strategy. With China's gradual access to the global Internet and extensive participation in the international economic division of labor, maintaining the stability of global cyberspace is of greater significance to China, and the cost of launching cyber warfare is higher and higher. Such findings help avoid miscalculation and maintain strategic stability between China and the United States in cyberspace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the challenges brought about by the devastating COVID-19 pandemic in China and the Chinese government's increasingly stringent regulatory policies, this paper poses the following research questions: During the pandemic and in interactions with the government, why did some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) survive while others were shut down, although most of those that survived were small and medium-sized NGOs? In addressing this question, this paper delves into the strategies adopted by small and medium-sized NGOs to cope with COVID-19. Using data drawn from three years of field observations and research in six major cities in China, this paper finds that four types of small and medium-sized NGOs resorted to different strategies that followed degree of competitiveness and scope of main business. The scarcity of resources resulting to the pandemic plunged NGOs into a competitive survival posture; thus, the strategies for the four types of small and medium-sized NGOs achieved three levels of effectiveness, namely good, medium, and poor. The findings of this paper shed significant light on the diversity and complexity of the survival and development of NGOs under the authoritarian regime of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Crises constitute ideal opportunities for authoritarian leaders to promote certain narratives, shaping reality in their favor and crafting their own preferred storylines about current events. In other words: they serve authoritarian leaders on a silver platter the opportunity to instrumentalize these unforeseen circumstances to gain domestic political legitimacy by promoting strategic narratives. The COVID-19 pandemic was no exception in this regard. Ever since its onset in early 2020, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was among the most active actors worldwide seeking to capitalize on the global crisis for legitimation purposes. Whether applying narratives of governance supremacy, portraying the People's Republic of China as a "global savior," or promoting emotionally appealing nationalistic narratives, the regime used the pandemic as a window of opportunity to rebrand its international role and enhance its domestic legitimacy. When observing the CCP's communication style over the course of 24 pandemic months (2020–2022), however, major shifts become apparent regarding the main narratives crafted in communication with national audiences. Based on this, the paper focuses on the role of such narratives for legitimation claims. Using exemplary media articles collected between the outbreak of the pandemic in China in late 2019 until the harsh Shanghai lockdown in spring 2022, it thus traces the narratives employed by Chinese state elites and explores how they are intertwined with nationalism and broader power claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores cycles in innovative outcomes corresponding with the timing of political turnover. Using data on local government officials and firm level innovation activities in China, firm innovation is found to be negatively associated with a turnover of local political leaders. We examine several potential explanations and find evidence supporting the premise that political turnover reduces firms' incentives to innovate until the uncertainty is resolved. This paper also indicates that local political turnover significantly inhibits firms' research and development investment, government subsidies, and expansion decisions, leading to less innovative outcomes. Moreover, reductions in innovation are greater in cities with higher levels of government expenditure or intellectual property rights trials, or in smaller firms or non-state-owned enterprises during the rotation of local government leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Establishing a service-oriented government (SOG) that can satisfy the needs of the people is not only a critical research topic in the field of public administration, but also a strategic agenda officially proposed since the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). As SOG research increases, it is important to thoroughly review the topics and trajectory of research on SOG in China. This paper uses CiteSpace, a visual analysis software, to provide an up-to-date overview and systematic summary of the research topics, trajectory, and gaps in SOG research in China. SOG research in China is classified into four categories: SOG concepts, development paths, government reforms, and performance evaluations. This paper illustrates the underlying problems, such as unsystematic theoretical development, research perspectives, and deficiency of the integrated research on the development mechanism, prominent focuses, and practical applicability. We concluded by identifying new trends in SOG research in China regarding government–society relations and big data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China has risen as an advanced technological society, a new type of Orientalism—Digital Orientalism—has likewise emerged. Using historical materialism, this paper details these developments, including China's change from a civilization-state to modern nation-state and its transition from a technical state to an advanced technological society, closing the technology gap that had left it vulnerable to foreign aggression and continued forms of international dominance and hegemony. It reviews and develops theories associated with technological societies, and how these relate to technophobia generally and the rise of Sino(techno)phobia specifically. It then theorizes three distinct but overlapping trends or themes in Orientalist depictions of China over the past two centuries: 1) 'classical' Orientalism, first theorized by Edward Said; 2) 'Sinological Orientalism,' described by Daniel Vukovich; and now 3), 'Digital Orientalism,' which was first introduced by Maximilian Mayer. This paper develops analyses associated primarily with the third theme, investigating contemporary developments in the context of China as a rising power and how scholars and other nations have responded in turn. It argues that China appears to have surpassed others now as a technological society, including the US, with China's response to COVID-19 as a clear example, and with clear implications for China's national advancement and global position vis-à-vis the United States particularly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel control in China in the twenty-first century. Employing the city-level turnover data of political leaders in China between 2000 and 2018 and utilizing the fixed effects ordered logit model, we find that the likelihood of promotion of local leaders rises with their economic performance. This relationship holds more firmly in the municipal party secretary. The probability is also found to decrease with the economic performance of their immediate predecessors and neighboring cities. This finding is robust to various robustness tests. We interpret the finding as evidence that the relative economic performance (peer effects) also contributes to the local political turnover, in particular within a province. Moreover, after the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, a material change in the personnel arrangement within the party arises and this promotion mechanism shows a dynamic change. Our study sheds some light on the growing literature emphasizing the relationship between political turnover and economic performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Utilizing national migration data regarding the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV), this paper employs a difference-in-differences approach to empirically analyze the relationship between human mobility and the transmission of infectious diseases in China. We show that national human mobility restrictions ascribed to the first-level public health emergency response policy effectively reduce both intercity and intracity migration intensities, thus leading to a declining scale of human mobility, which improves the effectiveness in controlling the epidemic. Human mobility restrictions have greater influences on cities with better economic development, denser populations, or larger passenger volumes. Moreover, mobility restriction measures are found to be better implemented in regions with increased public awareness, or with provincial leaders who have healthcare crisis management experience, local administrative experience, or the opportunity to serve a consecutive term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eliminating poverty is a worldwide problem, but China has recently made major achievements in poverty alleviation. By the end of 2020, 832 nationally designated poor counties had all been lifted out of poverty within five years. Why do some poor counties perform better in poverty alleviation? This paper leverages a unique county-level dataset of 832 nationally designated poor counties in China and uses discrete-time event history analysis to understand the relationship between political institutions and poverty alleviation. We find that the presence of a county party committee secretary concurrently holding a higher rank position above the county level significantly increases the odds ratio of accomplishing poverty alleviation tasks. Previous studies have emphasized the important role of empowering people in democracies for poverty reduction. This study shows that empowering key governmental actors in authoritarian regimes can help them increase their bargaining power and improve the performance of poverty alleviation. In addition, this paper echoes the research on political institutions of authoritarian systems and deepens the understanding of the importance of the higher-ranking institution of Chinese officials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the authors discuss topics within the issue, including deliberative and participatory innovations in China, China’s institutional adaptation, and how China's political system has been changing since the 1990s.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is poised to profoundly reshape the regional geographical landscape. While existing communication studies on BRI have focused on the official and media narratives to frame the initiative, the overall orientation of the topic in academic circles is not well understood. By conducting a bibliometric literature review, this paper addresses this gap by answering the research question: How is the BRI reflected in the academic literature? In the review, we divide all academic studies on BRI into four cohorts (studies from scholars based in China, in Quad countries, in the rest of the world, and cross-collaborating scholars) and use structural topic model to understand the themes and trends on BRI scholarship from scholars from these regions. Our results show that scholars in different cohorts understand BRI differently, specifically, with China-based scholars projecting ideas of development, growth and sustainability, while Quad-based scholars mostly focus on the geopolitical impact, security implications and debt sustainability of BRI. The findings also show a divergence between popular narratives on BRI and academic research on the topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As President Xi Jinping expands and deepens his mark on the Chinese political system, how should scholars assess the impact of his administration on core institutions such as the police? This article employs a mixed methods approach by combining data from interview research with text analysis of ministerial level documents to explore reforms and rhetoric in the public security bureaucracy during the first six years of Xi's tenure. The timing, nature, and practical execution of police reform shed light on the priorities of the Xi administration and its ability to make changes to the police bureaucracy and enforce law and order in Chinese cities. The paper assesses key policing reform rhetoric using Jean-Paul Brodeur's framework of high and low policing to analyze which areas of policing have received the most attention and in what ways. Ultimately, I find that preferences for "high policing" style stability maintenance reforms supersede concern for "low policing" activities such as crime-fighting, resulting in the further politicization of policing in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National identity is the cognition of citizens regarding to which political community they belong, and the tendency to accept the political, cultural and ethnic values of the state. Previous studies have found that national identity is heterogeneous at the subnational levels. Why do people hold different degrees of nationalism and patriotism in the subnational units? In this paper, we offer a political economic explanation of national identity, which links the state capacity with political attitudes. We employ a nationalism-patriotism framework to decompose the concept of national identity, then use the supervised learning approach to measure nationalism and patriotism based on a massive number of Weibo posts dating from 2011 to 2017. Automated text analysis shows that the state capacity plays an important role preventing the national identity from being weakened by globalization and the diversity of social information. Specifically, with the progress of China's globalization, multiculturalism and various information have crossed the national boundaries, which undermines China's national identity. In order to maintain this identity, the Chinese government utilizes its redistribution capacity to reinforce both nationalism and patriotism, and also its information capacity to strengthen nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to address the development of China's narrative power during the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on world order. It argues that in the post-pandemic world, the emergence of the authoritarian sub-order would be prompted by China's more proactive narrative power, given that the climate of opinion is ambiguous when faced with the uncertainty of the pandemic. (This does not imply the end of the existing liberal order; instead, it features the coexistence of both orders.) To understand how China's narrative power has encouraged the emergence of the authoritarian sub-order to coexist in parallel with the dominant constitutional order, the article first reviews the existing literature concerning the changing world order. In this section, it also briefly defines and differentiates between the constitutional and authoritarian orders, what defines world order, and what distinguishes authoritarian from constitutional liberal order. Second it looks at the theoretical grounding. The nature, role and power of narratives are explored. Ideas about strategic narratives and the economics of attention are discussed. This theoretical background paves the way to examine China's narrative power during a pandemic. Lastly, it switches to the Chinese perspective to address its support for the plurality of orders and its awareness of the strength of narrative in influencing dominant ideas. It looks at how China's narrative power has been exercised from three perspectives (formation, projection and reception). Here, it mainly tackles how China has used its narrative power to spin the pandemic to its advantage in the reorganization of world order: improving its international image and advocating the authoritarian order as an alternative. China has been building its narrative along with its changing strategic diplomacy – from restrained and low-profile to proactive and assertive. In the conclusion, some reflections on China's narrative power and the implications for world order are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the emergence and evolution of direct elections (DE) for officials at township-level government in China using social evolutionary theory. The explanations provided by existing research using modernization theory or rational choice theory are not sufficient for fully understanding innovation and change of grassroots democratic institutions across China as a whole. This paper argues that the experiment of DEs at the township level is an institutional reform driven by external forces. Under the pressure of financial crisis, a small number of county-level political elites challenged existing thinking and initiated this institutional innovation. The diffusion, continuation and subsequent breakdown of this innovation was the result of the interactions between the external actors of local political elites, the central government, and public opinion led by media and scholars following major fiscal structural changes. Our research finds that during the period of continuation, it is the central government who plays the most pivotal role amongst the external actors and continues to determine the future evolution of this institutional innovation. This paper concludes that a social evolutionary approach has strong explanatory power regarding analyzing institutional changes around local elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is no secret that EU member states cannot come to terms on a unified China-policy. Most studies on EU-China relations come to the conclusion that disagreement exists and that this fragmentation is utilized by Chinese foreign policy in a kind of divide and rule strategy. However, the question as to why the EU members disagree has not been answered satisfactorily. This paper investigates the reasons for this discord from the perspective of the core-periphery theory. We illustrate how the spatial position of nations within Europe–in a geographical and political sense–shapes their outlook on China. As a case study to illustrate the differences in the outlook on China of among EU member countries, we analyse the discourses on Chinese COVID-19 vaccines in the Hungarian and German press from April 2020 until summer 2021. We argue that these differences have their grounds in the spatial-relational positioning at either the core or the semi-periphery of the EU. Based on our findings we suggest that a sustainable EU China-policy has first to address these differences in foreign policy outlook and then find a common ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sino-U.S. relations tumbled during the Trump Administration. The talk of decoupling permeated the decision-making circle in Washington D.C. Many factors have contributed to the free fall. The roles Congress has played are undoubtedly one of them. Based on the new institutionalist approach, this study provides three analyses of recent China-related legislative activities. First, the historical analysis of legislative data illustrates a surge in congressional activism on China-related legislative activities. Second, the content analysis reveals some of the triggers in the deterioration of bilateral relations in recent years. Third, the political analysis of the critical congressional players and the structures and procedures Congress created provides some insight into the domestic and political logic of the congressional crusade against China. Finally, the paper ends with assessing the impact of the surge in Congressional activism on the new Biden Administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines whether the pacifying effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on territorial disputes between adversarial dyads is conditional upon the dyads' past experience of military cooperation. I built a political economy model and conducted a logistic regression analysis on the newly coded bilateral FDI data between adversarial dyads and the existing dataset by merging the rivalry data established by Thompson [51] and the territorial disputes data collected by Lee and Mitchell [42]. I found that when bilateral FDI flows between adversarial dyads reach a certain level the pacifying effect of FDI is stronger for adversarial dyads with past military cooperation. I also found that while past military cooperation has a pacifying effect in general, past military cooperation that occurred more recently has a stronger pacifying effect than those that occurred a while ago. Moreover, based upon the theoretical model and empirical findings in this paper, I investigated the political implications for Tsai Ing-wen's "New Southbound Policy" and Taiwan's approach to the territorial dispute issues in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The wave of volunteerism and popular participation in disaster relief activities after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake in authoritarian China has attracted much academic attention. Existing literature leverages the erosion of state capacity, the moral symbolism and emotions of disaster relief, and civil society's ability to provide crucial public goods and services to explain this popular mobilization ([12]; [15]; [22]). However, these arguments do not satisfactorily explain why sustained, self-organized non-state activities were concentrated in few sites across the region most affected by the earthquake. This paper investigates the lingering puzzle of uneven grassroots activities through the lens of spatial theory. I argue that conditions favorable to popular mobilization were mediated by the creation of large and accessible public spaces in the form of emergency shelters, breaking the ordinary cellular spatial order which enhances state control through partitioning, surveillance, and securitization. Public spaces open to all increased contact among citizens, enabled coordination and collective activities, and created new common symbols and histories, thus facilitating sustained and self-organized popular activities. To test this theory, I conduct a most similar cases comparison between two prefectural-level cities, Deyang and Mianyang, in Sichuan province. I demonstrate that despite the similar lack of civil society organizations before the earthquake and similar needs after the earthquake, Mianyang saw more sustained grassroots activities due to the presence of large, dense, highly visible and accessible emergency shelters, while Deyang's distributed emergency resettlement strategies better maintained the cellular spatial order that left few sites for sustained popular activities. This paper seeks to understand the spatial nature of popular mobilization and aims to address a so far understudied element of civil society formation in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies focusing on China and Russia, whose relationship is of key importance to the configuration of the international system, have been evolving dynamically in various disciplines. We analyze the evolution of this research by focusing on the fields of International Relations and Area Studies. This novel bibliometric study employs Biblioshiny, AntConc, and VOSviewer to analyze 947 publications collected from the Web of Science Core Collection, focusing specifically on 266 publications in International Relations and Area Studies. While mapping research on China and Russia over the last three decades (1990–2019), we identify the main trends regarding the annual distribution of papers, document types, dominant journals, collaboration networks between countries, and the most productive authors. We also establish prevailing research themes resulting from keyword analysis and their respective growth over time, as well as the density of the most frequently used terms and methods employed in the selected research fields. Finally, we identify fruitful avenues for further research, while also demonstrating how the bibliometric approach can inform and direct developments on China and Russia studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the question of how provincial top leaders' promotion incentive drive their strategies of land approval in China. This question is situated in broad theoretical knowledge of politicians' incentives and behaviors for career advancement. In view of promotion rules in China, we make officials' age a proxy for promotion incentives. Then based on the fact that land is essential for economic growth and the power of land approval is largely in provincial governments, we establish a theoretical framework to uncover the relationship between provincial leaders' age and their strategies of land approval. With detailed information of provincial leaders and data of land approval areas of 30 provinces in China from 1999 to 2014, we identify an inversed-U relationship between the amount of construction land approved by provincial governments and age of provincial party secretaries, while not for governors. And the maximum of land approval scale corresponds to party secretaries' age of 57, 2 years before their sensitive age of political career, which can be explained as proactive behavior for upcoming promotion incentives. Furthermore, once the tenure of officials in the same province exceeds 5 years, the scale of land approval will no longer be affected by age. Our study contributes to the existing literature by testing and confirming politicians' strategical behaviors intrigued by promotion incentive and make it more concrete with the case of land approval in China. Furthermore, we provide a political perspective to understand the expansion of construction land in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to characterize China's approach to global economic governance during the Xi Jinping era, and to provide details on how it is playing out. One finding is that China has moved away from the period of "hiding one's strength and biding one's time" and is now acting in a more norm-making and agenda-setting role in which it is seeking largely incremental change. Another finding is that China is doing these things through a variety of global governance forms such as inter-governmental organizations with a fairly highly degree of formality, looser international organizations that have weaker implementation capacity and unilateral initiatives which put China very much in a leadership position. Findings are based on an examination of major activities of the Xi period, including hosting the G20 leaders' summit in Hangzhou, China, joint creation of new multilateral development banks, and the Belt and Road Initiative. The paper also touches on motives for China's activities, including hedging against adverse developments in the international system, greater wealth, and a global power vacuum that has arisen with the rise of nativist and populist movements in the West, and possible constraints to the realization of China's objectives such as slowing domestic economic growth and a backlash against China's globalization, which could intensify. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By exploring the CECC's political prisoner database and employing three ARDL times series models and two OLS models, the paper finds that China's party-state has been dealing with political cases through depoliticization, politicization, and criminalization within and without the judiciary. The author argues that these strategies employed by China's party-state are a function of China's modernization, domestic conflicts, and the urgency to sustain political stability. Unlike what happened in the Western history where depoliticization was usually followed with democratization, China's depoliticization has been strategically utilized to justify the Party's rule over China mainly through its judicial system. China's politicization, as a fundamental political strategy, has been often applied to handle those political threats such as Falun Gong practitioners and political/civil rights fighters, who are unable to be publicly criminalized and trialed but can be penalized with covert judicial and/or extra-judicial means by the Chinese government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Voting in China's grassroots elections is more of a ritual than a right. For most citizens especially in the urban areas, the results of the local elections have little effect on their lives. Indeed, despite the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) campaigns to get the vote out in local elections, voter turnout is relatively low especially among younger voters. Beyond local political campaigns to remind citizens of their duty to vote is the community pressure and engagement. How does community interaction influence voter turnout in authoritarian grassroots elections? That is, are more socially engaged citizens more likely to vote in ritual elections? Moreover, does community engagement mitigate the age gap in voter turnout in grassroots elections in China? Scant literature exits on the relationship between community interaction and ritual voting in authoritarian regimes. Using the 2013 Chinese General Social Survey, this paper finds that community interaction plays a significant role in voter turnout. In addition, young people, who interact with neighbors, are just as likely to vote as the more socially connected older residents. The results have important implications for political behavior as well as for the grassroots elections in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of the characteristics of China's Non-governmental Organizations (CNGOs) is rooted in three approaches: the civil society approach, the corporatism approach, and the contingent approach. The debate between Civil Society and Corporatism has lasted for three decades and has dominated the thoughts and vocabularies of the description of CNGOs. More recently, however, some researchers have sought to focus attention on the context in which CNGOs survive and play a role, pointing out that the characteristics of a CNGO go beyond the question of 'autonomy', and arguing that they are the reflection of this socio-economic environment. This type of research may be called a 'contingent approach.' This paper investigates and critically reviews these three categories of literature by describing and comparing their key ideas and implications for the NGOs in China, and finally concludes with the author's view on the macro discourses, theoretical tools, and research methods of studying the characteristics of CNGOs in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper links China's pattern of infrastructure lending to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) with China's own development experience in this regard. It raises the question whether Chinese infrastructure investments in LAC have the potential to promote sustainable development in the region. The paper consists of four parts. Part 1 outlines China's massive domestic infrastructure construction projects as a specific development strategy which has contributed considerably to the country's rapid internal development, but has simultaneously given rise to complex dynamics of social and environmental risk. Part 2 assesses the strategies involved in China's infrastructure investment in LAC. Part 3 identifies key actors involved in China-LAC infrastructure cooperation and how they relate to different ways of financing infrastructure projects. Part 4 focuses on policy guidelines for managing the social and environmental risks of infrastructure projects. The paper concludes that more research, more capacity-building, and new forms of multinational development cooperation are needed to strengthen the social and environmental policies associated with China's infrastructure investment in LAC countries, to help uphold existing social and environmental standards, and to extend project benefits more effectively to local communities and people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tries to analyse the roles played by three categories of Chinese actors (the state, enterprises and quasi-government organizations) involved in China's engagement in Latin America to develop economic ties with the region. The first section focuses on the role of the state (the Chinese government) which has maintained a strong focus on the 'top-down-design' in Sino-Latin American economic cooperation by issuing a set of policies and undertaking a number of practical measures. The second part of the paper analyses the role of Chinese enterprises including both state-owned and private ones by analysing two cases of Chinese enterprises which on the one hand, implement government policies and on the other sometimes act as pioneers. In the last section, through the case study on the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) which is one of the few quasi-government organizations involved in China's foreign economic cooperation and also, without doubt, one of the most influential. Its role as platform for economic cooperation has been acknowledged by the 'top' (Chinese goverenment) and the 'bottom' (enterprises) in China and by Chinese enterprises and their counterparts in Latin America. The paper shows that none of the Chinese actors can take the place of the other in the economic cooperation between China and Latin America; instead, the roles of the three different categories of Chinese actors are complementary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its associated domestic industrial policies represent a parallel trade and investment strategy that challenges the Akamatsu principle of the Flying Geese pattern of industrial development in East Asia. This paper is positioned against the dominant orthodox theory of national systems of industrial development in East Asia. It argues that China’s trade and industry policy in the 2012-2017 period has demonstrated that government will expand its industrial policy market intervention rather than retract, moving away from the regional economic integration order by moving industrial production and import trade away from the Asia-Pacific along a Westward axis to the Indian Ocean and Eurasia. Implications are that the emergence of China’s geoindustrial policy will subvert multilateral trade norms as China begins to institutionalise its external trade and industrial policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many have studied whether China will democratize in the near future, but few have asked what would happen to China if China were to democratize. This paper sets out to explore this question in light of lessons from new democracies. Four lessons are drawn from new democracies. First is the importance of balancing state capacity and social power. Second is that the role of political elites can sometimes be more decisive than structural factors. Third is that culture might matter more than institutions. Fourth is the need to avoid the pitfall of economic populism. Reviewing China’s conditions through the lens of these lessons, this paper argues that factors such as state capacity, socio-economic conditions and a culture of pragmatism favor democratic consolidation in China, but the lure of “strongman” populist-authoritarianism, the tradition of uncompromising political elites and fundamentalist nationalism could sabotage a transition to democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multiple risks have been building up in the Chinese economy during the past decade, exposing it to a possible financial crisis of increasing likelihood. Based upon the inductive reasoning from the conventional key indicators discussed by economists, this paper also adds a deductive reasoning by examining the incentive structure for key players in the Chinese political economy to gauge the risk of a financial crisis in China. It highlights the political and structural factors that are responsible for soft budget constraint, moral hazard from major players, and the lack of institutional foundation for sovereign credibility. It argues that recent policies have not only failed to address these issues but instead have further damaged the credible commitment of the state to the market economy and ratcheted up the course of a great meltdown. This paper calls for a fundamental institutional change in China’s political economy in order to prevent perversion in the state-market interaction from spawning both political and economic crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper intends to provide a framework for conceptualizing and interpreting the resilient capacity and adaptability of the Chinese Communist Party to cope with changing political and economic environments and to sustain its hegemony through periods of crises and transformations. Based on an instrumental reading and reflective incorporation of some relevant concepts and discourses of Gramsci’s political theory, the paper aims to facilitate a well-rounded analysis of the CCP’s authoritarian resilience, which is achieved through a continuous process of “passive revolution”. The party’s new hegemony is realized through a reconstituted historical bloc on the basis of convergence of interests and through neutralizing the pressures of various contending forces that might otherwise trigger profound structural transformations. The paper concludes that “authoritarian resilience is one of the strongest enduring features of the CCP’s political culture, characterized by dynamic adaptive skills and greater institutional capacity for political survival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese central government has embraced the internet as a new channel for public service provision and has encouraged local authorities to innovate in this field. However, when the progress over the last decade is considered - as seen through the scores in annual benchmarking of local government websites - innovation appears very hard to sustain. Most localities experience a decline at some point in time. It is a conundrum why and how some cities can continuously enhance their online presence, while the majority experiences decreasing scores at some point. The purpose of this paper is to identify the factors that influence the sustainability of e-government innovation by Chinese local governments. In this paper, we apply an exploratory case study design. We analyse both qualitative data and quantitative indicators of 22 prefectural-level cities to identify drivers and constraints on sustainable innovation. Among the key findings are that user focus, long-term planning, and an organizational culture based on political control promote sustainability.Provincial-level governments, in contrast, appear to have little impact on the continued performance of the municipalgovernment websites. These findings are summarized in the conclusion along with suggestions for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper intends to build a case for a third alternative that can reconcile the two opposing views of democracy, i.e., the consensual vs. the adversarial, through a reexamination and reconstruction of Chinese traditional theories of political governance. The paper links the rule of virtue with consensual politics, and the rule of law with adversary politics, By focusing on the roles of virtue and law, and their importance to the acquisition and maintenance of original and utilitarian dimensions of political legitimacy, the paper proposes a hybrid version of democracy that will continue the dualist political tradition while enabling necessary political modernization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the landmark volume The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China (Leib and He eds. ), a growing number of theoretical and empirical studies in the context of China have advanced our knowledge of deliberative democracy in comparative settings. This paper aims to discuss the recent development and prospects of deliberative democracy in China, with particular focus on the approach of a deliberative system that has not been adequately addressed in the context of China. This paper proposes an analytical framework for the concept of deliberative capacity building in the context of contemporary China. The paper analyses three dimensions of deliberative capacity building: social capacity, institutional capacity; and participatory capacity of a deliberative system. The three dimensions lay particular emphasis on the public sphere, empowered space, and deliberative actors respectively. The multi-dimensional framework considers deliberative capacity building as a process by which the three dimensions synergize and evolve with each other to produce a functional deliberative system incorporating isolated deliberative practices. The multi-dimensional analyses suggest that deliberative capacity building is critical to democratization in China, as it produces a stronger public sphere, more effective government responsiveness and improved participatory competence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2018, 43 leading International Relations scholars in the United States signed a public statement in support of an urgent call to preserve the current international order, triggering heated scholarly debates. The idealized form of the liberal international order was criticized by many scholars for its chronic problems, including the contradictions between proclaimed liberal values and illiberal behaviors, the inability to reform its institutional pillars to accommodate the diverse group of emerging powers, and the tensions between the defenders of this order and its challengers. These problems became fully exposed under the external shock caused by the coronavirus pandemic. As the coronavirus spreads globally and disrupts the world's political, economic, and social fabric, several forces that have gained momentum and strength during the last decade are now converging as a formidable force that may reconfigure the post-pandemic international order. This paper addresses three significant challenges to the foundations of the current liberal order: (1) the entrenchment of authoritarianism, characterized by authoritarian resilience, autocratization, and the consolidation of competing authoritarian political-economic models; (2) the exacerbation of nationalism enabled by nationalist and populist politicians; and (3) the intensified competition among major powers. China has played mixed roles in the process of reconfiguring the current order. It challenges the mythologized liberal international order and exposes the contradictions in the dominant Western model, while promoting an alternative hybrid political-economic model. The shock brought by the pandemic has provided ample opportunities for China to extend its networks and expand international space for its model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By employing discourse-historical approach and corpus linguistics, this paper examines media reports to analyze the Chinese official discourse in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak. The results demonstrate that a paradox of globalism and nationalism has been simultaneously reflected when reporting the global pandemic. Based on a polarizing discursive construction of positive "self" and negative "others," on many occasions, the globalist and nationalist arguments have been closely intertwined and complement each other to reinforce the legitimacy of the ruling party at home and the international reputation of China under the leadership of the ruling party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Chinese scholars, media, and writers have long reported a noteworthy rural-urban difference in political participation, the meaning of this divergence to China's local democracy remains underexplored. This paper explores the different patterns of electoral participation between rural and urban residents. I argue that the rural zeal in elections is due to VC governments' strong capacity to mobilize loyalists to vote in state-controlled elections, while voter apathy in urban elections is resulted from the RC governments' lack of the equivalent power to cultivate loyalist voters. Using Chinese General Social Survey 2013 to test the argument, I find evidence that shows that in VC elections rural people are more likely to vote in state-controlled elections than are urban residents. In addition, villagers' electoral participation has nothing to do with their democratic consciousness but is significantly associated with Party membership. In contrast, urban turnout is highly correlated with democratic consciousness but not Party membership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study provides an overview of the development of contemporary China studies in Singapore from the regional Cold War to the present. It argues that the waxing and waning of China studies in Singapore were intertwined with state interests at different points in time, defined in accordance with the state's self-professed 'pragmatism'. In particular, this paper suggests that the state's ostensible aversion to communist China during the regional Cold War, the decline of the Chinese language under its bilingual policy, and the state's active courting of China from the 1990s have profound and lasting influence on the state of China studies in Singapore. All in all, in the context of a rising China and the state's 'pragmatic' responses, it is likely that China studies in Singapore shall continue to gravitate toward policy research for many years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses the theory of social construction of reality deriving from the writings of Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger to explain the origin of national identity and hence the emergence of a nation. It argues that social construction of national reality originates from everyday life experience taken for granted during the process of socialization. Individuals make sense out of the external world. Experiences taken for granted become actor's stock of knowledge. A common scheme of knowledge shared by the community serves to differentiate in-group (nationals) and out-group (foreigners). Collective consciousness thus defines national identity and hence a nation. Unless people (both in-group and out-group) interact with and learn from each other, different stocks of knowledge taken for granted will create political tension. This theory will be applied to understand the tensions in Tibet and along the Taiwan Strait. The paper further argues that Taiwan can hardly separate from mainland China in the future, while strong Tibetan consciousness continues to defy against powerful Chineseness, resulting in endless upheavals in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Chinese political system, according to the constitution, the people's congresses at the primary level are the only institution which the voters can directly elect. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tightly controls the 'direct elections' and takes every measure in the elections to prevent grassroots power from entering even the primary-level people's congresses. In recent years, grassroots power has kept struggling for its legal rights in the 'direct elections' held in a few localities. The conflicts between the grassroots power and the authoritarian party in the 'direct elections' have become an interesting political phenomenon, a subject deserves close observation and research. This paper studies the background of the independent candidates, their motivations and behaviour in elections. The paper also examines the party's control in the elections and thus exposes the true nature of China's people's congress 'direct' elections. The paper argues that independent candidates can have little impacts on China's political structure at the current stage because of the party's tight control, but their political participation has the most democratic value, compared with the 'reforms' instigated and carried out by the CCP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pervasive media censorship in China is often seen as a strictly political issue. Although in past years reporters have had leeway to report on economic issues, the Chinese Party/state has moved to tamp down economic journalism, even arresting those who report on bad economic news. This shift brings to the fore an issue long ignored by social scientists – economic censorship. Economic censorship takes place when state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or large private companies pressure the state to censor negative reports or directly pay off media companies to quash such reports in favor of more positive ones. Such economic censorship distorts markets and shifts investor money away from new market entrants and towards large, well-resourced and well-connected SOEs. Using a database of Chinese newspaper articles from 2004 to 2006 and a separate database of newspaper articles, blog posts and micro-blog posts from 2010, and supplemented by secondary sources, this paper examines how media coverage is distorted by censorship and corruption to the benefit of China's entrenched interests. In particular, I find that private and provincially owned companies receive much more press coverage than do their central government (SASAC) owned equivalents, controlling for a number of factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers have been wary about social desirability of approval in authoritarian countries, namely, the tendency for people to overreport their regime support. Few have studied the social desirability of dissent, the reverse tendency for people to underreport their regime support. This paper argues that social desirability of dissent exists among Chinese university students because 1) the Chinese government has loosened its control on speech, 2) Chinese university students experience peer pressure to be aloof from the government, 3) blatant propaganda gives regime supporters a negative image, and 4) open expression of regime support may associate one with the infamous Fifty Cent Party. We conducted an implicit association test (IAT) among 306 Chinese university students and found distinct social desirability of dissent among them. We also found that the effect of social desirability of dissent is stronger among firm regime supporters identified by the IAT than among weak supporters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s distinctive set of stock market institutions was introduced in 1990. Among the characteristics of China’s stock markets was a strict separation between different categories of investors. Listed companies issued different categories of shares to state shareholders, domestic corporate investors, domestic individual investors, and foreign investors. By 2005, the barriers segmenting China’s stock market had been significantly relaxed. Domestic investors were allowed to purchase shares previously reserved for foreign investors, and approved foreign investors were allowed to purchase shares previously earmarked for domestic individuals. Nevertheless, a crucial barrier remained. An ongoing debate among Chinese academics, investors, and policy makers focused on how to resolve the “split share structure” (guquan fen zhi) in which a minority of shares were tradable while the majority of shares (namely those reserved for domestic corporate and state shareholders) were excluded from the market. The split share structure was blamed for distorting prices and inhibiting development of the stock market. This paper analyzes the policy adopted to address the split share structure. To what extent does this policy change reflect new thinking on the part of China’s market regulators? This paper argues that analysis of policy making in China’s capital markets can help to distinguish between two competing assessments of China’s political economy. One account sees China pursuing a gradualist strategy, slowly but steadily expanding the role of markets. Another account sees China trapped in a semi-marketized and increasingly corrupt development pattern. The implementation of the split share structure reform program provides evidence to support the gradualist account of incremental, but persistent, reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a framework of incomplete contract, this paper shows that for provision of public goods such as medicare and education, pure privatization may not promote competition. On the contrary, the co-existence of public and private provision may enhance de facto competition. Two competitive effects are identified. When consumers are heterogeneous, the co-existence of public and private ownership gives consumers freedom to choose from different ownership, improving allocation efficiency (Tiebout effect). While consumers are homogeneous, the co-existence can promote yardstick competition, squeezing out information rents from both ownerships, improving production efficiency (benchmarking effect). In either case, the co-existence dominates unique ownership. The paper ends up with some implications for China.s medicare and education reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on multi-task principal–agent theories, we aim in this paper to explore a hitherto understudied politics–infrastructure nexus using a data set of Chinese municipal leader profiles. Analysing a panel dataset of 2,399 political leaders’ profiles and infrastructure-investment change across 283 Chinese cities from 2002 to 2016, we demonstrate that city leaders adopt an inverted U-shaped curve regarding infrastructure-investment growth over their tenures. The investment fluctuation strengthens in municipalities with a relatively lower degree of institutional development and in municipalities which have fewer political resources. Furthermore, a higher frequency of political turnover leads to a higher average growth rate of infrastructure investment. This study suggests that fluctuation in infrastructure investment in China is aligned with political incentives, offering new opportunities for comparative studies of global relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin America is a critical region for analyzing China's economic statecraft. Following the Monroe doctrine, Latin America has long been seen as part of the sphere of U.S. influence. For the purpose of studying the effectiveness of China's economic statecraft I will focus on two countries that stand on opposite extremes: Brazil and Mexico. Both countries happened to be important target states (strategic partners) of China's economic statecraft in the region, albeit for different political and strategic goals. In this paper I will compare the different domestic political and economic conditions, interests and institutions in these two countries to explain why China has made greater progress in projecting its economic power through trade and investment to pursue its political goals with Brazil, but has not succeeded in Mexico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]