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ABSTRACT Choice blindness is the finding that participants both often fail to notice mismatches between their decisions and the outcome of their choice and, in addition, endorse the opposite of their chosen alternative. But do these preference reversals also carry over to future choices and ratings? To investigate this question, we gave participants the task of choosing which of a pair of faces they found most attractive. Unknown to them, we sometimes used a card trick to exchange one face for the other. Both decision theory and common sense strongly suggest that most people would easily notice such a radical change in the outcome of a choice. But that was not the case: no more than a third of the exchanges were detected by the participants. We also included a second round of choices using the same face pairs, and two stages of post-choice attractiveness ratings of the faces. This way we were able to measure preference strength both as choice consistency and by looking at measures of rating differences between chosen and rejected options. We found that the initially rejected faces were chosen more frequently in the second choice, and the perceived attractiveness of these faces was increased even in uncoupled individual ratings at the end of the experiment. This result is discussed in relation to Chen and Risen's recent criticism of the Free Choice Paradigm, as it shows that choices can affect future preferences. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research suggests that algorithms—based on artificial intelligence or linear regression models—make better predictions than humans in a wide range of domains. Several studies have examined the degree to which people use algorithms. However, these studies have been mostly cross‐sectional and thus have failed to address the dynamic nature of algorithm use. In the present paper, we examined algorithm use with a novel longitudinal approach outside the lab. Specifically, we conducted two ecological momentary assessment studies in which 401 participants made financial predictions for 18 days in two tasks. Relying on the judge‐advisor system framework, we examined how time interacted with advice source (human vs. algorithm) and advisor accuracy to predict advice taking. Our results showed that when the advice was inaccurate, people tended to use algorithm advice less than human advice across the period studied. Inaccurate algorithms were penalized logarithmically; the effect was initially strong but tended to fade over time. This suggests that first impressions are crucial and produce significant changes in advice taking at the beginning of the interaction, which later tends to stabilize as days go by. Therefore, inaccurate algorithms are more likely to accrue a negative reputation than inaccurate humans, even when having the same level of performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper tests whether the dimensions involved in preferential choice tasks are evaluated independently from one another. Common decision heuristics satisfy dimensional independence, and multi‐strategy models that assume that decision makers use a repertoire of these heuristics predict that they are unable to represent and respond to dimensional dependencies in the decision environment. In contrast, some single‐strategy models are able to violate dimensional independence, and subsequently adapt to environments that feature interacting dimensions. Across five experiments, this paper documents systematic violations of the assumption of dimensional independence. This suggests that decision makers are able to modify their behavior to respond to dimensional dependencies in their environment, and in turn those models that are unable to do this do not provide a full account of human strategy selection and behavior change. This paper ends with a discussion of ways in which some existing models can be modified to incorporate violations of dimensional independence. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper is an exploratory study of the anchoring bias among individuals with autism. Anchoring bias is one of the most robust choice heuristics. The anchoring bias is measured and compared among adults with autism and age‐, gender‐, and education level‐matched, neurotypical controls. The study differentiates between high and low anchors. Results show that individuals with autism are generally equally susceptible to the anchoring bias as neurotypical individuals in judgment and decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decision‐making competence is a skill that is associated with numerous positive life outcomes. Even though multiple cognitive abilities have been shown to predict decision‐making competence, few studies have incorporated a large test battery tapping into several cognitive abilities concurrently in the same models. The current paper presents a study that sought to investigate which cognitive abilities predicted overall decision‐making competence in adults using hierarchical regression analysis. A cognitive test battery, comprising abilities such as general intelligence, executive functions, numeracy, visuospatial ability, and time perception, was administered to 182 participants. Results indicate that both general intelligence, which was consistently the strongest predictor, and numeracy contributed independently to overall decision‐making competence. Executive functions did predict overall decision‐making competence, while all predictors were included in the models. A novel finding concerns the relationship between time perception and decision‐making competence. The complementary roles of these cognitive abilities are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The seven papers in this special issue represent the breadth and complexity of approaches to the study of affect in judgment and decision processes. Four papers examine the role of arousal or specific emotions in decision making. The three other papers investigate the impacts of uncertainty, time course, and thinking about mood. We briefly describe four functions of affect in decision making (affect as information, as a spotlight, as a motivator, and as common currency) and relate them to the seven special-issue papers. The role of affect in decisions and decision processes is quite nuanced and deserves careful empirical study in basic and applied research. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper, we provide a domain‐general scoping review of the nudge movement by reviewing 422 choice architecture interventions in 156 empirical studies. We report the distribution of the studies across countries, years, domains, subdomains of applicability, intervention types, and the moderators associated with each intervention category to review the current state of the nudge movement. Furthermore, we highlight certain characteristics of the studies and experimental and reporting practices that can hinder the accumulation of evidence in the field. Specifically, we found that 74% of the studies were mainly motivated to assess the effectiveness of the interventions in one specific setting, while only 24% of the studies focused on the exploration of moderators or underlying processes. We also observed that only 7% of the studies applied power analysis, 2% used guidelines aiming to improve the quality of reporting, no study in our database was preregistered, and the used intervention nomenclatures were non‐exhaustive and often have overlapping categories. Building on our current observations and proposed solutions from other fields, we provide directly applicable recommendations for future research to support the evidence accumulation on why and when nudges work. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Everyday life is full of self-control problems. The economist's favorite explanation for self-control problems is present bias. This paper tests whether experimentally elicited present bias predicts self-control problems in everyday life. We measure present bias by using a standard incentivized delay discounting task and everyday self-control by using the day reconstruction method (DRM). Because this is the first study to measure everyday self-control by using the DRM, we also validate the method by showing that its data replicate key results from the seminal Everyday Temptation Study. We find that present bias does not predict everyday self-control. This points to a distinction between decreasing impatience (as measured in delay discounting tasks) and visceral influences (as occurring in everyday life) as determinants of self-control problems. We argue that decision making research can benefit from the DRM as a cost-effective tool that complements lab and field experiments to better understand economic preference measures and their correlates in everyday life decision making. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a response to commentaries on an article which offered a defense for independence axiom in decision making. Value of information; Choice and preferences in non-information-aversion.

This paper identifies four attentional processes that increase efficiency and accuracy in repeated lexicographic tasks using an instructed strategy approach. We propose a framework to decompose attentional effort used to make a decision into four components: Orientation, Wrong Target, Duration, and Repetition. Orientation assesses attention to decision rules and the location of relevant information. Wrong Target measures wasted effort on unneeded information. Duration gauges time spent on each piece of needed information. Repetition measures the number of views on each relevant item. Greater Orientation is associated with lower effort in other components and increased accuracy. Repetition is most variable across individuals but generates the greatest improvement with practice. Duration is less affected by the other components and shows minimal improvement with experience. Finally, Wrong Target is similarly resistant to practice, but it is the only component strongly and positively associated with making errors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the same decision to act can occur in multiple contexts, how these contexts differentially influence behavior is not well understood. In this paper, we investigate whether contextual framing affects individuals' behavior in spatial decision making. Although previous research suggests that individuals' judgments are sensitive to contextual (and particularly moral) factors of a scenario, no work has addressed whether this effect extends to spatial decisions. To investigate the impact of context on perceptual sensorimotor behavior, we superimposed two moral dilemmas (which we call help and harm) on a spatial decision‐making paradigm. The basic task required participants select a target area while avoiding an overlapping nontarget area. Although the visuospatial task was constant, the moral context was changed when participants had to execute either a drone missile strike on enemies in the harm context or deliver ammunition to allies in the help context. Participants more strongly avoided losses in the harm context, reflected by a greater selection bias away from the nontarget (i.e., allies) on drone strike trials. These findings suggest that the contextual framing of a subjective perceived loss on a spatial decision can drive avoidant motor execution behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A striking finding has emerged recently in the literature: When decision makers are faced with essentially the same choice, their preferences differ as a function of whether options are described or are “experienced” via observation and feedback. For example, when presented the described choice: (A) A 90% chance of $0 and a 10% chance of $10 or (B) $1 for sure, people tend to prefer (A). But when those same two options are experienced through observation of “draws” from two payoff distributions that match the described options, the modal preference reverses. Why? This is just one question that the papers in this special issue address. In addition, they address the rich repertoire of issues that arise when one considers experience-based choices. The decisions-from-experience paradigm—with its focus on the acquisition and integration of information prior to choice, as well the choice itself—taps many of the fundamentals of psychology (learning, memory, encoding, knowledge representation, modelling) thus inspiring novel and fruitful avenues for research. This paper reviews recent research on experience-based choice, and highlights the contribution of the papers in the special issue. The paper introduces a framework that places different types of decisions along a continuum of uncertainty about what one is choosing between, which emphasizes the rich and varied role of “experience” in decision making. It ends by identifying important unsolved questions that are ripe for future research. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charitable giving entails the act of foregoing personal resources in order to improve the conditions of other people. In the present paper, we systematically examine two dimensions integral to donation decisions that have thus far received relatively little attention but can explain charitable behavior rather well: the perceptions of cost for the donor and benefit for the recipients. In line with current theories in judgment and decision making, we hypothesize that people weigh these dimensions subjectively and perceive them asymmetrically, consistent with prospect theory. Costs for the donor are typically perceived as losses, whereas benefits for recipients are perceived as gains. In four studies, we presented several scenarios to participants in which both donation amounts (costs) and number of lives helped (benefits) were manipulated while keeping the ratio of costs and benefits constant. Results from Studies 1 and 2 showed that willingness to help decreased as donation amounts and number of lives helped increased. Additionally, Studies 3 and 4 provide evidence for a solution to reduce the asymmetry and increase donation amounts as the number of lives at risk increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large body of research has found evidence that hiring decisions are frequently subject to strong gender bias and has explored factors that help to predict and prevent such a bias from occurring. In this paper, we explore a novel factor that has received only little attention: the composition of the choice set. Drawing on prior research on the attraction effect of decoys in consumer choice and personnel decisions, we posit that when decision makers need to decide whether to hire a male or a female applicant for a stereotypically male position, the presence of a third applicant whose profile is asymmetrically dominated by one of the two applicants can in many circumstances strongly increase the odds that the male applicant will be selected, but will not be beneficial for the female applicant. We test our hypotheses in five experimental studies with different designs, experimental settings, and participant pools—including managers with professional experience in hiring decisions. Our results provide robust evidence demonstrating the strong effects of choice set composition on the emergence of gender bias. In addition, we found that the presence of asymmetrically dominated applicants makes decision makers more confident in their biased decisions and more likely to implement them immediately without searching for further information. Finally, our results also provide some initial evidence that our results for stereotypically male positions will be reversed when hiring decisions are made for stereotypically female positions where the presence of decoys instead gives an advantage to female over male applicants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite abundant literature theorizing societal implications of algorithmic decision making, relatively little is known about the conditions that lead to the acceptance or rejection of algorithmically generated insights by individual users of decision aids. More specifically, recent findings of algorithm aversion—the reluctance of human forecasters to use superior but imperfect algorithms—raise questions about whether joint human‐algorithm decision making is feasible in practice. In this paper, we systematically review the topic of algorithm aversion as it appears in 61 peer‐reviewed articles between 1950 and 2018 and follow its conceptual trail across disciplines. We categorize and report on the proposed causes and solutions of algorithm aversion in five themes: expectations and expertise, decision autonomy, incentivization, cognitive compatibility, and divergent rationalities. Although each of the presented themes addresses distinct features of an algorithmic decision aid, human users of the decision aid, and/or the decision making environment, apparent interdependencies are highlighted. We conclude that resolving algorithm aversion requires an updated research program with an emphasis on theory integration. We provide a number of empirical questions that can be immediately carried forth by the behavioral decision making community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors promote or hinder volunteering within organizations and groups? This paper simultaneously explores the impact of individual, contextual, and sociocultural variables on decision making in a special type of social dilemma: the volunteer's dilemma game (VDG). The VDG provides a controlled experimental method for studying volunteering behaviors in an anonymous interactive environment. We developed six variations of the VDG and administered them to economics students in five different cultures (Ntotal = 603). Among other things, these VDGs varied whether the potential benefits of volunteering were certain or uncertain. Although the overall level of volunteering did not vary substantially across most cultural groups, we found that culture interacted with the size and (un)certainty of the benefits associated with volunteering, to influence volunteering decisions. We also found that religiosity (but not religious affiliation per se) increases volunteering and that men are less likely to volunteer when the returns to doing so are certain. These results extend our knowledge of behaviors in the VDG, and their potential drivers, with clear implications for understanding how culture, individual characteristics, and context jointly influence prosocial behavior and coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provides information on a selection of papers presented at the sixteenth Research Conference on Subjective Probability, Utility and Decision Making held in Leeds, England on April 18-21, 1997. Effects of anticipated regret in decision making under uncertainty; Evaluation of policy scenarios for metropolitan traffic in the next decades; Role of frequentistic information in judgments of risk and probability; Hypotheses about how the way in which people represent hypotheses affects the subjective probability people associate with them.

This paper attacks one of the chief limitations of the field of behavioral decision research—the past inability to use this literature to improve decision making. Building on the work of Thompson, Gentner, Loewenstein and colleagues (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Gentner, 1999; Thompson, Gentner, & Loewenstein, 2000; Gentner & Markman, 1997), the current paper finds that it is possible to reduce bias in one of the most robust problems in the decision literature, the Acquiring a Company Problem (Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985). Past research has shown that individuals make suboptimal offers as a result of the failure to think about the decisions of others and to incorporate a clear understanding of the rules of the game. In the current study, we find that by allowing study participants to see and understand differences in seemingly unrelated decision problems—versions of the Monty Hall Game (Nalebuff, 1987; Friedman, 1998) and Multiparty Ultimatum Game (Messick, Moore, & Bazerman, 1997; Tor & Bazerman, 2003)—study participants can learn to focus more accurately on the decisions of other parties and the rules of the game, the keys to solving the Acquiring a Company Problem. This research offers a new piece of evidence that comparative and analogical processes may be a successful direction for improving decision making. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents abstracts of papers of interest to readers of the "Journal of Behavioral Decision Making." "Psychological Models of Deferred Decision Making"; "The Mindlessness of Organizational Behaviors"; "The Contributions of Cognitive Engineering to the Design and Use of Expert Systems."

This paper argues that a violation of the independence condition, used by von Neumann and Morgenstern to characterize expected utility maximization, will always lead to the existence of choice situations in which information-aversion is exhibited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deals with various criticisms about the "Journal of Behavioral Decision Making." Need for a new journal; Encouragement of isolation from mainstream disciplines; Inherent disadvantages of a multidisciplinary journal.

The Iowa gambling task (IGT) was developed as a neuropsychological assessment of "real‐life" decision making in a laboratory setting by Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson in. The IGT was originally implemented as a manual task during which the participants selected paper cards. The task has since evolved into a computerized assessment tool (Psychological Assessment Resources IGT or PAR™IGT) that uses only virtual cards and reinforcement schedules that are somewhat different from those in the original version. Caution should be used when psychological assessments change from manual to virtual formats. Such changes may unintentionally introduce confounds that render the 2 tests nonequivalent as shown with the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task by Steinmetz, Brunner, Loarer, and Houssemand in. In this study, we compared IGT performance when participants used either a laptop computer or a touchscreen tablet. Each device was used in 2 conditions: "involved" and "noninvolved." Participants in the involved condition turned over physical cards and mimicked their own selections by clicking (laptop) or reaching out and touching (tablet) the corresponding virtual cards. Participants in the noninvolved condition only made selections of virtual cards, whereas an adjacent experimenter turned over the corresponding physical cards. Results showed that performance systematically and significantly improved as degree of physical involvement increased in the following order: laptop noninvolved (lowest performance), tablet noninvolved, laptop involved, and tablet involved (highest performance). In addition, participants' verbalized understanding of the task was significantly more accurate with increased physical involvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT A central assumption of neoclassical economics is that reservation prices for familiar products express people's true preferences for these products; that is, they represent the total benefit that a good confers to the consumers and are, thus, independent of actual prices in the market. Nevertheless, a vast amount of research has shown that valuations can be sensitive to other salient prices, particularly when individuals are explicitly anchored on them. In this paper, the authors extend previous research on single-price anchoring and study the sensitivity of valuations to the distribution of prices found for a product in the market. In addition, they examine its possible causes. They find that market-dependent valuations cannot be fully explained by rational inferences consumers draw about a product's value and are unlikely to be fully explained by true market-dependent preferences. Rather, the market dependence of valuations likely reflects consumers' focus on something other than the total benefit that the product confers to them. Furthermore, this paper shows that market-dependent valuations persist when - as in many real-life settings - individuals make repeated purchase decisions over time and infer the distribution of the product's prices from their market experience. Finally, the authors consider the implications of their findings for marketers and consumers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper, we explore the relationships between psychometric and behavioral measures of maximization in decisions from experience (DfE). In two experiments, we measured choice behavior in two experimental paradigms of DfE and self‐reported maximizing tendencies using three prominent scales of maximization. In the repeated consequentialist choice paradigm, participants made repeated choices between two unlabeled options and received consequential feedback on each trial. In the sampling paradigm, participants freely sampled from two options and received feedback on their sampling before making a single consequential choice. Individuals exhibited different degrees of maximizing behavior in both paradigms and across different payoff distributions, but none of the maximizing scales predicted this behavior. These results indicate that maximization scales address constructs that are different from the maximization behavior observed in DfE, and that these measures will need to be improved to reflect behavioral aspects of choice and search from experience. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Decision‐making competence (DMC) is the ability to follow normative principles when making decisions. In a longitudinal analysis, we examine the robustness of DMC over time, as measured by two batteries of paper‐and‐pencil tasks. Participants completed the youth version (Y‐DMC) at age 19 and/or the adult version (A‐DMC) 11 years later at age 30, as part of a larger longitudinal study. Both measures are composed of tasks adapted from ones used in experimental studies of decision‐making skills. Results supported the robustness of these measures and the usefulness of the construct. Response patterns for Y‐DMC were similar to those observed with a smaller initial sample drawn from the same population. Response patterns for A‐DMC were similar to those observed with an earlier community sample. Y‐DMC and A‐DMC were significantly correlated, for participants who completed both measures, 11 years apart, even after controlling for measures of cognitive ability. Nomological validity was observed in correlations of scores on both tests with measures of cognitive ability, cognitive style, and environmental factors with predicted relationships to DMC, including household socioeconomic status, neighborhood disadvantage, and paternal substance abuse. Higher Y‐DMC and A‐DMC scores were also associated with lower rates of potentially risky and antisocial behaviors, including adolescent delinquency, cannabis use, and early sexual behavior. Thus, the Y‐DMC and A‐DMC measures appear to capture a relatively stable, measurable construct that increases with supportive environmental factors and is associated with constructive behaviors. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper presents a simple formal analytical model delivering qualitative predictions for response times in binary‐choice experiments. It combines a dual‐process/multi‐strategy approach with the standard diffusion model, modeling a utility decision process and a heuristic decision process as diffusion processes of evidence accumulation. For experiments with objective alternatives (including many tasks in judgment and decision making), the model predicts that errors will be quicker than correct responses in case of process conflict and slower in case of alignment, capturing a well‐documented asymmetry regarding slow or fast errors. Further, the model also predicts that correct responses are slower in case of conflict than in case of alignment, capturing the well‐known Stroop effect. The model is also extended to cover experiments with subjective alternative evaluations, that is, preferential choice. In this case, results depend on whether trials are hard or easy, that is, on whether the heuristic can be interpreted as relatively automatic or not. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we merge research related to experiential learning, temporal perception, and the value of time and money by examining decisions where the timing of action (response) determines the outcome received. We predicted that time-saving preferences and impatience would decrease maximization (i.e., taking action when it returned the largest reward), and that the constraints of temporal perception would compound their effects. Across three studies, participants undershot on average (i.e., responded earlier than the period of time during which a response would return the maximal reward) showed a preference for shorter-delay options and often did not find the maximal reward. In addition, participants' reliance on temporal perception increased undershooting, increased preferences for shorter-delay options, and reduced maximization. Nevertheless, participants who found the maximal reward continued to maximize at a high rate rather than opting for shorter delays and smaller rewards. Thus, while most participants appeared to have a preference for saving time, most behaved as reward maximizers rather than temporal discounters. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Allais common ratio effect is one of the most robust violations of rational decision making under risk. In this paper, we conduct a novel test of the common ratio effect in which we elicit preferences for the common ratio choice alternatives in choice, pricing, and happiness rating tasks. We find large shifts in preference patterns across tasks, both within and between subjects. In particular, we find that both the consistency and distribution of responses differ systematically across tasks, with modal choices replicating the Allais preference pattern, modal happiness ratings exhibiting consistent risk aversion, and modal prices maximizing expected value. We discuss the predictions of various cognitive explanations of the common ratio effect in the context of our experiment. We find that a dual process framework provides the most complete account of our results. Surprisingly, we also find that although the Allais pattern was the modal behavior in the choice task, none of the 158 respondents in our experiment exhibited the Allais pattern simultaneously in choice, happiness, and pricing tasks. Our results constitute a new paradox for the leading theories of choice under risk. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Recent papers have demonstrated that the way people acquire information about a decision problem, by experience or by abstract description, can affect their behavior. We examined the role of experience over time in the emergence of the Gambler's Fallacy in binary prediction tasks. Theories of the Gambler's Fallacy and models of binary prediction suggest that recency bias, elicited by experience over time, may play a significant role. An experiment compared a condition where participants sequentially predicted the colored outcomes of a virtual roulette wheel spin with a condition where the wheel's past outcomes were presented all at once. In a third condition outcomes were presented sequentially in an automatic fashion without intervening predictions. Subjects were yoked so that the same history of outcomes was observed in all conditions. The results revealed the Gambler's Fallacy when outcomes were experienced (with or without predictions). However, the Gambler's Fallacy was attenuated when the same outcomes were presented all at once. Observing the Gambler's Fallacy in the third condition suggests that the presentation of information over time is a significant antecedent of the bias. A second experiment demonstrated that, while the bias can emerge with an all-at-once presentation that makes recent outcomes salient (Burns & Corpus, 2004), the bias did not emerge when the presentation did not draw attention to recent outcomes. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abundant experimental research has documented that incidental primes and emotions are capable of influencing people's judgments and choices. This paper examines whether the influence of such incidental factors is large enough to be observable in the field, by analyzing 682 actual university admission decisions. As predicted, applicants' academic attributes are weighted more heavily on cloudier days and non-academic attributes on sunnier days. The documented effects are of both statistical and practical significance: changes in cloud cover can increase a candidate's predicted probability of admission by an average of up to 11.9%. These results also shed light on the causes behind the long demonstrated unreliability of experts making repeated judgments from the same data. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we examined the impact of a specific emotion, guilt, on focusing in decision-making. Through the focusing mechanism, when making decisions, individuals tend to restrict their thoughts to what is explicitly represented in the decisional task, disregarding alternatives. In this paper, three experiments are performed to investigate whether an emotional state of guilt can critically guide individuals' focusing, and even prevailing over the focusing mechanism. Guilty emotional state was induced by asking participants to write about a guilty related life event. The emotional state was thus neither generated by nor related to the tasks used in the experiments. Results of the first two studies show that guilt affects focusing in decision-making in the case of only one explicitly specified option (a positive or a negative one). Guilty participants, when presented with a stated option that has predominantly positive characteristics, prefer other, unspecified options over the positive one. Guilty participants faced with a stated option that has predominantly negative features tend to prefer it to other, unspecified, options, instead. Finally, experiment 3 shows that guilty participants presented with two different options (a negative vs. a positive one) having different degrees of explicitness (i.e. they are not equally represented in the decision frame), focus on the negative option, even though the latter was not explicitly represented but only hinted at the end of the text. Overall, these results suggest that guilt emotion state can play a crucial role in either strengthening or reducing the focusing mechanism. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foregone payoffs add information about the outcomes for alternatives that are not chosen. The present paper examines the effect of foregone payoffs on underweighting rare but possible events in repeated choice tasks. Previous studies have not demonstrated any long-lasting effects of foregone payoffs (following repeated presentation of a task) when foregone payoffs do not add much information. The present paper highlights the conditions and the contributing factors for the occurrence of such long-lasting effects. An experimental study compares the effect of foregone payoffs under different degrees of rarity of the negative payoff. It is demonstrated that foregone payoffs increase the selection from risky alternatives with extremely rare and highly negative outcomes, and that this effect does not diminish with repeated presentation of the task. These findings can be summarized using a surprisingly simple reinforcement-learning model. The findings are discussed in the context of the potential long-term effect of social learning. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The principle of 'divide and conquer' (DAC) suggests that complex decision problems should be decomposed into smaller, more manageable parts, and that these parts should be logically aggregated to derive an overall value for each alternative. Decompositional procedures have been contrasted with holistic evaluations that require decision makers to simultaneously consider all the relevant attributes of the alternatives under consideration (Fischer. 1977). One area where decompositional procedures have a clear advantage over holistic procedures is in the reduction of random error (Ravinder, 1992; Ravinder and Kleinmuntz, 1991; Kleinmuntz, 1990). Adopting the framework originally developed by Ravinder and colleagues, this paper details the results of a study of the random error variances associated with another popular multi-criteria decision making technique, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP); (Saaty. 1977. 1980), as well as the random error variances of a holistic version of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (Jensen. 1983). In addition, data concerning various psychometric properties (e.g. the convergent validity and temporal stability) and values of AHP inconsistency are reported for both the decompositional and holistic evaluations. The results of the study show that the Ravinder and Kleinmuntz (1991) error-propagation framework extends to the AHP and decompositional AHP judgments are more consistent than their holistic counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Working in a group requires coordination. The current paper examines coordination in terms of member-level behavioral choices. Extending expectancy theory to a collaborative group setting, we interpret past findings on expertise and hypothesize that component features (specifically their difficulty and worth relative to each other) impact member behavior and hence coordination both directly and by moderating the role of expertise. Findings were largely as predicted, suggesting that an expectancy theory perspective may be a useful tool for the study and understanding of coordination. An exploratory examination of recordings of group interaction suggested that although most of our groups discussed coordination strategies, the strategies discussed did not generally map to the behavioral choices observed. Implications for coordination in general and transactive memory specifically are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This paper investigated decision pattern analysis (DPA) as a general and standard framework for studying individuals' consistent decision making behavior within and between contexts. DPA classifies decisions on the basis of judgement accuracy and the goal orientation of the decided-upon action. Over repeated decisions, patterns of individuals' decision behavior are described by five variables: competence, optimality, recklessness, hesitancy and decisiveness. A fictitious medical decision making test and three standard cognitive ability tests (extended with confidence ratings and a 'submit answer for marking' decision) were used to investigate the psychometric properties of these DPA variables. Internal consistency of the decision patterns ranged from good to excellent. Convergent validity was assessed via cognitive abilities, metacognitive confidence and a control criterion imposed on confidence that determines the decision to be made: the point of sufficient certainty. Personality variables were included to assess discriminant validity. As hypothesised, cognitive abilities showed positive correlations with competence and optimality. High confidence, low points of sufficient certainty and a greater discrepancy between them were associated with higher decisiveness and recklessness, and lower hesitancy. Personality measures showed mixed and generally weak correlations with the DPA variables. These convergent and discriminant results also held after controlling for all variables in regression. The results provide preliminary psychometric support for DPA as a general framework of behavioral decision making. DPA has the potential to be exploited in many contexts for uses that, to date, have been unachievable in a psychometrically valid manner. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A call for papers on the application of eye tracking methodologies and data analysis in decision making and judgment is presented.

Standard choice theory assumes choice to be independent of the point of reference. Based on a number of studies which challenge this assumption. Tversky and Kahneman have proposed a reference-dependent model which captures the influence of reference points on individual choice. If choice is reference-dependent, switching the reference point so that it is first dominated by x and then by y increases the likelihood of choosing y. Switching the location of an asymmetrically dominated reference point without altering the dominance relationship should also influence reference-dependent choice in a predicted manner. In this paper the reference-dependent model is tested in two experiments which focus on asymmetrically dominated reference points. The results of these experiments give further confirmation to the reference-dependent model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper the Brunswikian framework provided by the theory of Probabilistic Mental Models (PMM), and other theoretical stances inspired by probabilistic functionalism, is combined with the Thurstonian notion of a stochastic component of judgment. We review data from 25 tasks with representative selection of items collected in our laboratory. Over/underconfidence is close to zero in most domains, but there is a moderate hard-easy effect across task domains that is inconsistent with the original assumptions of the Brunswikian framework. The binomial model modifies PMM-theory by allowing for sampling error in the process of learning the ecological probabilities and the response-error model takes error in the process of overt probability assessment into account. Both models predict a moderate hard-easy effect across task environments that differ in difficulty or predictability, but it is also demonstrated that the two interpretations of random error lead to different predictions. The response error model predicts format dependence, with more overconfidence in full-range than in half-range assessment, and the phenomenon is illustrated with empirical data. It is proposed that a model that combines the Brunswikiati fratnework with both sampling error and response error captures many of the important phenomena in the calibration literature. For illustrative purposes, a combined model with four parameters is fitted to empirical data suggesting good fit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses differences between prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory. It shows that cumulative prospect theory is not merely a formal correction of some theoretical problems in prospect theory, but it also gives different predictions. Some experiments by Lola Lopes are re-analyzed, and are demonstrated to favor cumulative prospect theory over prospect theory. It turns out that the mathematical form of cumulative prospect theory is well suited for modeling the psychological phenomenon of diminishing sensitivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines two dimensions of concurrent verbal protocol validity. First, whether verbalization affects process and outcome (reactivity) was examined by comparing concurrent verbal protocol traces with those from a computer search process tracing method, the latter being a complete trace of information acquisition from experimental materials. Earlier findings that verbalization affects time were confirmed. However, verbalization did not affect amount and pattern of acquisition or accuracy of judgments. Second, whether concurrent verbal protocols are complete was examined by comparing concurrent verbal protocol and computer traces that were simultaneously obtained in a treatment in which subjects verbalized as they acquired information from the computer. The verbal traces less completely captured information acquisition behavior than computer search. This suggests that, although concurrent verbal protocols provide greater insight into decision behavior than computer search, the latter is a more reliable information-acquisition trace. Thus, if information acquisition is of primary interest and if computer search activities can be naturally integrated into performing the primary task, computer search is preferred to concurrent verbal protocols. However, if information use or retrieval from long-term memory is of primary interest, concurrent verbal protocols are preferred to computer search. Finally, this paper examined whether the simultaneous use of concurrent verbal protocols and computer search provides traces of information acquisition and use that are as complete as when each method is independently applied. Although computer search tended to limit subjects' verbalizations of evaluative operators, this effect may be eliminated by practice on the computer prior to collecting data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports the results of two experiments to investigate the effects of payoff alterations in two-person symmetric games. The initial experiment involved 60 subjects, each of whom could earn from £0 to £15, depending on the interaction of their decisions and the unknown decisions of one other person. All decisions were made without feedback to isolate the impact on subjects' behaviour of the game's parameters. A primary aim was to see if the games had strategically distinct structures, or whether uncertainty over the choice rule of others would influence choice behaviour and lessen this independence. An alternative model of rational choice, making allowance for uncertainty in the decision environment, was proposed to capture subjects' behaviour. The results indicated that the frontiers of most of the games had no impact on choice behaviour other than through the magnitude of the change in payoffs. The model received strong support across an identifiable set of 'frontierless' games. However, the variety of games was not sufficient to provide a comprehensive test. A second experiment was recently held to close these gaps. Fifty subjects took part, each of whom earned from A$0 to A$24, averaging A$17. The findings provided broad additional support for the theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Of all of the new technologies emerging in the late 20th century, the production of artificial intelligence may provide the most profound impacts on organizational decision making. Because the development of artificial intelligence technologies and models has largely been based on psychological models of human cognition, the effects of their implementation in complex social settings have not been thoroughly examined. This paper is an attempt to generate research which will develop a comprehensive understanding of the impacts of artificial intelligence and its role in complex organizations. A set of 11 hypotheses has been developed which examine the relationships between artificial intelligence technologies and the dimensions of organizational decision making. It is argued here that the implementation of expert systems will lead to less complex and political decision processes, while the implementation of natural language systems will lead to more complex and political decision processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports on experiments which test whether factors such as regret or disappointment influence taxpayer compliance decisions. Previous tests of regret and disappointment theory have been based upon the common-ratio effect in which probabilities vary while outcomes are held fixed. In contrast, our experiments involved trials in which the outcomes were allowed to vary. Previous tests had mainly found evidence of regret effects and to a lesser extent were supportive of disappointment. In contrast, we were able to reject simple theories of both regret and disappointment. A second experiment produced evidence which indicates that whether or not rejected risky alternatives are resolved has no significant influence on subjects' choices. One would expect that regret could only occur when a subject learns the outcome of a non-chosen option. Hence this result can be seen as evidence against regret theory. We shall argue that there is a possible interpretation of regret theory which is compatible with this result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented which discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the use of eye movements in behavioral decision making, the use of eye-tracking methodologies in judgment and decision-making research, and challenges while using eye tracking in research.

Prescriptions for improving negotiation performance, including developing alternatives to negotiated agreements or setting high aspirations, often fail to consider the inherent uncertainty in such deliberations. Across three studies, this paper demonstrates that negotiators who address this uncertainty by unpacking their positive alternatives and aspirations (e.g., the likelihood of attaining an alternative job offer from Firm #1, Firm #2, or any other firm) judge these outcomes to be more likely to occur and achieve better negotiation outcomes compared with negotiators who consider these same outcomes as a single package (e.g., the likelihood of attaining an alternative job offer from any firm). Unpacking is not uniformly beneficial: unpacking potential negative outcomes (e.g., not receiving another job offer) leads negotiators to demand less in the current negotiation and claim less value as a result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Whether buying stocks or playing the slots, people making real-world risky decisions often rely on their experiences with the risks and rewards. These decisions, however, do not occur in isolation but are embedded in a rich context of other decisions, outcomes, and experiences. In this paper, we systematically evaluate how the local context of other rewarding outcomes alters risk preferences. Through a series of four experiments on decisions from experience, we provide evidence for an extreme-outcome rule, whereby people overweight the most extreme outcomes (highest and lowest) in a given context. As a result, people should be more risk seeking for gains than losses, even with equally likely outcomes. Across the experiments, the decision context was varied so that the same outcomes served as the high extreme, low extreme, or neither. As predicted, people were more risk seeking for relative gains, but only when the risky option potentially led to the high-extreme outcome. Similarly, people were more risk averse for relative losses, but only when the risky option potentially led to the low-extreme outcome. We conclude that in risky decisions from experience, the biggest wins and the biggest losses seem to matter more than they should. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT The decision whether to explore new alternatives or to choose from familiar ones is implicit in many of our daily activities. How is this decision made? When will deviation from optimal exploration be observed? The current paper examines exploration decisions in the context of a multi-alternative 'decisions from experience' task. In each trial, participants could choose a familiar option (the status quo) or a new alternative (risky exploration). The observed exploration rates were more sensitive to the frequent outcome from choosing new alternatives than to the average outcome. That is, the implicit decision whether to explore a new alternative reflects underweighting of rare events: Over-exploration was documented in 'Rare Disasters' environments, and insufficient exploration was evident in 'Rare Treasures' environments. In addition, the results reveal a decrease in exploration of new alternatives over time even when it is always optimal and some exploration even when it is never reinforcing. These results can be captured with models that share a distinction between 'data collection' and 'outcome-driven' decision modes. Under the data collection mode, the decision maker collects information about the environment, to be used in future choices. Under the outcome-driven mode, the decision maker relies on small samples of previous experiences with familiar versus unfamiliar alternatives, before the selection of a specific alternative. The predictive value of a two-parameter 'explorative sampler' quantification of these assumptions is demonstrated. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT For many decisions we make, we are more likely to receive feedback about some outcomes than about others, and thus we must operate under conditions of asymmetric partial feedback. In this paper, we examine the effects of asymmetric partial feedback on decision making across three experiments. Experiment 1 examines the effects of four partial feedback schedules on decision making in a single-attribute auditory detection task. Experiment 2 examines these same schedules in the context of a simulated experiment in which virtual participants perform a multi-attribute choice task. Experiment 3 then examines effects of one partial feedback schedule representative of a real-world decision-making domain (personnel selection) using an ecologically informed multi-attribute choice task. All three experiments reveal that asymmetric partial feedback primarily impacts on response-bias, a parameter of signal detection theory. These findings can be explained in terms of decision makers' attempts to maximize accuracy and the fact that shifts in response-bias will, under partial feedback, produce misleading impressions of greater accuracy. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT One of the most common findings in behavioral decision research is that people have unrealistic beliefs about how much they know. However, demonstrating that misplaced confidence exists does not necessarily mean that there are costs to it. This paper contrasts two approaches toward answering whether misplaced confidence is good or bad, which we have labeled the overconfidence and unjustified confidence approach. We first consider conceptual and analytic issues distinguishing these approaches. Then, we provide findings from a set of simulations designed to determine when the approaches produce different conclusions across a range of possible confidence-knowledge-outcome relationships. Finally, we illustrate the main findings from the simulations with three empirical examples drawn from our own data. We conclude that the unjustified confidence approach is typically the preferred approach, both because it is appropriate for testing a larger set of psychological mechanisms as well as for methodological reasons. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]