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This article contributes to two debates about international relations (IR) as a discipline: first, how global is IR, and how is it structured? Second, what is the state of theory in IR? We conducted (co-) citation analyses of both Web of Science (WoS) and—for the first time— non-WoS publications from Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. With regard to the first question, we find that global IR resembles a core–periphery structure as a "hub and spoke" system whereby transatlantic core nodes are interconnected to each other and to some periphery nodes, while the periphery nodes are connected to the core but not to each other. IR scholarship in the periphery quotes the transatlantic theory cluster but is not linked to each other, not even in the same region. Knowledge produced in the periphery has to go through the transatlantic core in order to be recognized globally. As to the transatlantic core, we identify two major (co-) citation clusters: one committed to IR theory-building across issue areas from a variety of perspectives and the other focused on security studies with a strong emphasis on quantitative methods. With regard to the second question, global IR hangs together through references to the IR theory cluster consisting of North American and European authors who appear to define what IR theory is. Scholars in the periphery refer to this transatlantic IR theory cluster when engaging in theory-building. IR theories have become rather diverse and pluralistic, even in the core. While scholars still refer to the big "isms," they use them around the globe in a synthesizing manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lacher, Hannes, and Julian Germann. (2012) Before Hegemony: Britain, Free Trade, and Nineteenth-Century World Order Revisited. International Studies Review, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2486.2012.01100.x This article argues that neo-Gramscian theorizations of 'hegemony' have failed to illuminate the role of nineteenth-century Britain in the rise of a liberal world economy in three respects. First, they have provided mutually exclusive accounts of the social forces underpinning domestic and international hegemony. Second, they have failed to show Britain's agency in the making of a liberal world order. Third, they have posited a uniformity of social forces and liberal state forms that elides the differences between British and continental societies, thereby obscuring the real reasons for the general shift to liberal internationalism. We argue that it was the structural differences in the economic, social, and political organization of Britain and continental Europe that made free trade without a hegemon possible. Neo-Gramscian theorists of hegemony-just like their mainstream peers-have unduly generalized from the unique structures of American hegemony after 1945. Instead of serving as a master concept to organize the history of international relations, hegemony itself needs to be historicized: as a singular and temporally limited possibility of societal and international rule, preceded and succeeded by other forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, we argue that critical International Relations (IR) scholars must consider American Orientalism in tandem with American Exceptionalism in order to better understand US identity, foreign policymaking, and hegemony. We claim that American Exceptionalism is a particular type of American Orientalism, a style of thought about the distinctions between the “West” and the “East” that gives grounding to the foundational narrative of “America.” While Exceptionalism and Orientalism both deploy similar discursive, ontological, and epistemological claims about the “West” and its non-western “Others,” Exceptionalism is also rooted specifically in American political thought that developed in contradistinction to Europe. As such, we demonstrate that different logics of othering are at work between the West and the non-West, and among Western powers. We implore critical IR scholars to interrogate how the United States and Europe alternatively collude and clash in wielding normative power over their non-Western Others. We claim such research is important for exploring the staying power of American hegemony and understanding the implications of European challenges to American foreign policy, particularly given recent concerns about a so-called transatlantic divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has become a contentious subject in transatlantic security relations. This essay identifies the ambiguities that have occurred in the policymaking on both sides of the Atlantic that appear to have generated a basic lack of confidence and trust in the other side's good intentions and commitment to cooperation. It does so by sketching three historical time periods—1981–1986, 1988–1996, and 1998–2004—that convey the recurrent patterns and outcomes in the ESDP dispute. These three cases cover the periods (1) from the London Report on European Political Cooperation to the Single European Act and the Western European Union Security Platform, (2) the Maastricht Negotiations on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and (3) the evolution of ESDP from St. Malo to Brussels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]