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As states jostle to attract and entice others by deploying a range of innovative strategies, a ‘soft’ power competition era looms possibly in the Asia-Pacific. This paper argues that reflecting on this period of competitive policy innovation provides a valuable opportunity to re-assess the theory and practice of Joseph Nye's ‘soft’ power, given its conceptual and empirical frailties: how theoretically precise are the policies commonly described as projecting ‘soft’ power? To do so, it undertakes a comparative evaluation of Japan's and China's ‘soft’ power strategies. By paying close attention to the theory–practice linkage, it illuminates the disparities in their understanding of Nye's ‘soft’ power. Rather than a one-size-fits-all concept, ‘soft’ power strategies with distinctively Japanese and Chinese characteristics are emerging, bringing different advantages and weaknesses. The proverbial magic mirror would conclude that by more closely matching Nye's formulations and displaying a less competitive streak, Japan appears the ‘softer’ power. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the late 1990s, China, Japan, and South Korea – the core states in Northeast Asia – have gradually engaged in various initiatives and institutions for regional cooperation. Such initiatives extend from summitry to functional cooperation in finance, environmental protection, logistics, and other areas. Furthermore, the three countries have shown their willingness to vitalize cross-border economic activities by concluding commercial arrangements. Given these evolutions, this article seeks to address the following questions: what features are found in trilateral cooperative initiatives and how these features are evaluated in terms of ‘regional governance’? The paper advances two propositions. First, regional cooperation in Northeast Asia can be characterized as weak neoliberal orientation and intensive business involvements in cooperative projects in state-directed policy networks. Second, regional governance in Northeast Asia has gradually intensified the nature of regulatory governance in which the governments of the three countries sought to harmonize standards and regulatory systems through trilateral cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In contemporary East Asia, political rivalry between China and Japan is often discussed. However, little has been done to systematically analyze the bilateral relationship and possible conflict escalation. In this paper, I employ the multiple-hierarchy model of regional politics offered by power transition theorists, in order to examine the recent Sino–Japanese relationship. After examining the effect of the factors suggested by the theory, I conclude that China's rise does not pose immediate destabilizing effects on regional security because the relative rise of China's capability is at best moderate. I also argue that the dyadic relationship has been pacified by several factors such as interest similarity and defense-dominant geography, in spite of China's overall rise. Finally, I offer some policy recommendations suggested by the theory-driven analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China–Japan relations are frequently analyzed either in the light of disputes about different interpretations of history, the consequence of a strategic power shift in the Asia-Pacific resulting from the rise of China or as a conflict between Chinese and Japanese national identities. This paper argues that bilateral relations should be assessed on the basis of a comprehensive approach. It concludes that the current state of bilateral relations can be understood as the result of identity crises of the political systems in Beijing and Tokyo. Owing to the rapidly changing environment in East Asia and their inherent conservative natures, both political systems' perceptions and policies lag behind present realities. This renders it difficult for them to effectively address important domestic and international problems and consequently affects bilateral relations negatively as it complicates the accurate redefinition of the representation of ‘self’ and ‘other’ with regard to foreign relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Historical controversies continue to plague northeast Asian politics today, with Chinese and Koreans protesting Japanese history textbooks and Japanese politicians' visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and Koreans protesting Chinese claims that the ancient Kingdom of Goguryo was Chinese, not Korean. Yet, there is little empirical research exploring what, if any, impact historical beliefs have on threat perception and foreign policy preferences in northeast Asia today. On the basis of surveys of Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean university students, this paper explores the relationships among beliefs about the past, perceived threat in the present, and foreign policy preferences for the future. Results and their implications for northeast Asian security are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China and Japan used to have good energy cooperation before China switched into a net oil importer in the mid-1990s, but the recent years have witnessed an increasingly intensive competition between the two countries over petroleum supplies. While many saw such competition as inevitable with China's growing energy demands, the paper argues that the energy relationship between the two countries was never separated from political and strategic concerns, and heavily affected by the concern of ‘relative gains’, as suggested by the neorealists. Like the case prior to the mid-1990s when the non-energy factors underpinned the Sino–Japanese energy cooperation, the key factors that prevented the two from continuing energy cooperation today also lay in political and strategic aspects. Being two regional powers in East Asia, China, and Japan need to recognize the fact that their lack of energy cooperation due to mutual political distrust will not only impair their own energy security, but may also have negative implications on regional stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers whether an alliance can have a reassurance effect on a third-party. It uses hypotheses derived from balance-of-power realism and a revised version of balance-of-threat theory called balance-of-malevolence theory. Using the revised 1997 US–Japan Defense Guidelines as a primary case, Chinese reactions are found to provide greater support for balance-of-malevolence theory. Side-evidence from Japan's decision in the early 1990s to begin deploying troops overseas to participate in humanitarian and UN peacekeeping operations, and its dispatch of naval ships to the Indian Ocean in the wake of 9-11, confirm the centrality of Chinese concerns about Japan's disposition as a military power and the reassurance value of the US alliance and other ‘containment frameworks’ such as UN peacekeeping. This also suggests that the demonstration effect of benign overseas deployments can be effective in overcoming negative attributions about a state's disposition as a military power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States today dominates the globe and many regional geographical subsystems in an unprecedented way, maintaining a hegemonic order that is in no way similar to the ‘anarchy’ assumed in realist analyses. The global system today is not simply unipolar; it is a hegemonic system that is increasingly globalized, in which the basic concepts of realism (anarchy, self‐help and power balancing) provide little guidance or understanding in explaining state behavior. This paper describes the US hegemonic system, analyzes the roles of China and Japan within this system, and examines how the Bush administration's plans for missile defense might transform the system. The conclusion points to some critical implications from this analysis for realist interpretations of international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article draws on prospect theory to explain the variation of China's risk propensity during the 2012–14 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes with Japan. China's initial reference point 1.0 regarding the disputed islands was the 'shelving agreement' 'shelving the sovereignty dispute and a tacit acceptance of Japan's de facto exclusive control. So after Japan's 'nationalization' of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, China was clearly in a domain of losses. China was thus highly risk-acceptant by intensifying maritime and air patrolling, engaging in provocative behaviors, and suspending crisis management mechanisms. Meanwhile, China's reference point evolved. Discourse analysis of Chinese official statements and media coverage indicated that regularized patrolling or joint control became China's reference point 2.0. As it started to act from a domain of gains, Chinese behaviors turned risk-averse by scaling back patrolling and resuming negotiations over crisis management mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Japan continue to partly live in the shadow of World War II (WWII) with recurrent expressions of anti-Japanese nationalism in China periodically ebbing bilateral relations. How does the Chinese government manage anti-Japan public manifestations of nationalism and what factors explain it? The government has to walk a fine line by managing the nationalism it has bred without undermining its own rule and considering elite divisions, heightened public nationalism, and the developments in its external environment. Six case studies from the Hu-Wen era provide a comprehensive understanding of what pertains to Chinese nationalism, the means used to express it, and more importantly the way the government chose to tackle them. While nationalism can be a mean of garnering legitimacy and exercising pressure on Japan to bend to its wishes, the Chinese government is embarked on the sinuous task of preventing an escalation beyond its control at both the domestic and international levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Japan are among the world's top space powers, with significant technical competence in both conventional and 'newspace' capabilities. Since the early 1990s, each country has also taken a keen interest in shaping the governance of outer space activities. But they have done so in remarkably different ways, calling into question Asian states' supposed preferences for soft and informal institutions. Japan has led the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, involving both state and nonstate participants, which is guided by a set of principles. China has opted for a high-profile formal intergovernmental design, the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, with a Convention and all the trappings of a formal organizational structure. This article assesses the activities of China and Japan in the new space race, discusses how and why the design of their space governance differs, and reflects on prospects for competition and cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates and explains the development of International Relations studies (IRS) in China, Japan, and India. Beginning in early 1980s IRS experienced exponential growth in China and is becoming a separate discipline in that country. Despite early starts, IRS in Japan and India is still an appendage in other disciplinary departments, programs, and centers although growing interest is discernible in both countries. Continued rise of Asian powers along with their growing roles and responsibilities in constructing and managing regional and global orders is likely sustain and increase interest in IRS in these countries and more generally in Asia. Distinctive trajectories have characterized the development of IRS in China, Japan, and India. Distinctiveness is evident in master narratives and intellectual predispositions that have shaped research and teaching of IR in all three countries. The distinct IRS trajectories are explained by the national and international context of these countries as well as the extensiveness of state domination of their public spheres. Alterations in national circumstances and objectives along with changes in the international position explain the master narratives that have focused the efforts of IR research communities. Extensiveness of state domination and government support, respectively, explain intellectual predispositions and institutional opportunities for the development of IRS. IRS in Asia has had a predominantly practical orientation with emphasis on understanding and interpreting the world to forge suitable national responses. That orientation contributed to a strong emphasis on normative–ethical dimensions, as well as empirically grounded historical, area, and policy studies. For a number of reasons including intellectual predispositions and constraints, knowledge production in the positivist tradition has not been a priority. However, IR theorizing defined broadly is beginning to attract greater attention among Asian IR scholars. Initial interest in Western IR theory was largely a function of exposure of Asian scholars to Western (primarily American) scholarship that has been in the forefront in the development of IR concepts, theories, and paradigms. Emulation has traveled from copying to application and is now generating interest in developing indigenous ideas and perspectives based on national histories, experiences, and traditions. Although positivism may gain ground it is not deeply embedded in the intellectual traditions of Asian countries. Furthermore, theorizing in the positivist tradition has not made significant progress in the West where it is also encountering sharp criticism and alternative theories. Asian IR scholarship would continue to emphasize normative–ethical concerns. And historical, area, and policy studies would continue to be important in their own right, not simply as evidentiary basis for development of law-like propositions. It also appears likely that Asian IR scholarship would increasingly focus on recovery of indigenous ideas and traditions and their adaptation to contemporary circumstances. The net effect of these trends would be to diversify and enrich existing concepts, theories, methods, and perspectives, and possibly provide fresh ones as well. The flourishing of IRS in Asia would make the IR discipline more international. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]