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The article discusses the foreign currency and commercial paper paid out by the Reichsbank and the Ministry of Finance in Germany for reparation purposes. The author gives an overview of the London schedule of payments for German reparations, and the problems it caused for Germany's exporting business and the valuation of its currency. He then points out that after the payment schedule was made, the German government slacked on its reparation payments, even though they were adequately collected by the Reichsbank on exports as stipulated. Information on how this affected American trade with Europe is included.

The article focuses on the reestablishment of Germany's merchant marine after World War I. Early financing of the merchant marine by the German government and the shipping companies themselves is examined. Details related to the policies of German shipping companies concerning joint operations between German and foreign companies, especially American shipping companies, are discussed. Comparisons are made of the capabilities of the German merchant marine before and after World War I, and the improvements upon operation made by companies such as the Hamburg-American Line are presented.

The article details the difficult situation that German businesses are finding themselves in as the German mark depreciates and businesses are unable to find capital to fund growth. The article explains that German business is facing low worker performance, an increase in overhead costs, a lengthening in time to process raw materials, and unstable product prices. The article examines the efforts to stabilize industry, including the attempt by some industrial firms to establish their own banking institutions to attract financing and the formation of branch factories in other countries. The issues of loans, "valorization," and interest rates from the Reichsbank and commercial banks are addressed. Because of instability, much German industrial financing is being backed by foreign currencies.

The article compares the German stock exchange quotations and dividends from before World War I to those up to 1923. The author suggests that to calculate the actual value of the current quotations, the par values of the shares before the war must be considered, as well as the par value of the shares issued in the meantime at their gold par value at the time of the issue. He includes tables showing the real values of stocks before and after the war in several different industries. Furthermore, he analyzes the real value of the stock before and after the war and presents several conclusions.

An interview is presented with assistant professor Erik Meyersson on research with economist Albrecht Glitz on the economic returns of industrial espionage operations in East and West Germany during the Cold War. Emphasis is given to topics such as the technology and productivity gap between East and West Germany and corporate spying in relation to research and development.

The article examines German prices and competition in international markets. Several causes of differences between the domestic value and the foreign exchange value of the German monetary note are discussed, as well as efforts to stabilize its valuation. Economic sanctions on Germany after World War I only exacerbated their economic crisis, eventually leading to a complete economic collapse. The devastating effects of this collapse on German domestic commerce, its currency exchange rate and wages and salaries are detailed.

The author’s first overseas business assignment came when he was 29 and a sales manager at Xerox, running a team in New York City. The company sent him to Puerto Rico to turn around its failing business there. Because he didn’t know the culture or the market, he arrived without an agenda and just listened to people for two weeks. He learned a few important phrases in Spanish so that he could relate to his new team. His experience there helped him later in his career, when he had to manage people across a variety of cultures. In 2002 SAP hired McDermott to head its North American business, which was struggling. He viewed the company’s belief that it could simply transfer its strategies for the German market to the U.S. market as part of the problem. “Leading in any country is all about reading the room, respecting the culture, and understanding the nuances of how people perceive information,” he writes. “You have to care about what the culture needs instead of just focusing on your agenda and how to get it done.” In one illustration of that, although he and his wife have kept the family home in Philadelphia, he moved into a house in Heidelberg to demonstrate to his employees that being a part of the German culture is important to him. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines whether Germany's competitiveness is declining or just deviating from the pattern of a modest but steady inflow of direct investment. Whereas in the last century, the country relied on foreign direct investment (FDI), over the past twenty years it has not been one of the major recipients of such capital flows. Despite this setback and other problems, however, the author concludes that the country's status as a "natural" creditor as regards FDI does not mean that it has lost its attractiveness as an investment location. With its highly developed infrastructure and stable business environment, the country continues to be a good place for foreign companies to operate.

Most American managers have a hard time making sense of Germany. The country has a fraction of the resources and less than one-third the population of the United States. Labor costs are substantially higher, paid vacations are at least three times as long, and strong unions are deeply involved at all levels of business, from the local plant to the corporate boardroom. Yet German companies manage to produce internationally competitive products in key manufacturing sectors, making Germany the greatest competitive threat to the United States after Japan. The seemingly paradoxical nature of the German economy typically evokes one of two diametrically opposed responses. The first is to celebrate the German economy as a "model" worth emulating--indeed, as the answer to declining U.S. competitiveness. The alternative, more skeptical response is to question Germany's staying power in a new, more competitive global economy. According to Kirsten Wever and Christopher Allen, the problem with both points of view is that they miss the forest for the trees. Observers are so preoccupied with praising--or blaming--individual components of the German economy that they fail to see the dynamic logic that ties these components together into a coherent system. In their review of recent research on the German business system, Wever and Allen argue that managers can learn an important lesson from Germany. In the global economy, competition isn't just between companies but between entire socioeconomic systems. Germany's ability to design a cohesive economic and social system that adapts continuously to changing requirements goes a long way toward explaining that country's competitive success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany's small and midsize companies, known as the Mittelstand, are a hidden source of wisdom on global competition. German companies like Krones, Korber/Hauni, Weinig, Webasto, and TetraWerke dominate their markets with world market shares ranging from 70% to 90%; when combined, they account for the bulk of Germany's considerable trade surplus. But for all of their market strength, the Mittelstand companies are seldom in the limelight. As a result, other companies know little about what makes these "hidden champions" succeed. Although Germany's hidden champions relish their obscurity and defend their privacy, 39 of them agreed to participate in a study of their strategies and practices. From the companies' responses to questionnaires, interviews, and the author's personal knowledge, five lessons emerged. The hidden champions (1) combine a narrow product-market focus with broad geographic scope; (2) perform best in the areas customers care most about; (3) balance closeness to customers with deep technical knowledge; (4) rely on themselves, especially for R&D; and (5) foster close ties between managers and workers. Big companies will have a harder time replicating the hidden champions' technically competent leadership and intuitive market knowledge-and getting beyond their own rhetoric about globalization. However, the success of the hidden champions suggests that big companies are right to decentralize. Small, autonomous business units are more likely to achieve the kind of specialization, closeness to customers, integration of technology and marketing, and employee identification that meet today's competitive requirements. INSETS: Who are the Hidden Champions?;Market Position of Selected Hidden Champions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Joyful at the outset, the unification of Germany has become a process of painful realization. In eastern Germany, once-promising factories have turned out to be little more than industrial museums; the railways and postal system are in wartime shape; the work force needs relocation and retraining. Meanwhile, as eastern Germans grow impatient with democracy, many western Germans cynically regard the east as inferior. What Germany lacks is a concept for merging east and west. And while not a perfect blueprint, the corporate merger provides useful lessons: for example, simply grafting the corporate culture of the acquirer on the acquired does not work. The same holds true for Germany: eastern Germany should develop on its own course rather than become "West Germany: The Sequel." This national merger is a chance for Germany to pursue creative solutions to tough problems. Four areas in particular present opportunities for growth and innovation: People. The merger is creating unprecedented levels of employment--yet it is also an opportunity to devise new ways of retraining workers and to experiment with flexible, part-time employment. Infrastructure. Eastern Germany has an antiquated infrastructure--but this is an opportunity to leapfrog western Germany's system and set new, world-class standards for roads, railroads, telecommunications, and postal service. Regional Centers. Germany has limited resources--but instead of trying to "smear" economic growth across the new federal states, Germany should concentrate on those regional centers with proven expertise in specific industries. Environment. Eastern Germany has terrible environmental problems--but a cleanup may be the chance to advance the new science of environmental improvement and create a new source of competitive advantage for Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the subject of industrial competitiveness comes up, criticism of U.S. management is seldom far behind. And in many cases it looks well deserved, since executives often seem to concentrate more on quarterly profits and price-earnings ratios than on product quality or customer service. Yet the assumption that senior managers consciously choose between long-term corporate growth and short-term gains rings hollow as does the suggestion that many if not most of them are motivated largely by compensation packages structured around quick returns. In the analysis presented here, the author implicitly takes up this question of behavior by exploring the ways in which capital markets color the choices management can make. Turning first to the United States, he shows how market standards for shareholder returns and financial leverage lead to corporate financial goals that divert executives' attention from the product-market needs that build long-term competitive strength. He compares these goals to West German and Japanese growth-centered objectives, which their capital markets reinforce. Thus he raises serious questions about the contribution our country's capital market conventions have made to our industrial malaise. He challenges business and government leaders to rethink the financial policies they have heretofore accepted as givens. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines the economic integration of German-occupied territories in Europe during World War II. Germany strengthened the Wehrmacht by exploiting the natural, human, and industrial resources of the conquered countries and integrating their economies with the Reich. German forces, as well as German manufacturers, used contracts in occupied territories rather than directly taking over the manufacturing companies. The transmission of contracts, which was distinct from subcontracting within the Reich, was one of the three phases of economic relations during the occupation. Topics include German-French economic relations, Germany's Four-Year Plan and conversion method for industrial collaboration, and the advantages of German contracting for these occupied nations.

The article reports on American holdings in Germany, which were seized by Allies to take the place of money reparation and reduce Germany's potential for remilitarization, and mentions the procedure of filing compensation or recovery claims. A resource for information about war claims is the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, which functions in the Western Zones but not in the U.S.S.R.-occupied Eastern Zone. Topics include the issue of whether American corporations should be compensated for their damaged subsidiaries and business losses, the Paris Agreement and United Nations reparations policy, looting during the Soviet occupation, the Potsdam Agreement, the U.S. Supreme Court and State Department's stance on international law, and the U.S. war-claims policy.

The article discusses the effects that a "controlled" inflation of the U.S. dollar would have on life insurance companies. Descriptions of the varying effects of deflation and "mild" or "controlled" inflation on insurance markets and company holdings are presented, as well as information regarding interest rates, bond valuation and speculative investments. The article also discusses the effects of extreme inflation on premium income, operations and expenses, and assets. The article also compares the effects of inflation on U.S. life insurance industry to similar German insurance markets, which were rendered nearly worthless during an inflationary period from 1919 to 1924.

The article discusses the Bank for International Settlements (B.I.S.). The Bank was created to collect the reparation payments from Germany post World War I and to imitate the functions of a central banking organization. The Bank's lending capacity is almost entirely dependent on its own resources and its own deposits. The B.I.S. plays an important role throughout the global banking community through its commercialisation and mobilization of Germany's debt. Analysts speculate that the B.I.S. is too dependent on the Central Banks and their regulations.

The article explores the impact that the post-World War I German monetary policy has had on business conditions. The article focuses on three specific volatile periods of time, with upward trends followed by downward movement: January to July 1924, the middle of 1924 to the Spring of 1926, and developments since the Spring of 1926 until publication. The impact of the Dawes loan and Reichsbank policy is discussed. The author focuses specifically on the Reichsbank's reduction of the discount rate in January 1927 and the retention of this rate from June to October of the same year. The author notes that the Reichsbank currency policy should prevent these drastic fluctuations in order for business to develop securely. The author questions the Reichsbank's views of monetary theory.