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Abstract: With the expansion of the world''s population, apartment buildings have become popular, especially in metropolitan areas all over the world. Although apartment buildings could economize on the use of land, they may generate collective action problems among owners in the building management process, resulting in a “tragedy of the commons” in the urban environment. However, in the literature, there has been a lack of research that has investigated collective action problems in building management. In order to fill the gap, this study surveys collective action in apartment building management and proposes to utilize the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework to analyze their problems. Making references to the literature on collective action and drawing from studies of common-pool resource management in particular, this paper classifies collective management actions into four categories, namely: 1) rules design, 2) rules enforcement, 3) maintenance decision making, and 4) performance monitoring. It further illustrates the application of the IAD model by empirically investigating a specific collective action—the appointment of a property management company (PMC). By using the logistic regression model for 2989 single block residential apartment buildings in 18 districts in Hong Kong, this paper will show that building condition, building location, the number of owners, and the presence of an owners'' organization each have a different impact on a property''s likelihood of appointing a PMC. The results of this paper should shed light on both collective action theory and building management. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Management of apartment buildings is never straightforward because of the need for collective homeowner action. Mancur Olson suggests that a rational individual will not participate in collective action which provides no positive net benefit for him or her. Based on this premise, it would seem that rationality drives homeowners to free-ride on others’ efforts and that, as a result, no collective action will take place. However, some homeowners do actively participate in housing management, and it is worthwhile to examine why some participate and others do not. Building on the wide-ranging applications of the collective interest model (CIM) in explaining political participation and environmental activism, this paper expands its relevance to the arena of housing management. The explanatory analysis which is based on the findings of a structured questionnaire survey in Hong Kong corroborates the central propositions of the CIM and provides a theoretical account of housing management activism. In brief, housing management activism is a function of beliefs about personal and group efficacy, the value of the collective good, and the selective benefits and costs of participation. These findings have far-reaching implications for the formulation of government policies promoting homeowners’ active involvement in housing management in Hong Kong and other megacities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]