Search

Why do individuals in Central and Eastern Europe support parties and candidates that hold restrictive positions on migration? I argue that the mobilization of public opinion against the European integration of external migration management is a cause. To test, I employ an experiment in Slovakia that combines a between-subjects experiment with a candidate-choice conjoint. Results indicate strong support for restrictive migration policies generally and that ideology moderates reactions to messages about European Union influence. In response to these messages, liberals shift toward restrictive policy preferences; conservatives do not. These differential effects suggest that messages about European Union influence run up against ceiling effects, where entrenched anti-migration preferences prevent attitudinal change. This paper identifies the limited set of conditions under which the mobilization of public opinion against European integration influences attitudes and electoral preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most member states of the European Union (EU) have some difficulty in transposing EU directives. Despite the obligation to comply with EU law, member states are often slow to adopt national policies implementing directives. In this paper I analyse this problem by focusing on the coordination of transposition in the domestic policy arena. Coordination is approached as a game in which one or more higher-level players decide on policy when lower-level players are unable to make a decision. Based on the model developed in the paper, lower-level players sometimes appear to have discretion in shaping the policy transposing a directive. Furthermore, if a single player coordinates the transposition process, the implementing policy differs from the policy specified by the directive. However, a decisionmaking process with more than one higher-level player can result in deadlock, leading to a literal transposition of a directive. Moreover, deadlock between the deciding players may delay the transposition process. Both mechanisms are illustrated by two cases of decision-making on EU directives in The Netherlands: the cocoa and chocolate products directive and the laying hens directive. The analysis shows that the framework developed in this paper contributes to the understanding of transposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the circumstances under which affluent interest groups wield influence over policy outcomes. Interest group scholarship is ambiguous about the beneficial role of economic resources for lobbying influence. Economically resourceful groups are often presumed to provide more and better expert information to decision-makers and, in exchange, receive more favourable policy concessions. We argue that the beneficial role of economic resources is contingent on the media salience of policy dossiers. We expect that resourceful groups are more influential when issues are discussed behind the public scenes, while their competitive advantage dampens once issues grow salient in the news media. We test our expectations in the context of European Union policymaking, drawing from 183 expert surveys with lobbyists connected to a sample of 41 policy issues. Our empirical findings demonstrate that economic resources matter for lobbying influence, but that their effect is conditional on the media salience of policy issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the impact of the Economic and Monetary Union on international tourism flows across a set of 37 developed countries. To do this, an augmented gravity model is estimated using a sample of 31 European countries plus six non-European OECD countries over the period 1995–2012. Results suggest a substantial impact of the euro on intra-Eurozone tourism of between 44 and 126% when proper estimation method, control group and definition of the Eurozone are used. Moreover, evidence of tourism creation is also found. Finally, the potential tourism gains for new members and possible entrants of adopting the euro are explored. This study provides a detailed analysis on the effect of the euro on tourism flows which might be of interest for policymakers of the Eurozone or future member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies theories of international socialization to examine the impact of European Union contact on the professional socialization of public officials in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on a survey of officials in seven new member states, the paper finds that daily work on European Union issues is associated with favourable attitudes towards merit-based civil service governance. The distinction between types of European Union contact shows that officials dealing with ‘reception’-related European Union activities such as the transposition and implementation of European Union policies develop more meritocratic attitudes. By contrast, ‘projection’-related activities that involve personal contact with European Union officials have no effect. The paper concludes that the small but consistent impact of European Union contact on professional socialization promotes the silent professionalization of public administration in Central and Eastern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some Europeans support immigration from within the European Union, while rejecting immigration from elsewhere? Acceptance of intra-European Union mobility—even by those who wish to restrict immigration more generally—is important for popular support for the European Union itself. This paper identifies and attempts to explain the preferences of "EU-only inclusionists": EU nationals who support relatively high levels of immigration, but only from within the European Union. We analyze an underexplored experimental module in the European Social Survey to explore European Union inclusionism in relation to other preference profiles. We find that identification with the European Union helps explain specific support for European Union mobility, while subnational (racial and religious) identities are associated with a preference for European migrants over non-Europeans, but not with specific support for intra-European Union movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although many interest groups work together perpetually, most academic studies agree that coalition formation does not lead to more influence. In this article, we try to explain these puzzling findings. While former research generally tends to frame the decision of forming an interest group coalition as a strength, in this paper, we argue that coalition building should be considered as a 'weapon of the weak'. Interest groups fearing that they are insufficiently influential, and whose very existence as an organisation is at risk, are more likely to coalesce. This theoretical framework is tested on a sample of around 3000 interest groups in six European countries – Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden – and the European Union. Empirical findings clearly demonstrate that perceived fears – oriented towards both organisational survival and policy influence – have an effect on how likely it is that an interest group will decide to build a coalition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors explain public support for international redistribution? While the European Union has sent billions of taxpayers' money to over indebted euro countries in an attempt to avoid an economic collapse, these transfers have encountered fierce resistance among both donor and recipient constituents. However, we know surprisingly little about why citizens support or oppose redistribution within the EU. This paper suggests that domestic levels of corruption and institutional quality may be one of the most important explanations for the great variation in public support for financial assistance, bailouts and aid. Using recent European Elections Survey data merged with data on regional level quality of government, we show that the effects of institutional quality are consistently stronger than macro-economic factors, including economic development, inequality or levels of public debt. We find strong evidence that citizens in low corrupt contexts are more likely to support financial assistance to fellow member states. The results have implications for future challenges in securing public support for EU economic integration as well as for our understanding of how and why corruption undermines society's collective action capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An increasing number of member countries of the European Union (EU) is heading for ratification through referendum of the yet to be adopted constitution for Europe. Such popular votes will add an additional ratification constraint and empirical models will require information on the positions of the voters on various issues related to the new treaty. This information can come only from mass surveys. In this paper we discuss the ways in which data from mass surveys may be used to infer the policy positions of voters on the most salient aspects of the constitutional treaty. We also propose a way in which these policy positions may be connected with information on the policy positions of the member states’ governments. Combining this information, which is almost imperative for systematic tests of two-level games, allows us to demonstrate that certain referendums are likely to lead to ‘involuntary defections’. In addition, our analysis shows that the prospect of referendums has already led to changes in the draft constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers whether political business cycles existed in East European accession countries during the period 1990-9. Based on the Mundell-Fleming model expanded in Clark and Hallerberg (2000), we argue that the type of exchange rate regime and the relative independence of the central bank affects the instruments governments use to influence the economy before elections. In our empirical analysis, we find that accession countries with dependent central banks and flexible exchange rates have looser monetary policies in electoral periods than in non-electoral periods. If a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, it manipulates its economy in election years through running larger budgets instead of through looser monetary policy. The presence of such cycles in Eastern Europe has implications for the introduction of the euro in EU accession countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does income inequality increase political backlash against European and global integration? This paper reports research suggesting that it can. The article analyses party opposition to and support for trade openness, European Union integration and general internationalism of political party platforms in advanced industrial democracies between 1960 and 2008. It finds that inequality tends to increase anti-globalization positions of parties, net of pro-globalization positions, an effect that does not significantly differ across party families or levels of actual globalization. This effect, however, does depend on, and is diminished by, generous redistributive policies. These findings clarify socio-economic conditions underlying the backlash against political and economic globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Making interventions during negotiations within the Council of Ministers is the primary way in which member states make their policy positions known to one another and attempt to influence negotiations. In spite of this, relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to the factors that influence a member state’s decision to intervene. This paper seeks to address this gap in our understanding by analysing a new data set that specifies which member states are intervening and at what level of negotiation within the Council they are doing so. Significant differences between member state intervention behaviour are observed, and these differences can be explained to some degree by structural characteristics of the policy space within which member states negotiate. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We present a new data set enumerating the population of organizations listed and/or registered as lobbyists in the European Union. In the first part of the paper we describe how we arrived at the population data set by drawing on three independent sources (CONECCS; Landmarks; European Parliament registry). We briefly discuss the validity of these registers in the context of recent substantial changes to each of them. In the second part, we present descriptive information on the number and type of groups as well as their territorial origins. In the final section, we outline potential research questions that can be addressed with the new data set for further research on the role of groups in the EU policy process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the factors that help EU member states to secure favourable bargaining outcomes? Although existing research highlights the importance of the member states' 'political power', scholars tend to equate this with their voting power. In this paper, I argue that proposal-making power associated with the EU presidency helps the member states to obtain preferable negotiation outcomes. Analysis of the cross-state allocation of the EU budget from 1977-2003 shows that holding the EU presidency during the time of allocation decisions brings financial benefits to individual member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of the European Parliament (EP) under the consultation procedure has been widely neglected by rational choice models of legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU). This paper offers a new understanding of the procedure by means of a computational model in which lobbyists provide legislators with policy options. Transaction costs of assimilating information lead to rationing of access to the agenda-setter (i.e. the Commission). In this context, consultation converts the EP into an indirect channel to the agenda-setter for some lobbyists. I argue that the resulting pool of policy options, together with the right to be heard by the Commission and the latter's degree of rational ignorance, provides the EP with a legislative power that the literature has not so far recognized. The implications of this finding extend to other legislative procedures of the EU and to consultative committees in other political systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we seek to understand why attitudes vary among individuals regarding the issue of income distribution in European Union member states. We believe that the issue of income inequality is a potentially significant political cleavage that may have an important influence in meaningful ways in European politics. Rather than focusing on the national context to explain variation in citizen attitudes toward income inequality, we control for national context and explore the relative influence of various individual-level characteristics in shaping how Europeans think about the distribution of income in their countries. We assess how individuals' political attitude, economic self-interest, and general attitude toward society affect how they think about income equality in their own society. To test these propositions, we devise a series of hypotheses that are tested in an ordered probit model using data from the 2000—1 wave of the World Values and European Values Surveys. It is our contention that the way people think about income inequality in their society is largely a product of the ideas that they hold about politics and society, and not principally a product of their economic self-interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses public opinion on common European policies in foreign affairs and defence. It proposes three models of support for common policies in these fields. Drawing on Eurobarometer data, the analysis shows that instrumental self-interest and territorial identities contribute considerably to explaining support for common foreign affairs and defence policies. Moreover, support for common policies is strongly driven by domain-specific evaluations of the European Union's performance. These findings suggest that popular support for common European policies in foreign affairs and defence has an experiential base. Thus, elites have an incentive to respond to public opinion when making policy decisions, so this analysis supports the liberal view in international relations rather than the realist account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on the presidency of the EU shows mixed results. Although most scholars agree that the EU presidency is not able to advance its domestic interests in the European forum, Tallberg (2006) provides evidence for presidency effects. In the present paper, we empirically estimate presidency-based power in the Council of the European Union on the DEU data — a large-scale data set containing EU policy issues from various policy areas. We show that holding the presidency does significantly and positively contribute to the bargaining power of member states, but only in the final stages of decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Practitioners as well as scholars of European integration have for decades debated why it takes so long for the European Union (EU) to adopt legislation and how to improve decision-making efficiency. Four studies have investigated decision-making speed using survival analysis, a particularly appropriate quantitative technique. In this paper I show that all four studies suffer from serious methodological problems that render their conclusions unreliable. I then outline where work in this area should focus, and take an initial step in this direction by fitting a methodologically more appropriate survival model to my 2002 EU decision-making data set (Golub, 2002). Substantively, the results indicate that throughout the EU's history, for the most important types of legislation, qualified majority voting (QMV) and EU enlargement have increased decision-making speed, whereas empowerment of the European Parliament and extreme preference heterogeneity amongst decision-makers have decreased it. Theoretically, formal approaches — spatial models and especially coalition theory — do a better job of explaining these results than do perspectives that privilege informal norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between European integration and regionalist parties is still a largely unexplored area of research. In this paper, I evaluate whether regionalist parties perceive the European Union (EU) as an ally or an enemy. Using expert surveys, I assess the views of regionalist parties on European integration and I find that regionalist political parties are consistently pro-EU across time, space, and issue area. I find further support for this finding in a case study of the Scottish National Party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 1 May 2004, the European Union (EU) welcomed its new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. This paper considers to what extent one of the most widely tested and supported theories of voting behavior in Western Europe, the second-order election model, applies in the enlarged EU. We test the model using election data from the new member states and find that voters do not cast protest votes against their incumbent national governments in second-order elec tions, that is, elections where voters believe little to be at stake. This finding contradicts one of the model's basic propositions and runs counter to the empirical reality in the old member states, with potentially significant implications for inter and intra-institutional politics in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the ways in which government activity, or demand-side forces, influence interest mobilization and formal inclusion in the policy-making process in the European Union. Drawing on an original dataset of nearly 700 civil society groups active in the European Union, the paper provides empirical evidence of three routes by which the EU institutions influence interest group activity: (1) direct interest group subsidy; (2) manipulation of the establishment and composition of formal arenas of political debate; and (3) broader, system-wide expansion of competencies and selective development of chosen policy areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines European Union (EU) member state attitudes toward enlargement. We use Eurobarometer data for aggregate national support from 1996 to 2002 for the accession of each of 13 candidate countries--the 10 that will join the EU in 2004 plus Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. Analyzing our cross-section time series, we find, first, that the level of support correlates positively with the share of the candidate country in the total exports of the member state and negatively with the distance between the capitals of the member state and the candidate country. This finding supports the hypothesis that common identity, or 'we-feeling,' grows with interaction (Deutsch et al., 1957). Second, support correlates negatively with the relative importance of agriculture in domestic employment. Since agriculture triggers EU financial flows, this finding supports the view that attitudes toward integration are policy related (Gabel, 1998b, 1998c). Third, support is lower when both the member state and the candidate country are predominantly Catholic. This suggests that, although Catholics may desire a deeper Europe (Nelsen et al., 2001), they oppose a wider Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the democratic deficit in the European Union (EU). It examines what constitutes a democratic deficit, analyzes whether there is one in the EU, and offers suggestions for a solution. I focus on the output of the legislative process and study whether policies deviate from those emerging in other political systems. In particular, I present a formal model of policy-making in a bicameral system, apply it to the EU, and compare the EU with the United States. I conclude that the institutional setup of the EU does not lead to policies that are fundamentally undemocratic, and that the composition of its institutions is not inherently less democratic than that of the US political institutions. I also find, however, that a democratic deficit may exist owing to a lack of transparency and an excess of delegation in the legislative process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between territorial representation and fiscal redistribution in the European Union. Given that small states are vastly overrepresented in both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, models of legislative vote-buying predict that overrepresented member states will be systematically favored in the distribution of EU fiscal transfers. Empirical analysis of each manifestation of the EC or EU from 1977 to 1999 reveals a strong linear relationship between votes and transfers per capita during each period. This is true for both agricultural and regional development transfers as well as total net transfers. The paper concludes by reflecting on the importance of the connection between representation and redistribution as the European Union prepares to enlarge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) is increasingly relying on regional policy networks to govern climate change outside its borders, both in the areas of climate change adaptation and mitigation. Although the functioning of such policy networks has consequences for climate policy in participating countries, little is known about the role of such networks. This article focuses on the example of climate cooperation with the European Neighbourhood Policy region, conceptualizing the EU as a network manager. Using a novel dataset on climate networks in the European Neighbourhood Policy region for the period 2013–2017, we show that the EU uses climate networks for multiple purposes. The results suggest that the EU uses climate networks not only to mitigate the risks associated with climate change, but also to manage varying contexts in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National identification strength is a key Euroscepticism driver. We examine how politicians' framing of immigration policies increases the salience of different national identity representations and its relationship with support for the European Union (EU) in a two-waves between-subject survey-experiment using French and German samples. As predicted, exposure to assimilation frames (directly for the French sample or via frame perception for both samples) increased the salience of ethnocultural national identity representations. Additionally, as hypothesised, higher ethnocultural representations salience following assimilation frames exposure was related to higher Euroscepticism. However, feeling emotionally attached to the EU reduced this negative impact of ethnocultural national identity representations on EU attitudes. We discuss the role of ethnocultural nationalism in Euroscepticism and the importance of fostering stronger emotional ties to the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building upon the "new" new trade theory, this article proposes that the regional business demography plays a prominent role in shaping Europeans' preferences on globalization. Specifically, I argue, regional populations of high-growth enterprises that take advantage of internationalization and export opportunities drive positive attitudes on globalization, especially among the "losers" of import competition. Regression models on cross-sectional survey data from Eurobarometer surveys covering ten waves between 2015 and 2019 supplemented by a series of macro-level covariates establish that residents in regions with higher shares of high-growth enterprises are more likely to view globalization as an opportunity. More importantly, the positive association between regional high-growth enterprise shares and support for globalization is particularly pronounced among lower-educated and lower-skilled individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies have sought to explain variation in protection recognition rates between EU member states with, however, limited explanatory power. Surprisingly, few have contemplated the role of the administration, despite it being at the centre of the process through which asylum claims are examined. We posit that recognition rates are significantly affected by administrative capacity, although the administration's action may be mitigated by political factors. Our findings show that administrative effectiveness and experience in asylum matters yield higher recognition rates. We show that government preferences and the overall political context affect protection recognition, too. Importantly, we also find that the mechanisms at play are different if we consider the different forms of protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the policy consequences of constitutional differentiation in core state powers? We argue that the most important consequence is not necessarily the exclusion of the constitutional outs from the policies of the ins, but their reintegration by different means. The outs often have strong functional and political incentives to re-join the policies they opted out from, and the ins have good reasons to help them back in. We develop a theoretical framework that derives the incentives for reintegration from the costs of a policy exclusion. We use a novel dataset of reintegration opportunities to map trends and patterns of reintegration across policy fields and member states. We analyze selected cases of reintegration to probe the plausibility of our theoretical argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This forum article analyzes differentiation among states in the European Union and among regions within states as a single phenomenon, an arrangement in which one or more constituent units opt out of a common policy. By examining differentiation in a variety of contexts, we seek to shed light on its basic features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the extent to which European Union (EU) directives allow for variation in domestic implementation. Such flexibility in implementation may be used to deal with heterogeneity among member states. Based on an original dataset of 164 directives adopted between 2006 and 2015, we find that the use of flexibility is associated more with efforts to accommodate differences between national policies (substantive use of discretion) than with attempts to facilitate the decision-making process in and between EU legislative institutions (strategic use of discretion). Although flexibility may be used to address some of the same concerns that drive differentiated integration (DI), the situations in which each is most likely to be used are distinct because they approach the divergences between member states differently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Noncompliance and differentiated integration are two strategies to cope with heterogeneity between European Union member states. This article explores the relationship between the two strategies of coping with heterogeneity. We start from the observation that research has linked cross-country variation in differentiated integration and noncompliance to similar root causes—diverging preferences and differential capacity. Addressing the same issues of heterogeneity, we hypothesize that differentiated integration is likely to reduce member states' noncompliance. In order to test this hypothesis, we combine novel data on differentiated integration and noncompliance. We find that differentiation increases rather than reduces the likelihood of noncompliance. We conclude by discussing why differentiated integration does not serve as a strategy to prevent noncompliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) is the start of a new relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU). As the consequences of Brexit unfold, there will be pressure to change the TCA, either in a "softer" or "harder" direction. To determine the potential medium-term direction of the EU–UK relationship, we conducted a conjoint survey experiment with a sample of British voters, where we asked them to choose between different hypothetical package deals. When faced with such choices, British citizens overall mostly support a softer relationship in which the UK applies EU regulatory standards in return for greater access to the single market. However, Leave voters most often support a much harder trade-off of full regulatory sovereignty but continued restrictions on UK exports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article maps and investigates public support for different types of differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union. We examine citizens' preferences for DI using novel survey data from eight EU member states. The data reveals substantive differences in support for different types of DI. Factor analyses reveal two dimensions that seem to structure citizens' evaluations of DI. The first dimension relates to the effect of DI on the European integration project, the second concerns the safeguarding of national autonomy. Citizens' attitudes on this second dimension vary substantively across countries. General EU support is the most important correlate of DI support, correlating positively with the first and negatively with the second dimension. Our results underline that while citizens generally care about the fairness of DI, balancing out their different concerns can be a challenging political task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union (EU) has focused on the causes, conditions, and patterns of differentiation in European integration. By contrast, we know less about its effects on institutional outcomes and public support; moreover, alternatives to de jure DI in providing flexibility are still rarely accounted for. This introduction to the special issue takes stock of, and discusses omissions, in the current literature on DI. We propose an analytical framework, centering on efficiency and legitimacy, to study the effects of different types of DI. We use this framework to motivate the choice and assess the contributions of the articles selected for this special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does differentiated integration undermine the motivation of parliamentarians from less integrated member states to become involved in European Union affairs? Focusing on the European Union's new interparliamentary conferences in economic governance, and justice and home affairs, this study examines whether voluntary and involuntary as well as comprehensive and partial differentiation influence parliamentary involvement, measured as participation in interparliamentary conferences. Based on new data and Coarsened Exact Matching, the results indicate that the effect of differentiation depends on its political origins and design. Only voluntary and comprehensive differentiation depress parliamentary involvement. The results can be seen as favourable regarding the legitimacy of differentiation and compatible with the European Union's ambition to limit the institutional implications of differentiation. They also indicate a targeted parliamentary response to differentiated integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What characterizes European Union soft law and what are its implications for the EU multilevel system? What is the proportion of hard and soft law in EU policy? Which types of soft law act are adopted in different policy sectors? This article introduces the conceptual and analytical framework that encompasses the EfSoLaw dataset and explains its methodology, advantages, and limitations. This dataset unites information on thousands of EU hard and soft law acts from seven different policy sectors, drawn from over fifteen years (2004–2019) and from various sources (EUR-Lex, DGs, agencies). We present implementation options of the dataset making it exploitable for other scholars and we propose hypotheses to explain the variation in the adoption of soft law in different policy sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are two main categories of counterterrorism policies: proactive and defensive measures. Proactive policies directly target terrorists and, by weakening their ability, share public good features. Defensive measures, on the other hand, seek to protect a potential target. Unilateral defensive measures may induce terrorists to replace one target with another, possibly a foreign one, as confirmed by the succession of terrorist attacks in the European Union over the last 20 years. We analyse different institutional frameworks to determine the best one for interstate cooperation considering the externationalites of various counterterrorism measures. This article highlights the combined effect of voter propensity towards defensive policies, certain intelligence policies and different institutional scenarios on the (in)efficient strategic choice of counterterrorism defensive policies in democratic countries, where efficiency means maximising the joint welfare of countries. We consider four different institutional scenarios: decentralisation, intelligence cooperation, unanimous political cooperation and full political union. We model these situations as a three-stage signalling game and show that, surprisingly, intelligence cooperation increases the probability of efficient defensive policies more than unanimous political cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To mitigate the enormous and asymmetric economic implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU has adopted an unprecedented €750 billion fiscal transfer programme, financed by joint member state liabilities. The highly contested decision pitted 'frugal' northern member states against 'profligate' southern member states. However, do citizens from northern countries view EU transfers as unfavourably as their governmental positions suggest? This article focuses on the crucial case of the Netherlands, whose government has become the assertive leader of the 'frugal' coalition. We test COVID-19 specific explanations based on a large-scale survey conducted at the height of the pandemic. Our analysis suggests that citizens who experience the non-material health and social effects of the pandemic more directly are more supportive of fiscal transfers than those to whom the pandemic is more abstract, whereas those who experience negative financial effects and those who believe that COVID-19 is a conspiracy are less supportive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the effect of economic assessments on attitudes towards the European Union. The literature has mostly studied this question with observational data (which does not allow to establish a causal link), and has not explored how different countries's experiences during economic hardship shape opinions about the European Union. To account for this, I run a survey vignette experiment in Germany – a creditor countries's during the Great Recession – and Spain – a debtor country. I find that having worse perceptions about the impact of the crisis erodes attitudes towards the European Union. The mechanism is, however, different across countries. In Germany, worse economic evaluations reduce the perception that the European Union is a beneficial project. Conversely, in Spain, negative assessments about the financial crisis are linked to beliefs that democratic representation is limited in the European Union. These results are relevant to understand the conditions and mechanisms by which attitudes towards the European Union are worsened. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One key question in the study of the European Union has always been the extent of Commission discretion. We take the discretion index, typically used by principal–agent scholars to measure the Commission's designed discretion, to measure its actual discretion. Commission designed discretion can today be computationally generated with sufficient accuracy across all secondary acts. The study of designed discretion thus reaches considerable maturity. Therefore, we argue that scholars should prioritize studying Commission actual discretion. We present a systematic and transparent investigative technique based on the discretion index, which we use as a roadmap to guide our empirical investigation. The index facilitates the accumulation of knowledge across policy areas and time by providing exact values for Commission discretion. We illustrate our approach with the Development Cooperation Instrument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We ask whether and why European political parties receive election news coverage abroad and investigate this phenomenon by combining theoretical stipulations regarding the politicisation of European integration and the horizontal Europeanisation of national public spheres. Based on a content analysis of 64 newspapers in 16 European Union countries following the 2019 European Parliament election, we argue that contestation over European integration increases the likelihood that foreign journalists report election results from a particular member state. Eurosceptic parties are more often visible abroad than Europhile parties, unless they stood for election in a highly polarised party system. Our results have important implications for the European Union's legitimacy as contestation over European integration increases the chances for citizens to learn about election results in other European countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quantitative text analysis constitutes a promising new method that allows for measuring the policy positions and the lobbying success of interest groups by analyzing their submissions to legislative consultations (Klüver, 2009). The use of quantitative text analysis allowed me to present a novel and unique research design which was the largest in scope at the time and resulted in important new insights regarding the determinants of lobbying success (Klüver, 2009, 2011, 2013). In their recent article, Bunea and Ibenskas (2015) however question the usefulness of quantitative text analysis for studying interest groups and discuss several issues which in their view constitute important disadvantages of the technique. In this article I carefully discuss each of their arguments and show that none of their objections actually prevents scholars from successfully using quantitative text analysis to study interest groups in the European Union and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the logic of standard veto bargaining models with complete information, bargaining in the European Union should never reach the second reading of the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision). Even so, non-agreement at the first reading occurs frequently in European Union decision making. How can this be explained? Drawing upon game theory on bargaining with incomplete information, two specific predictions with regard to the occurrence of first-reading non-agreements can be generated. First-reading agreements are less likely to occur (1) the greater the distance between the ideal point of the Council and the ideal point of the European Parliament and (2) the greater the salience attached to the proposal. This article combines positional and proposal-specific data and finds robust support for both hypotheses in two different empirical tests. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Informal trilogue meetings are the main legislative bargaining forum in the European Union, yet their dynamics remain largely understudied in a quantitative context. This article builds on the assumption that the negotiating delegations of the European Parliament and the Council play a two-level game whereby these actors can use their intra-institutional constraint to extract inter-institutional bargaining success. Negotiators can credibly claim that their hands are tied if the members of their parent institutions hold similar preferences and do not accept alternative proposals or if their institution is divided and negotiators need to defend a fragile compromise. Employing a measure of document similarity (minimum edit distance) between an institution's negotiation mandate and the trilogue outcome to measure bargaining success, the analysis supports the hypothesis for the European Parliament, but not for the Council. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic proved the latest stress test for the European Union, after Brexit, the Eurozone crisis and the large influx of refugees. This highly relevant and well-timed special issue examines how past crises have left an imprint on the opinions and behaviour of ordinary citizens and political elites regarding the European Union. This Forum article reviews the special issue contributions by spelling out which lessons we can learn from each of them and which paths for future research they have opened up. In terms of a path forward, I argue that scholars ought to pay more attention to (a) the role of political elites, (b) political opportunity structures, and (c) heterogeneity both between and within member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of the unexpectedly high turnout in the 2019 European Parliament election, we explore how major transnational policy issues mobilize voters in European electoral contests. Based on the analysis of two data sets, the Eurobarometer post-election survey and the RECONNECT panel survey, we make three important observations. First, European citizens show a higher tendency to participate in European Parliament elections when they attribute greater importance to the issues 'climate change and environment', 'economy and growth', and 'immigration'. Second, having a more extreme opinion on the issue of 'European integration' increases people's likelihood to vote in European elections. Third, the mobilizing effect of personal issue importance is enhanced by the systemic salience that the respective policy issue has during the election campaign. These findings show the relevance of issue mobilization in European Parliament elections as well as its context-dependent nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leader evaluations are a crucial aspect in representative democracy. We analyse the patterns, antecedents and consequences of European Union leader evaluations against the backdrop of the 2019 European Parliament elections in ten countries. The article shows, firstly, that leader evaluations are unidimensional, both among voters with low and high knowledge as well as partisans and non-partisans. Secondly, among the antecedents of leader evaluations, European Union trust and performance evaluations are positively associated with leader evaluations, while European identity hardly plays a role compared to other factors. Lastly, the positive effect of leader evaluations on vote choice is conditional upon the individual leader and their party affiliation. Our results have important implications for expectations towards and evaluations of European Union leadership in the long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates whether public preferences for European solidarity are associated with vote choices in the 2019 European elections. After multiple crises, the politicisation of European Union affairs has increased, polarising voters and parties between those favouring the redistribution of risks across member states and those prioritising national responsibility in coping with the consequences of the crises. We expect pro-solidarity voters to be more prone to vote for green and radical-left parties and less prone to vote for conservative and radical-right parties. Testing these hypotheses in 10 European Union countries with original survey data, we find that green and radical-left parties profited from European solidarity voting only in some countries, while being pro-solidarity reduced the likelihood of voting for both moderate and radical-right parties in each sample country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]