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This paper makes three major arguments: 1) US policy inconsistencies during the Iraq containment era alienated key European allies; 2) the allies really wanted the same outcome as the US in Iraq; and 3) the allies supported the US role as leader of the international system, but they envisioned a cooperative leader, not the unilateral actions of the Clinton and Bush (Jr) administrations. Thus, US policy inconsistencies are partially responsible for the lack of allied support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Three time periods are examined: the Gulf War (1990-91), the Clinton-led coalition that continued against Iraq under UN sanctions-prior to the invasion to oust Saddam Hussein (1991-2002), and events during the Bush administration which led to the 2003 takeover of Iraq. The paper concludes with lessons learned and implications for future of US-European relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transformation of transatlantic security relations after 9/11 remains the subject of extensive scrutiny. Academics and practitioners alike continue to seek an explanation for the stark divergences in national security policies that transpired in the period between 2001 and 2003. This paper argues that the existence of national strategic cultures in shaping states security policies and perspectives towards the use of force in particular is crucial to any comprehensive understanding of recent developments in transatlantic security. Furthermore, only when the perspectives of states from Central and Eastern Europe are brought more centrally into analysis can a clearer prognosis of the longer term consequences for both transatlantic security and Europe’s own ambitions to become a secruity actor be reached. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]