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Recently the Chinese government has been actively collaborating with nonprofit nongovernmental organizations to provide social welfare services to older adults at the community level. The role played by NGOs in facilitating governance has only recently gained attention in the literature on Chinese NGOs and urban governance. Addressing this gap, the paper advances geographers' understanding of State–NGO collaborations in facilitating urban governance in the Chinese context using fieldwork in Beijing and Shanghai on the provision of community eldercare services as an example. It also explains the political control of these NGOs and their changing role in the eldercare market. We argue that collaborations between the state and NGOs in China have gradually transferred eldercare services to the NGOs, and led to a fragmented welfare system, which, as a consequence, has facilitated entrepreneurial urban governance. The paper sheds light on community-based organizations, their collaboration with local governments, and how they have become not only welfare providers but a significant site for social control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developing artificial intelligence (AI) is a priority on China’s state agenda, yet the constitutive state roles in AI development are understudied. Against the background of the coexistence of authoritarianism and market liberalism in the governance of the Chinese economy, state rescaling is a useful lens to understand how China is developing this new strategic sector. This paper proposes an analytical framework reifying vertical and horizontal scalar relations via the rescaling lens and three state roles (owner, promoter, and supervisor) to explore how government-business relationships are made. More than 100 Chinese AI policy documents have been collected from central, provincial, and city levels for a systematic multi-scalar policy analysis. As a result, this paper captures both downscaling/upscaling within the state hierarchy and statization/destatization between state and non-state actors in China’s AI development. A series of intertwined state rescaling practices manifest themselves in the state roles figuring in three functionalities of government-business relationships (sponsorship, cultivation, and disciplining). It is argued that the state roles are not pre-given modalities in a setting of a specific industry. The restructuring and even revolutionizing effects of AI in the socio-economic systems prompt non-state actors to respond proactively, which shapes the variegated functionalities of government-business relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about a package of infrastructure investment, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This paper uses a range of theoretical perspectives (buttressed by historical and contemporary evidence) to think about the likely impact of CPEC on economic (especially industrial) growth in Pakistan. The theory includes crowding in of private by public investment, social savings, spillovers and the leading sector, and industrial policy. Theory points to some likely growth promoting effects of CPEC, on corporate logistics, shorter transport routes to China, and greater local production of cement. The impact of CPEC is unlikely to be transformative. There is little evidence that CPEC has improved corporate logistics in Pakistan. CPEC may reduce physical distances for overland trade with China but trade is likely to remain seaborne. CPEC construction activity has generated positive spillovers in local construction employment and cement production but no spillovers in either bitumen or steel production. Pakistan lacks a capable state and commitment to an industrial policy that historically have proved important in leveraging transport infrastructure into domestic industrialisation. The most important reason is that Pakistan is a middle-income country and CPEC is too small to create more than modest economic growth benefits for Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the mid-2000s, the Russian Far East (RFE) has seen a revival of agriculture accompanied by rapid agrarian transformation that has taken a unique form because of the area's proximity to China. However, the existing literature either does not recognize Chinese presence or only studies it in terms of capitalist relationships transplanted directly from China and isolated from local realities. This paper seeks to remedy this oversight by exploring the influence of the multifaceted Chinese presence on RFE agriculture. We use the concept of social topology to demonstrate how different forms of economic life have not evolved as "Russian" or "Chinese," but instead present a bundle of capitalist and non-capitalist relationships that are continuously changing and rewriting themselves. We also explain the observed effect of China's simultaneous presence and absence in RFE's agriculture: Chinese agricultural practices are tightly embedded in local social networks and are loosely tethered to local infrastructure, but the Chinese presence also manifests in perceptions and imaginaries that influence and determine the strategies of the Russian state, agroholdings, and Russian farmers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to unfold, the approach of the Chinese government remains under the spotlight, obscuring the complex landscape of responses to the outbreak within the country. Drawing upon the author's social media experiences as well as textual analysis of a wide range of sources, this paper explores how the Chinese public responded to the outbreak in complex and nuanced ways through social media. The findings challenge conventional views of Chinese social media as simply sites of self-censorship and surveillance. On the contrary, during the COVID-19 outbreak, social media became spaces of active public engagement, in which Chinese citizens expressed care and solidarity, engaged in claim-making and resistance, and negotiated with authorities. This paper situates this public engagement within a broader context of China's health-care reforms, calling attention to persistent structural and political issues, as well as the precarious positionalities of health-care workers within the health system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's borderlands have received increased investment and policy attention since Beijing formally launched the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. This special issue, comprised of four research articles and a photo essay, is designed to provide a timely intervention into the growing literature seeking to situate and assess this important policy campaign. Drawing on extended ethnographic fieldwork in China's southwestern, northwestern, and northern borderlands, the contributing authors analyze recent borderland transformations against the backdrop of the BRI. However, by shifting the analytical focus to prioritize voices and events in borderlands, the papers de-center Beijing-centric discourse on the BRI, and provide urgent reminders of region-specific geographies and histories. Taken together, the papers underscore the persistent social complexity of borderland situations, revealing intricate processes of resistance, adaptation, and muddling through, while highlighting continuities and ruptures associated with the present moment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is often conceptualized as an element of geoeconomics, whereby states wield economic influence, build alliances, and shape the global political and economic landscape in their favor. Southeast Asia is no stranger to such tussles because of its strategic location in the middle of major trade routes. In recent years, China has emerged as a prominent player in the region, apparently upending the hitherto stable environment. This paper explores Chinese FDI entering Southeast Asia, comparing it to three more mature investors: Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The similarities and differences between these four providers are illustrated through an analysis of their FDI patterns over the last 10–20 years. Two interrelated arguments are posited. Firstly, Chinese FDI is considerably “smaller” than popular rhetoric suggests. Secondly, Chinese FDI entering the region focuses mainly on tertiary industries such as real estate and general business services, unlike the manufacturing-heavy nature of Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese FDI. Because of the rather distinct characteristics of these four FDI sources, it can be inferred that there has been relatively little direct competition between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper elucidates how the geography of interprovincial migration in China has evolved with the country’s structural changes over the past 35 years and explores how this geography has developed in the past decade. In synthesizing existing literature, we demonstrate that the coast-inland migration discrepancy emerged in the late 1980s when migration control was relaxed and a coastal development strategy was adopted, reinforced in the 1990s when globalization, marketization, and decentralization unfolded and interprovincial economic disparities increased, and stabilized in the 2000s when the growth of interprovincial economic disparities came to a halt with the country’s shift to a coordinated regional development strategy. Using 2020 Census data, the geography is revealed to have become less skewed between 2010 and 2020, driven primarily by two groups of provinces. One group includes five southeast coastal provinces and two coastal municipalities; the other includes nine southern inland provinces. The southern inland-coast migration flows, which had been growing prior to 2010, have decreased between 2010 and 2020, whereas counterflows have increased greatly. These emerging trends can be attributed to several significant transformations in China’s demography and economic landscape, including the aging of a large number of first-generation migrants, a declining workforce, the relocation of manufacturing industries, and people’s increasing emphasis on public services, the access to which are often tied to the hukou place. Interprovincial migration in China has reached a turning point in terms of geographic changes. The policies on this migration and the geographical framework for analyzing it may need updating. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) intersect and overlap in Central Asia at the heart of Eurasia. Whereas the literature has commonly focused on the economic aspects of these major regional policy initiatives, efforts to create a common Eurasian higher education space through these regionalisms have barely been studied. In response, this paper compares the development of Russian and Chinese led visions for Eurasian higher education regionalism in Central Asia and the extent to which these constructions overlap. The paper also sheds lights on the perspectives of Central Asian states by investigating how these countries are approaching these efforts to construct a Eurasian higher education region. The conceptual framework brings together higher education regionalism with overlapping regionalism and takes a policy-oriented methodological approach. The paper introduces the new term of "points of correspondence" based on language used in both Russian and Chinese policy discourse to explain how constructions of a Eurasian higher education region can overlap without duplicating or flowing into each other. "Points of correspondence" emphasizes neither competition nor collaboration but rather the ongoing pursuit to find ideas and policy tools that best fit one another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to reconstruct the "Asian" dimension of Russian national identity discourse by using relations with China as a case study. It analyses the foreign policy debate before and after the 2014 Ukrainian crisis (2010–2016) by focusing on the emerging concept of "pivot to the East." Based on a discourse analysis of official documents, elites' speeches, and think-tank views, this paper inductively recovers the identity discourse, structured around linking/differentiation and such themes as the relative perception of China's threat. This research shows that the identity structure put several limitations in the way of engagement with China. These interlinked structures made it extremely difficult for the more intense economic turn toward China, which eventually occurred only when the relationship with the West (as the significant Other in Russian identity) broke down after the 2014 crisis. By comparing the identity structure and policies before and after the crisis of 2014 and following the poststructuralist notion of mutually constitutive relations between identity and foreign policy, this paper argues that policy changes after 2014 affected the gradual changes in identity narratives. However, there was not enough time and pressure to change the deeper layer of the core identity discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that "the urban" has emerged as the most significant ideological realm in contemporary China. In developing this argument, I suggest an alternative approach to how we theorize urbanization in China. Seeking to avoid the dichotomized analyses that often characterize scholarship on China's urbanization, the paper suggests reading "the urban" as an ideological device. Such a reading calls for an analytical distinction between the city as a technology of socialist party-state planning and government and urbanization as a messy social process over which the state struggles for control. It also calls for a recognition of the ways that ideology itself has shifted dramatically in China, from the Mao-era centrality and coherence of class struggle and its overriding goal of proletarianization to a much less coherent post-reform message of "stability". The paper begins with a brief discussion of ideology and Gramsci's notion of "common sense" in a Chinese register. It then considers the film 24 City, directed by Jia Zhangke, as a template for understanding urban spaces as sites of conflict between the city as an ideological device and urbanization as a social process. New urban spaces are then explored in an effort to tease out their complex and contradictory ideological renderings. I conclude with an argument about the openness and contradictions of China's urban spaces and how an ideological analysis can resist the kind of theoretical closure that much work on urbanization in China seems to aim for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a review of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) nuclear warfare and uranium mining programs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Its scope spans from the PRC's first nuclear weapon test in Lop Nor, to contemporary issues surrounding in-situ leach uranium mining in the Yili basin, which now provides a third of PRC's uranium. By exploring these scenarios, a lens can be placed on the parameters and limitations to Uyghur life within a nuclear state. This paper draws on the work of Achille Mbembe's necropolitics, whereby power is persistently exercised as violence, to consider the entangled aftermath of nuclear imperialism and its effects to Uyghur bodies, environment and culture. While racialized nuclear imperialism presented Uyghur lives as inconsequential to progress in Xinjiang, post-Cold War necropolitics presents Uyghur culture as a direct threat to the progress and values of the PRC sovereign state. This paper proposes that the ongoing exploitation of nuclear Xinjiang provides an additional motivation for state-imposed necropolitical sanctions upon Uyghur people. This paper also presents a new theoretical contribution, the "nuclear imperialism-necropolitics nexus", which offers a way to consider the entangled legacies of spaces of nuclear activity, from nuclear imperialism to the post-Cold War world. Abbreviations: People's Republic of China (PRC); Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR); Global War on Terror (GWOT). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Investigating a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project in Myanmar, this paper contests the proposition that China's state-coordinated investments are, by nature, more accommodating to local people's demands than Western investments. Tension between Myanmar villagers and the Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) in a copper mine project does not square with Beijing's "inclusive globalization" narrative. Drawing upon extensive semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in a Sino-Myanmar copper mine project, as well as other secondary data, this study finds that the Chinese SOE's operation was reactive to the ebb and flow of social resistance and the government's pressure amid the host country's democratization in the 2010s. Reforms were more likely to occur when the Chinese SOE observed more domestic constraints in its operation environment. It showed less incentive to improve its business practices when societal actors failed to display strong resistance, and the host government did not care about its legitimacy. Despite Beijing's efforts to craft an image of itself as a responsible power, conflicts in the BRI project should not be simplified as the SOE's defiance of the state's regulations. They are rooted in the state-centric foreign policy that systematically overlooks societal actors in state-coordinated investments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Authoritarian leaders rely on regional leaders for both political support and the fulfillment of their policy objectives. In addition, top leaders face trade-offs between following established rules for managing bureaucratic officials' careers and exercising a free hand in choosing regional officials. This paper compares patterns of appointment of regional officials in Russia and China before and after 2012. In recent years, the leaders of both countries have centralized and personalized state power. We hypothesize that these changes have altered policies for managing the appointments of regional leaders in such a way as to increase their dependence on the central authorities and reduce their autonomy to create their own networks at the regional level. We analyze a comprehensive original set of biographical data on all top regional officials from 2003 through 2019 in China and from 2000 through 2019 in Russia. We discern clear differences between the pre- and post-2012 period for China and less marked differences for pre- and post-2012 Russia. Turnover of regional officials has become more frequent in both systems; average tenure in office has fallen; and the share of "outsiders" has risen. However, the corps of regional officials has not been rejuvenated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Covid-19 pandemic started in Wuhan in December 2019 and then spread to the rest of China and the world. This paper examines the relationship between inter-provincial migration and the diffusion of covid-19 outbreak in Mainland China from 26 January to 6 March 2020. Statistical analysis shows that the migrants who moved into Hubei in 2010–2015 are a good indicator of the population flow from Hubei to other provinces that caused the spread of covid-19 in early 2020. Many migrants traveled back to hometown before the traffic ban of Wuhan city for the spring holiday. Thus, the migration flow from a province to Hubei in the period 2010–2015 had the highest correlation coefficient with the number of covid-19 cases in four selected dates. The population flow based on the big data from the Baidu map on 20 January 2020 was also highly correlated with the number of cases, but not as good as the above migration data. The finding demonstrates the role of established migrant networks in the spread of covid-19. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of financing the Belt and Road Initiative sharpens the broader debates about the intentions behind and implications of the initiative, in particular, whether it represents an alternative to or within globalization (global capitalism) and the broader global order as currently constituted. This paper addresses this by examining the institutions, actors, mechanisms, and nature of the (proposed) financing of Belt and Road projects. It argues that however Chinese rhetoric on the BRI is read, looking at the financing demonstrates the structural power of the existing institutions, structures, and mechanisms of global political economy, and this will constrain Chinese ambitions to base an alternative world order on the foundations of the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To contribute to the debate on the importance of state vis-à-vis inter-firm competition in regional development, this paper examines a representative dataset of the relocation of manufacturing firms in Guangdong province of China with multinomial logistic regression models. To improve the competitiveness of manufacturing in the Pearl River Delta, the Guangdong government implemented pro-active policies to encourage the relocation of existing manufacturing firms to their designated industrial parks during the 2000s. Although the initial results appear to support the usefulness of relocation policy, further examination reveals its effectiveness depends on the industrial sector and profiles of the relocated firms. In fact, the relocation of large-scale labor-intensive firms is not driven by local government initiatives. The physical proximity of high-technology parks to airports/ports has a bigger impact on the relocation of small-scale locally-funded high-technology firms into designated parks. In the case of locally-funded firms in polluting sectors, they are expanding rather than relocating to designated industrial parks. The empirical evidence indicates the non-binary nature of the industrial relocation policy. The nuances of relocation policy and its multi-scalar effects on relocated firms rejects any simplistic generalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the question of extended urbanization by arguing for the need to overcome dualistic views to properly address the political specificities of urbanization in China. To this end, this paper understands state-territorial relations as a process of étatization by drawing on the particular literature on the role of the party-state in urbanization. Through a brief history of Guangdong, it elaborates on the political modalities of territorialization through China's administrative rank system. This has enabled the party-state to mediate the production of urban space. From this, I arrive at the concept of "territorially-nested urbanization", moving beyond limited accounts of hierarchical state powers in Chinese urban studies. Next, from a short periodization of Dongguan's urbanization, the paper exemplifies how a particular mode of territorialization has evolved into tense relationships between the city and towns in the ongoing dilemma of multi-centered versus concentrated direction of urbanization. Based on insights from in-depth fieldwork, the last part of this paper illustrates the contradictory mobilization of village collectives within extended state power through local government, and the development of villagers' politics and activism in contested land transformations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The construction of the high-speed railway (HSR) system in China has improved cities' interconnectedness. We contend that the improved interconnectedness will likely strengthen economic interaction among cities, particularly cross-border trade integration. Employing a spatial panel fixed effect error model with prefecture-level city data from 2008 to 2013, this paper evaluates how cities' proximity to the HSR system affects urban market integration in China. We find that cities' proximity to the HSR system exerts a positive influence on reducing market segmentation, ceteris paribus. This study for the first time assesses the impacts of cities' proximity to HSR on inter-city market integration in China. The study will facilitate proactive regional policy decisions related to the future development of HSR and other critical infrastructure investment and development. Results obtained from the study could be of broader impact on policies of marketization reform and development for Eurasian countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the fall of the USSR, Sino-Russian relations have evolved along a paradoxical dichotomy of friendship and mistrust. Experts have widely discussed this phenomenon, but little attention has been paid to historical narratives. Border regions of the Russian Far East are places where memories of a conflicting Imperial past coexist with more recently developed friendly narratives of cooperation and "bon voisinage". Exhibitions in history museums are interesting objects of study in this context. They selectively display historical contents to visitors and convey a political interpretation of the past. This paper explores the significance of the representations of history in Russian border museums, and that of the Nerchinsk Treaty, within the framework of contemporary Sino-Russian relations. This analysis reveals contradictory elements related to the historical narratives of the history museums of Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Chita and Nerchinsk. On the one hand, it detects a desire to portray a history in a way that expunges elements of contestation and smooths over highly controversial facts. On the other hand, national discourses cannot completely renounce particularistic narratives or obliterate elements of pride considered to be founding elements of Russia's past. The persistence of tensions triggered by the interpretation of history is then revealed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children - including those of migrants - are China's future. Children of migrants now make up close to 40% of all children in China. This paper analyzes the recent trends from 2000 to 2016 and the major aspects of the children of migrants by distilling data from multiple large national surveys and assessing the very small rural left-behind children (LBC) population figures published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 2016. The paper also develops a method to estimate the LBC population generated by migrants in each provincial destination between 2010 and 2015, linking up different but related populations (adult migrants, migrant children, and LBC) in the origins and destinations. This broader "origin-destination" framework allows us to pinpoint clearly a major driver of LBC and hence to identify provinces needing the most attention in national and provincial efforts to alleviate the problem of LBC. Abbreviations: MC: Migrant Children; LBC: Left-Behind Children; MPR: Migration Participation Rate: LBCG: Left-Behind Children Generated [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops new ontological and epistemological terrain to advance critical understanding of migrants’ everyday lives in urban china. More specifically, we highlight the opportunities afforded by pluralist relational theoretical and comparative empirical interrogation of emotions across diverse work, domestic, family and leisure times/spaces both within and, beyond cities. To that end, we apply a counter-topographical approach to a kaleidoscope of imaginative, implosive, and mutual emotions as competences and resources that constitute past, present, and future lives of female building-workers. Concluding, we signpost fruitful avenues for ongoing migration research in China, as well as reflecting on broader opportunities and challenges when exploring the complex emotional lives of urbanites no matter where in the world studies are undertaken. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has long positioned itself as the ancient civilization of the Far East, which only makes geographical sense through the lens of the West. The literature on China resonates with this geographic illustration, about which, critical scholars have cautioned against the imperial hegemony of Eurocentric knowledge. In this paper, we attempt to answer the call for a Global East through the situated agency of the others in the geopolitics of knowledge circulation. The circulation of knowledge foregrounds transnational flows in a multifaceted and multidirectional process, and mimicry calls for attention to political/soft subversions beneath the camouflaged behavior of coping. By investigating scholarship on the particular topic of shanzhai, we probe into two layers of knowledge production: how the variegated scholarly citation behaviors reflect the situated agency that bears the effects of asymmetric power relations formed through multiple flows of people, idea and capital, but nonetheless demonstrates an endeavor of autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent 2017–18 "dash for gas" captured global attention, but also exposed critical failings in China's gas market. The 2019 lull imposed by the Government reflects the need to address local challenges. This paper analyzes the prospects for demand growth and assesses the various ways in which that demand can be met. There is considerable uncertainty surrounding demand growth, with cost competitiveness being the determining factor. Equally, although China has significant natural gas reserves, they are largely unconventional and present significant geological and technical challenges; with domestic production growth failing to keep pace as demand import dependence increases. China's gas imports are met by pipeline gas from Central Asia and Myanmar and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) from avariety of countries. The Power of Siberia pipeline started deliveries of Russian in late 2019. However, plans to expand Central Asian imports have disappointed and China may agree to asecond pipeline from Russia or increase its LNG imports. Asimple "gas balance model" is used in the final discussion and conclusions to explore future developments and their consequences for global gas security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previously articulated within several regional multilateral frameworks, the "China-Laos Railway" eventually turned into a flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Started in 2016 and planned to be completed in late 2021, this project will provide Laos with unprecedented railway infrastructure, linking its capital Vientiane with China through the northern border town of Boten. This paper critically scrutinizes the underlying geo-economic win-win rhetoric of coupling China's regional BRI ambitions with Laos' national vision of transforming into a land-linked country. Understanding the newest BRI labeling of infrastructural connectivity against the backdrop of Laos' and the region's longer-lasting neoliberal developmental trajectory, I examine the financial mechanism of the railway project and the different temporal and spatial scales of Laos' and China's calculation of potential benefits. These are juxtaposed with the empirical reality of already visible dynamics and impacts of Chinese investment alongside the railway. Together, they tend to paint a future of Chinese profits at the expense of Laos' sustainable long-term development. Contributing to much-needed grounded accounts of local unfoldings of China-backed megaprojects, I pay particular attention to vernacular discourse and experience to fully understand the nature, processes and impacts of BRI financing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The energy and mineral resource base of Southeast Asia is relatively modest by international standards. Nevertheless, Chinese energy and mining companies have been investing heavily in the region over recent years, in comparison with multinational companies and state-backed companies from other Asian countries. This paper applies a framework derived from the field of business studies to analyze why the scale of China’s engagement in Southeast Asia has become so great and how the motivations vary between the different energy and resource industries. The motivations for these activities reflect a mix of corporate and state objectives. Corporate objectives include securing energy or resource supply chains, increasing or diversifying their asset base, and enhancing their profits or market share. The motivations of the government range from straightforward support of the companies for the purpose of industrial strategy and security of resource supply, to development assistance and regional strategic positioning. The different motivations of the oil and gas, hydropower, and mining industries arise from the particular character of each market, both within China and globally. Southeast Asia has the twin advantages of geographic and apparent cultural proximity to China. Nevertheless, inexperience and a desire to catch up with their international peers have resulted in companies applying low social and environmental standards in some high profile projects. The subsequent disputes, together with the current low level of resource prices, may constrain the further growth of Chinese investment in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Analyzing data of a merged sample of two Chinese student surveys conducted in two rural counties of Hunan province and in the capital city of Guangdong province, this paper examines the impact of parental migration on rural children's involvement in delinquent behaviors. We compare delinquency of non-migrant and left-behind children in the countryside, rural-to-urban migrant children, and urban local children. Both rural children left behind by one migrant parent and those left behind by both migrant parents are similar to rural children without parental migration in terms of delinquent involvement. The situation of rural-to-urban migrant children is noticeably worse, as they are more likely to engage in delinquent behaviors than rural children without parental migration. Nevertheless, rural-to-urban migrant children are not more prone to delinquency compared to their urban local peers. We also found an acculturation impact in the study because the odds of engaging in delinquent behaviors first increases and then decreases for rural-to-urban migrant children when they stay longer and learn some local language in the hosting city. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In August 2019, The Shenzhen Model City Initiative was released in which the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced its decision to support Shenzhen, the long-standing poster city for China's economic reform, in building a demonstration pilot zone for Chinese socialism with a particular emphasis on further developing the city's technological prowess. What are the ideological implications of the latest model-making of Shenzhen? And how does the city's innovative turn relate to its role as the nation's perceived civilizational front line? This study explores the continuities and evolution of contemporary Chinese governance by considering the reinvention of the "Shenzhen Model" in relation to processes of urbanization, globalization and industrial upgrading. Drawing upon Tim Oakes's theory of the "urban" as an ideological device, it examines the (re)making of the "Shenzhen Model" through different discourses, apparatuses and policies related to the city's technological innovation and entrepreneurship. Situating the "Shenzhen Model" at a time of precarity and uncertainty amidst economic growth slowdown, the China-United States trade war and the COVID-19 pandemic, this article demonstrates how the state mobilizes narratives and practices pertinent to technological innovation and entrepreneurship to enhance its political influence and thus sheds light on the latest developments in urban governance during China's post-industrial turn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented which discusses various research papers on topics including China's economic history, impacts of the World War II of China on its economy and the Chinese foreign relation.

China is moving ahead with the Silk Road Economic Belt, an ambitious infrastructure development agenda with the distinct promise of regional and sub-regional economic development. However, the initiative will create new environmental risks across the entire Eurasian continent, especially in countries with predominately poor records of environmental governance, including the former Soviet republics and Russia. Concurrently, on the domestic front, the Chinese Government has launched a new policy paradigm, “ecological civilization,” to dramatically improve environmental regulations, reduce pollution, and transform industries by adopting new green technologies and higher environmental standards. But does China’s intention to go through a “green shift” domestically resonate with these new transborder infrastructure development mega-projects? This paper will attempt to answer this question by juxtaposing China’s new domestic policy paradigm with environmental standards currently proposed in its global outreach projects focusing on China-northern Eurasia and China-Russia, including trade exchanges in natural resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's administrative division adjustments (ADAs) reallocate resources and power under a unitary centralized structure. Using national-level data for 2001–2017, this study analyzed the likelihood of ADAs of counties or county-level cities through the events of history analysis method (EHA). The results revealed that county-level local economic factors (value added by first industry, value added by second industry, fiscal revenue, and urban fixed-asset investments) and particularly national strategic factors (promotion of city-regions, frontier location, strategic initiative location) significantly predicted adjustments. The findings verified that economic factors account for ADAs. Additionally, the strategies for creating city regions are a major motive for ADAs. ADAs were performed as spatial strategies in privileged areas to realize national goals for cities, city clusters and frontiers. Governments try to accomplish national strategies and promote spatial governance capacities by territorial urbanization and rescaling administrative power, which crystallizes the practice of state spatial selectivity. However, national spatial strategies should balance efficiency with equality among regions, meaning that the logics of different ADA types differ. Our study enriches the theory of territorial urbanization and contributes to the existing literature by providing a quantitative analysis and thick descriptions of factors facilitating the reconfiguration of state space in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last two decades and particularly in the last 10 years, Chinese investment in Mongolia has skyrocketed, with the vast majority of the country’s exports now flowing to China. As foreign investment has grown in Mongolia, particularly in the mining sector, apprehension circulates about the extension and meaning of increased Chinese power. We argue that contemporary anxieties about China’s economic influence in Mongolia go beyond recent and contemporary political economic issues and are tied to memories of the Qing Dynasty. Controversies surrounding Mongolia’s flagship mine, the Oyu Tolgoi copper–gold mine in South Gobi province, demonstrate how even non-Chinese foreign mining operations are intertwined with Mongolia’s past and future relationships with China. Rather than acting simply as resource nationalists, the people and government of Mongolia often see contemporary Chinese economic power through a historical lens, with fears of declining sovereignty and becoming Chinese through control over land and resources. This paper draws on fieldwork conducted by the authors in Mongolia from 2009 to 2015 and contributes to discussions about fears of Chinese influence, extractive industry development, and resource nationalism in Mongolia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China’s influence in neighboring Central Asian states is growing at a fast pace. Since the launch of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative to accelerate China’s engagement in Central Asia and beyond, nearly all Chinese activity in this region has been gathered under OBOR. OBOR now seems to cover a plethora of spatially and temporally expanding state and privately driven projects. In this paper, I discuss large- and small-scale Chinese farm enterprises in Tajikistan, in which discussions around China’s “global land investments” and OBOR intersect. Beneath abstract conceptualizations of OBOR and the Chinese presence in Central Asia, my analysis shows that Chinese land investments in Tajikistan are shaped by Chinese dynamics of agrarian change and are contingent upon country-specific conditions. Rather than state-led endeavors as is often assumed, the main Chinese actors in Tajik agriculture are capitalist yet partially state-embedded enterprises driven by profit-oriented goals. Chinese farm enterprises tap into specific market demands that are either unanswered or underdeveloped in Tajikistan, or which have emerged due to the growing number of Chinese consumers in Tajikistan. The nature and drivers of Chinese land acquisitions in Tajikistan shed light on the various, sometimes competing, factors driving China’s broader foreign “land rush,” in Central Asia (and beyond). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the status of forest resources in Russia and on how consumption drives forest change. Topics discussed include the impact of consumption patterns to ecosystems and socioeconomic relations, the state of forest degradation in the country, and the geographic shifting of Soviet and Russian timber production and trade. It also discusses the trend of illegal logging and institutionalized corruption in the country.

In this article the author discusses aspects of China's energy future consisting oil, natural gas and nuclear power sectors. He comments on the issues related to the country's energy sector development which include the objective of energy policy, energy source endowment in relation to population size, and the locations of energy sources and consuming market. It notes that China's 6th Five Year Plan of 1981-1985 is the pillar of its energy policy.

The article explores the mechanisms which spurred the growth in the international reserves of Russia, China, and India during the 2000s. It examines the costs incurred by such countries in intervening into exchange markets to maintain exchange rate regimes as well as highlights the measures they have taken to address the 2008 global financial crisis. How each country deal with the outflows of foreign private capital and decreases in demand for imports in developed countries is discussed.

Since the Soviet breakup, rural communities in the Kazakhstan–China borderlands have faced cataclysmic social, economic, and ecological transformations. Collective and state farms have been replaced by precarious smallholder agriculture suffering from a decline in financial inputs and the deterioration of infrastructure. At the same time, dynamic transformations of border permeability (and trans-border reconnections) between Kazakhstan and China have challenged the until relatively recent widespread Soviet rhetoric on Western China (or rather Xinjiang) as an underdeveloped space across the border. This article is based on several months of fieldwork between 2019 and 2021 in Panfilov District, located at major cross-border road and railway intersections and hosting important infrastructural objects, such as a dry port, a major railway transhipment hub, and a trans-border special economic zone. The article explores how the border situation (and the border's changing permeability for people, commodities, and ideas since the early 1990s) as well as the implementation of new trans-border infrastructures eventually shaped local discourses and practices in the socio-economic development of south-east Kazakhstan's agricultural sector. It is scrutinized herein how various forms of trans-border socio-economic interactions (although heavily regulated) and China's (agri-) economic policy in Xinjiang started to affect farmers' ambitions and practices across the border. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's Opium Replacement Policy (ORP) is one of the country's earliest cross-border development interventions in the upper Mekong region. A massive state subsidy program for "alternative" development in the northern parts of Myanmar and Laos, the ORP helped finance a wave of Chinese agribusiness investments abroad since the mid-2000s, causing significant social and ecological transformation. Yet key details about the program remain opaque. In this article, we contribute to a growing literature on the rising economic power of China's "peripheral centers," borderland prefectures whose role in foreign affairs has increased significantly as the country's borders become more porous. We review state motives for establishing the ORP and use public records about the program's activities in Myanmar and Laos to interrogate the vertical politics that structure and complicate the ORP's implementation. The program's public records are characterized by a mix of transparency and opacity which we analyse to show that the ORP's increasing transparency since around 2010 has moved away from regulating impacts abroad and instead toward securing and distributing benefits for borderland business (and their interlinked political) interests in China. As borderland authorities play a growing role in China's foreign trade, we show that the vertical politics that increasingly shape the regulatory environment have allowed the ORP to proliferate in size and influence as state oversight of its activities abroad has waned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is undergoing a rapid agrarian transition from dispersed household farming to large-scale, mechanized, and commercialized agricultural production, while retaining collective rural land ownership. Reforms have encouraged transfers of rural land to new subjects of agriculture including agribusinesses, family farmers, and cooperatives, leading to capitalist dynamics in agriculture both from above and from below. Central-state pressure to scale up and modernize agriculture has led local governments to engage in creative experimentation with new institutional forms. This article investigates one such innovation, which has been widely lauded as an important model: the creation of an "agricultural co-management system" in Chongzhou City, Sichuan province, which combines land shareholding cooperatives (LSCs), the hiring of new professional farm managers for the LSCs, and state-provided agricultural services aimed at modernization. We demonstrate that the Chongzhou government's experimentation arose from political economic incentives to capitalize and modernize agriculture as well as the locally specific circumstances of the failure of a dragonhead enterprise. Examining the three components of the agricultural co-management system in depth, we argue that it has deepened rural differentiation through a process of state-led accumulation, and that the continued scaling up of LSCs in the context of a new modern agricultural functional zone threatens to further erode shareholder control. These LSCs, set within the agricultural co-management system, are a new subject of agriculture that combine elements of capitalization from above and below. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study empirically investigates the nexus between global value chain participation and geographic concentration by export destinations. We follow the recent theoretical framework of Antras and Gortari (2020) and Pflüger and Tabuchi (2019), which allows us to determine a link between global value chain participation and geographic concentration by export destinations with trade cost reduction and dispersive effect in the global value chains. Using China's firm-level data from 2000 to 2011 and a Tobit model, we find that firms with higher global value chain participation are more likely to concentrate in export destination countries. Moreover, heterogeneous firms with lower productivity are more likely to concentrate in destination countries. Firm size and type can also affect the geographic concentration by export destinations. The destination country's GDP, language, border, and distance from China also play significant roles in determining Chinese exporting firms' concentration by destination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neoliberalism’s theoretical ascendancy within urban geography coincided with the rapid growth of scholarly attention to Chinese cities. Therefore, it is unsurprising that neoliberal causality has been a widely used tool for interpreting China’s spatial transformation. This paper critically reviews some of the most prominent debates on neoliberalism in the Chinese context. China’s Leninist political hierarchy and Dual Structure, crucial institutions for the management and regulation of society and economy under Mao, are now reduced to the quirks of “actually existing neoliberalism.” Neoliberal critique applied to China, however, fails to adequately explain China’s spatial development because it assigns causality for social and economic inequality to globalized processes of capital accumulation while ignoring the continued importance of Maoist institutions in China’s present-day political economy. Uncritical acceptance of neoliberalism’s explanatory power for spatial change has led to flawed and inaccurate portrayals of the development and future trajectories of Chinese cities, and misrepresents the sources of social injustice in Chinese society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the issue of ethnic disparities in educational attainment in China with particular focus on the interethnic children in the country. Topics include interethnic children whether classified as Han or minority found to be educationally advantaged compared to their non-interethnic co-ethnics, the classification of interethnic children not making any difference in observed patterns of stratification, and observed advantage among historically advantaged groups.

China is woven into the fabric of territorial demarcation between rural and urban space, which shapes people's life chances. Grounded in the study of rural-urban and local/non-local inequalities, we explore the identity constructions of people-in-between – rural local villagers (commonly named "urban villagers") in chengzhongcun (villages-in-the-cities). Based on in-depth interviews and participant observations in Shenzhen and Guangzhou, we found stereotypes of rural local people's as ill-mannered and lazy; yet economically well-off. Women and men who considered themselves rural locals challenge the stereotype by drawing upon the gender- and class-appropriate understandings of their identities. Rural local women crafted a "model woman discourse" by emphasizing their traditional Chinese feminine traits, othering rural migrants for manipulating sex for upward mobility, and criticizing urban women for being too assertive in relation to men. Some rural local men, in contrast, created a subculture that defined their version of success; others embraced urban masculinity. In any case, the processes of identity construction often reinforce stereotypes based on rural/urban and local/non-local divide, class, and gender. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the development of a model which uses concepts of externalities to define regional dependence, political centralization and national capital in China. Topics discussed include the China's economic history, its political economy and history of political centralization. Other topics include the country's political ecology and voluntary cooperation among the Chinese region.

The article discusses the impact of the rise of the home appliance industry in Shunde, in the western Pearl River Delta (PRD), China. Topics discussed include China's industrialization and regional development by revealing the salient Shunde model, establishment of domestic market-oriented production networks and expansion of global market reach and valuable policy implications for latecomer regions in the aftermath of global financial crisis.

In this article, the author informs about variations in geographical patterns in merchandise export trade during the Cold war and after European political-economic integration along with globalization. He presents a comparative study which reveals the broadening role of Germany and China in Europe merchandise trade which is followed by decline in the significance of the U.S. and Great Britain. He demonstrates the expansion of export trade of the Netherlands to many European countries.

The article offers information about the regional wage inequality in China during 1996 to 2010 mainly as a result of technological change, educational differences and globalization. It mentions several categories of Chinese provinces including peripheral, emerging and lagging. It adds that wage inclination comprises instances from both advancing interior provinces and decline of coastal provinces.

The article focuses on a paper which explores on Han-Uyghur inequality through the comparison of Han and Uyghur migrants at Urumqi, Xinjiang in China. It says that base on a survey of 30 sites conducted in 2008, it is crucial to consider the role of self-initiated migration. It states that through the analyses of migration characteristics, findings show that Uyghur migrants do not seem disfavored compared to Han migrants. Moreover, heterogeneity of Urumqi's labor market is also investigated.

The article focuses on a paper which discusses the foundation and development of a Chinese-financed residential megaproject or the Baltic Pearl situated at the southwest part of the historical district of St. Petersburg. It says that Baltic Pearl is considered to be the biggest investment project contracted outside China by a government-sponsored Chinese consortium. It also explores the way the consortium was encouraged to accept interscalar techniques reactive to local conditions.

The steady intensification of Sino-Russian cooperation over the past few years has triggered a surge in scholarly interest. However, in light of the far-reaching geopolitical implications of the Sino-Russian rapprochement, most studies of Sino-Russian dynamics are not only conducted from the disciplinary perspective of International Relations (IR), but also continue to be embedded in realist assumptions and power-political perspectives. This special issue seeks to advance the scholarly knowledge on the Sino-Russian relationship by making the case for expanding the scope of analysis theoretically, disciplinarily and empirically. This introductory article first sets the context by providing a historical overview of key developments in Sino-Russian relations. Following an in-depth review of the IR-dominated literature, it then substantiates the claim that there is a need to broaden the scope of analysis in order to move beyond the IR realist perspective that predominates the literature on the Sino-Russian relationship. Together, the articles in the special issue add new insights to the literature by analyzing the depth of the relationship; scrutinizing Russian discourses on China, in both historical and contemporary contexts; exploring the limitations and dilemmas of the relationship; and paying specific attention to the agency of the countries "in-between", from Central Asia to Mongolia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]