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In this paper we describe learners being asked to generate examples of new mathematical concepts, thus developing and exploring example spaces. First we elaborate the theoretical background for learner generated examples (LGEs) in learning new concepts. The data we then present provides evidence of the possibility of learning new concepts through a symbiosis of induction and abduction from experience and deduction from the relationships generated in exemplification. In other words, experience can be organised in such a way that shifts of understanding take place as a result of learners’ own actions. Actions, in this context, include mental acts of organisational reflection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on the papers in this special issue as well as on our own experience and research, we try to shed light on the construct of example spaces and on how it can inform research and practice in the teaching and learning of mathematical concepts. Consistent with our way of working, we delay definition until after appropriate reader experience has been brought to the surface and several ‘examples’ have been discussed. Of special interest is the notion of accessibility of examples: an individual’s access to example spaces depends on conditions and is a valuable window on a deep, personal, situated structure. Through the notions of dimensions of possible variation and range of permissible change, we consider ways in which examples exemplify and how attention needs to be directed so as to emphasise examplehood (generality) rather than particularity of mathematical objects. The paper ends with some remarks about example spaces in mathematics education itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we examine the possibility of differentiating between two types of nonexamples. The first type, intuitive nonexamples, consists of nonexamples which are intuitively accepted as such. That is, children immediately identify them as nonexamples. The second type, non-intuitive nonexamples, consists of nonexamples that bear a significant similarity to valid examples of the concept, and consequently are more often mistakenly identified as examples. We describe and discuss these notions and present a study regarding kindergarten children’s grasp of nonexamples of triangles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]