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After World War II, Japan became a major recipient of foreign aid from the USA. As Japan's economy improved in the 1960s, it played a significant role as a global aid donor in world politics through its Official Development Assistance (ODA). This commitment continued into the 1990s when Japan, as one of the leading proponents of the concept of human security, began providing humanitarian aid to more countries across the globe. To better understand the notion of human security in international politics, this paper examines Japan's endorsement of the concept in its foreign policy strategy. This paper provides an overview and critical assessment of Japan's Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Projects (GGP) in the state of Sabah in East Malaysia from 2000 to 2021. This paper argues that different contexts and circumstances in the state of Sabah require further study, especially for understanding Japan's focus and concern in the area of basic human security needs, as enshrined in the GGP philosophy. Despite Japan's GGP objective as part of its foreign policy to promote human development, the execution of its foreign aid in Sabah does have issues. This paper concludes that the implementation of Japan's GGP necessitates greater inclusion, particularly for other vulnerable groups and underdeveloped areas in Sabah. Despite Japan's GGP objective as part of its foreign policy to promote human development, the execution of its foreign aid in Sabah does have issues. This paper concludes that the implementation of Japan's GGP necessitates greater inclusion, particularly for other vulnerable groups and underdeveloped areas in Sabah. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

2004 was the year when the Japanese public's affinity with China dropped dramatically, to 37.6 %, due to anti-Japan riots in China. Now more than 70 % of the Japanese public does not feel an affinity with China. How could such a strong anti-Chinese sentiment influence Japan's policy toward China? This paper considers this question by examining Japan's decision-making process on terminating the much-criticized yen loans to China. Yen loans are a type of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by the Japanese government to countries lacking sufficient funds for economic development. China is one of the top yen loan borrowers, and the loans have contributed to China's economic growth and increasing openness. However, in March 2005, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura told Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing that Japan intended to phase out the yen loans before the 2008 Beijing Olympics and reached an agreement on the matter. Two-and-a-half years later, Japan terminated its yen loans to China, as the foreign ministers had agreed. Through mainly firsthand documents and interviews with government officials, this paper will clarify the following two points: (1) While it is true that the Japanese government significantly reduced its yen loan package to China from 2001 onward due to domestic criticism of China, as pointed out by previous studies, it was not planning to terminate the yen loans as of summer 2004. Instead, the Japanese government was contemplating how to keep providing yen loans to China; (2) Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, who was appointed in September 2004, had pushed for the termination of yen loans to China only after anti-Chinese sentiment rose dramatically in summer 2004, because he felt that continuing the much-criticized yen loans would not benefit stable Japan-China relations. This paper sheds light on the background of the termination of yen loans to China, a major milestone in postwar Japan-China relations that had been unclear until now. Having said this, the more important point of this paper may be that it also shows the influence of strong anti-Chinese sentiment on Japan's policies toward China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the policy choices of Germany and Japan for contributing to international security and stability in Afghanistan. Both countries have been closely involved with Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 2001. It is argued that the policy choice of Japan with a low military element and high civilian element differs significantly from the German military centered approach. An analysis of the goals and motives behind the foreign policy choices reveals that in Germany the military involvement has been justified with humanitarian reasons, national self interests and the right to 'unlimited' sovereignty. This logic has ultimately led to the acceptance of civilian casualties and participation into offensive counterinsurgency operations. It is suggested that elite driven discourses have determined foreign policy strategy. In the case of Japan the paper claims that the conservative LDP elite had been pushing for intensified military involvement which materialized in the dispatch of military vessels to the Indian Ocean and ground forces to Iraq. Similar to Germany these moves towards gaining international reputation were rooted in domestic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1947, Japan became the first East Asian country to introduce democracy, and it was not until four decades later that South Korea completed the democratic transition. Today, surprisingly, South Korea stands out among the East Asian countries as the one that has the most vibrant and politically powerful civil society, whereas in Japan, the role of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector in political advocacy is greatly limited. Using historical institutionalism, this paper tries to explain why the NGOs in South Korea and Japan play vastly different roles in political advocacy. It concludes that the different social movement traditions have played important roles in the evolution of the civil societies in Japan and South Korea, and led to the different levels of institutionalization within the NGO sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Feudal Japan was one of the countries within the cultural space of Chinese characters and maintained a "tributary diplomacy" relationship with China. However, although it was part of the Chinese tribute system, Japan was not a typical tributary state like Korea or Vietnam at that time. Therefore, Japan's tribute activities with China, in addition to the similarities inherent in this activity, also had many unique characteristics. This article places Japan's tribute activities in the context of the region and compares them with China's tribute activities of Korea and Vietnam at the time to draw out similarities and differences. At the same time, the article derives the characteristics and essence of Japan's tribute activities at that time, contributing to an understanding of the nature of Japan–China relations in the past and present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indo-Pacific region is vital to the emerging countries' geostrategic and geo-maritime strategic competition. It is crucial for Japan's economic, political, and security interests. For the last few years, Japan has been promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy to protect the region free from other countries' dominance and make a balance of power by countering China's hegemony. Despite the growing strategic involvement of Japan in the Indo-Pacific region, some literature focused on the people's perception of Japan. Thus, this study explores the public perception regarding Japan's strategic rise in the Indo-Pacific to fill the knowledge gap. Using a snowball sampling method, we conducted a descriptive cross-national study with 365 individuals in Bangladesh and Thailand. Most participants (88%) agreed that the strategic rise of Japan would promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Besides, they agreed (69.1%) that the FOIP could be the alternative to the Chinese BRI in this region. However, around 52.6% of respondents moderately supported Japan's FOIP and QUAD in the region not to provoke China. Participants in this multi-country research generally expressed optimism about Japan's strategic ascent and its implications for a balanced Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the findings of this study can assist policymakers in gaining a better understanding of public attitudes and preparing for future policy formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article observes that the cycle of violent political extremism that began in Japan's postwar period did not last long beyond the mid-1990s. In view of the situation, this article intends to (1) give an overview of the issue, (2) discuss why the frequency and degree of political violence declined, and (3) investigate current trends in Japanese political extremism, as it still appears to exist if we define extremism as more than physically violent behaviors. This article argues that violent extremism as a tactic may have found it difficult to outlive the period of the "developmental state" of Japan, while the era of "civil society" in Japan that followed perhaps rendered ideologically motivated violence irrelevant. This article also argues that, today, acts that can be counted as extremism have morphed into occasions where activists have grievously offended the feelings of the targeted population, thereby gaining notoriety and publicity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The projects discussed in this paper, Galileo and ITER, are two contrasting experiences of Euro-Asian cooperation within Very Large (Public) Scientific Enterprises. They offer key insights into the deepening relations which have given shape to the rapidly expanding field of Euro-Asian collaborative interregional projects. Cooperative agendas within such "Big Science" endeavors heighten the question of the political considerations supporting the decision to engage specific forms of international cooperation. As the main driving force behind both projects, the EU's choices have resulted in the establishment of novel and distinct forms of Euro-Asian scientific cooperation. A better understanding of how such Euro-Asian initiatives emerge can logically be garnered by confronting the Euro-Chinese cooperation within Galileo, and the Euro-Japanese partnership within ITER. This comparison will show that the agendas and institutions of these two interregional policies vary greatly. Within the same policy field - in casu Large Scientific Projects - and in relationship to the same region - i.e. East Asia - this study shows that fundamentally different policies are practiced side-by-side. If in both cases Euro-Asian scientific cooperation has provided its participants with renewed leverage and unprecedented opportunities, the exact scope and function of these interregional collaborations range from the merely tactical in the Euro-Chinese Galileo experience, to the substantial in the Euro-Japanese ITER experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For five years of his premiership, Jun’ichiro Koizumi bravely fought against politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups to promote his structural economic reform. Fortunately, by the time he retired, Japanese economy got out of the depression. But the tide changed. In the July 2007 Upper House elections, the public was opposed to structural reform that Koizumi and Abe had advocated. Now it is not clear where Japanese political economy is likely to go. This paper will take a long-term view on the evolution of Japan’s political economy, and try to understand Jun’ichiro Koizumi’s structural reform in that long-term context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Japan’s FTAs with Mexico and the Philippines in the context of parallel negotiations in the Doha Round. Although the limited results produced by these FTAs represent an inferior outcome to what might be achieved with multilateral trade liberalization, there is no evidence that these agreements have weakened the political will of Japanese export interests to push ahead with trade liberalization in the WTO or increased the leverage of protectionist interests in opposing that goal. The greatest hope for increased Japanese flexibility in WTO agricultural talks lies in accelerated reform of domestic farm policy rather than reduced emphasis on pursuit of FTAs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese aid has been continuously criticized as its modalities are focused on economic infrastructure via loans. However, support for economic growth and infrastructure has become more important due to the growing influence of recipient needs and emerging donors. Accordingly, Japan's perception and implementation of its aid in the changing international regime in the 2010s are a salient factor. This study clarifies the common and different features between the official development assistance before the 1990s and the 2010s to identify which characteristics "returned" from the "Japan model" in the past. The domestic background and factors were examined to explain the alteration concentrated on the meaning of aid in the Abe administration's policy directions and domestic actors. The results indicate the aid modalities in the 2010s are similar to the aid in the 1980s in some aspects, putting emphasis on economic growth, infrastructure, and cooperation with private sectors. But "quality growth" came into the slogan in the 2010s, as Japan is not the largest donor anymore. The Prime minister's office (Kantei) led the aid policy as a part of priority policy "Abenomics" to support the prime minister in the 2010s, while collaborations among Liberal Democratic Party members, bureaucrats, and private actors led the aid policy in the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

War reconciliation and cultures of memory themes continue to receive high attention but despite the long list of newly released books praising Germany which has been thought to be more prone to experience guilt and from it ensuing war responsibility for its past than the Japanese nation in the aftermath of World War Two [46], the long shadows of the past are still prevailing in both countries. Even if Germany scores better then Japan from a comparative perspective this does not mean that Germany has internally resolved the problems related to its past once and for all. Yet, the slave labor compensation legislation in Germany which was meant to definitely settle the accounts with the past has shown that lasting war reconciliation is possible. The unwillingness of Japanese Government officials to admit past wrongdoings, to apologize for coerced war prostitution and to refuse to compensate former slave laborers has put Japan on the frontline of international criticism. The claim that Japan as a nation has not learned from history is critically re-assessed against the backdrop of bottom up NGO reconciliation activities and lawmaker efforts to enact legislation aimed at resolving the comfort women issue. In contrast to conventional explanations it is argued that different circumstances, influenced by distinct historical and political factors in each country, resulted in different approaches. In Germany the social protest movements led to the institutional birth of the Green Party. The Greens initiated the reconciliation process for former slave laborers and changed the political landscape from the bottom. In Japan the social protest movements did not succeed to settle as a novel political force. Thoughtlessness, ignorance, conspiracy of silence, “double victimization” stigma, “negative pacifism” and the reluctance to address the war guilt issue prevented a public discussion. It is then sought to answer the question: Why do people repress or deny past wrongdoings despite knowing the facts? It is looked at how consecutive generations in Germany and Japan have coped with guilt and shame feelings in different ways. The article concludes that war reconciliation similar to restorative justice is an ongoing, never-ending process. The emotional part of reconciliation which goes far beyond words of apology, judicial punishment or monetary compensation and does not necessarily lead always to positive outcomes is given particular attention. Ways of civil society bottom-up reconciliation in Germany and Japan are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the role of nationalism in domestic politics in Japan since 2005 by contrasting the Koizumi and the Abe administration of 2012/2013. It argues that the Koizumi and Abe administrations have exploited nationalism as a means to consolidate political power, move away from faction-based politics toward populism-based politics to weaken factions within the political system with entrenched interests that are counter to or prevent bolder, necessary economic reforms to propel Japan out of 20 years of economic stagnation. Furthermore, this article demonstrates that while each politician has used nationalism to mobilize popular support for their respective administrations, Koizumi's use of nationalism was to achieve an economic agenda while Abe's use of nationalism has been used to achieve his political agenda which includes constitutional reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The official narratives of Surrounding Areas in the 1997 New Guidelines are a curiosity: on the one hand, they signify Japan's readiness to increase its international involvement, while on the other hand, the geographical designation remains vague despite Japan's preoccupation with Asia. This suggests that Asia as Japan's neighbourhood is considered along with international developments to facilitate the emergence of an ambiguous language for Japanese policy makers as they seek to adapt to changes in the international environment. As such, the term 'Surrounding Areas' signifies Tokyo's anxieties in facing up to new challenges, as well as the willingness of the government to enhance Japan's international role while maintaining its status as a pacifist state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Chinese nation building in the post-Cold War era from the perspective of foreign policy. It focuses on the role of Japan and the United States as significant 'Others' in Chinese leaders' construction of three major variants of Chinese national identity: as a victim (past), as a developing country (present) and as a great power (future). The article argues that Japan occupies a primary place in the enactment of the past aspect of Chinese identity, while the US plays a major role in its present and, especially, future aspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article revisits a conventional interpretation of Sino-Japanese energy relations from geopolitical and zero-sum viewpoints. Contemporary Sino-Japanese disputes over the East China Sea and their scramble over a crude-oil pipeline from Russia have drawn global attention to the intensification of the rivalry between the two giant energy consumers. Beijing and Tokyo, however, have gradually found common interests resulting from business opportunities, environmental countermeasures, etc. Russia’s failure in driving a wedge between China and Japan, and the United States’ proactive engagement in Asia-Pacific energy issues, appear to provide new opportunities in which the East Asian powers’ energy rivalry can be reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese women have been assigned to the private role of caretaker, but the Japanese government has made prominent efforts in constructing a “gender-equal” society during the past decade. This policy development has come under the context of falling birth rate. The Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society and the measures taken by the government so far still fall short from enforcing gender equality and do not affirm equality as a human right. Since the pursuit of gender equality is a means to boost the birth rate, when there is a contradiction between these two goals, the former will be conceded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]