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Chinese cultural conservatism used to participate in shaping the course of modernization to a large extent. In this paper, I aim to describe a hidden lineage of Chinese cultural conservatism of the twentieth century that is still alive and appears to be more and more influential in mainland China. Relying on several ideas developed by Neo-Confucians of the early twentieth century, Gan Yang's paper in 2007 represented a contemporary revival of Chinese cultural conservatism. More importantly, in recent years, this kind of revival of conservative discourse went through another big change, which not only matters to the self-underpinning of the legitimate basis of the current regime, but also combined with the political conservations related to the Hong Kong protest of 2019–2020 explains why this country is so ideologically different from the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a well-acknowledged central economic and diplomatic policy of the Chinese government, which was proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013. This paper intends to discover the relationship between the public diplomacy narratives of the BRI and its implementation. By using content analysis, this paper analyzes Chinese President Xi's speeches from 2013 to 2020 about the BRI, as well as official statements of the Chinese central government. It identifies the public diplomacy narratives of the BRI: an assemblage of constantly changing policy settings that accommodates various economic and political interests. Also, this paper draws on differences between countries joining the BRI or not, and several case studies to elucidate the implementation of the BRI. Different from repetitive literature that explores either the BRI narratives or its implementation, this paper contributes by combining and comparing the two. Despite positive interpretations of the BRI the Chinese government has adopted, the paper argues that there are no deceptive tricks with skeletons in the closet of the Chinese government, as the BRI public diplomacy narratives are, in general, consistent with its implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's burgeoning economic and security activities abroad have given rise to suspicions and criticisms of its intentions. As Buddhism is a shared faith and heritage among many Chinese; an integral part of national identities of Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia; a proud legacy in India; and a major religion in Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Mongolia, Korea, and Japan, winning over the trust and friendship of neighboring Buddhist countries has emerged as an important Chinese diplomatic initiative, especially under the current Xi Jinping leadership's enterprise to revive the Silk Road. Having over 245 million Buddhists, 28,000 Buddhist monasteries, 16,000 temples, and 240,000 Buddhist monks and nuns makes the promotion of Buddhism a rich source of soft-power, or "soul power," for China, generated from its heavy investments in building Buddhist institutions and engaging Buddhist groups in these countries. However, there are external and domestic challenges in using Buddhism as a Chinese foreign policy vehicle. The paper analyzes what the objectives of China's Buddhist diplomacy are; which personnel, organizations, or state bureaus in China make China's Buddhist diplomacy; how is it carried out; what the targeted institutions and personnel in the affected countries are; the reactions from these countries; and the extent to which a Communist regime is able to carry out its promotion of Buddhism in Asia despite its professed atheism. The analysis is conducted through the spectrum of two major perspectives in international relations literature: neo-realism and constructivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the role of the Chinese in a Southeast Asian business cum societal context; from different approaches towards Chinese-ness via different notions of intra- and inter-ethnic relation towards a critique of the idea of a Chinese diaspora in a Southeast Asian context. The article argues that a culturalist reading of Southeast Asian Chinese modes of engaging in capitalist practices and societal entrenchments constitutes a deception that produces a variety of stereotypes of Chinese-ness, thus disregarding the complexity and dynamic developments within the ethnic Chinese community region-wise. Finally, in relation to Chinese business practices in a Southeast Asian context the paper suggests that cultural notions of guanxi and xinyong do not form a basis for doing business the Chinese way, but only options; that intra-ethnic relations do not play an important role in transnational Chinese linkages, and that contemporary conceptions of Chinese identity are always negotiated with the dominant ‘other’ so as to secure the construction of an economic ‘room’ or space from where business can be conducted in an overall societally acceptable manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on how the Chinese are represented in the international business literature. Chinese cultures are packaged to make knowledge about the Middle Kingdom more accessible to a general audience. The ways in which these packaged cultures are framed and constructed will be questioned here. Drawing inspiration from Foucault, this article identifies four traits of a packaged culture – it mediates, it asserts the uniqueness of the culture, it selectively packages the culture and it claims that cultural differences matter in business. These traits will form the basis for comparing and examining three methods of packaging a culture, namely the general-macroscopic, ethnographic present and critical emergence approaches. This paper concludes that researchers should reflect on the power they yield when they represent another culture, and that the general public may privilege theories that are accessible rather than sound. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has Communism fundamentally changed Chinese society? Or has Chinese culture stayed stable despite Communism? The official discourse in China is that Communism has fundamentally changed Chinese society, and for the better. The dominant discourse in the West also believes that Communism has fundamentally changed Chinese society, but for the worse. It is politically incorrect in China to say that Communism has not changed China for the better, and it is politically incorrect in the West to say that Communism has not changed China for the worse. This paper argues for the position that Chinese culture has stayed largely consistent despite the introduction of Communism in the Chinese cultural landscape. Communism does not define Chinese culture. Chinese culture will likely absorb Communism. The recognition of Chinese cultural continuity has important implications for China relations. To truly understand how China functions today, one needs to stop using Communism as a narrow lens to examine China but to look into the traditional Chinese value systems that continue to shape how Chinese people think and behave. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s supreme leader Xi Jinping pursues a “whole-nation” approach to acquire strategic technology from advanced nations. It means the Chinese state uses all resources at its disposal to tap and steer Chinese citizens and members of the Chinese diaspora to use their expertise, money, and network to acquire strategic technology from abroad. This article demonstrates that this approach has three main defining features. The first is to attract foreign technology firms to China, where they are incentivized or coerced into sharing technologies with Chinese companies, especially state-owned enterprises. The second is to acquire foreign technology firms abroad through mergers and acquisitions, portfolio investment, loans, foreign venture capital firms, and greenfield investment. The third is to recruit global technology talents, especially by enticing scientists from advanced countries to relocate to China to carry out research for the benefit of Chinese entities. This paper concludes that while the “whole-nation” approach has delivered significant results, it is reaching the limit of what it can deliver due mainly to backlashes from the governments and companies in Western countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this paper is on the strategies applied by Singapore Chinese businesses upon failing in their China business ventures. It has been argued that both the increase in Singapore ventures into China and the failures are due to either cultural issues (misconceptions of ‘shared ethnicity’) or economic factors (differences in economic practices). Singapore businesspeople apply inclusive strategies combining Western management styles with allegedly Chinese ways of doing business in order to reduce the risk involved with investments across national borders into China. Though largely successful, this strategy entails its own risks. Based on a number of case studies, this paper discusses the diverse business experiences of Singapore Chinese entrepreneurs in China, their response to business failure and their strategies to relocate their transnational business ventures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though acknowledging that ethnic Chinese cooperate in networks in which they feel ‘comfortable’, scholars dispute what it is that makes ethnic Chinese cooperate transnationally, and they disagree as to what extent these networks can be regarded as independent of nation-state regimes. Phrased differently, there is no agreement on the contents of this ‘comfort zone’ and on how it is created. Scholarly debate focuses on ethnic Chinese businesses and on the nature of transnationalism, but fails to address the process of transnationalising businesses. By considering the different perspectives on transnationalism, identity and business development among ethnic Chinese, this paper analyses the process of transnationalisation of Malaysian Chinese small and medium enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the role and meaning of Chineseness in business conduct among different generations of Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs active in small and medium sized enterprises. This issue is raised in order to inspire the ongoing debate concerning the characteristics of ethnic Chinese business practices in Southeast Asia, and to offer a way out of the culturalist – criticalist impasse by addressing topics that are often neglected: the voice of those concerned, the business practices of Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs in the SME sector, and generational differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's first cohort of the sent-down youth during the Cultural Revolution has since its early years attracted considerable research interest and been analysed from a few different viewpoints. However, the gradual retreat from executing the sent-down policy, especially bingtui (return to urban centres of origin because of medical reasons) as the then widely used tactic, and its long-term impact on people's socio-political attitudes and behaviours have not been examined and evaluated adequately. This has resulted in a large discrepancy between the non-academic discourse of returning sent-down youth, including bingtui, and the academic literature on these aspects in both Chinese and English. As revealed by many non-academic publications, bingtui not only represented the emergence of a widespread popular resistance to the Maoist Cultural Revolution that involved mobilising those who were then sent to the countryside, but was also believed to be responsible for a surge in what has since become known as songli feng (a wave of gift-giving practice). Based on the information recorded in published personal memories of many sent-down youth and other published accounts, online and print, as well as the information collected from my own past observations and recent interviews, this article will go beyond both glowing and condemnatory documentations of the sent-down movement of the late 1960s and 1970s and seek to analyse how bingtui was started, how it was utilised by sent-down youth and their families and, importantly, how it had led more Chinese people to realise that certain aspects of their identity could be performed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article begins with an analysis of small-firm economies in Italy and China and then compares and contrasts the migrations of Italian peasants and Wenzhou Chinese to Prato, a historic center of textile production in northern Italy. The purpose of our analysis is not to argue that, despite many differences, the rural to urban migration of Italian peasants and the international migration of Wenzhou Chinese are fundamentally the same. Instead, through an analysis of similarities and differences into the organizational nature of these two migrations, we can better understand the crucial historical differences between the two cases, differences that give us insight into the more complex questions about the place of Italian and Chinese family firms in the global economy of the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews theoretical perspectives about the development of ethnic Chinese-owned enterprises in two major sets of literature. The first school is one that adopts culture as the primary explanatory tool for the dynamism of Chinese enterprise. The second school employs the concept of transnationalism, which has served to create a link between identity and capitalism, to analyse Chinese entrepreneurship. Both sets of literature argue that common ethnic identity facilitates the creation of business networks, which explains the rise of ‘Chinese capitalism’. This study questions the foundations of these theoretical arguments by tracing the evolution of family firms and by employing the concept of ‘generational change’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the summer of 1997, I walked into the newly constructed Elephant Spring Hotel(n1) in Jinghong to discover one of the most unique small tourist shops I had ever seen on three continents. The glass front display case was divided into two sections, one with toothbrushes, cards, towels, and film, and the other displaying every kind of condom imaginable. A Guangzhou brand called International (guoji) had a picture of a young white couple on the cover, she in a sexy pink-flowered sheath-dress and he in a white suit. The couples depicted on the box were caressing each other in a languorous pose on a grassy knoll. The caption on the box read, "Love plus feeling at ease equals speaking from the heart" (aixin + fangxin = chengxin). A smaller packet of condoms had a diffused soft light image of a Chinese woman seen from her back. She was naked with her long black hair reaching to the middle of her back, focusing the yellow lighting on her round buttocks where her hands lay against her body. This Tianjin brand of condoms were called Harmonious and Happy Condoms (hele tao), with a caption that read "prevent pregnancy, prevent disease, be healthy and happy"(biyun, yufang, jiankang, kuaile). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the institutions and discourses in Huian, China that have produced a dominant construction of sexuality as marital and reproductive in orientation. Factors which contribute to the repression of natural sexuality; Marriage and sexuality; Population policies and market reforms.