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Chinese cultural conservatism used to participate in shaping the course of modernization to a large extent. In this paper, I aim to describe a hidden lineage of Chinese cultural conservatism of the twentieth century that is still alive and appears to be more and more influential in mainland China. Relying on several ideas developed by Neo-Confucians of the early twentieth century, Gan Yang's paper in 2007 represented a contemporary revival of Chinese cultural conservatism. More importantly, in recent years, this kind of revival of conservative discourse went through another big change, which not only matters to the self-underpinning of the legitimate basis of the current regime, but also combined with the political conservations related to the Hong Kong protest of 2019–2020 explains why this country is so ideologically different from the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a well-acknowledged central economic and diplomatic policy of the Chinese government, which was proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013. This paper intends to discover the relationship between the public diplomacy narratives of the BRI and its implementation. By using content analysis, this paper analyzes Chinese President Xi's speeches from 2013 to 2020 about the BRI, as well as official statements of the Chinese central government. It identifies the public diplomacy narratives of the BRI: an assemblage of constantly changing policy settings that accommodates various economic and political interests. Also, this paper draws on differences between countries joining the BRI or not, and several case studies to elucidate the implementation of the BRI. Different from repetitive literature that explores either the BRI narratives or its implementation, this paper contributes by combining and comparing the two. Despite positive interpretations of the BRI the Chinese government has adopted, the paper argues that there are no deceptive tricks with skeletons in the closet of the Chinese government, as the BRI public diplomacy narratives are, in general, consistent with its implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's burgeoning economic and security activities abroad have given rise to suspicions and criticisms of its intentions. As Buddhism is a shared faith and heritage among many Chinese; an integral part of national identities of Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia; a proud legacy in India; and a major religion in Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Mongolia, Korea, and Japan, winning over the trust and friendship of neighboring Buddhist countries has emerged as an important Chinese diplomatic initiative, especially under the current Xi Jinping leadership's enterprise to revive the Silk Road. Having over 245 million Buddhists, 28,000 Buddhist monasteries, 16,000 temples, and 240,000 Buddhist monks and nuns makes the promotion of Buddhism a rich source of soft-power, or "soul power," for China, generated from its heavy investments in building Buddhist institutions and engaging Buddhist groups in these countries. However, there are external and domestic challenges in using Buddhism as a Chinese foreign policy vehicle. The paper analyzes what the objectives of China's Buddhist diplomacy are; which personnel, organizations, or state bureaus in China make China's Buddhist diplomacy; how is it carried out; what the targeted institutions and personnel in the affected countries are; the reactions from these countries; and the extent to which a Communist regime is able to carry out its promotion of Buddhism in Asia despite its professed atheism. The analysis is conducted through the spectrum of two major perspectives in international relations literature: neo-realism and constructivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has Communism fundamentally changed Chinese society? Or has Chinese culture stayed stable despite Communism? The official discourse in China is that Communism has fundamentally changed Chinese society, and for the better. The dominant discourse in the West also believes that Communism has fundamentally changed Chinese society, but for the worse. It is politically incorrect in China to say that Communism has not changed China for the better, and it is politically incorrect in the West to say that Communism has not changed China for the worse. This paper argues for the position that Chinese culture has stayed largely consistent despite the introduction of Communism in the Chinese cultural landscape. Communism does not define Chinese culture. Chinese culture will likely absorb Communism. The recognition of Chinese cultural continuity has important implications for China relations. To truly understand how China functions today, one needs to stop using Communism as a narrow lens to examine China but to look into the traditional Chinese value systems that continue to shape how Chinese people think and behave. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s supreme leader Xi Jinping pursues a “whole-nation” approach to acquire strategic technology from advanced nations. It means the Chinese state uses all resources at its disposal to tap and steer Chinese citizens and members of the Chinese diaspora to use their expertise, money, and network to acquire strategic technology from abroad. This article demonstrates that this approach has three main defining features. The first is to attract foreign technology firms to China, where they are incentivized or coerced into sharing technologies with Chinese companies, especially state-owned enterprises. The second is to acquire foreign technology firms abroad through mergers and acquisitions, portfolio investment, loans, foreign venture capital firms, and greenfield investment. The third is to recruit global technology talents, especially by enticing scientists from advanced countries to relocate to China to carry out research for the benefit of Chinese entities. This paper concludes that while the “whole-nation” approach has delivered significant results, it is reaching the limit of what it can deliver due mainly to backlashes from the governments and companies in Western countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]