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When the interests of Tokugawa Japan and the Russian Empire clashed for the first time in the second half of the 18th century, Ainu, the native people of Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurile islands, were in the center of the dispute. Furthermore, at least from the Japanese side, the notion of culture has defined the dispute. Namely, the potential Russian expansion of influence was seen as expansion of superior culture, conducted through enlightenment and amicable policies which could result in the voluntary embracement of the rule of the Russian empire by the Ainu (Akatsuki 1987.)In the last five decades the same border zone, namely the South Kurile islands (known as Northern Territories in Japan) have continued to occupy the central place in Japan's agenda vis-a -vis the Soviet Union and, after 1992, Russia. However, the existent scholarship has paid little attention to the role of culture and the Ainu in the contemporary dispute over control of the islands. This paper hopes to bridge this gap by bringing together the debate on the place of Ainu in Japanese society that emerged in early 1970s and the concurrent cultural construction of the Japan's "sef" vis-a -vis Russia.The first part of this paper provides a brief review of modern Japan's engagement with the Russian and the Ainu "other" in terms of national identity construction. The second part examines the contemporary dialogue between the two "others" within the broader context of identity politics of the 1970s and 1980s. It starts by analyzing the critical reevaluation of Japan's history of colonization of Ainu lands and the relocation of Ainu culture from the realm of the inferior assigned to it by the prewar discourse. This paper argues that this reconstruction presented a challenge not only to the conception of Japan as a homogenous nation but also undermined the validity of Japan's claim to the South Kurile islands as a quest for the return of inherent territory as it granted subjectivity to the Ainu "other" and allowed for the Ainu participate in the public discourse. The paper follows by introducing the cultural discourse on Russia and Japan that emerged almost simultaneously with the debates on Ainu. It argues that one of the functions of this construction of the national "self" was to suppress the challenges posed by the contemporary debates on Ainu by presenting a hierarchical construction between Japan's "self" and the Russian "other" and through this reaffirming Japan's belonging to the realm of the civilized and the normal. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will posit the argument that the aggravation of the East China Sea disputes since the 1990s between Japan and China are the product of a number of factors specific to both states. Using neo-liberal institutionalism as a theoretical guide in terms of ways out of this impasse, this thesis will contend that the heightened tensions over energy resources and maritime territory since the mid-1990s have developed as a result of a combination of state specific factors that have hindered Sino-Japanese attempts to find binding agreements on joint-developments and designated Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea.Four major contributing factors to the East China Sea disputes are identified in this thesis. In the first place, there is the issue of the security structure in North-east Asia, a structure that remains closely related to one suited to a Cold War environment, where Beijing remains cautious of any real or imagined US-Japanese attempts to contain China; a fact that inhibits China's ability to engage in regional security activities. China thus views the security implications of the East China Sea disputes through both a traditional and non-traditional lens where new issues such as maritime piracy and terrorism provide both states with opportunities and challenges for co-operation. Secondly, there is the influence of domestic politics and nationalism in Japan and China on how the respective governments and populations perceive, address and formulate their maritime security policy . Yinan He highlights the importance of this second factor by claiming that the reason why nationalism has a strong role in this evolving era of Sino-Japanese relations is that 'the historically derived mutual antipathy and mistrust can worsen the security concerns generated by the high ambiguity in their current power balance and cause serious mutual threat perception' . A third issue relates to differing Japanese and Chinese interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) along with the importance of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs); factors closely linked to security concerns in the East China Sea. Lastly, another contributing factor is the clear lack of an adequate security management regime in the North-East Asia region . By choosing neo-liberal institutionalism as a theoretical guide and a way forward, this paper will also look at the part played by, distrust, the fear of being cheated on in negotiations, and uncertainties over Japan and China's post-Cold War roles, in contributing to the aggravation of the East China Sea disputes since the 1990s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are unmistakable signs of rising nationalism in contemporary Japan. It has manifested itself in Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the rewriting of history textbooks, Prime Minister Abe'ss denial of the Japanese military's direct involvement in forced prostitution during the Second World War (the so-called "œcomfort women" issue), the recent revision of the basic education law designed to instill patriotism among the nation's youths, and the move to revise Article 9 and other parts of the constitution. Neither domestic opposition to nor foreign criticisms of these developments have had a marked impact on the shift to the right in the discourse on nationalism in Japan. On the contrary, against the backdrop of an increasingly assertive political leadership in Tokyo, the emergence of post-war generations of opinion makers and opinion leaders in Japan, and the growing uncertainty in the nation's security environment, the chorus of foreign critics may be having the opposite effect and strengthening the nationalists' cause. This paper explores this proposition through an examination of the way Japanese nationalists are using Japan's disputes with China, Korea, and Russia and these countries' criticisms of Japan to articulate their cause. The paper concludes that the Japanese nationalists make a selective use of ideas, events, and institutions from the past in reconstructing a post-postwar "Japan" in their image, anchor their arguments around Japan's bilateral disputes with the neighboring countries, and exploit foreign criticisms of Japan regarding those issues to advance their nationalist cause. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically examines the constructivist works on Japan’s security and shows empirically the inherent dangers in applying the constructivist framework to studies of national identity. It argues that the works discussed, besides not providing any new insights into Japan, suffer from reductionism and orientalism. In its second part the paper attempts to offer some modifications to the constructivist framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese have long been simultaneously fascinated and threatened by the international. Since the 1980s, the discourse of kokusaika (internationalisation) has promoted both a more open approach to the international but, at the same time, a defensive, nationalistic stance. These contradictions can be felt in the classroom. On the one hand, ‘education for international understanding’ classes have been part of the primary school curriculum since 2002. In terms of English, the government’s goal is that every high school student will be able to communicate in everyday English in normal communicative situations by the time they graduate. Also, more and more universities are switching from language classes (classes on English) to content based courses (classes in English). On the other hand, students themselves, steeped in nationalistic discourses of a ‘uniquely’ unique Japan, often find the leap from ‘English class’ to ‘class in English’ too difficult to bridge, with many dropping out of the course or even university itself. In this way, internationally minded citizens and perhaps future scholars and members of the international relations community are lost. As ‘international’ educators in a non-English speaking environment, a key part of our job is to provide students with the tools to bridge the linguistic, cultural, and pedagogical divides they inevitably encounter when studying about the world outside Japan in a foreign language. Drawing on years of experience teaching Australia and Japanese studies in Japan, this paper looks at (a) some of the barriers in the ‘internationalisation’ of the Japanese university classroom and (b) practical techniques to help overcome these problems, specifically drawing on the wide range of activities and strategies known as active learning that involve students in doing things and thinking about the things they are doing. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent summits have sought to redefine Japan-China ties as a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" by "increasing political trust." Sino-Japanese trust is important because hedging in security affairs is expensive and can undermine stability. Lack of trust encourages worst-case assumptions about the other's motives, placing a ceiling on cooperation and making miscalculation and conflict more likely. Why is trust such a problem between Japan and China? Studies in international relations point to the power shift associated with China's rise and differences in regime type (democracy/authoritarianism). Research on contemporary Sino-Japanese ties often focuses on the significantly expanded and sometimes contentious trade relationship. Finding those explanations insufficient, this paper argues that trust problems are better understood as functions of national identity. The way that Japan and China perceive 'the other' in the context of their own national identities is the primary source of distrust. In Japanese perception, Japan tends to be seen as more developed and civilized than China and Chinese identity as obsessed with being at the center. In Chinese perception, China tends to be seen as morally and historically superior to Japan and Japanese identity as latently aggressive and disrespectful of natural order. These perceptions are traceable in Japanese views of China's human rights policies and regional diplomacy, and Chinese views of Japan's handling of history (including textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine) and military normalization. By explaining the link between identity conflicts and bilateral trust, this paper demonstrates why Sino-Japanese trust remains low and recent improvements in relations fragile. Peace and security in East Asia depend not only on how Tokyo and Beijing define and pursue their interests, but also on how they define and relate to each other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic integration has been progressing rapidly in Northeast Asia, particularly among Japan, China, and South Korea, and a large volume of industrial and cultural products flow across the region. Despite high-level economic integration, the three countries have not developed an institutional arrangement to stabilize regional politics. To the contrary, Japan and the other two countries continue to dispute over issues related to Japan?s wartime past, including controversies over Yasukuni shrine and Japan?s history textbooks. Based on the constructivist approach, this paper explains why the three countries fight over these issues, focusing on state identity and politics of recognition. Japan developed its state identity mainly through interactions with the United States. Japanese leaders emphasize that Japan, as a liberal democratic country, has developed a pacifist stance after World War II. They want other countries to recognize that their actions, including the prime minister?s visit to the shrine, are consistent with the pacifist stance. In contrast, the memory of Japan?s past colonial rule plays an important part in China and South Korea?s state identity formation. State leaders in each country denounce the colonial rule as unjust invasion while praising past nationalist leaders? fight against it as patriotic. They demand Japan?s current leaders to recognize (acknowledge) wrongdoings of Japan?s colonial rule, opposing any actions that imply Japanese leaders? support for or tolerance of the colonial rule. Through the analysis of the current controversies between the three countries, this paper develops a theoretical discussion of identity and recognition in international relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1980s, the notion of national identity and the nature of its relationship with foreign policy have been in the focus of constructivist and post-structuralist scholarship. In both theoretical approaches, the nature of the relationship is pre-determined. The constructivist scholars tend to treat the national identity as a cognitive lens through which national interests and related polices are defined and shaped. In a post-structuralist analysis, foreign policy is often perceived as a practice of difference that creates borders and enhances the national identity construction.The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between national identity discourse of the Japanese ?self? vis-à-vis the Russian ?other? and foreign policy without any pre-theorization regarding the relationship.In the first part this paper examines the structure of contemporary Japan?s national identity construction vis-à-vis Russia. It argues that Russia, because of her role as a traditional ?other? for the West, has played a special role in Japan?s attempt to construct herself as a member of the universal realm of ?modern nations.? The second part of the paper examines Japan?s foreign policy vis-à-vis post-communist Russia along three dimensions; economic, military and the territorial dispute related to the islands captured by the Soviet Union during the last days of the Pacific War. Identity does not matter in economy- business as usual with profits overriding other concerns related to territory and history. Identity is slightly visible in the security discourse as seen in the lack of long-term trust of Russia?s intentions among the members of the security community. In the context of the the territorial dispute, identity shapes and, at the same time, is shaped by the policy related to this dispute. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper employs the case of ChinaÂ’s recent anti-Japanese sentiments to answer: (1) What is the nature of ChinaÂ’s current nationalism? And (2) if it were not inherently xenophobic, how would the Chinese leadership deal with nationalistic sentiments toward Japan? The first part of this paper briefly depicts the nature of Chinese nationalism, attributing the emergence of radical nationalistic views to the CCPÂ’s patriotic education campaigns, economic development and commercialization, and technological advancement. Given that ChinaÂ’s recent antagonism toward Japan results from the history-related issues such as textbooks and interest-related UNSC issues, this paper contends that the nature of Chinese nationalism is not predetermined but lies in interactions between China and Japan. This paper further suggests that how the CCP manages these anti-Japanese sentiments is decisive to future Sino-Japanese relations. Nationalism helps the CCP in getting the upper hand in Sino-Japanese relations: on the one hand, the CCP co-opts and channels up anti-Japanese sentiments to deter JapanÂ’s political ambitions; on the other hand, as an authoritarian regime, the CCP is less than hesitant to oppress any radical movements considered as a threat to its party survival. In other words, by cooptation and oppression, it seems that the CCP astutely controls this double-edged nationalism. Thus, future Sino-Japanese relations depend not on the nature of Chinese nationalism but on the leadershipÂ’s cost-benefit calculations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been argued that the hegemony of sovereignty is constructed by a binary opposition between inside and outside. The paper reconsiders how hegemony of sovereignty is constructed in process of state-building. Sovereignty is totally a discursive practice: national identity inside relies on the foreign threats outside. The methodology of inside/outside may play the convincing role in analysing the sovereign-building of early-modern (Meiji) Japan. The Japanese national identity inside is constructed by confronting the Western imperial powers as the outside threats. This paper deals with how hegemony of the sovereignty is discursively constructed by the inside/outside dichotomy in the process of the Japanese state-building in early-modern period. Two mechanisms play the significant roles in hegemonising the Meiji sovereignty: Exclusion and Supplement. National consciousness of the Meiji Japan, on the one hand, strongly relied on the Western threats, since there has been no nationalism and national identity until the Western powers confront Japan in mid-nineteen century. In this sense, the Japanese national identity inside is constructed by excluding the West. On the other hand, it does not mean the Meiji Japan totally challenged the modern international system: Japan induced a number of Western methods and technology in the process of modernisation. That is, Japanese modernization inside are also supplemented by the Western methods. This is because, the Meiji restoration is neither complete Westernisation (Kaikoku: open country) nor endorsement of ultra-nationalism (Sakoku: close country), but combination of both. Thus, an overall aim of the paper is to uncover discursive practices of the Meiji Japan that excludes and be supplemented by the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the advanced information technology came to redefine every facet of human life, it appears that global capitalism has nearly completed its project of subsuming the entire world under its transcendental gaze. In this circumstance, Japanese nation-state has been undergoing some visible and less visible transformation, adapting itself to the diverse and conflicting forces in a highly media permeated and technology driven politico-cultural space of contemporary Japan. In this paper, I investigate an emergent form of nationalism which appears to be benign and harmless, as exemplified in the circulation of national icons expressing one’s attachment to the nation, and assess the significance of this casual, individualistic, and madatized form of nationalism in the context of current globabl transformation. This paper is particularly interested in the effect of advanced technology and media which has radically been altering the cognitive and experiential parameters of the individuals, eroding historical temporality involved in seeing, and generating aesthetic inclinations that prioritizes feelings and senses over reason and ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite evidence of “nationalist” influences on security policies in Japan and Korea, particularly in recent years, the term “nationalism” is conspicuous for its absence in Japanese security debates and for its replacement by the more popular “sovereignty ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The leaders of both Japan and Turkey have recently made headlines with their refusal to acknowledge past atrocities committed by their states. In the case of Japan, the refusal centers on the Japanese state’s role in forcing Korean women into prostitution during WWII. In the case of Turkey the refusal is an outright denial of the Armenian genocide. It would be easy to dismiss these actions as the product of irrational nationalist bravado, put on for the benefit of a domestic audience. However, given the international character of these disputes, and their very serious consequences for the diplomatic credibility of the countries in question, international relations scholars have an obligation to explain why states act in ways which are contrary to their short-term self-interests. I argue that because of the social status hierarchy in the international system, admitting to past atrocities is more difficult for those states which are not naturally or inherently favored by the norms of the international system. In other words, it is not an accident that two Asian states with the highest aspirations to join the Western the world are also the states which have the most difficulty facing their past. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, relations between China and Japan have been stable yet contentious due to unresolved controversies concerning history textbooks, territorial disputes, military activity, market distortions, and environmental degradation. While by no means precluding the real possibility of reconciliation between China and Japan, such ends cannot be understood without explanations about cultural preferences amid materialist pursuits. As nearly 2,000 years in the history of Sino-Japanese relations thus demonstrates, unitary actors derive their general interests from specific identities such that the propensity for either apprehension or resolve need not always depend upon the effects caused by those structural factors (security dilemmas, imbalanced capabilities) which seem to be less conditional and more coincidental instead. For what has elsewhere been termed "civilizational realpolitik" continues to determine the conditions in constructing Sino-Japanese relations across time/space. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why, despite external pressures due to globalization and shrinking workforces domestically due to aging populations, have Japanese and Korean immigration policies remained resistant to change? This paper attempts to identify the mechanisms for openness or ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite improved relations between China and Japan since Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister in September 2006, nationalism remains a major force in driving the future direction of bilateral relations. On the surface, both Tokyo and Beijing talk with carefully guarded diplomatic language amid strong undercurrents of antagonistic feelings from both sides that range from historical to stratigic to territorial issues. This paper explores the bottom-up anti-Japanese sentiment in China alongside the top-down right-wing views aimed against the rise of China in Japan, which thereby explains how such nationalistic agendas relate to a number of dilemmas that impact profound influences on both policy-making and long-term strategies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite of the fact that China and Japan are becoming the biggest trade partner with each other in recent years, political relations between both countries have deteriorated. Many people in China still concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more and more people in Japan worry about China?s military modernization and growing nationalism. The tension is unlikely to improve in the near future.The role of Taiwan in this China-Japan dispute is worth attention. While Taiwan has enjoyed de facto independence since 1949, it is still regarded by Chinese leaders as a renegade province, and the recovery of the island was considered in China as the sacred and ultimate goal. In recent years, Taiwan has increasingly attempted to act as a truly independent state, a development that could be attributed to political democratization on the island since the late 1980s. The question is whether the leaders in Taiwan will continue to push the envelope to a point short of de jure independence that will be intolerable to the leaders in Beijing. On the other hand, both Taiwan and Japan have shown strong intention in improving political relations between both sides. Creation of a Japan-Taiwan alliance is becoming a popular view in Taiwan?s strategic circle, and Japanese public have shown more sympathy to Taiwan?s international isolation. Japanese government even adjusted its policy toward the island state by including the Taiwan Strait into the sphere of concern in Japan-US Security Threty. These developments have been unthinkable in the past, because both China and Japan have committed to the ?One China? policy and because the Taiwan issue used to be excluded from China-Japan relations. This paper will examine the Taiwanese perspective of China-Japan relations. The author will outline the developments of Taiwan-Japan relations, identify the strategies Taiwanese government have utilized to strengthen the relations with Japan, and to assess the Taiwan factor in future Japan-China relations. In addition to analyses of secondary data, the author will also interview strategic scholars and even government officials to gain first hand information. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of International Relations in the Japanese universities? classrooms has definitely shifted to the Realist paradigm recently. The shift is reinforced by the current international situations. For example, the strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the rise of China in Asia, and the rise of Japan?s nationalism, seem to be pushing the Realist paradigm over the others in the classrooms. In retrospect, the shift of focus to the Realist paradigm also took place in International Relations in the Japanese universities? classrooms in the early 1980?s. The shift in the 1980?s seemed to have occurred with the Soviet Unions? military buildup in Northeast Asia. However, the shift did not stick after the Cold War ended. Today?s shift seems to be evolved by the incident on September 11, 2001 and its aftermath. Does this shift stick and make the Realist paradigm the core of International Relations curriculum in the Japanese universities? By comparing these two shifts of focus to the Realist paradigm took placed in the Japanese universities? International Relations, this paper tries to explore the recent shift and its impact on Japan?s International Relations education and Japan?s foreign policy making in the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2005 marked a new low in Sino-Japanese relations. A grassroots petition in China, South Korea and around the world gathered more than 30 million signatures in a matter of weeks. Violent demonstrations in China displayed Chinese people's deep resentment of Japan on a range of issues. Both Beijing and Tokyo have traded charges against each other while trying to control the situation from getting worse. This paper examines these developments, and focuses on how nationalism manifested itself in both China and Japan, what are behind the emotional outbursts of public sentiments, and why there is no single model that can explain the nationalistic behavior in either China or Japan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Japanese relations have deteriorated in recent years, driven by clashes over the interpretation and commemoration of war history. This stands in contrast to the growth in economic ties between the two countries, and appears to run counter to liberal theories that emphasize the pacifying effects of commerce.In this paper we examine recent trends in Sino-Japanese relations utilizing the theoretical lenses of commercial peace and nationalism. We suggest that economic interdependence is a weaker factor than nationalism in determining the direction of future relations for three reasons. First, although bilateral aggregate levels of trade and investment are increasing, we argue that the structure of these economic interactions suggest that increased commercial ties may not have the pacific power posited by commercial liberal theories. Second, evidence suggests that the attempt by both states to separate economic ties from political ties has been only partially successful, and that nationalism has trumped commercial interests when the two have clashed. Third, we argue that although deepening economic interactions may have increased the costs of conflict, they have not dampened increased relative gain concerns and bilateral threat perceptions. This has generated higher expectations within each state of future militarized disputes, and raised the risk of inadvertent military confrontation in territorial and resource-driven disputes. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore the ?rise? of China and Japan in the international political sphere through the theoretical lens of the English School. One of the most important insights provided by the English School approach of International Relations is its notion that ?Great Powers? hold special responsibilities in the Society of States. However, studies of ?great power responsibilities? have not sufficiently problematised or historicised what exactly these ?responsibilities? entail. Building on a recent study by Roland Paris which argues that international peacebuilding constitutes the modern ?mission civilisatrice?, I argue that the English School theoretical framework can offer us a fresh perspective in understanding the political ambitions of China and Japan to play a greater political role in International Society. Moving beyond conventional explanations which trace these movements to domestic nationalism, I explore through a comparative case study of Chinese and Japanese participation in international peacekeeping whether China or Japan?s recent actions for ?a greater international political role? is informed by both states? interaction with a international normative consensus of what constitutes a ?civilised? Great Power in twentieth and twenty first-century International Society. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese nationalism has clearly influenced Japanese immigration policy in ways that privilege Japanese ethnicity but not in terms of outcomes of immigrant political incorporation. A change in immigration law in 1990 now provides Nikkeijin (Japanese des ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the inauguration of the Koizumi administration in 2001, China and Korea (ROK) have repeatedly protested against the visits by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine. After he stepped down as Prime Minister last September, new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's first official visits to China and Korea helped to reduce, to some extent, the anti-Japanese sentiment in both countries. Although he promised to construct a new relationship of 'strategic reciprocity' with China during his subsequent visit to Beijing in October, his public statement concerning the so-called 'comfort women' issue before the Diet session had revealed his conservative stance on 'statist' nationalism in Japan. After the end of World War II, the Japanese government established and pursued the fundamental national doctrine of maintaining the Japan-US security alliance and gaining economic prosperity under the peace constitution. In other words, Japan adopted and pursued the so-called 'Yoshida Doctrine' as the political symbol of "Small Japan." However, the doctrine has undergone some changes under strong pressure from the conservative leaders like Former Prime Ministers, Nobusuke Kishi, Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Junichiro Koizumi. Currently, Prime Minister Abe clearly shows his political will to change the gear in a step-by-step manner from 'Small Japan' to another stance, even if not of "Greater Japan." Even if Mr. Abe maintains "strategic ambiguity" vis-a-vis the neighboring countries, his assertively conservative agenda to change basic political values in Japan, as illustrated in his catch phrase "Beautiful Japan" might cause the neighbors to become more concerned about Japan's future. Their cyclical cautiousness toward Tokyo may very well have a negative impact on the ongoing attempt to build an East Asian community encompassing Japan, China, South Korea, and other countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does nationalistic sentiment intensify? Collective history and memory play significant role in intensifying nationalistic sentiment. It is said that China-Japan political relations falls to their lowest point in years. I believe that lack of sharing history is a major cause of this. In November, 2003, the skit performed by Japanese students and teacher upset Chinese. The skit itself was nothing to do with Japanese atrocity or nationalism. But it ended up provoke anti-Japanese sentiment. Why did this incident become nationalism issue? Why did this incident become issue of Japanese wartime atrocity? I will answer my questions by analyzing how this incident was understood by Chinese and Japanese. I study English, Japanese and Chinese sources to answer my research questions. It is said that X’ian skit showed the recent evidence of Chinese distrust for Japan. By analyzing this incident, I will examine how history and war memory of Chinese and Japanese affect nationalism. The Xian skit brought up the revival of Chinese suffering past and memory of the war which lead to huge anti-Japanese protests. This skit also exhumed Japan’s inability to face history. I will show that how significant for Japan to acknowledge wrongdoing in the past and truly respects the Chinese emotion relate to the past in order to build the relationship of trust. Shared historical understanding is most necessary for the future relationship between China and Japan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]