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Trilateral security cooperation among Japan, Australia and the United States has accelerated over the last few years, with the first foreign ministerial meeting held in early 2006. Not unexpectedly, the new cooperation between Canberra, Tokyo, and Washington is often characterized as a revival of Containment (against China, this time) or a mini-NATO in Asia. The paper will examine this latest development in East Asia’s security relations, with a specific focus on Japanese policymaking. The concept of a democratic state as one form of state identity will be given particular attention for understanding Tokyo’s attitude toward trilateral security cooperation, as well as the new security order in Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the Cold War period the Japanese maintained a largely inflexible approach to their role and place in international affairs. Even now in 2007, the major security policies of Japan are based upon the Japan-US security alliance and the US remains the first and only interdependent security partner for Japan. However, in the post-9.11 world, much more accommodation with international norms will be required. Japan needs alternative security partners to work with. Australia, together with New Zealand, is considered an eligible candidate. Therefore, the paper will rationalize the prerequisites towards the complementary security arrangements within Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. The effectiveness of the ‘JANZUS’ is boldly examined from various points of view. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Copenhagen School's concept of securitisation is regarded as one of the most innovative, but also most controversially discussed approaches in IR and security studies. Located within the wider theoretical scheme formulated by the Copenhagen School, it provides a specific analytic in respect of examining security politics and, predicated on this, the evaluation of the prevailing pattern of security interactions on a given regional level. However, several commentators have pointed out a tension within the securitisation approach, which mainly stems from two different possible readings of this concept: one that puts more theoretical emphasis on language and a second that stresses the importance of considering context. By conducting a first-cut, preliminary analysis on one crucial issue of current Japanese foreign policy, the case of abducted Japanese citizens to North Korea, this paper highlights the challenges one encounters in trying to apply the securitisation approach to this specific case. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In postwar Japan, idealism and realism have developed within the framework of Japanese Constitution and the US-Japan security system. At first glance, the current Japanese Constitution seems unrealistic whereas the drafting reveals it was not only influenced by GHQ’s unilateral compulsion. This paper examines the circumstances where the constitutional thought was formed based on the political thought of modern Japanese political thought. And it examines how their idealism has been transformed while conflicting with realism in the Cold War and the reality of the US-Japan security system. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War world Japanese security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to "securitize" itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. Working from International Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Buzan et al., this paper examines Japanese security policy in light of Japan’s attempts to securitize itself in non traditional ways that impact traditional security, while focusing on the policy implications of Japan’s ongoing failure to securitize its economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that the traditional notion of Japan and the EU as the world’s two civilian powers is no longer sufficient to provide the conceptual glue for the EU-Japan Partnership. The EU and Japan both are gradually introducing harder defence mechanisms into their overall strategic outlook. The European Security Strategy (ESS) is evidence of a holistic concept of security that combines economic, civilian and, if needed, military means. Japan will also see the overhaul of its defence policy in the new strategic environment in Asia. However, neither the EU nor Japan will turn to traditional 20century power politics. In fact, both will continue to defend some of the values captured in the concept of civilian power while taking on larger and more difficult global responsibilities. The paper offers a conceptual framework of “shared global responsibility” that could provide a reference point for policy makers in Japan and Europe when revitalising and implementing enhanced co-operation between Japan and Europe. Older “lofty” notions of “civilian power” are perceived as outdated elsewhere. The new notion of “shared responsibility” is based on the unique capacities and historical trajectories that the EU and Japan posses. It combines civilian values with real capacities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The April 2007 visit by Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to Japan highlights new opportunities for cooperation between China and Japan to address challenges of globalization, such as pollution and rising demand for energy, yet progress in their relations has been uneven. Until recently China’s approach to globalization largely focused on its economic benefits and assumed that the Chinese state would be able to manage the process. Increasingly Chinese leaders and scholars are calling attention to the numerous non-traditional security challenges facing their country. The problems of economic globalization and non-traditional security are linked, however, as China’s dramatic growth creates unintended non-traditional security consequences for its neighbors, as well as its own citizens.This paper argues that, even if its rise is peaceful, China’s development creates unintended environmental consequences such as trans-boundary air pollution and rising demand for energy, which create risk for its neighbors. The paper examines China’s environmental risk management and its impact on Sino-Japanese relations, using a conceptual framework based on the work of European theorists of risk, particularly German sociologist Ulrich Beck’s World Risk Society. This research reveals a pattern of cooperation in addressing air pollution, but greater competition over energy. Why is there cooperation in the environmental area? Why has competition been more prevalent over energy? The paper argues that several factors shape the impact of environmental risk in China’s relations with Japan, including the urgency of the risk involved, the nature of risk management, state-society relations, and the securitization of risk. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan?s quest for regional order-building has a mixed historical record. During the first half of the 20th century, the country pursued its vision of a Japan-centered regional order, termed as the Grater East Asia Co-prosper Sphere, excluding the United States, only to bring total catastrophe to the region. Four decades later in the early 1990s, it conceptualized the ?multi-tiered? structure of regional security, with the US-Japan alliance as the linchpin, and rather quietly promoted it with some success. Despite such stark contrasts, the two instances show one commonality?Japan was an ascending power. With this backdrop, the paper examines Japan?s current attitude toward the question of the emerging regional order. Is Japan, now far from being an ascending power thanks to decade-long economic stagnation, and in the face of a new, rapidly ascending power, China, still committed to regional order-building? If so, does Japan still maintain a ?multi-tiered? regional order, in which the position of China is unspecified. Or has the country conceived of a new kind of regional order to reflect the current power balance in Asia? Through addressing these questions, the paper seeks to articulate the factors that shape Japan?s perspective of a regional security order and assess the possible implications for the country?s relations with other regional countries, especially China, overall intra-regional relations, and the ongoing discussion on the recently proposed East Asian Community. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic theorists depict the process of appraising the national interest, developing a supporting foreign policy, and crafting strategy that applies resources to policy ends as one of the most important and most vexing challenges of statecraft. This challenge is particularly difficult for contemporary Japan, where the habit of strategic thought has fallen into disuse -- and disrepute --owing in large part to decades of constitutional pacifism. With regard to sea power, the legacies of militarism and wartime defeat discredited strategic theory. Japanese leaders evidently recoil from Alfred Thayer Mahan's sea-power theories as they consider how to uphold Japan's interests at sea. Nor has Mahan been replaced in the Japanese lexicon by a less bellicose strategist such as Julian Corbett or C. E. Callwell. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces' (JMSDF) postwar dependency on the U.S. armed forces has only compounded the difficulties Tokyo faces as it rethinks its maritime policy and strategy in a more and more complex security environment.In recent years Japan has moved gradually to resume its place as a "normal" country, including in maritime affairs. Tokyo dispatched JMSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the first Gulf War, for example, and after September 11 it deployed escorts and logistics ships to support the coalition flotilla watching for terrorists fleeing Afghanistan. At the same time, Japanese leaders have evinced increasing enthusiasm for humanitarian operations. JMSDF units joined the massive multinational relief operation following the 2004 tsunami that struck South and Southeast Asia. Tokyo has portrayed the tsunami relief effort as a model for future maritime operations, not only out of genuine concern for disaster relief but as a way to amass "soft power" and to confer legitimacy on a more activist military strategy in the eyes of the Japanese populace. It is evident that Tokyo is increasingly couching "hard" maritime power in humanitarian terms.The dual nature of Japan's emerging maritime strategy, which seeks to cope with both conventional threats and new humanitarian responsibilities, raises several important theoretical and policy-relevant questions that we intend to address. Tokyo has declared that it will expand its new array of missions while continuing to discharge traditional missions such as defense of the sea lines of communication and the home islands, all at current funding levels and with the same force structure that now comprises the JMSDF. Accordingly, we will ask: Are these ambitious objectives feasible? Has Japan created a mismatch between policy and strategy? If so, how can it realign its maritime strategy with policy? Should (or can) it scale back humanitarian operations and other nontraditional initiatives? Should it rethink how it approaches traditional maritime security missions such as sea-lane defense? Should (or can) it increase naval spending and acquire new platforms? What kind of assets would the JMSDF need to execute a more ambitious slate of missions? Which strategic theorist supplies the best guidance in these matters?We will conclude that unless Japan conducts a thoroughgoing reassessment of its maritime posture, it will confront severe strategic dilemmas arising from a mismatch in policy and strategy. To help Japanese and U.S. decision-makers fend off such an outcome, the paper will generate a series of policy-relevant recommendations for Japan and its seafaring partner, the United States. We thus expect the paper to have immediate policy relevance for strategists and alliance managers, both in Tokyo and Washington. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper will examine Japan's growing roles in US-sanctioned peace-keeping/building functions and in alliance with the United States, both of which are gradually blurring the border between Japan's self-defense and international security. This narrowing of the two areas is obscuring the relevance and meaning of Japan's policy of recognizing the nation's right to collective self-defense but not exercising that right. This blurring distinction is further eroding the restrictive constraints of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution on Japan's international security role. The paper will discuss these issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyzes the relevance of the European integration experience for East Asia's future security architecture. Tracing European cooperative efforts from the early post-World War II days to the present, it argues that the process of European security integration provides useful lessons that can inform a similar process in East Asia. Considering the multi-faceted nature of security threats, the main ingredient of the European success strategy, namely the institutionalization of trust on multiple levels, and hence the creation of a complex web of governance, is likely to be emulated in the long run. While institutions are being created to enhance transparency, efficiency and trust, the paper argues two further developments need to occur to promote East Asian security. First, East Asia needs to deal more effectively with its historical legacy and the German case may provide useful lessons. Secondly, outstanding disputes need to be addressed and it is postulated that confidence-building via multi-layered institutions, similar to those found in Europe, may help resolve these conflicts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S.-Japan security alliance has faced major challenges over the last decade, including the post-9/11 transformation of the international security environment, the changing balance of economic and military forces in East Asia, and growing popular disc ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan’s mobilization of its Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) for the purpose of statecraft began in the 1990s. The notion that the SDFs contribute to Japan’s statehood and global security seems to be a new idea. Existing explanations such as the security arrang ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan became more active in dealing with international security issues in the 1990s than before the cold war. This Koizumi administration further enhanced this trend by dispatching the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in the Indian Ocean to support the US led at ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a study that examines the rationales and substance of the redefined U.S.-Japan alliance. It cites the implications of the 1997 Revised Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the 2005 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee for regional security issues, particularly a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. It examines the special role that Japan plays in the U.S. security strategy in the region.

The article examines several human security issues and regionalism in Northeast Asia. The level of economic success achieved under the government of Japan has prevented it to reconsider the transition in the nature of national sovereignty. It mentions that prospects of European-type integration and free trade agreement affect the region's economy and politics. It notes that human security and regionalism can provide a more friendly way to better address the new threats to civil society.

The article discusses the role of the Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) in establishing cooperative security in Northeast Asia. It explains that the idea of cooperative security involves cooperation based on the definition of scholars Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry and John D. Steinbuner. The strategy of cooperative security as a realistic approach is also tackled. It argues that the ODA can establish its security through bilateral and regional relations in the region.

An essay is presented on post cold war foreign and security policy being implemented by Japan. It discusses the changes in international security threat level and the responses of Japan. It mentions that the factor that contribute to the active participation of Japan in security issues is its enhancement of the U.S. and Japan alliance relations after the cold war.

The purpose of this paper is to explore a reasonable model for security cooperation in an “East Asian community.” Today, the countries of Asia â€" including the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, Japan and India â€" are eag ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1970s, the EU and Japan have both evolved as an international actor, or ‘Civilian Powers’. They now act even over the issue of peace and international security. This paper argues that the changing nature of both ‘Civilian Powers’ and the emerging need for their shared responsibility in international security. It will particularly focus upon their parallel interests in the Middle East, the Gulf region, and Iraq. It will cover European and Japanese policy towards Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, 1979-2003, and, to some extent, towards post-Saddam Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been widely recognized that Japanese security policy has transformed greatly since the end of the Cold War, better equipped legally and militarily to engage in active operations abroad today than any time in its post-World War II history. While many terms have been coined to describe the characteristics of the transformation of the Japanese security policy, however, we have yet to come to an agreement in determining the nature of the recent Japanese expansion of overseas activities and the directions in which Japan is heading as it tries to identify its new roles in global security. Is Japan "scrapping away the Yoshida Doctrine" and "salami-slicing" its post-WWII pacifism? Is Japan merely reacting to the situational necessities of the international environment and to the U.S. demand in an ad-hoc manner, or does it adhere to certain principles and codes of conduct that remain unaffected despite the pressures from abroad to increase its independent military capabilities? The objective of the paper is to address these questions by utilizing theories of institutionalization as a framework of analysis, with a particular focus on the expansion of the roles of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in overseas operations since the end of the Cold War. By discussing the key features that have worked as constraints and opportunities for Japan's increased roles in global security at the systemic and domestic levels, I will argue that the new developments in the Japanese security policy in fact reflect a process of reconfirmation of the post-WWII pillars of Japanese security policy: pacifism and the stable security ties with the United States. These core features became embedded while Japan tried to adapt itself to the new security environment after the end of the Cold War. The institutionalized nature of the proactive Japanese security policy also has profound implications for the future Asia-Pacific security alignment, which constitutes an important part of the stable global order. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite of the fact that China and Japan are becomingthe biggest trade partner with each other in recent years, politicalrelations between both countries have deteriorated. Many people in Chinastill concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more andmore people in Japan worry about China's military modernization and growingnationalism. The tension is unlikely to improve in the near future.The role of Taiwan in this China-Japan dispute is worth attention. WhileTaiwan has enjoyed de facto independence since 1949, it is still regarded byChinese leaders as a renegade province, and the recovery of the island wasconsidered in China as the sacred and ultimate goal. In recent years, Taiwanhas increasingly attempted to act as a truly independent state, adevelopment that could be attributed to political democratization on theisland since the late 1980s. The question is whether the leaders in Taiwanwill continue to push the envelope to a point short of de jure independencethat will be intolerable to the leaders in Beijing. On the other hand, bothTaiwan and Japan have shown strong intention in improving politicalrelations between both sides. Creation of a Japan-Taiwan alliance isbecoming a popular view in Taiwan's strategic circle, and Japanese publichave shown more sympathy to Taiwan's international isolation. Japanesegovernment even adjusted its policy toward the island state by including theTaiwan Strait into the sphere of concern in Japan-US Security Treaty. Thesedevelopments have been unthinkable in the past, because both China and Japanhave committed to the One China policy and because the Taiwan issueused to be excluded from China-Japan relations.This paper will examine the Taiwanese perspective of China-Japan relations.The author will outline the developments of Taiwan-Japan relations, identifythe strategies Taiwanese government have utilized to strengthen therelations with Japan, and to assess the Taiwan factor in future Japan-Chinarelations. In addition to analyses of secondary data, the author will alsointerview strategic scholars and even government officials to gain firsthand information. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: During the Cold War Japan maintained a fairly insulated defense strategy within the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Following the end of the Cold War events in the Persian Gulf, North Korea, and the Taiwan Straits brought a tension to the alliance and challenged Japan to reevaluate its role in international security affairs. In the ten years that have passed since Japan revised its National Defense Program Outline, a number of incremental, yet significant changes have occurred in Japan?s defense policies, culminating in the National Defense Policy Guidelines for FY2005. This paper will examine these changes with an eye to future U.S.-Japan security cooperation in defense of Japan and possible regional or international contingencies while taking account of the policy directions of the United States' 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After their first overseas mission in 1992 in participating the UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) in Cambodia, Japan?s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have increased its roles in international security problems until present. In addition to the UNPKO activities in Africa and other areas, the Maritime SDF has been making logistical support on the Indian ocean for the US coalition forces in Afghanistan and the Grand SDF was dispatched to Iraq to participate reconstruction activities after the invasion. Comparing with her very limited security roles, such as extending economic assistance to countries of security concerns of the West like Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Japan has become more active in international security problems after the end of the cold war.On the other hand, while her economic performance during the cold war period was one of the best among G8 countries, Japan?s post cold war economy has been stagnating for more than a decade after bursting the bubble in 1990.Regarding global issues, although she is making financial and other contributions, Japan does not lead others but rathre follows initiatives of other actors. So Japan?s role in global issues is limited.This paper will focus on these contrasting differnces of Japan?s behavior in international affairs of the post cold war period. After confirming limits of international systemic explanations, state level factors will be analyzed. State-society relations, changing political power balance at the Diet, delayed economic reforms will be particular focuses of the domestic sources. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to explain the position of the U.S.-Japanese alliance in the context of Northeast Asian regional security order. It also examine how strengened ties between the two countries would influence in shaping the future regioanl security order. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With advanced nuclear technical capability and surrounded by nuclear neighbors, Japan is often regarded as a country close to the nuclear brink. To what extent do international forces -- such as the 2006 North Korean nuclear test -- shape Japanese nuclea ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article demonstrates how Tokyo has been exercising economic power over the other actors in the Six-Party Talks, including the U.S.A. The implication, it is argued, is that Japanese foreign and security policy can already be regarded as "normal"â??hence, making a "normalization" which includes remilitarization rather unnecessary. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan’s postwar security policy has been predicated on its alliance with the United States, but the extent to which Japan can assure the U.S. provision of security in emergent situations has not been answered as long as the U.S. government maintains a pol ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War era, China, Japan and Taiwan entered the new phase of their relationship and were forced to reconsider their security and political dialogues. Despite of the US presence in East Asia, they are becoming more active players in the regio ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to cope with the changing security environment, Japan’s defense policy should be developed in three directions. The first is to modernize defense capability by introducing modern technology as well as joint operation by Japan Self Defense Forces. Currently in order to deal with missiles attacks from neighboring areas, though MD system has currently been introduced, to equip an offense capability against the missile sites would be of pressing priority, Secondly, to strengthen cooperation with the U.S. forces are essential not only to defend Japan itself but also to increase its defense capability. Thirdly, to participate in the international security cooperation Japan need to enhance its readiness in mobilizing its forces abroad. The exclusively self-defense principle which originated from the Article 9 of the constitution has worked as a strong constrain in developing these policy options. PM Abe, recently having passed the referendum bill for the revision of the constitution, set up the council to give the collective defense right to JSDP in order to tackle the coming contingencies. Some argues that North Korea has wakened up the Japanese public opinion. However Japan must make utmost effort to catch up rapidly mutating security environments from East Asia to Middle East as the level of defense setting-up has substantially been lagging behind, ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although U.S. policy toward Asia is often articulated in terms of the emergence and political evolution of China, the U.S.-Japanese relationship has been the primary means of effecting American policy in the region for over a century and a half. If Washington is to achieve a second "Pax Americana" in this century, the relationship with Japan will continue to be a major factor as U.S. policymakers attempt to best devise and implement diplomatic and defense policy in Asia. The rapid development of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance in the past decade indicate that it will continue to be a viable and valuable policy tool in this effort, although there are several areas where it remains deficient relative to the demands placed upon it. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The worsening Sino-Japanese relations threaten East Asian regional stability and have serious implications for Canadian interests in promoting peace, economic prosperity and good governance. Despite growing trade, investment, and other socio-economic ties between China and Japan since 1972 when the two countries normalized diplomatic relations, the level of mutual understanding and trust remains low today. The recent spats over territorial disputes, historical issues, military buildups, and alternative approaches to developing regional security and economic architecture pit the two Asian powers in a dangerous rivalry. There are many reasons behind the ambivalence of the bilateral relationship, including the two countries? changing domestic political dynamics as new generations of leadership take up the rein and as policy debates and processes are increasingly influenced by public opinions and growing nationalist sentiments; divergent views of and interests in the future security architecture in East Asia and the role of military alliances and suspicions in both capitals of each other?s intentions and military buildup; and perceived and actual competition for the region?s political and economic leadership with China?s continuing growth and Japan?s recent recovery. Complicating this changing relationship is the lack of mutual trust, which in turn is further fed by the legacy of the past, territorial disputes, and domestic developments. Indeed, a serious challenge to the leaderships in both capitals is that never in history have both countries been powerful at the same time and this raises the question of how this potential competition for regional primacy is to be managed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan has been looking for a way to make "soft" non-military contributions to peace and security but events have turned Japan in the direction of Article Nine revision and enhancement of Japan's ability to use "hard" military power to support global order. Nevertheless, there still is widespread reluctance in Japan to shift emphasis in this direction. I would suggest that Japan can expand on the precedent set by the Self Defense Forces (SDF) deployment to Samara in Iraq in the direction of soft rather than hard power. Problems in the way of Japan's progress in this direction are conceptual, political, and practical, but are less daunting than those of persisting in a strategy that emphasizes national hard power/traditional security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an outline of a study entitle "Models in Their Minds: European Security Structures and Japan's Promotion of East Asian Security Multilateralism in the Early 1990s." The study poses an hypothesis, which says that European security models and concepts have strongly influenced Japan's promotion of multilateral security cooperation in East Asia first as negative examples and then as models to be used as points of departure for promoting security cooperation in the region.

When Joseph Nye?s famous quote ?Security is like Oxygen.? is first introduced to the Japanese university students, a major of them understand that it means security is free of charge. When they were born, it was the end of the Cold War and the world has been enjoying economic interdependence. To them, the memory of World War II is only in the textbook. In Cultures of Antimilitarism, Thomas U. Berger tests the new model of political-military culture, so called Culturally Bound Actor Model, to post World War II Japan. He concludes that his findings offer a peculiar combination of ?good news? and ?bad news.? The good news is that it is highly unlikely to see Japan aspire to the status of great military power for some time to come. The bad news is that Japan?s unwillingness or inability to respond to military security threat is much greater than assumed by those who believe that Japan?s behavior is merely the consequence of the free ride on security it receives from the United States.The current situation of the Japanese students seems to reaffirm Berger?s good news. However, to fight against the terrorism, Washington needs all the help which it can get. The United States count heavily on Japan for this matter. In order to do so, Washington makes every effort to change what Berger calls a bad news. The worldwide transformation plan of the U.S. Forces overseas unveiled in May 2004 can be regarded as Washington?s effort o change Japan?s unwillingness or inability to military threat. The plan calls for the integration of the headquarters of the U.S. Air Force in Japan and the Japanese Air Defense Force to the Yokota Air Base. It also plans to relocate the headquarters of the U.S. 1st Army Corps from the State of Washington to Kanagawa prefecture in Japan. The plan includes the pullout of 12000 troops, a third of the 37000 American troops in South Korea.While Washington seek to demand more contribution from Japan and Japan?s defense integration with the United States, it will be highly unlikely to see Japan live up to America?s expectation unless Japanese Foreign Policy Formation shifts from Culturally Bound Actor model to Rational Actor Model. This transformation will not be succeeded only by the agreement of leaders between Washington and Tokyo. It will not be achieved without changing Japanese people?s understanding of security and cultivating their wish to contribute to international security, based on Japan?s status. Otherwise, Washington? bad news will always remain as headaches to the U.S.-Japan Relations. tries to focus on the need to expand the Realist paradigm and Security Studies in International Relations classrooms in the Japanese universities to educate the future generations of the Japanese to understand what security means, what it takes to sustain security, and what Japan needs to do. Based on the survey of International Relations curriculum at the Japanese universities, it will first describe how little the Realist paradigm and Security studies are taught. Then, it will introduce a few good initiatives as models for the future. Finally, I will present a semester long model course focusing on the Realist Paradigm and Security Studies with the intention of narrowing the gap of understanding of security between Washington and Tokyo. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will analyse and discuss the recent development in the relationship between China and Japan and its implications for security in Northeast Asia and for international security. The argument is that the relationship between China and Japan constitutes a serious risk of developing into a dominating regional bipolarity with characteristics similar to the Cold War bipolarity. Such a development will not only have strong implications for security in Northeast Asia, but also for international security especially due to the United StatesÂ’ security alliance with Japan and the strong interest of the United States to maintain its strong role in Asian security. The development in the Sino-Japanese relationship towards a hostile dominating regional bipolarity is however not inevitable and by adopting a long-term policy focusing on balancing the American security relations to Japan and China, the United States can help pre-empt such a development. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]