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This paper offers an overview of subtle yet significant shifts in Beijing's stance on non-interference and evolving standards of responsible international engagement in humanitarian crises to highlight China's clear, but cautious, support for the responsibility to protect (R2P). Although it is reticent to apply sanctions and objects to nonconsensual force, China has consistently affirmed the R2P principle and issued corresponding statements in favor of bolstering the UN's capacity to avert mass atrocity. China's statements provide a basis for Beijing to play a constructive, if reserved, role in translating the responsibility to protect from principle to practice. This paper argues that the path of most promise and least resistance for consolidating China's support for implementing the responsibility to protect is paved in practical engagement rather than polemics. It concludes with specific measures that may be taken for China to contribute to upholding the global pledge to protect populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contends that coming to terms with the nature of China's "rise" requires a much closer examination of what Beijing wants the current world order to look like, and how it defines China's place within such a system. It argues that at the core of such issues lies an emerging struggle over defining contemporary Chinese national identity. Simply put, the paper will demonstrate that the diversity of competing identity constructs in China today is staggering, such a plurality makes it exceedingly difficult to define what those in China today want, and this trend has been largely overlooked in the existing secondary literature on China's rise and Chinese nationalism ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beijing and Taipei experienced an uneasy and even turbulent period of bilateral relations after the mid-1990s, particularly during the period 2000-08 when the pro-Taiwan independence party, DPP, was in office. With the KMT, which has a very different perc ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As feminists and women’s activists across the globe have engaged in diverse forms of collective protest, they have also necessarily confronted the same rocky terrain of intersectionalities and multiple identities with which feminist theorists have long grappled. Such differences continually threaten to splinter women’s movements, yet many activists remain committed to finding paths to solidarity. Movement actors have repeatedly disrupted important boundaries and negotiated cultural, racial, national, religious, sexual, and material differences. The development of strategic discourses, or frames, that connect seemingly disparate issues, such as violence against women, economic development, sexual identity, and militarism, while simultaneously responding effectively to external threats and opportunities, has been a vital piece of this process. In this paper, I argue that activists’ strategic deployment and adaptation of discourses in the face of changing political and discursive opportunities in the post-Beijing era can yield important insights for feminist theorizing. Drawing primarily on a discourse analysis of organizational documents produced by a selected sample of transnational feminist networks, and secondarily on participant observation at two World Social Forums, I examine the diverse landscape of contemporary transnational feminist framing and give particular attention to differences in strategic approaches among feminist movement actors. From these activist discourses I attempt to distill theoretical lessons regarding issues of similarity and difference, instrumentality and ideology, and especially the challenges and possibilities of coalition politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China continues its shift from being an energy exporter to one of the greatest importers in the world, Beijing's foreign policy is becoming increasingly sensitive not only to the international energy market, but also to the security of its energy trade routes. Since 2003, there has been increased talk within the Chinese government of a "Malacca Dilemma", the problem of potential trade bottlenecks in the South China Sea region which could conceivably be blocked, creating a potential political and economic crisis for China. This thinking has greatly affected China's diplomacy in Southeast Asia but also with other energy producing regions in the developing world. This paper will examine the geo-strategic question of the Malacca Dilemma and its effects on Chinese energy policy and its 'new diplomacy', including whether its policies will bring it into greater opposition with the West as it too seeks to secure energy sources from the Middle East and beyond. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since early 2003, China has been playing an increasingly more pro-active but equally more frustrating role in seeking a resolution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. Specifically, Beijing has been instrumental in providing the impetus and venue for the trilateral meeting and later, Six-Party Talks. While the multilateral forum offers good opportunity for China and the United States to cooperate on an issue of common interest, it also imposes on China the unenviable task of reconciling apparently irreconcilable positions between Pyongyang and Washington, with the risk of alienating both in the process. The dilemmas and difficulties China faces and hence its balancing act must be placed in the broader contexts of Beijing's interest in a de-nuclearized Korean Peninsula, in particular in that it averts a possible nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia; China-DPRK relations, not from an ideological perspective but more from one of securing a strategic buffer; and the growing ties between Beijing and Seoul and China's views of the longer term prospects of a unified Korea and the consequences for China's security. This paper seeks to analyze China's declared policies and its diplomacy, with a viewing to uncovering how and to what extent its pro-active diplomacy and occasional reluctance in involvement both advance and reflect its core strategic interests and larger implications for regional security. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The “Genocide Olympics” campaigns present a special challenge to Beijing. The incendiary label not only targets Beijing as complicit to Khartoum’s genocide in Darfur, it also soils Beijing’s “coming out party” â€" the upcoming Olympic Games. To be link ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once a faithful supporter of its Communist brother, Beijing seems to now be oscillating between open friendship and embarrassment toward Pyongyang. As such, what does China want its relationship with North Korea to be, and vice-versa?This research aim ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent year, there have been significant developments in the peace and stability in cross-Strait relations, which is critical to the international relations in East Asia. At the same time, economic interdependence links mainland China with the US and T ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Driven by the dream of independence and prosperity, the Chinese has been struggling for their integration into the world over more than one hundred years. Since the opening up and reform in 1978, China has speeded up this process. The upcoming 2008 Beijin ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analysis of the extent and consequences of China’s growing involvement with international markets. They see deep and extensive links with global markets and with supply chains for components, technology and research as significant aspects of China’s past development that appear poised to assume even greater importance in the future. Growing dependence on access to far-flung networks that provide resources, markets, semi-fabricates, capital, technology, management expertise and many other crucial ingredients in China’s dynamic economy creates powerful incentives for Beijing to craft policies oriented toward cooperation rather than conflict. Although tension and strife may overcome the forces pushing for cooperation, the authors argue that the growing dependence of China’s prosperity on massive engagement with global markets elicits a positive Chinese response to cooperative approaches to difficult regional and global problems. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]