Search

Given their economic capacity and tradition as the major providers of Overseas Development Aid, global development policy is an obvious field for much more advanced co-operation between Europe and Japan. However, while there are similar intentions and responsibilities, actual policies and preferences differ. Apart from different regional emphases, there are also different normative considerations that guide European and Japanese development assistance. Japan and Europe seem agree on a philosophy that emphasises humanitarian considerations, an appreciation of the concept of “human security”, the recognition of global interdependence, environmental conservation and potential for self-help as desirable conditions for development aid. When actual decisions on donations are made, many other considerations, among them traditional notions of regional hegemony and trade interest, seem to guide policy-makers in both regions. The paper looks at shared and differing concepts of Japanese and European development aid and asks whether better co-ordination between the poles could change the global debate on development aid. The paper has a normative agenda which is, however, rooted in a remarkably deep understanding of the practicalities of Japanese ODA. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For conventional studies of the English School, Japan’s interactions with International Society takes place only after Perry knocked down Japan’s doors in 1853. Until this point, Japan’s relations with Europe are presumed to have taken place under conditions of an ‘international system’, with minimal rules and common norms to govern their relations. This paper undertakes a fresh examination of Tokugawa Japan’s interactions Europe to challenge this account. The Tokugawa shogunate’s attempts to legitimate its position as the rightful ruler of Japan led to attempts to monopolise the conduct of diplomatic relations, and resulted in the emergence of a Japan-centric international order modelled on the hierarchical Chinese international order. Under this order, the Europeans had to consent to the rules set to them by the Japanese rulers if they were to maintain their trading and political relations. Furthermore, they were relegated to the lowest rung of the social hierarchy, and reduced to performing an ‘exotic other’ which served to confirm Japanese identity as the centre of the cosmos. This paper presents an empirical challenge to existing accounts of European relations with the non-European world by examining a case where the Asian polity dominated and dictated the rules of interaction, thus demonstrating that different civilisations can indeed establish societal relations in the absence of a common culture or ‘standard of civilisation’. It will generate implications for emerging scholarship in the English School tradition which calls for greater homogeneity among different polities in order to advance the ‘good’ international life. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does globalization bring forth fundamental institutional changes in national political economy? In this paper, I claim that domestic political institutions take a critical role in mediating the forces for change in markets. With a comparative case study of labor market reforms in Japan and Korea since the late 1980s, this paper argues that political and economic coordination mechanisms account for variations in the scope of reform agendas and policy outcomes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By using the Koizumi’s administration foreign policy towards North Korea as a case study, this paper argues that a constructivism framework can bring a new perspective to the Japanese questions of security by linking them to the identity construction and its reproduction process. Exploring Japan’s relationship with North Korea in such a perspective challenges the dominant representation of Japanese identity. In the first part of my paper, I deal with the dominant representation of Japanese identity by defining the terms of this dynamic concept. I then focus on the recent structural changes such as the “North Korean threat” and the redefinition of the American security alliance, which take took place under the Koizumi administration.In the second part of my paper, I approach the recent right-wing turning point in Japan’s political spectrum as a redefinition of national security in relation to the balancing process of identity construction.Finally, I conclude by exploring a few definitions of “foreign policy” such as the one proposed by David Campbell which represents it as an exclusion process to bring under control parts of population who disagree or might be a threat to the dominant representation of national identity. This part will end our survey about the looping interactions established between identity construction and security policy, by examining how the latter can further influence the dynamic process of identity reproduction through domestic policies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A shift from active pursuit of multilateral security framework in East Asia to enhancement of the U.S.-Japan alliance has characterized Japanese security policy during the last decade. Despite this shift, Japan has continued to diversify its security partners in East Asia. This paper will describe a broad range of Japan’s security cooperation with ASEAN countries and analyze the drivers of such cooperation. In doing so, the paper intends to seek a nuanced and empirically grounded explanation of Japanese security policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how the dynamics of multiparty decision making in parliamentary coalition governments affect international conflict, peace, and the stability of governments. It examines the conflicting expectations on the role of coalition cabinet politics in decisions affecting governments? foreign relations in Dutch, Japanese, and Turkish comparative case studies of foreign policy in the Netherlands, Japan, and Turkey from the 1980s to the present day. These cases are all instances of disagreement between coalition partners over foreign policy and focus on the way in which coalition politics affected the policymaking process, the foreign policy decisions, and the quality of the decision making process. This paper is part of a broader project that is cross-national, multi-methodological, and focuses on the policymaking process to examine the assumptions often made about coalition politics. Its purpose is to provide an analytical framework on the conditions under which coalition cabinets are effective and the factors that affect how coalition politics influences foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of norms and ideas upon international relations are at the center of my research interests. In this paper, I seek to reposition the status of norms as merely intervening variables to independent variables and address how they shape the media as an institution and decide its relations with state actors. My paper examines how Japan's top two national dailies (also the world's top two in terms of circulation) have covered China since the mid-1990s, when the relations between these two Asian giants began to deteriorate, a trend that is still going on today. I argue that these portrayals are driven more by concerns about Japan than about China, and that Japanese journalists choose from a limited series of normative frames, explaining China so as to understand Japan's place and identity in the world. This suggests that international reportage is about how the press domesticates foreign countries: China?s image has been socially constructed as a mirror by the Japanese media to reflect Japan?s own successes and problems. This paper further argues that the ?China Mirror? is in the process of being transformed from a fun-house mirror to a real mirror: that is, the portrait of China and of bilateral relations is changing from simple and one-sided moral judgments to a more contextualized representation. Hence, at a time when prevailing views on China?s swift rise as a world power would suggest increasing Japanese hostility and suspicion toward the country, instead we see a more complex media portrayal of China and of Japan-China relations. This recognition points to the autonomy of the Japanese press vis-à-vis a democratic home country and an authoritarian host country. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Japanese system of decision-making is often referred to as Japan, Inc., alluding to a blending of political, bureaucratic, and business circles into one unit. This relationship has also been portrayed as the horizontal bar on the letter T with the vertical bar symbolizing the hierarchically structured society that is subservient to its ruling class (Pempel 1987; Broadbent 2002). This paper argues that the Japanese political system is not always quite so rigid. Looking at climate governance, specifically the period during 2001-02 when Japan sought to reposition itself after the Bush Administration's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol reveals that public opinion and non-profit organizations were influential forces. Japan is constitutionally a parliamentary democracy, but power has rested primarily with the major ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI, before 2001 called MITI), and business (with the business association Keidanren as its primary mouthpiece). Prime ministerial power is limited not just because Japan is a parliamentary democracy, but because of the strong prevalence of factional politics within the LDP (Orr 1990). Although non-profit organizations are comparatively weak in Japan, they are gradually emancipating.This paper examines the roles of state and non-nation state actors in determining climate policy. Many studies on Japanese politics have used the reactive versus proactive dichotomy. While the Japan-as-'proactive-state' proponents argue that Japan's foreign policy is primarily internally driven (Yasutomo 1995; Anderson 1993; Nester 1990), the 'reactive-state' advocates claim that it is subject to significant foreign pressure (gaiatsu). However, the advocates are divided over whether this is due to international systemic conditions - that is, Japan's dependence on the United States for defense or trade - or whether domestic factors are the cause of Japan's passiveness (Calder 1988; Schoppa 1997; Orr 1990; Sato 1977). Such factors include the strong sectionalism of Japan's bureaucracy, the absence of a powerful central executive, Japan's unique electoral system, and the factionalism of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Calder 1988); in fact, they seem to include almost anything in the Japanese political system that is peculiar to the Western eye.Since assessments of the 'reactive state' theory diverge significantly, it has to be concluded that the extent of reactiveness or proactiveness by Japan on a particular foreign policy issue depends to a great deal on the respective determinants of a policy issue. They can include vested interests, strategic factors such as energy dependence, foreign policy goals or the level of media attention. If these determinants are weak, then Japan is more likely to be reactive to foreign pressure. Campbell (1992, xxx) argues that the presence (or absence) of a policy sponsor with sufficient resources, drive and skills to push a particular issue forward (or hold it back) is "the single most important 'variable' in determining whether and when a policy change will occur, and sometimes its contents as well".This paper describes the Japanese political system and examines the Japanese policy constituency on climate change to ascertain whether there is a policy sponsor and who this is who is driving the Japanese climate change agenda, and what role non-state actors play in this process. It starts from the premise that different types of policy networks exist in Japan, which span from stable, highly-integrated policy communities with restricted membership to unstable, loosely-integrated issue networks with large numbers of participants (Rhodes and Marsh 1992)... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The implications surrounding Japan?s population decline and its corollary?the growing need for foreign labor?continue to be widely discussed. The majority of this attention, both mainstream and academic alike, has been provoked by the ways in which the issue stages a critical tension in contemporary Japanese society: the industrial and service sector demands for foreign labor versus a seemingly narrow belief in ethno-cultural homogeneity. While numerous political, economic, and cultural analyses have sought to mitigate this conflict, the present study contends that their marginal gains can be attributed to a failure to recognize what Connolly refers to as the "identity\difference paradox." This paper, therefore, proceeds by focusing on the case of the nikkei (foreign-born Japanese and their descendents) since they stand as not only the policymakers' first attempt to address the labor issue, but also as disruptive subjects who are viewed as being neither "truly Japanese" nor "resolutely foreign." Thus, by employing a Deleuzian conception of "the One," "the Many," and "the Multiple," the paper will trace how three enunciative spaces (i.e. Japanese policymakers, activists/academics, and the nikkei themselves) frame Japan's nikkei population through various conceptions of difference: 1) a universalism that maintains national exclusions, 2) "minority" claims that demand, yet inhibit, pluralization, and 3) singular identifications that undermine the previous two. At stake in this treatment lays the very possibility of creating a more hospitable Japan?one that would be able to accommodate intra-national differences through acts of tolerance, plurality, and non-violence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic integration has been progressing rapidly in Northeast Asia, particularly among Japan, China, and South Korea, and a large volume of industrial and cultural products flow across the region. Despite high-level economic integration, the three countries have not developed an institutional arrangement to stabilize regional politics. To the contrary, Japan and the other two countries continue to dispute over issues related to Japan?s wartime past, including controversies over Yasukuni shrine and Japan?s history textbooks. Based on the constructivist approach, this paper explains why the three countries fight over these issues, focusing on state identity and politics of recognition. Japan developed its state identity mainly through interactions with the United States. Japanese leaders emphasize that Japan, as a liberal democratic country, has developed a pacifist stance after World War II. They want other countries to recognize that their actions, including the prime minister?s visit to the shrine, are consistent with the pacifist stance. In contrast, the memory of Japan?s past colonial rule plays an important part in China and South Korea?s state identity formation. State leaders in each country denounce the colonial rule as unjust invasion while praising past nationalist leaders? fight against it as patriotic. They demand Japan?s current leaders to recognize (acknowledge) wrongdoings of Japan?s colonial rule, opposing any actions that imply Japanese leaders? support for or tolerance of the colonial rule. Through the analysis of the current controversies between the three countries, this paper develops a theoretical discussion of identity and recognition in international relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although IR scholars have offered various explanations for the origins of sovereignty, the literature is yet to offer a convincing one. Rejecting the hypothesis to locate sovereignty with Westphalia, this paper traces the emergence of sovereignty to two nineteenth century developments: the dominance of the positivist legal theory and the ascendancy of European states over non-European states. Theoretically, this paper integrates critical legal theory and postcolonial theory into international relations theory. The critical legal theory clarifies how three doctrines that constructed sovereignty (state?s ultimate authority, territoriality, recognition) were directly related to the positivist (as opposed to earlier natural) legal theory. The postcolonial theory illuminates how the positivist legal theory?s construction of sovereignty was related to the legitimization of European and delegitimization of non-European political entities. Sovereignty both justified and enabled Europe? domination over non-European political entities. The empirical part of the paper examines the imposition of extraterritoriality (European states? exclusive jurisdiction over their citizens in non-European states) in Japan, China, Turkey, Iran, and Thailand to provide evidence that positivist legal theory?s attempt to conceptualize the interaction of European states? interaction with the non-European political entities crystallized the doctrine of sovereignty. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the evolution of Japanese national attitudes and security policy since the Cold War and will demonstrate how ideational explanations provide insights into Japan?s security policy in the 21st century. Adopting the constructivist framework of ideational impact on national policy (e.g., Katzenstein, 1996) but challenging the constructivist conclusion that Japan?s national identity is a pacifist state, this study will demonstrate how changes in Japanese collective identity have impacted security policy over the last fifteen years. Three questions will be asked: (1) How have public attitudes evolved in Japan since the end of the Cold War and how have these changing public attitudes affected security policy to date?; (2) what domestic and international factors explain shifts in public attitudes and national policy?; and (3) what are the implications of changes in public attitudes and national identity for the future of Japanese security policy?This paper argues that the highly unstable environments in East Asia and the world have encouraged the emergence of a new collective identity in Japan based on the concept of a ?normal state,? a state possessing military power commensurate with its economic power. The idea of a normal state has been promoted by ?international hawks? who define Japan?s national role not only as a promoter of its national interests but also as a defender of international peace and security that does not hesitate to resort to military means when necessary. The paper further argues that this new identity has affected the behavior of state leaders, who have sought to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security treaty and significantly expand the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines institutional design and change of financial regulatory systems as one of significant post-crisis financial reform efforts in Japan, Mexico, and South Korea. There has been a plethora of research concerning financial reform not just in the academic works but also in policy prescriptions from international financial institutions such as IMF and BIS. However, while most works emphasize the benefits of prudential regulation through financial reform, their emphasis has been put on its significance per se rather than on the conditions under which financial regulatory systems can be better designed and implemented as planned. Similarly, economic literature on this topic has been basically apolitical, not being able to take into account how diverse actors can strategically initiate, transform or resist reform efforts. Economic crises and subsequent reform efforts in post-bubble Japan, post-1994 Mexico and post-1997 South Korea provide a great opportunity to examine the similarities and differences in financial reform processes and outcomes. This is so since, despite differences in their pre-crisis financial systems, there had been considerable similarities among them such as (a) use of financial regulation as a primary policy instrument for economic adjustment and development, (b) the prominent role of state, especially finance ministries, in financial sectors, and (c) the timing of crises and financial reforms since mid-1990s. However, did Japan, Mexico, and Korea adopt similar post-crisis institutional settings for financial regulation because of pre-crisis similarities and international norms of prudential regulation? If not, why did they choose different institutional designs? To what extent have the post-reform regulatory systems been successful in prudential regulation? In order to answer these questions, this paper challenges previous works that emphasized organized interest groups and their influence on reform politics. Rather, it takes seriously the role of unorganized public that has been largely underestimated because of its lack of information and collective action problem and the conditions under which political leadership had to serve the public. It also questions the role of international actors and norms in financial regulation. Given the fact that even the most arm?s-length financial regulation leaves considerable room for subjective assessment of regulators, international norms and best practices are likely to be mediated by national institutions and conflicts among actors. Finally, this study compares the post-reform institutional changes of financial regulatory system in these countries by looking at the interaction between well-established pre-crisis regulators and newly established regulatory agencies. This study can contribute to a better understanding of how financial regulation is designed and under what conditions it is implemented as designed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northeast Asia (for the purpose of this paper, China, Japan, and South Korea) may be described as the most dynamic region today. Some Asian scholars like Cho Myungrae, Sum Ngai Ling and Tao Lai Po-wah assert that Northeast Asia is a potential bloc. Some Western scholars; Simon and Gartzke, Waltz to some extent, and especially Huntington lend support to the above. This paper attempted to investigate the truth to the above claim using variables like trade, cultural affinities, common memberships in IGOs, and the BOP/fear factor (of the hegemon). The findings of this paper question the strength of the Korea-US and Japan-US alliance. Does peace between China, Japan, and South Korea prove Huntington's "shared foundation of culture"/"cultural-consciousness" ideas or simply prove the liberal peace theory. Or is Northeast Asia a marvelous example of a combination of both ideas. Northeast Asia is a test of this. Can we refute formation of a bloc simply because there is no formal agreement? Could it be invisible, operating on oriental-styled informal, familiarity-based structures rather than western formal ways. If so, is this the beginning of a future alliance? The uniqueness of this paper is it takes into consideration both Asian and western scholars' views and discusses implications of a Northeast Asian alliance. In addition, the paper adresses implications of the above for American foreign policy - should the U.S. prevent the formation or prepare for it. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1980s, the notion of national identity and the nature of its relationship with foreign policy have been in the focus of constructivist and post-structuralist scholarship. In both theoretical approaches, the nature of the relationship is pre-determined. The constructivist scholars tend to treat the national identity as a cognitive lens through which national interests and related polices are defined and shaped. In a post-structuralist analysis, foreign policy is often perceived as a practice of difference that creates borders and enhances the national identity construction.The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between national identity discourse of the Japanese ?self? vis-à-vis the Russian ?other? and foreign policy without any pre-theorization regarding the relationship.In the first part this paper examines the structure of contemporary Japan?s national identity construction vis-à-vis Russia. It argues that Russia, because of her role as a traditional ?other? for the West, has played a special role in Japan?s attempt to construct herself as a member of the universal realm of ?modern nations.? The second part of the paper examines Japan?s foreign policy vis-à-vis post-communist Russia along three dimensions; economic, military and the territorial dispute related to the islands captured by the Soviet Union during the last days of the Pacific War. Identity does not matter in economy- business as usual with profits overriding other concerns related to territory and history. Identity is slightly visible in the security discourse as seen in the lack of long-term trust of Russia?s intentions among the members of the security community. In the context of the the territorial dispute, identity shapes and, at the same time, is shaped by the policy related to this dispute. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on the International Whaling Commission (IWC) notes that some pro-whaling countries have encouraged developing countries to join. Many of these new entrants to the IWC have dubious ties to whaling as either a cultural, economic, or environmental interest. For example, consider that Japan lobbied for land-locked Mali to become a member in 2004. Several NGOs, journalists, and delegates from other member states have raised questioned whether or not pro-whaling countries are attempting to overcome their current minority coalition status in the IWC though the ?buying? of votes from countries to which they provide a great deal of foreign aid. Before answering the ?vote buying? question, prior questions must be answered: what is the similarity of votes between the new entrants and the pro-whaling countries? This paper analyzes voting patterns in the IWC for all years votes are publically available.To determine the similarity of votes, this paper calculates the voting affinity of dyads in the IWC in a given year. Each annual meeting results in about two dozen recorded votes. It is expected that countries that have recently joined the IWC will vote more frequently with Japan and other pro-whaling members. The method applied is similar to that used by Gartzke (1998) in assessing the similarity of votes in the UN General Assembly (see also Oneal and Russett 1999; Reuveny and Li 2003). Using the measure of similarity, S, defined by Signorino and Ritter (1999), this paper analyzes the similarity in members? votes in the IWC. Multiple calculations are performed with different weightings for substantive and procedural votes. In short, this paper provides an additional measure of dyadic voting similarity that can be used to supplement extant measures such as the now widely used UN voting variable. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal Reform in Japan: the Establishment of American Style Law Schools and Reinstitution of Jury System In recent years the Japanese government has set up American style graduate level three year law schools (Hoka Daigakuin) in Japan. The primary purpose of this initiative is to increase the qualified number of lawyers, prosecutors and judges in order to meet increasingly litigious societal needs and to meet global business challenge. The current number of lawyers (Bengoshi) in Japan is approximately 20,000 mostly concentrated in urban areas. This represents one lawyer for 6,300 Japanese. There are 941,000 lawyers in the United States or one for 290 Americans. The Japanese government wishes to increase the number of passers of the annual National Bar Exam from current 1,000 level to 3,000 level by about 2010. More than 70 percent of graduates of law schools are expected to pass the Bar Exam at their first try. The content of the Bar Exam will be to a large extent revised in accordance with the curriculum of the new graduate law schools. In addition, the Japanese government plans to re-institute the jury (Saiban-in) system in criminal law procedure in 2009. According to the Japanese government, this attempt is to encourage citizen participation in the judicial process in Japan and to improve the rule of law in Japanese society. The judicial process has been considered the last bastion of Okami (officialdom) based on the Confucian reverence for officialdom ? ?Respect official; and despise subject.? (Kanson Minpi). Critics argue that the decisions made by judges have been at times out of touch because of lack of citizen participation in the judicial process. Japanese courts have astonishingly a conviction rate of 99.9 percent. This paper examines recent legal reform in Japan from various perspectives. First, the paper examines rationale of the reform followed by law school curriculum, national bar examination, process of becoming lawyers in Japan, internationalization of lawyers, and reinstitution of jury system. The paper explores, further, whether the legal reform gives any impact on the issue of Japan?s war reparation and on deteriorating relations with neighboring countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan?s quest for regional order-building has a mixed historical record. During the first half of the 20th century, the country pursued its vision of a Japan-centered regional order, termed as the Grater East Asia Co-prosper Sphere, excluding the United States, only to bring total catastrophe to the region. Four decades later in the early 1990s, it conceptualized the ?multi-tiered? structure of regional security, with the US-Japan alliance as the linchpin, and rather quietly promoted it with some success. Despite such stark contrasts, the two instances show one commonality?Japan was an ascending power. With this backdrop, the paper examines Japan?s current attitude toward the question of the emerging regional order. Is Japan, now far from being an ascending power thanks to decade-long economic stagnation, and in the face of a new, rapidly ascending power, China, still committed to regional order-building? If so, does Japan still maintain a ?multi-tiered? regional order, in which the position of China is unspecified. Or has the country conceived of a new kind of regional order to reflect the current power balance in Asia? Through addressing these questions, the paper seeks to articulate the factors that shape Japan?s perspective of a regional security order and assess the possible implications for the country?s relations with other regional countries, especially China, overall intra-regional relations, and the ongoing discussion on the recently proposed East Asian Community. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1989 and 2000, Japan was the largest foreign aid donor in the world. Meanwhile, Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) had played a prominent role in Japan's foreign policy. Yet public recognition of Japan's ODA as a critical foreign policy tool seems low, and the effectiveness of this foreign policy is uncertain. Therefore, this paper analyzes Japan's national interests and how Japan's foreign aid attained its foreign policy goals. First, Japanese national interests will be examined by content analysis using white papers prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Second, it surveys Japan's foreign aid policy as a foreign policy tool. Third, this study attempts to assess if Japan's national interests were achieved while Japan was one of the largest ODA donors in the world. Quantitative studies reveal whether Japan's ODA provided positive impact on Japanese economic, diplomatic, and security interests. Finally, the research findings suggest how Japan should define and formulate its foreign aid policy as a foreign policy tool in the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic theorists depict the process of appraising the national interest, developing a supporting foreign policy, and crafting strategy that applies resources to policy ends as one of the most important and most vexing challenges of statecraft. This challenge is particularly difficult for contemporary Japan, where the habit of strategic thought has fallen into disuse -- and disrepute --owing in large part to decades of constitutional pacifism. With regard to sea power, the legacies of militarism and wartime defeat discredited strategic theory. Japanese leaders evidently recoil from Alfred Thayer Mahan's sea-power theories as they consider how to uphold Japan's interests at sea. Nor has Mahan been replaced in the Japanese lexicon by a less bellicose strategist such as Julian Corbett or C. E. Callwell. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces' (JMSDF) postwar dependency on the U.S. armed forces has only compounded the difficulties Tokyo faces as it rethinks its maritime policy and strategy in a more and more complex security environment.In recent years Japan has moved gradually to resume its place as a "normal" country, including in maritime affairs. Tokyo dispatched JMSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the first Gulf War, for example, and after September 11 it deployed escorts and logistics ships to support the coalition flotilla watching for terrorists fleeing Afghanistan. At the same time, Japanese leaders have evinced increasing enthusiasm for humanitarian operations. JMSDF units joined the massive multinational relief operation following the 2004 tsunami that struck South and Southeast Asia. Tokyo has portrayed the tsunami relief effort as a model for future maritime operations, not only out of genuine concern for disaster relief but as a way to amass "soft power" and to confer legitimacy on a more activist military strategy in the eyes of the Japanese populace. It is evident that Tokyo is increasingly couching "hard" maritime power in humanitarian terms.The dual nature of Japan's emerging maritime strategy, which seeks to cope with both conventional threats and new humanitarian responsibilities, raises several important theoretical and policy-relevant questions that we intend to address. Tokyo has declared that it will expand its new array of missions while continuing to discharge traditional missions such as defense of the sea lines of communication and the home islands, all at current funding levels and with the same force structure that now comprises the JMSDF. Accordingly, we will ask: Are these ambitious objectives feasible? Has Japan created a mismatch between policy and strategy? If so, how can it realign its maritime strategy with policy? Should (or can) it scale back humanitarian operations and other nontraditional initiatives? Should it rethink how it approaches traditional maritime security missions such as sea-lane defense? Should (or can) it increase naval spending and acquire new platforms? What kind of assets would the JMSDF need to execute a more ambitious slate of missions? Which strategic theorist supplies the best guidance in these matters?We will conclude that unless Japan conducts a thoroughgoing reassessment of its maritime posture, it will confront severe strategic dilemmas arising from a mismatch in policy and strategy. To help Japanese and U.S. decision-makers fend off such an outcome, the paper will generate a series of policy-relevant recommendations for Japan and its seafaring partner, the United States. We thus expect the paper to have immediate policy relevance for strategists and alliance managers, both in Tokyo and Washington. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses how and to what extent the international norm concerning the prohibition of the death penalty plays a role in East Asian democracies. In stark contrast to the worldwide abolitionist trend, the death penalty remains most entrenched in Asia, where more than 90 percent of all known executions take place. Why does the norm against the death penalty, which is apparently so important for most parts of the world, seem to have no impact on East Asia? How do domestic factors ? political leadership, public opinion, and institutional structures ? contribute to the rejection of the universally promoted human rights norm? With regard to the three major democracies in East Asia at different stages of the anti-death penalty movement (South Korea, most active in the abolitionist movement; Taiwan in the middle; and Japan least active), it investigates what accounts for the current varying impact of the norm in the same region. Analyzing how public and elite opinion interact with each other on capital punishment and what roles domestic institutional structures play, this paper aims to assess norm diffusion and to measure the norm?s capabilities and limitations for helping to shape new death penalty policy in this region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developmental state theories are one of comparative socio-political economy?s most prominent modes of explaining cases of state-led successful economic development. Nonetheless, while they had greatly improved our understanding of the positive functions states can play in industrial development, and the mechanisms through which they do so, to date they have proved to be inadequate in explaining the differences between diverse successful state-led economic-development. We know a lot about how state?s structure can influence development, but we know much less about why different development states succeed or fail in different ways, industries, and periods.Recently, a new cohort of scholars, termed throughout this paper as the neo-developmental statists, has come up with an explanation for these puzzles. The neo-developmental statitsts contend that for success in high technology industries, unlike in more mature industries, there is a need for a different state structure ? the networked structure. If, so the argument goes, in the past the Japanese state managed to lead a miraculous economic growth by concentrating on an ever-more complex set of mature and maturing industries and by commanding and controlling the Japanese industry, in the global world of the high-technology industry a different structure of state-industry relationships is needed ? one that relies on meshed networks of state and industry (Ansell 2000; Evans 1995. Pp. 14-15.; O'Riain 2000; O'Riain 2004). Accordingly, if, for example, we want to understand why Japan succeeded in manufacturing cars but failed in software, while Ireland rose to prominence with its software industry, the only thing we need to understand is the extremely different structure of state-industry relations in the two countries. The neo-developmental state theorists proposed a categorization of developmental states based on their structure, arguing that different structures prove more efficient in different times and with different industries. This is an elegant, simple, and aesthetically pleasing explanation. Nevertheless, this paper argues it is wrong. By neglecting ideology, a cornerstone of the early development state theories, both the neo-developmentalists and their structuralist counterparts have missed the overarching cause behind all the differences that they have been trying to explain. Where in ideology I define the framework in which policy makers and businessperson alike construct, and even more importantly, legitimize their actions and mobilize mass support. This paper argues that if we want to understand the difference between successful developmental states, we should focus not only on their structure, but also on their economic-nationalist ideology (hereby: econonationalist ideology). It is the econonationalist ideology that defines what the proper roles of state in industry and industry in state are, what the proper shape of the national industry should be, and who should own it. Looking at structure alone, I contend, is insufficient. Only by understanding the roles of both structure and ideology can we fully understand the differences between varied cases of state-led development. In order to advance this argument, this paper subjects it to a strong test using the critical case study method (King et al. 1994; Ragin 1987; Van Evera 1997; Yin 1994). It compares the structure of the ideal-type ?old? style developmental state ? Japan ? with the ideal-type ?neo? or ?networked? developmental state ? Ireland. This comparison is done in order to first, show that in fact state-industry structure in Japan and Ireland is similar enough that we need to conclude that it adheres to the same model. Second, the comparison aims to show that the significant differences between the two cases are much better explained by econonationalist ideology, not by structure. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the second part of a time series analysis of foreign policy attitudes among Japanese foreign policy makers. The paper examines the current goals and direction of Japanese foreign policy makers though a series of interviews conducted in 2006 and compares these attitudes with interviews conducted back in 1998 with the same foreign policy makers. The paper tracks changes in attitudes, perceptions, and goals. It also explores new attitudes within Japan toward the rise of China and Japan?s newly found willingness to deploy the Self Defense forces (SDF) in the war on terror. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper will examine Japan's growing roles in US-sanctioned peace-keeping/building functions and in alliance with the United States, both of which are gradually blurring the border between Japan's self-defense and international security. This narrowing of the two areas is obscuring the relevance and meaning of Japan's policy of recognizing the nation's right to collective self-defense but not exercising that right. This blurring distinction is further eroding the restrictive constraints of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution on Japan's international security role. The paper will discuss these issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During World War II, the Japanese government is said to have conscripted over 100,000 women from the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, China, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines to serve as wartime military sexual slaves or euphemistically known as ?comfort women? for the Japanese military troops between 1932 and 1945. Since the Japanese government?s acknowledgment of its imperial military?s institutionalized sexual slavery in 1992, Tokyo has managed to establish a ?private? compensation program in 1995 for the victims. Despite the calls for the ?formal? compensation accompanied by an ?unambiguous apology? by former sex slaves, the transnational movement organized by various human rights and women?s NGOs, and foreign governments, Tokyo still refuses to provide the formal compensation. The purpose of this paper is to explore various domestic and international reasons for the reluctance to squarely face the wartime guilt and address the public?s ?collective amnesia,? which underlie the Japanese government?s stance on the compensation issue. The paper will also discuss foreign policy implications of the ?comfort women? issue for the Japanese government. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been substantial attention on the so-called history question in China's relations with Japan. It is indeed a serious problem and there is no short-term solution to history and Yasukuni related issues. However, this paper argues that the history issue, as serious as it is, is unlikely to cause a future conflict between the two countries. But the energy issue, and specifically the dispute at the East China Sea, will be a major threat for further deterioration of Japan's relations of China. There is also a possibility of escalation or miscalculation from both sides. The paper will contend that both Beijing and Tokyo should take positive measures to prevent a localized show-down of force in East China Sea, work on common concerns in the energy and environment area, and integrate bilateral energy cooperation into the large framework of bilateral trade, investment and technological cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyzes the relevance of the European integration experience for East Asia's future security architecture. Tracing European cooperative efforts from the early post-World War II days to the present, it argues that the process of European security integration provides useful lessons that can inform a similar process in East Asia. Considering the multi-faceted nature of security threats, the main ingredient of the European success strategy, namely the institutionalization of trust on multiple levels, and hence the creation of a complex web of governance, is likely to be emulated in the long run. While institutions are being created to enhance transparency, efficiency and trust, the paper argues two further developments need to occur to promote East Asian security. First, East Asia needs to deal more effectively with its historical legacy and the German case may provide useful lessons. Secondly, outstanding disputes need to be addressed and it is postulated that confidence-building via multi-layered institutions, similar to those found in Europe, may help resolve these conflicts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 21st century ushered in rising nationalism in both Japan and China. Mutual Sino-Japanese suspicions and accusations have been aggravated by the dispute over demarcating the resource-rich continental shelf in East China Sea and by the competition with regard to securing preferential access in the future construction of a pipeline from East SiberiaGiven that China?s imports of crude oil are projected to double by 2020 in tightening global energy markets, is it likely that Japan, whose dependence on oil imports is nearly 100 percent, may simply escalate conflicts with China with regard to energy security, due to the lack of policy coordination between the two? Is there any conceivable catalyst which may otherwise reverse what is seemingly a spiral of deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations?This paper sheds light on the ?hidden? side of so-called energy security, namely energy conservation; the other side of the coin as regards competition over limited energy supplies is usually emphasized from traditional geopolitical viewpoints. It attempts to explore the prospects for the emergence of an issue-oriented regime by focusing on energy-environmental areas and to examine the possibility of achieving a ?win-win? situation (or positive-sum game) in Northeast Asia It is estimated that China needs approximately ten times the amount of primary energy that Japan does to produce US one dollar equivalent of GDP, whereas the Chinese government considers energy conservation to be an unavoidable impending national issue in terms of maintaining its economic development, as endorsed by the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). Promoting technology transfers from Japan would bolster the sustainable development of the Chinese economy on the one hand, while on the other, Japan would also benefit, not only from mitigating China?s soaring energy demand, but also from promoting carbon emissions trading, particularly by employing the Clean Development Mechanism.It is argued that, despite the prima facie aggravation in the Sino-Japanese relationship, there nevertheless exists much potential for mutual cooperation or, at least, strategic trade-offs, which may in turn lead to stability in bilateral ties in the years to come. In addition to discussing the ongoing development of energy conservation business between the two, this paper addresses the implications of the Asia-Pacific Partnership, advocated by the Bush Administration since July 2005, and the conceivable roles of the United States in stabilizing Northeast Asian energy and environmental issues for the sake of future Sino-Japanese relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines of 1997, the subsequent War on Terrorism and other recent developments have significantly expanded the scope of the bilateral alliance and increased the role of Japan?s military beyond its own shores. This expansion directly affects the security of other Asian states. Deriving predictions from balance of power theory and a modified version of balance of threat theory, this paper tests both theories and attempts to explain Asian reactions. It tests two variables: the presence (or absence) of a military alignment relationship with the US, and wartime experience with the Japanese Empire. Asian reactions are evaluated according to whether they focus on the implications for power aggregation (i.e., the potential for changes to strengthen the aggregated military capabilities of the alliance) versus the implications for the containment function of the alliance (i.e., degrading the constraints on Japan?s reemergence as an independent military power). This paper finds that alignment with the US is less important than wartime experience. Regarding states with a brutal wartime experience, even US allies worry about the potential for expansion to degrade the alliance?s containment function rather than welcoming the power aggregation benefits of an expanded alliance. On the other hand, states that did not have a brutal wartime experience did not express concern about the degrading of the containment function regardless of alignment, and were likely to welcome the power aggregation benefits of the expanded alliance if they were allies or at least loosely aligned with the US. These reactions suggest that an alliance can have an important third-party reassurance effect by appearing to contain the military independence of an apparently threatening power. Finally, this paper assesses the implications of these findings for balance of power and balance of threat theories, and for East Asian regional security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The International Whaling Commission (IWC) is one of the exceptional negotiation arenas where Japan is the center of everyone?s attention. The participants, especially the dominating anti-whaling preservationists, are incessantly told by the Japanese negotiators to obey the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) exactly as it stipulates, to set the preservationists? ideology aside and let science prevail in the negotiations, to mutually respect the culture of participating nations, and to acknowledge the sovereign rights of the whaling nations to utilize cetacean resources sustainably. In parallel, the participants are also told by numerous studies why Japan is doing so. Those studies all presuppose that Japan is seriously trying to resume commercial whaling.However, because Japan?s assertions to lift the moratorium make no difference in the IWC stalemate, those assertions cannot be taken at face value. Rather, it is logically possible for Japan to obscure its real diplomatic objective by claiming the opposite in the IWC negotiations. Along this line of thinking, our argument challenges the common understanding of Japanese whaling diplomacy: since the negotiation phase to re-open the moratorium began, the primary objective of Japanese whaling diplomacy led by the dominating Fisheries Agency (FA) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry is the continuation of the so-called ?scientific whaling? under Article 8 of the ICRW and not the resumption of commercial whaling. We further argue that the Fisheries Agency (FA) even do not want to re-open the moratorium and is only pretending that it is devoted to lift the moratorium because the status-quo surrounding the whaling issue is favorable to continue whaling under Article 8 of the ICRW.Regarding the course of this paper, we begin with reviewing and briefly evaluating the aforementioned studies attempting to explain the Japanese whaling diplomacy. Secondly, a brief overview of the conceptual models is provided to understand the Japanese domestic political structure and process. Then, we thirdly turn to test our argument by counterfactual analysis. Fourthly, the domestic origin of Japanese whaling diplomacy including the policymakers? interests and incentives, and the enabling factors for pursuit of such interests are analyzed and put forward using the framework of a combination of conceptual models of Japanese domestic politics. This paper concludes with policy implications to the whaling controversy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human security, both its theory and practice, has attracted a significant number of academic and policy audiences. Japan is no exception. Nowadays the country prepares a powerful set of discourse, intellectually and practically, on human-centred perspective of security. With these as a background, this paper aims to analyse the relationship between human security and Japanese academic-policy complex. Because of its origin and recent development, human security itself is not a ?Made-In-Japan? product at all. However, the paper will argue that the idea of human security is in a sense very ?Japanese.? Focusing on major streams of both International Relations and International Law scholarships, the paper will present that the country?s academics did make a success to connect their theoretical development with actual policy. The key here is that both streams inherited different expertise from the United States respectively, namely social constructivism and Yale School?s theory of international law and policy sciences, these two streams converged into one theory that served as the foundation of the human security policy agenda. The paper will finally argue that although this policy-oriented academic discourse did contribute to the creation and development of human security, such tendency indeed raises questions that deserve serious reconsideration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses two research questions: (1)How different has China?s policy toward ASEAN and Japan been since the end of the Cold War? (2) What can account for such differences? To address the first question, specific indicators are developed to measure the differences in China?s policy toward ASEAN and Japan since the end of the Cold War. To address the second question, the paper explores a range of major ideational and materialist variables to determine which variable explains better the differences in China?s policy toward ASEAN and Japan since the end of the Cold War. Ideational variables include the relative relevance of Mao?s conception of the three worlds, or the Chinese conception of the North-South relations; the extent to which historical memories make a difference; and the degree to which norms of multilateral cooperation matter. Mao?s conception of the three worlds is somewhat related to historical memories, where China is conceived to be the victim of Western/Japanese imperialism and colonialism, and therefore belongs to the third world, or the South. To the extent ASEAN is commonly and conveniently conceived to be part of the South and Japan part of the North, Mao?s differentiation of the three worlds can be treated as one of the possible explanatory variables for the differences in China?s policy toward ASEAN and Japan. Materialist variables include the assessment of relative security threat and the development of relative military alliances and capabilities; and comparative levels of economic interdependence. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of forced migration and refugees is one of the most pressing of the twenty-first century. The Political Science sub-field of International Relations has been a late-comer to this area of research, however (Hollifeld 2000). Where IR scholars have taken up the issue of migration, there is a focus on economic migration from the global South to the North but one glaring omission from the literatures on both forced migration and that on North-South relations is consideration of the second most powerful economy in the world, Japan. The current rise of another economic power in Northeast Asia has led to more attention to the region but the focus here is usually on migration?often in the form of smuggling?of Chinese to North America and to a lesser extent, the small but steady flow of North Koreans to both China and South Korea. This paper will investigate three key issues as it relates to Japan as part of the ?North? and forced migration. First, the general theoretical concern of the paper will be to illuminate why and how Japan is situated internationally such that it is usually a ?silent partner? in discourses of ?the West? and ?the North.? Or put more boldly, why have scholars, especially those studying forced migration (e.g. Gibney 2004), omitted any serious, sustained consideration of Japan. Second, this paper will seek to offer an alternative explanation to the rationalist focus on economic pull factors as the primary explanation for migration from other parts of Asia to Japan. This will require us to reconsider the taken-for-granted explanations that flows of Chinese, Filippino and other Asian migrants to Japan can be wholly accounted for by the pull of economic opportunity. Third, this paper will offer an analysis of how the Japanese government is responding to the increase of refugees and other forced migrants, including victims of trafficking, in the face of heightened fears of terrorism and criticism in the US State Department?s report on human smuggling in Japan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines what I term the ?second face of security.? Specifically, a state?s unilateral choice of arms, allies, or appeasement can strengthen the political power of some societal and economic actors in foreign states while others will be weakened politically and economically. The domestic winners will then apply pressure on the government to support their preferred grand strategy. In contrast, the more traditional ?first face of security? entails direct attempts to create security by influencing other governments to change their foreign policy. This is accomplished through military or economic statecraft such as the threat or use of military force, economic sanctions, foreign aid, or tariffs. In this paper I examine the intent of Britain?s appeasement policy towards Germany and Japan in the late 1930s. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany represents the model penitent in international affairs. Arguably more than any other nation, it has been willing to confront the dark sides of its history and apologize to its former victims. As a result, it is commonly maintained, the Federal Republic has been able to reap a wide variety of benefits. By reconciling itself with its neighbors, Germany has been able to put an end to the rivalries that historically have plagued central Europe while at the same time laying the foundations for Europe's unparalleled success in building a liberal regional order. Constructivists in particular have often held up German example as a model that others should emulate, including Japan, Russia, Austria and even the United States. Realist and other critics of this narrative have argued that in reality, German efforts to come clean about the past were far as clear cut as is often supposed. Moreover, there is a considerable body of evidence that suggests that German motives were far from pure. Calculations of national interest clearly influenced decisions to when and with whom Germany pursued reconciliation over the past. This paper will analyze the Federal Republic's efforts to deal with the past and compare it with other countries that have faced or face similar problems: Austria, France, Japan and Russia. Whereas once Germany was seen a more or less unique example of a country that has had to deal with the burdens of a troubled past, today there is a host of countries that are confronted with similar issues. This allows the application of the case study method to control for structural variables that may influence the decisions countries chose to take in dealing with the past including the nature of the crimes involved, the degree of regional integration, regime type and the balance of power. The paper will try to stake out a position between the naïve Constructivist and narrow Realist positions. While calculations of national interest undoubtedly influence countries' decisions to pursue historical justice issues, embedded historical narratives help or hinder such decisions, and the failure to harmonize historical narratives may have far reaching impact on a countries position in the international system. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Labor everywhere is assumed to be under pressure as a result of shifts under way in the global economy. This pressure is manifested in the political marginalization of trade unions, the decline of union density, the significant reduction in job and income security, and changes in labor legislation intended to facilitate greater ?flexibility? in labor markets and social pacts. This paper is predicated on the assumption that the extent of, and responses to, these challenges vary significantly for organized labor in the North and South, with the more accelerated shrinking of the manufacturing base creating special problems for union recruitment in the North and the more accelerated growth of informal labor markets creating special difficulties for collective action in the South. The paper offers a paired comparison of the evolution of labor politics in two Asian economies, one of which, Japan, represents the North, and one of which, India, represents the South. Both societies have established formally democratic political institutions with some legal protection for trade union rights and labor standards. Both have made efforts to employ job security and generous enterprise-centered welfare benefits to reward the more privileged components of the workforce and thus maintain some semblance of labor peace in critical sectors (public sector employees in India and regular male workers in large corporations in Japan). Since the mid-1980s, unions in both countries have been facing mounting difficulties in rallying their members and applying meaningful political pressure, as laws and practices have steadily evolved in a direction that favors greater flexibility for business in terms of employment practices. Given the position of their constituencies within the national polity and the global economy, however, unions in the two countries have been responding to the challenges in quite different ways. In Japan, unions have sought to unite under a single umbrella organization (Rengo) with more militant unions left on the margins. Although internal splits have appeared, unification has permitted Rengo a chance to devise new strategies by reaching out to part-timers and temporary workers in order to regain the interest of the working classes. In India, unions remain deeply divided, with the two largest unions being more cooperative with a government committed to liberalization and the leftist unions steadfastly resisting further liberalization. With privatization occurring relatively slowly, there has been little incentive for unions to branch out into new sectors and recruit new categories of workers. However, while Japanese unions seem to be taking a more proactive approach to transforming their organizational structure and grassroots strategies, these changes also point to a fundamental difference in the overall perception of the legitimacy and power of organized labor in the two countries. Although representing a smaller segment of the workforce, India?s unions are better organized, retain ties to political parties that can make or break governing coalitions, remain capable of paralyzing the economy by virtue of their influence in crucial sectors such as the railroads, and still adhere to a discourse of labor relations that evinces clear consciousness of separate working class interests. In Japan, while leftist elements among the unions remain vocal about class interests, the steady shrinking of the manufacturing sector has had the effect of turning Rengo into more of a consultative body that orchestrates largely symbolic acts on the ground while accomodating demands for wage restraint. Thus, the relatively less fundamental transformation of Indian trade unionism reveals not resistance to change but somewhat greater political clout sustained by a still robust conception of class interest in an economy where the public sector and manufacturing still matter significantly. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACTIn September of 2000, 189 nations made the commitment to embark on the decade?s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with the intent of achieving the stated objectives by the year 2015. Annual reports seem to suggest that movements in the direction of achieving these goals, if any, have been either very slow and mostly progressing in the opposite direction, placing nations ? developed and developing alike, behind in their commitment to address the world?s most egregious development ills. The new regionalism in the Caribbean is one in which three overriding forces condition the development policy agenda of the region. On the one hand the need to attract global capital places a high priority on upgrading nation?s ICT infrastructure to meet the needs of the global business community. Second, negotiations in the region to establish the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the Caribbean Single market Economy (CSME) has placed regional connectivity as the highest priority for the region?s development. Third, Japan?s growing economic interest in the region also reinforces connectivity as a high priority. These factors are not to suggest that the UN?s MDGs have been given a low priority. Rather, the prioritization of ICT is a strategy designed to achieve the MDGs by the quickest means imaginable. Inherent in this new regionalism is a conceptual shift in development thinking about the relationship between technology and development. The result of this shift in thinking is a proliferation of newer global and regional ICT institutions designed to bridge the digital divide. This paper examines this proliferation of new ICT international institutions that have been established at the regional and international levels since 1990 and argues that the proliferation emerges from the perception of Caribbean leaders that ICT is a the necessary first stage towards achieving the MGD. Secondly, the paper argues that the region?s success in achieving these Goals is a function of the streamlining of this global ICT infrastructure to ensure that it truly facilitates and not obstruct the region?s movement towards bridging the digital divide. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper builds on my May 2005 International Studies Perspectives article, "Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration." It is a comparative study of threat perception and of the process by which threats have waxed and waned in our consciousness. It concludes that in time fears about terrorism may lose their charm--we have, after all, ceased to lose sleep not only over dragons, witches, ghoulies, ghosties, long-leggedy beasties, and things that go bump in the night, but also over anarchists, Communists under the bed, Japan's economic takeover, strategic thermonuclear war, the spread of ethnic war, and devils du jour like Qaddafi and Castro. The paper examines how such waning of fears took place, but it concludes that at base not all that much can be done about such fears. People will always jump at some spooks (but it is not always predictable which ones) and imagine them to be far more potent than they are, and they will always evaluate some risks perversely and fancy them to be becoming increasingly threatening. Politicians will always sanctimoniously play to those fears, become convinced themselves, and expend funds and deploy armed force foolishly, even counterproductively. Bureaucrats will always stoke the same fears since they need, after all, to cover their rears against any conceivable uncertainty and have no incentive to work themselves out of job. The entrepreneurs of the terrorism industry may eventually move on to the next governmental cash cow, but they will always first work very hard to sustain and milk their current one. And if it bleeds, it will always, always, always lead. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks to American-Japanese relations as exemplified in a cycle of technological exchange. In the move from American comics to Japanese anime and to Japanamerican cinema, hybrid stylistics are imagined as the terminus of this cycle of exchange. On the one hand, perspective is de-centred in an American style rapid flow of images; as such Japanamerican cinema is scripted as a triumph of the appropriative powers of western imperialism. On the other hand, sensations bubble up in a Japanese style pause; a sense emerges that Japanamerican cinema manifests the refined assimilative powers of eastern imperialism. Looking to exemplary Japanamerican cinema, this paper will gesture beyond the terminus of western and eastern imperialisms. It will demonstrate that American-Japanese relations that are marked by meaningful revolution are actually absorbed into a wash of continuous aesthetic transformation (i.e. of trauma and healing). ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how politics changes when institutions change. Japan provides us with an excellent case to explore this issue. Japan has reformed its key political institutions in stages since the mid-1990s. This paper examines how changes in the institutional context affected the way political actors interacted with one another. It takes the view that Japanese politics has drastically changed in the past few years. The paper uses an analysis of recent welfare reforms to support this view. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role and functions played by the Japanese realists not only in the academic world but also in actual Japanese foreign and security policies. The paper also touches upon the differences between the United States and Japan in terms of the content of realism in IR. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"I was shocked to the point that I was blinded by sheer disbelief ? In the end, [the U.S.] completely disregarded the years of sacrifice made by Japan, forcing us to forgo the great nation status that we had striven so hard to establish in the Far East. But to do so for Japan was none other than committing suicide. We now had no choice but to rise." (Jidai no Ichimen [An Aspect of Time], 2 vols, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1985.) According to the memoirs of Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, these were his immediate reactions upon reading the cable that had just arrived from the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura. Included in the cable was a note from Secretary of State Cordell Hull that contained an explicit rejection of Japan's proposal to resolve the current U.S.-Japan crisis. The message of the so-called "Hull Note" was clear: Japan needed to first withdraw from China before the U.S. would consider any Japanese demands. It was the same unequivocal position that the U.S. had maintained since early 1941. Unquestionably, Washington was unwilling to make even the slightest compromise towards Tokyo; appeasement was clearly out of the question.If there ever did exist a point-of-no-return on the road to Pearl Harbor, it was certainly on this day of November 26, 1941, when Togo - the leading advocate for peace in the cabinet - gave away all hope. Of course, Togo was no pacifist. However, he also was cognizant of the fact that war with the U.S. was futile and would only spell disaster for Japan. If so, then what pushed Togo to the brink that he felt Japan had "no choice but to rise"? Was it, as most Japanese historians claim, because the "Hull Note" was so uncompromising in its stance that it basically amounted to an ultimatum? Moreover, why was Togo so utterly dismayed? His emotionally charged words reveal that the foreign minister was so taken aback by the note that he felt a overpowering sense of betrayal. Could it be that Togo had been expecting an altogether different reply from the U.S.? Was he privy to any intelligence that would suggest otherwise? In light of the new evidence on prewar Japanese sigint recently discovered at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and the Diplomatic Record Office (DRO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Japan, the purpose of this paper will be the following: First, to illuminate the history of the hitherto highly obscure Japanese Black Chamber (Section 18),and two, to set forth a more logical and coherent explanation to Togo's volte-face in his policy towards the United States that ruptured all hope for peace. In conclusion, the paper will incorporate the new knowledge gained concerning Japanese prewar sigint and reveal how intelligence analysis had a detrimental impact on policy decisions a critical juncture. Through this undertaking, this paper will refute the longstanding understanding that the so-called "Hull Note" was the final straw that led to Pearl Harbor. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses Japan?s policy objectives and instruments in response to increased North Korea?s nuclear threat. It sheds light on the extent of Japan?s contribution to peaceful resolution of the North Korea?s nuclear crisis. The final section of the paper considers two questions: what kind of policy Japan should pursue to resolve the urgent problem of the nuclear standoff; and what kind of policy Japan should take to reduce other forms of North Korean threat. The author argues that Tokyo should promote the soft-landing of North Korea and try to increase North Korea?s dependence on Japan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan-EU economic relations have shifted from trade conflicts in the 1980s to mutual cooperation in the 1990s, and both sides have deepened their bilateral institutionalization in the 2000s. This paper assesses the contours and analytics of the deepening institutionalization of the Japan-EU economic relations. Measures of the institutionalization refer to the bilateral governmental frameworks (such as the EU-Japan Annual Summit, and the Regulatory Reform Dialogue), mutually-agreed documents to be implemented by the two sides (such as the EU-Japan Action Plan), as well as the business-side framework (such as the EU-Japan Business Dialogue Round Table and its recommendations.) This paper seeks to survey these ongoing Japan-EU institutional developments, following official documents and economic data on the Japan-EU relations. After tracking the institutional shifts of the Japan-EU economic relations, the paper examines factors that have promoted and hindered their developments. Specifically, it will extract and analyze economic, political and cultural factors that have all been contributory factors. These include, for example, the ups and downs of the Japanese economy (?the Lost Decade?), and advances in globalization (rise of China, deepening of EU). ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 21st Century, Japan will find itself in facing political, social, economic, and environmental challenges more than ever before. Challenges are not only ones caused by the outcomes of others? action, but also include ones caused by Japan?s action. Regardless of the nature of the challenges caused by others or by its own, the world expects Japan to be more responsible for contributing toward resolving these challenges. Thus, it is indispensable for Japanese students to be empowered with knowledge and skills to resolve challenges as active citizens of the world.In this paper, I would like to describe how systems of active learning focusing on controversial political and security challenges surrounding Japan effectively prepare students to address the challenges of the Twenty First Century. To name a few, the impact of Japan?s revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, that of Japan?s bid to a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, and the impact of Koizumi?s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on the relations between China and Japan. In this paper, I would like to show how the systems of active learning will enable students to understand the nature of these challenges, the factors which causes them, identify different perspectives in these challenges, and develop means by which they can effective resolve these challenges. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper first asks why and how the ASEAN+3 process got off the ground in the late 1990s. It will be argued that ASEAN took a catalytic role in bringing together major powers in Northeast Asia at the historical critical juncture precipitated by the Asian financial crisis. The paper then explores a major shift in both Japanese and Chinese policies toward East Asian regionalism, suggesting that full support from the two was crucial for moving the ASEAN+3 process forward. It highlights the different approaches that Japan and China employed in order to strengthen their relationships with ASEAN countries in trade initiatives, financial cooperation, and development cooperation. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that transnationalism, particularly political transnationalism, complicates the notion of a North-South divide. The movement, in both directions, of people, knowledge, and resources between countries in the North and South partially mitigates inequality and misunderstanding. At the same time, the bestowal or withholding of legal recognition by Northern host governments reinforces an asymmetrical power dynamic. Based on field research of the Burmese migrant and refugee community in Japan, this paper explores the iterative relationship between transnational action and legal recognition. First, drawing from the literatures on transnationalism and the diaspora, the paper considers the relationship between host government policy and transnationalism. Next, it reviews the functionality of legal recognition in Japan, followed by a categorization of Japan's migrants and refugees. Next, it offers an analysis of how host country legal status and local community linkages inform transnational acts. The paper concludes by showing that transnationalism both shapes and is shaped by legal recognition, revealing the ability of migrants and refugees to create either division or union, partially dependent upon local communities. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the end of the Cold War, the Japanese Government started the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for overseas missions that do not require the use of force. I argue that collective identity formation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance is an important factor to comprehend the transformation of Japan’s security policy in the post-Cold War Period. In this paper, collective identity is defined as “identification with other states on the basis of mutual trust in terms of non-violence and mutual aid.” My main method is the content analysis of public documents such as join communique, joint declaration, joint statement and Japan’s Defense White Papers, partially by using a computer program. In the case of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, I analyze its behavioral component – cooperative interaction in policy consultation, joint exercises, joint research, and cost sharing; and the attitudinal component – the consensus among group members about basic values, external threats, strategic goals, and strategic means. In addition, I attempt to trace chronological change in the description of Japan by Japanese policymakers. The evidence shows that since the end of the Cold War, collective identity has become stronger between Japanese and American policymakers in the national security field. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Vladimir Putin?s coming to power as President in 2000, Russian foreign policy towards East Asia has been oriented towards geopolitical considerations as well as economic pragmatism, as evidenced by his official statements and related governmental programs. This paper, however, argues that Russia?s attempt to pursue both geopolitical and economic pragmatism has resulted in a stalemate: on the one hand, it has continued to envisage the potential threat of geopolitical loss against Beijing due to the gradual expansion of Chinese demographic and economic influence on the Russian territory as a paradoxical consequence of advancing the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership. On the other, Moscow?s intention of playing China off against Japan in anticipation of maximizing foreign investment from the latter ? crucial to the development of the Russian Far East ? has failed to bear fruit. As regards relations with Japan, Russia has succeeded neither in demonstrating itself to be a reliable strategic partner to countervail the Chinese regional influence, despite the deteriorating Sino-Japanese relationship, nor in playing an intermediary role in the North Korean nuclear crisis. Moreover, unlike the most common interpretation of the deadlock in Russo-Japanese relations, it is domestic unpreparedness (the unfavorable investment climate and the lack of a concrete vision of energy projects? profitability for foreign participants) rather than the bilateral territorial issue that has prevented Japan fully supporting the gigantic project involving the construction of an oil pipeline from East Siberia to the Pacific Ocean (the biggest symbol of possible economic cooperation between the two).This paper concludes that it is difficult for Moscow to realize its ambition of becoming a ?regional power?, especially by maximizing her potential role as an energy supplier in the China-led energy-hungry East Asia, without not only overcoming increasingly xenophobic attitudes towards foreign capital, but also abandoning the expectation of Sino-Japanese competition over the energy resources in the Russian Far East. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the puzzle of why Japanese firms have long been active in corporate philanthropy outside of Japan, but in Japan, the same firms have been much more focused on employee welfare than on community-based programs. In recent years, the legal framework for philanthropic activities has become more permissive. At the same time, Japanese businesses, who have long been active in broad-based anti-poverty initiatives abroad, face a domestic environment with higher unemployment and fewer government resources. This paper examines the degree to which businesses have brought overseas corporate philanthropy activities back to Japan, and why. What kinds of privately funded welfare projects do we find in Japan and how has the state responded to such initiatives? The paper argues that the scope for corporate philanthropy is still tightly regulated by the state. These limits encompass both constraints for private sector solutions and opportunities for significant, if strictly demarcated, anti-poverty initiatives in areas outside the core of state activities. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]