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There are unmistakable signs of rising nationalism in contemporary Japan. It has manifested itself in Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the rewriting of history textbooks, Prime Minister Abe'ss denial of the Japanese military's direct involvement in forced prostitution during the Second World War (the so-called "œcomfort women" issue), the recent revision of the basic education law designed to instill patriotism among the nation's youths, and the move to revise Article 9 and other parts of the constitution. Neither domestic opposition to nor foreign criticisms of these developments have had a marked impact on the shift to the right in the discourse on nationalism in Japan. On the contrary, against the backdrop of an increasingly assertive political leadership in Tokyo, the emergence of post-war generations of opinion makers and opinion leaders in Japan, and the growing uncertainty in the nation's security environment, the chorus of foreign critics may be having the opposite effect and strengthening the nationalists' cause. This paper explores this proposition through an examination of the way Japanese nationalists are using Japan's disputes with China, Korea, and Russia and these countries' criticisms of Japan to articulate their cause. The paper concludes that the Japanese nationalists make a selective use of ideas, events, and institutions from the past in reconstructing a post-postwar "Japan" in their image, anchor their arguments around Japan's bilateral disputes with the neighboring countries, and exploit foreign criticisms of Japan regarding those issues to advance their nationalist cause. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russo-Japanese relations have been stuck in the fog of a territorial dispute in the Kuril Islands since the end of WWII. Orientation toward the dispute seems mired in the history and legal claims of the past, which do not seem a likely source of resolution to the conflict. Instead, a shift in perspective that focuses on the future, while transforming justice claims on both sides, is required. The paper explores the prospects and problems of one such perspective -- creating an International Peace Park (IPP) in the disputed islands to advance peace and conservation. It argues that the IPP idea holds considerable promise in creating what Conca and Dabelko call "environmental peacemaking" in a pragmatic context that exercises capacities for respect, trust, and mutual understanding. Also, environmental exigencies compel political action to protect one of the world's most unique, and least known, bioregions. However, the Kuril issue is captured by nationalists on both sides, and the political atmosphere not particularly amenable to "international" or "transnational" solutions to the conflict. Nevertheless, the IPP approach is an important, though not sufficient, component in the construction of a more comprehensive peace between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1980s, the notion of national identity and the nature of its relationship with foreign policy have been in the focus of constructivist and post-structuralist scholarship. In both theoretical approaches, the nature of the relationship is pre-determined. The constructivist scholars tend to treat the national identity as a cognitive lens through which national interests and related polices are defined and shaped. In a post-structuralist analysis, foreign policy is often perceived as a practice of difference that creates borders and enhances the national identity construction.The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between national identity discourse of the Japanese ?self? vis-à-vis the Russian ?other? and foreign policy without any pre-theorization regarding the relationship.In the first part this paper examines the structure of contemporary Japan?s national identity construction vis-à-vis Russia. It argues that Russia, because of her role as a traditional ?other? for the West, has played a special role in Japan?s attempt to construct herself as a member of the universal realm of ?modern nations.? The second part of the paper examines Japan?s foreign policy vis-à-vis post-communist Russia along three dimensions; economic, military and the territorial dispute related to the islands captured by the Soviet Union during the last days of the Pacific War. Identity does not matter in economy- business as usual with profits overriding other concerns related to territory and history. Identity is slightly visible in the security discourse as seen in the lack of long-term trust of Russia?s intentions among the members of the security community. In the context of the the territorial dispute, identity shapes and, at the same time, is shaped by the policy related to this dispute. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany represents the model penitent in international affairs. Arguably more than any other nation, it has been willing to confront the dark sides of its history and apologize to its former victims. As a result, it is commonly maintained, the Federal Republic has been able to reap a wide variety of benefits. By reconciling itself with its neighbors, Germany has been able to put an end to the rivalries that historically have plagued central Europe while at the same time laying the foundations for Europe's unparalleled success in building a liberal regional order. Constructivists in particular have often held up German example as a model that others should emulate, including Japan, Russia, Austria and even the United States. Realist and other critics of this narrative have argued that in reality, German efforts to come clean about the past were far as clear cut as is often supposed. Moreover, there is a considerable body of evidence that suggests that German motives were far from pure. Calculations of national interest clearly influenced decisions to when and with whom Germany pursued reconciliation over the past. This paper will analyze the Federal Republic's efforts to deal with the past and compare it with other countries that have faced or face similar problems: Austria, France, Japan and Russia. Whereas once Germany was seen a more or less unique example of a country that has had to deal with the burdens of a troubled past, today there is a host of countries that are confronted with similar issues. This allows the application of the case study method to control for structural variables that may influence the decisions countries chose to take in dealing with the past including the nature of the crimes involved, the degree of regional integration, regime type and the balance of power. The paper will try to stake out a position between the naïve Constructivist and narrow Realist positions. While calculations of national interest undoubtedly influence countries' decisions to pursue historical justice issues, embedded historical narratives help or hinder such decisions, and the failure to harmonize historical narratives may have far reaching impact on a countries position in the international system. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Vladimir Putin?s coming to power as President in 2000, Russian foreign policy towards East Asia has been oriented towards geopolitical considerations as well as economic pragmatism, as evidenced by his official statements and related governmental programs. This paper, however, argues that Russia?s attempt to pursue both geopolitical and economic pragmatism has resulted in a stalemate: on the one hand, it has continued to envisage the potential threat of geopolitical loss against Beijing due to the gradual expansion of Chinese demographic and economic influence on the Russian territory as a paradoxical consequence of advancing the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership. On the other, Moscow?s intention of playing China off against Japan in anticipation of maximizing foreign investment from the latter ? crucial to the development of the Russian Far East ? has failed to bear fruit. As regards relations with Japan, Russia has succeeded neither in demonstrating itself to be a reliable strategic partner to countervail the Chinese regional influence, despite the deteriorating Sino-Japanese relationship, nor in playing an intermediary role in the North Korean nuclear crisis. Moreover, unlike the most common interpretation of the deadlock in Russo-Japanese relations, it is domestic unpreparedness (the unfavorable investment climate and the lack of a concrete vision of energy projects? profitability for foreign participants) rather than the bilateral territorial issue that has prevented Japan fully supporting the gigantic project involving the construction of an oil pipeline from East Siberia to the Pacific Ocean (the biggest symbol of possible economic cooperation between the two).This paper concludes that it is difficult for Moscow to realize its ambition of becoming a ?regional power?, especially by maximizing her potential role as an energy supplier in the China-led energy-hungry East Asia, without not only overcoming increasingly xenophobic attitudes towards foreign capital, but also abandoning the expectation of Sino-Japanese competition over the energy resources in the Russian Far East. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of international relations have long studied and debated the nature of military power. Hitherto, most analysts have attempted to divine the way in which particular sets of resources - whether they be material, ideational, or related to the institutional structure of the state - affect the level of combat power that a given military may bring to bear on the battlefield. In this essay, I posit that by recognizing that militaries are organizations that vary in their capacity to translate resources into combat power, it is possible to develop a more sophisticated framework for the analysis of military power. Relying on the insights of structural contingency theorists, who suggest that organizational efficiency emerges as a function of the relationship between an organization's structure and the requirements of its environment, I trace the broad outlines of a framework that conceives of a military's capacity to translate resources into combat power in terms of the relationship between the command structure and the level of battlefield complexity. To illustrate the logic of the claim, evidence from the battle between Russia and Japan at Liaoyang in 1904 is considered. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the national identity construction of Japan. It analyzes the discourse on Russia and Russo-Japanese relations in the post-Cold War era in order to shed light on the nature of national identity. The author believes that cause-effect attempts to link the national identity to foreign policy result in essentialism and reductionism. It notes that Russia has played a significant role in the creation of Japan's national identity by being defeated in the Russo-Japanese War.

“Why has Japan not normalized its diplomatic relations with North Korea?” While following daily Japanese media, answers to this question probably appear self-evident and the question itself sounds foolish to many Japanese. However, reconsidering it from b ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains the failure of Germany and Japan after World War II, and contemporary Russia, to explore and condemn the repressive past after the collapse of the authoritarian order despite significant domestic and international pressures to do so? All th ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dispute over the remote territory of Sakhalin Island has existed between the Russian and Japanese governments since the end of WWII. While no peace agreement exists, both governments have shared governance of the island as well as the development and refi ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The presentation will provide an extensive analysis of the ways in which Japan?s central government has been viewing and propagating its official positions as they apply to Japan?s three major maritime disputes, namely the ?Senkakus issue? centering around control over the Senkaku islands (Diaoyu) and involving mainland China, Taiwan and Japan, the ?Takeshima issue? centering around control over the Takeshima islets (Dokdo) and involving South Korea, DPRK and Japan, and the ?Kuriles issue? centering around control over the Kurile islands chain and involving Russia and Japan. The period covered will extend from early 1950?s until the present moment.Interpretations of territorial disputes being particularly influenced by scholarly views, the critical focus of the presentation will be directed towards examining the ways in which the central government has been using relevant scholarly works and advice in order to establish Japan?s official positions regarding territorial issues. Particular attention will be paid to party politics and ideological divisions during the Cold War period as well as policies peculiar to those local constituencies which raise territorial claims based on the nature of their geographical positions, namely claims raised by the Hokkaido District (Japan-Russia dispute), Shimane Prefecture (Japan-Koreas dispute) and Okinawa Prefecture (Japan-Chinas dispute). The presentation will provide a critical appraisal of moral responsibilities involved in the discussed issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea has pursued a nuclear weapons capability for about two decades. Many diplomatic efforts have been made to convince or cajole the Northern regime to give up this quest-and all have so far failed. Since 2003, a new multilateral approach-the Six-Party Talks involving the Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States-has raised hopes anew. These hopes are based largely on China playing an active role. China has the potential both to guarantee North Korea's security, and to impose and enforce a denuclearization agreement. We analyze China's changing grand strategy and its implications for China's Korea goals and policies. To Deng Xiaoping's emphasis on China's national interests, China's third- and fourth-generation leaders have added a greater reliance on foreign and military policies to maintain domestic political support and legitimacy. This discussion indicates that China is currently more concerned to preserve the North Korean regime and prevent a second Korean War than to eliminate the North's nuclear capability. Therefore, the Six-Party Talks are unlikely to succeed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]