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This paper focuses on the role Japanese comprehensive economic partnership agreements (EPAs) play within the accelerating process of regional integration throughout East Asia, which had been a comparatively white spot on the map of bilateral trade liberalization until the late 1990s. The accompanying "noodle bowl" phenomenon of individual agreements with exclusive character and various rules poses one of the central future challenges for Japan, whose economy is heavily dependent on intra-regional trade. Japanese EPAs go substantially beyond liberalization of trade in goods and services, including further so-called "WTO plus" or "deeper integration" issues, e.g. measures for promoting investment and competition or protection of intellectual property rights. However, there are also some critical points to raise, such as the low basic trade liberalization rate or the special treatment of agricultural products. The respective contract partners often make much wider concessions due to their unfavourable bargaining position. Drawing especially on these imbalances in trade liberalization, the underlying paper compares the existing Japanese trade agreements within East Asia in respect to their scope and tries to shed some light on how "comprehensive" Japanese EPAs actually are. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing demand for natural resources has become an issue of primary importance in China's foreign policy, and has led many observers to argue that conflict with the United States and other states in Asia is growing more likely. This paper evaluates the historical record on that question: under what circumstances have the resource needs of previous rising powers led to conflict with other states? I propose two independent variables: the ability to extract natural resources at home and the openness of the international trade system. In cases where the rising power has a large domestic resource base, and can supplement domestic production with easy access to foreign resources through trade, rising powers are less likely to generate conflict. In situations where the rising power has a limited resource base at home and the international trade system is closed, on the other hand, are more likely to lead to war. The paper evaluates three cases. For the United States in the late 19th century, massive domestic reserves and the first great era of globalization led to a "peaceful" rise. For Japan in the 1930s, an extremely poor resource base and rising trade barriers contributed to conflict. Finally, the paper turns its attention to China and argues that this important contemporary case more closely resembles the rise of the United States than that of Japan. China's domestic resource base remains quite large, and the international trade system is unprecedented in its level of openness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By highlighting the phenomenon of bandwagoning for profit, Randall Schweller has made important contributions to the literature of alliance formation, including the introduction of a balance of interest theory. Yet, the validity of his arguments has not received academic scrutiny. To fill this void, the present paper examines the case of Japan and the Axis Pact, which constitutes a most likely case of his "bandwagon for profit" argument. Schweller posits that Japan jumped on the German bandwagon, like a jackal seeking a wolf's spoils. The paper demonstrates that his "Japan as a jackal" thesis is unsustainable on empirical grounds. For Tokyo, evidence shows, the Axis Pact was first and foremost meant to be a military alliance for balancing against the United States, rather than for free-riding on German power. On the basis of its empirical findings, furthermore, the paper presents an improved version of balance of interest theory on alliance formation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the interests of Tokugawa Japan and the Russian Empire clashed for the first time in the second half of the 18th century, Ainu, the native people of Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurile islands, were in the center of the dispute. Furthermore, at least from the Japanese side, the notion of culture has defined the dispute. Namely, the potential Russian expansion of influence was seen as expansion of superior culture, conducted through enlightenment and amicable policies which could result in the voluntary embracement of the rule of the Russian empire by the Ainu (Akatsuki 1987.)In the last five decades the same border zone, namely the South Kurile islands (known as Northern Territories in Japan) have continued to occupy the central place in Japan's agenda vis-a -vis the Soviet Union and, after 1992, Russia. However, the existent scholarship has paid little attention to the role of culture and the Ainu in the contemporary dispute over control of the islands. This paper hopes to bridge this gap by bringing together the debate on the place of Ainu in Japanese society that emerged in early 1970s and the concurrent cultural construction of the Japan's "sef" vis-a -vis Russia.The first part of this paper provides a brief review of modern Japan's engagement with the Russian and the Ainu "other" in terms of national identity construction. The second part examines the contemporary dialogue between the two "others" within the broader context of identity politics of the 1970s and 1980s. It starts by analyzing the critical reevaluation of Japan's history of colonization of Ainu lands and the relocation of Ainu culture from the realm of the inferior assigned to it by the prewar discourse. This paper argues that this reconstruction presented a challenge not only to the conception of Japan as a homogenous nation but also undermined the validity of Japan's claim to the South Kurile islands as a quest for the return of inherent territory as it granted subjectivity to the Ainu "other" and allowed for the Ainu participate in the public discourse. The paper follows by introducing the cultural discourse on Russia and Japan that emerged almost simultaneously with the debates on Ainu. It argues that one of the functions of this construction of the national "self" was to suppress the challenges posed by the contemporary debates on Ainu by presenting a hierarchical construction between Japan's "self" and the Russian "other" and through this reaffirming Japan's belonging to the realm of the civilized and the normal. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will address the allied occupation of Japan from 1945-1952 as a public policy issue. It articulatesand explores the general concept of institutional continuity during an occupation; more precisely, this paper will look at resiliency in terms of the prewar political authority of the bureaucracy. At its most basic, an important pre-surrender institution—the Japanese bureaucracy—can endure and resist substantive change during a system altering transformative period: Bureaucratic resilience during an occupation. One would expect that a celebrated democratization process that began with a military occupation would be peopled with those who seek to dramatically alter a variety of institutions; instead, one discovers a more accurate blend of continuity and change—hence, the challenge. At the most general level, I am identifying instances where institutional continuity can be recognized and then observing this condition and offering the implication for budding democracy. Specifically, with a finer focus on Occupation-era Japanese bureaucracy, this paper will first introduce this concept of resiliency. This introduction is followed by short discussion of the concept resiliency in relation to the Japanese bureaucracy; then, it presents them in relation to the following four topics: It maps the landmarks of (1) the purge process in Japan, (2) the enduring and problematic role of the Emperor, (3) the secretive crafting of the postwar constitution that celebrates democracy and curbs Japan's military, and (4) the role of Japanese bureaucratic reforms in the construction of postwar political power. Goal: To understand Japan during this uncertain times, the resiliency of institutions. Use of secondary sources &archival material. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines economic integration in East Asia with a focus on the key issues in harmonizing bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). Even though market forces, the Sino-Japanese rivalry, and functional cooperation may help drive regionalism forward, the foundation of any significant integration in the East Asian trading system will be the ASEAN+1 FTAs with China, Japan, and South Korea. It is therefore important to examine the way in which these agreements structure cooperation. This study examines some of the major choices made in the negotiation of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEPA) and the ways in which these choices might help or hinder the consolidation of economic regionalism. If AJCEPA is to be anything more than an umbrella for Japan's bilateral FTAs with ASEAN members, it must achieve greater uniformity in coverage of issues and, especially, rules of origin. The comparison of Japan's bilateral FTAs that closes the paper suggests the magnitude of this challenge. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are unmistakable signs of rising nationalism in contemporary Japan. It has manifested itself in Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the rewriting of history textbooks, Prime Minister Abe'ss denial of the Japanese military's direct involvement in forced prostitution during the Second World War (the so-called "œcomfort women" issue), the recent revision of the basic education law designed to instill patriotism among the nation's youths, and the move to revise Article 9 and other parts of the constitution. Neither domestic opposition to nor foreign criticisms of these developments have had a marked impact on the shift to the right in the discourse on nationalism in Japan. On the contrary, against the backdrop of an increasingly assertive political leadership in Tokyo, the emergence of post-war generations of opinion makers and opinion leaders in Japan, and the growing uncertainty in the nation's security environment, the chorus of foreign critics may be having the opposite effect and strengthening the nationalists' cause. This paper explores this proposition through an examination of the way Japanese nationalists are using Japan's disputes with China, Korea, and Russia and these countries' criticisms of Japan to articulate their cause. The paper concludes that the Japanese nationalists make a selective use of ideas, events, and institutions from the past in reconstructing a post-postwar "Japan" in their image, anchor their arguments around Japan's bilateral disputes with the neighboring countries, and exploit foreign criticisms of Japan regarding those issues to advance their nationalist cause. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On December 7, 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The government responded to American advances in the Pacific by selecting policies of war rather than policies of peace. Why did Japanese decision-makers choose the path of military confrontation rather than the path of diplomacy? What prompted them to confront the United States at Pearl Harbor? Was it the configuration of the international system, or the capabilities and resources of nation-states that compelled them all to choose war? Or were structural circumstances fluid enough for people to disagree, and for differences among decision-makers to reflect variations in the cognitive costs of making judgments?This paper will review Japanese decision-making dynamics in 1941, and investigate whether structural conditions or the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making best accounts for the foreign policy preferences of individual actors. It will draw attention to deliberations at several levels of government, including within the military services themselves, and consider whether the transparency of American provocations forced all decision-makers to routinely choose force, or if the ambiguity of American actions prompted some people to prefer diplomatic initiatives while others preferred military solutions. In particular, it will explore the proposition that because all individuals are cognitive misers or cognitive processing cost-minimizers who unconsciously prefer judgments that are mentally cheap to those that are mentally dear, differences between civilian and military actors predictably reflect the influence of three different cognitive cost-cutting cues: decision stage (problem definition or solution definition), decision role assignment (leader or advisor), and a decision-maker’s level of substantive knowledge (novice to expert).By examining the evolution of Japanese foreign policy over the course of several months, this paper will not only assess whether and when the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making can offer a most useful explanation for this case, it will address whether the actions of Japanese officials in 1941, like those of British decision-makers in 1938 and American decision-makers in the Cuban missile crisis, the turn toward peace in Vietnam, and the 9/11 responses of 2001 (four cases already investigated), reinforce and extend the power of the theory. It will consider whether the cognitive calculus explanation can account for the preferences of different individual actors, in different states, facing different national conditions, and different international circumstances. This paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of this work for future scholarly and policy efforts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan and North Korea began their official talks for diplomatic normalization in 1991. Sixteen years have passed since then. Yet it is uncertain when they can finally reach diplomatic normalization. During their first summit meeting of September 2002, Japan has promised to provide a massive economic aid to North Korea after diplomatic normalization, estimated at approximately 1 trillion yen, virtually as a compensation for Japan's colonial rule of Korea. The money would be a great asset to the North Korean economy and can serve as a major incentive for DRPK's denuclearization. Thus, the normalization has a strong bearing on the regional security of Northeast Asia. However, diplomatic normalization is not yet in sight. The paper will focus on key factors for delaying normalized relations between the two countries. It will discuss changes in the eagerness of Japan and North Korea for normalization, with a greater focus on recent changes, analyzing the factors that prompted the changes, including domestic and international as well as historical, economic, military factors. The paper will also consider the future prospects for normalization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the scholarly literature, the effect of electoral structure on foreign policy making is a matter of some question. The 1994 electoral reforms in Japan that resulted in a dramatic change in the electoral power structures provide a unique natural experiment, offering the potential to understand how electoral structure influences foreign policy making. This paper examines Japanese WTO agricultural trade negotiations in light of the 1994 reforms, looking specifically at whether or not Japan's agricultural negotiating position changed before and after the 1994 electoral reforms by examining Japanese negotiating positions in the Uruguay and Doha WTO trade rounds. If democratic electoral structure has an impact on the Japan's trade negotiating position, it will do so by reconfiguring the domestic pressures against trade liberalization, producing a different equilibrium point between domestic and international pressures. As a consequence of this shifted equilibrium point, Japan's agriculture trade negotiating position should change with relation to its position before the electoral change. This paper finds that the Japanese negotiating position does not change after the 1994 reforms, raising questions regarding the impact of how democracy is structured on foreign policy. This seems contra to the expectation that the nature of political power should have an impact on the policy outputs. In the Japanese case, a shift from a highly parochial and agricultural to a more urban and cosmopolitan electoral power base produced no appreciable change in Japanese trade negotiating position. This finding has a range of implications that are explored in the paper and create an agenda for future research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper will analyze the ways that Japan has approached nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in recent years. More specifically, in addition to the diverse approaches that have been taken by Tokyo and Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations, my paper will examine the extent to which U.S. policies influence the disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives of the Japanese government in the international arena. Preliminary research suggests that Tokyo is placing more emphasis on nonproliferation than on nuclear disarmament, creating two major reasons for concern. First, the government of Japan, despite its continuing public campaign to promote nuclear disarmament while seeking the assistance of civil society organizations, would be especially sensitive to the policy concerns of Washington, which, as many critics argue, has developed hegemonic global interests. Second, Tokyo would be alienating itself from Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations that in recent years have increased their international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically examines the constructivist works on Japan’s security and shows empirically the inherent dangers in applying the constructivist framework to studies of national identity. It argues that the works discussed, besides not providing any new insights into Japan, suffer from reductionism and orientalism. In its second part the paper attempts to offer some modifications to the constructivist framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins by providing an overview of the dependent variable, financial crisis management and reform outcomes, in Japan. It then goes on to link these outcomes to an incremental and less than comprehensive financial reform process. The paper reviews the sequencing of financial reform measures undertaken by Japanese since the bursting of the bubble, focusing on the period of 1996-2003, with particular emphasis on the period of 1999-2003. To explain the nature of reforms, their sequencing, and the elusive outcomes to which they correspond, the paper assesses the relative bargaining power of foreign investors, bureaucratic actors, elected officials and private business in Japan’s tortuous reform process. In doing so, the paper shows the ways in which these interests are mediated by Japan’s distinctive institutional arrangements. The theoretical baseline of this paper is that different institutional arrangements not only manage change differently but are also fundamentally more difficult to change than others. More specifically, Japanese institutional arrangements have mediated the pressures of global capital in ways that minimize the impact of this capital on rules or behaviors. Likewise, these institutions have proven remarkably resilient to being fully transformed, even in the face of unprecedented regulatory breakdown and vulnerability to external pressures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assumption that the balance of material costs and benefits of nuclear armament for Japan is sensitive to small changes in the scope and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence supports the current role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and military strategy. This paper scrutinizes this assumption in terms of a constraint that is especially difficult to change: what kind of deterrent strategy can Japan implement against nuclear weapon states? I start with pessimistic assumptions about the need for an independent nuclear deterrent, and optimistic assumptions about the feasibility of building nuclear weapons, both of which are crucial for prediction and advocacy of nuclear armament. The first set of assumptions, in which the United States no longer extends deterrence, and China values victory in nuclear war against Japan, rules out a small force de frappe for Japan. Instead, Japan will need a large retaliatory force, even with an asymmetric counter-recovery strategy against energy resources, transportation, and sea power. This deterrent is not likely to become operational without a decade of investment. In short, a claim that a small nuclear deterrent is necessary and sufficient for Japan contradicts itself. Japan needs either a large nuclear deterrent, or none of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's post-Cold War security policy has largely revolved around the question of how to respond North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. As a primary response, Japan has participated in the Six-Party Talks, which have aimed at promoting North Korea's denuclearization and building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Japan has had the ability to provide North Korea with strong economic incentives to change its policy stance. However, Japan has failed to use the economic card very effectively. In my paper, I will examine factors behind the failure. Then, I will consider what Japan should do in order to play a more positive role in building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, with a particular attention to the opportunities and constraints resulting from political changes in the United States and South Korea. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Confronting an ugly past is often regarded as essential not only to achieving some justice for the victims but also for allowing those held historically responsible to move on. This is sometimes a prerequisite for the 'normalization' of relations between states whose shared histories may contain events in which one party believes they have been grievously wronged by the other. The paradigm case in which an almost permanent impasse exists in coming to terms with a difficult war past is Japan vis-à-vis its immediate neighbours in East Asia. The cycle of apologetics and denials will almost certainly continue as deep contestations over war memories continue within Japan while at the same time political leaders seek a more prominent role for their country as a 'normal' actor in international affairs. This paper assesses the problem of Japan's 'normalization' efforts with particular reference to issues of nationalism, state identity and normative theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea is Japan’s most natural ally in East Asia. Both nations share the same primary military benefactor, the United States. Their geographic proximity makes them natural allies in offsetting China’s growing power and unknown intentions. In spite of this natural need to ally, relations remain strained primarily over Japan’s historical occupation of Korea. This paper examines the political issues that need to be resolved in order for Japan and South Korea to work together and the potential for such reconciliation in light of South Korea’s drift away from its American ally and Japan’s open embrace of the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea are the worse they have been in many years. Several major problems still impede the normalization of Japan-North Korea relations. These problems, but particularly the abduction of Japanese nationals during the 1970s and 1980s by North Korean agents and Japan's past annexation of Korea, continue to strain this bilateral relationship. Pyongyang's decisions in 2006 to launch a series of missiles and then to detonate a nuclear device created even more problems for the already bad relationship between Japan and North Korea. Caught in the middle of a these bilateral problems, which have palpably increased tension between Tokyo and Pyongyang, are the many thousands of Korean residents in Japan who have maintained their political allegiance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Represented by Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) for more than fifty years, these Koreans loyal to the DPRK, like all zainichi (Koreans permanently living in Japan), have long faced discrimination in Japanese society. However, of late the members of Chongryon also have had to contend with the political fallout from the visible deterioration in Japan-North Korean relations, which has been exacerbated by Tokyo's adoption of a hard-line policy toward the DPRK. This paper examines the politically connected problems that Chongryon Koreans have recently experienced in Japan, as well as the extent to which this ethno-political minority has been subjected to repression by the Japanese government, as claimed by these Koreans and by Pyongyang. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Long a critic of regional blocs as harmful to a multilateral trading system based on non-discrimination, Japan has nevertheless emerged as an avid preferential trader seeking to develop a substantial network of preferential liberalization accords. The goal of this paper is to underscore the domestic roots of Japan’s FTA policy on three key dimensions: partner selection, sectoral coverage, and issue scope. To this end, I develop a modified supply and demand model of regional integration with two main independent variables: 1) lobbying incentives for societal actors in the game of preferential trading, 2) degree of centralization of government trade policy-making. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IFew items being monitored by the international development assistance community have caused as much consternation as the emergence of China as a significant source of official development assistance (ODA). 40 years ago, similar criticisms were being made about Japan's ODA, which was considered a mere offshoot of its mercantilist trade policies. Yet today Japan is arguably a strong adherent to the prevailing international norms that guide (though perhaps do not govern) official giving, especially on positions with respect to tied aid, non-military aid, economic development, environmental impact, and monitoring and evaluation standards. This paper looks at international aid norms and how they came to be accepted in Japan despite domestic political opposition. It also places Japanese and Chinese aid in global perspective. There is a lesson to be learned from the Japanese experience: China will also one day converge towards international norms on aid. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers Japan?s development aid in the context of the development discourse. Questioning the dichotomy between the ?West? and the ?Third World? from Japan?s ?in-between? perspective, it argues that Japanese aid policy is not a ?third space? (Homi Bhabha) but rather a ?derivative discourse? (Partha Chatterjee) that reinforces the hierarchical discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper compares the banking reform process in Japan and Korea. The two countries differ in the interaction of exogenous forces such as foreign pressures, and the domestic political institutions. I explain the circumstances that prompted each country to choose its particular course of reform and discuss the costs and prospects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War world Japanese security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to "securitize" itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. Working from International Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Buzan et al., this paper examines Japanese security policy in light of Japan’s attempts to securitize itself in non traditional ways that impact traditional security, while focusing on the policy implications of Japan’s ongoing failure to securitize its economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent summits have sought to redefine Japan-China ties as a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" by "increasing political trust." Sino-Japanese trust is important because hedging in security affairs is expensive and can undermine stability. Lack of trust encourages worst-case assumptions about the other's motives, placing a ceiling on cooperation and making miscalculation and conflict more likely. Why is trust such a problem between Japan and China? Studies in international relations point to the power shift associated with China's rise and differences in regime type (democracy/authoritarianism). Research on contemporary Sino-Japanese ties often focuses on the significantly expanded and sometimes contentious trade relationship. Finding those explanations insufficient, this paper argues that trust problems are better understood as functions of national identity. The way that Japan and China perceive 'the other' in the context of their own national identities is the primary source of distrust. In Japanese perception, Japan tends to be seen as more developed and civilized than China and Chinese identity as obsessed with being at the center. In Chinese perception, China tends to be seen as morally and historically superior to Japan and Japanese identity as latently aggressive and disrespectful of natural order. These perceptions are traceable in Japanese views of China's human rights policies and regional diplomacy, and Chinese views of Japan's handling of history (including textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine) and military normalization. By explaining the link between identity conflicts and bilateral trust, this paper demonstrates why Sino-Japanese trust remains low and recent improvements in relations fragile. Peace and security in East Asia depend not only on how Tokyo and Beijing define and pursue their interests, but also on how they define and relate to each other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Japanese system of decision-making is often referred to as Japan, Inc., alluding to a blending of political, bureaucratic, and business circles into one unit. This relationship has also been portrayed as the horizontal bar on the letter T with the vertical bar symbolizing the hierarchically structured society that is subservient to its ruling class (Pempel 1987; Broadbent 2002). This paper argues that the Japanese political system is not always quite so rigid. Looking at climate governance, specifically the period during 2001-02 when Japan sought to reposition itself after the Bush Administration's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol reveals that public opinion and non-profit organizations were influential forces. Japan is constitutionally a parliamentary democracy, but power has rested primarily with the major ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI, before 2001 called MITI), and business (with the business association Keidanren as its primary mouthpiece). Prime ministerial power is limited not just because Japan is a parliamentary democracy, but because of the strong prevalence of factional politics within the LDP (Orr 1990). Although non-profit organizations are comparatively weak in Japan, they are gradually emancipating.This paper examines the roles of state and non-nation state actors in determining climate policy. Many studies on Japanese politics have used the reactive versus proactive dichotomy. While the Japan-as-'proactive-state' proponents argue that Japan's foreign policy is primarily internally driven (Yasutomo 1995; Anderson 1993; Nester 1990), the 'reactive-state' advocates claim that it is subject to significant foreign pressure (gaiatsu). However, the advocates are divided over whether this is due to international systemic conditions - that is, Japan's dependence on the United States for defense or trade - or whether domestic factors are the cause of Japan's passiveness (Calder 1988; Schoppa 1997; Orr 1990; Sato 1977). Such factors include the strong sectionalism of Japan's bureaucracy, the absence of a powerful central executive, Japan's unique electoral system, and the factionalism of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Calder 1988); in fact, they seem to include almost anything in the Japanese political system that is peculiar to the Western eye.Since assessments of the 'reactive state' theory diverge significantly, it has to be concluded that the extent of reactiveness or proactiveness by Japan on a particular foreign policy issue depends to a great deal on the respective determinants of a policy issue. They can include vested interests, strategic factors such as energy dependence, foreign policy goals or the level of media attention. If these determinants are weak, then Japan is more likely to be reactive to foreign pressure. Campbell (1992, xxx) argues that the presence (or absence) of a policy sponsor with sufficient resources, drive and skills to push a particular issue forward (or hold it back) is "the single most important 'variable' in determining whether and when a policy change will occur, and sometimes its contents as well".This paper describes the Japanese political system and examines the Japanese policy constituency on climate change to ascertain whether there is a policy sponsor and who this is who is driving the Japanese climate change agenda, and what role non-state actors play in this process. It starts from the premise that different types of policy networks exist in Japan, which span from stable, highly-integrated policy communities with restricted membership to unstable, loosely-integrated issue networks with large numbers of participants (Rhodes and Marsh 1992)... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1989 and 2000, Japan was the largest foreign aid donor in the world. Meanwhile, Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) had played a prominent role in Japan's foreign policy. Yet public recognition of Japan's ODA as a critical foreign policy tool seems low, and the effectiveness of this foreign policy is uncertain. Therefore, this paper analyzes Japan's national interests and how Japan's foreign aid attained its foreign policy goals. First, Japanese national interests will be examined by content analysis using white papers prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Second, it surveys Japan's foreign aid policy as a foreign policy tool. Third, this study attempts to assess if Japan's national interests were achieved while Japan was one of the largest ODA donors in the world. Quantitative studies reveal whether Japan's ODA provided positive impact on Japanese economic, diplomatic, and security interests. Finally, the research findings suggest how Japan should define and formulate its foreign aid policy as a foreign policy tool in the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries in the OECD have played a significant financial role in providing foreign aid for HIV/AIDS. In accounting for the convergence of AIDS funding behaviors, constructivist international relations theories w ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite evidence of “nationalist” influences on security policies in Japan and Korea, particularly in recent years, the term “nationalism” is conspicuous for its absence in Japanese security debates and for its replacement by the more popular “sovereignty ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northeast Asia is often regarded as having an uneasy atmosphere, with tensions between the countries making the region sometimes look unpeaceful. North Korean arms tests and other aggressive gestures also contribute to this view, as well as tensions between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. My study tries to look closer at the development of the relations between the most important states in the region, China, Japan and South Korea, assuming that the above-mentioned conflicts are not dominating the relations between the three countries. The study tries to assess changes in the triadic and dyadic relations which don not get as much attention as the conflicts, but will also have an impact on the future relations in the region.These changes are studied by using the concept of Security Community that has been first developed by Karl W. Deutsch and later been elaborated by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. The larger goal of my study is to examine the long term stability of the peace between the three countries. A pluralistic Security Community is defined as a community of states having "dependable expectations of peaceful change". Whilst Deutsch developed the concept of the Security Community with reference to the North Atlantic region, Adler and Barnett and Amitav Acharya expanded the scope of the concept to other regions in the world. They also based it on constructivist ideas, giving it more theoretical rigidity, and added the idea of a development pattern with different stages in building a Security Community from nascent to mature. This now allows to study Security Communities that have not fully developed yet, such as in Northeast Asia. Following this concept, the key factors in the development of a Security Community are transactions, norms and institutions. In my work I study the changing relations of the three countries by looking at changes in these factors in different issue areas, with special focus on the development in the maritime domain, which seems to display a case of change towards closer co-operation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, relations between China and Japan have been stable yet contentious due to unresolved controversies concerning history textbooks, territorial disputes, military activity, market distortions, and environmental degradation. While by no means precluding the real possibility of reconciliation between China and Japan, such ends cannot be understood without explanations about cultural preferences amid materialist pursuits. As nearly 2,000 years in the history of Sino-Japanese relations thus demonstrates, unitary actors derive their general interests from specific identities such that the propensity for either apprehension or resolve need not always depend upon the effects caused by those structural factors (security dilemmas, imbalanced capabilities) which seem to be less conditional and more coincidental instead. For what has elsewhere been termed "civilizational realpolitik" continues to determine the conditions in constructing Sino-Japanese relations across time/space. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has an "associational revolution" taken place in Japan's civil society? Is civil society in Japan "robust?" We try to provide an answer to these interesting questions by drawing on data we have accumulated from a comparative survey of civil society organizations conducted between 1997 and 2007 in ten countries, including Japan, South Korea, the United States, Germany, China, Turkey, Russia, the Philippines, Brazil and Bangladesh. In addition to the data from the ten-country survey, we used about 40,000 items of data from the 2006-07 Japan Interest Group Survey 2 (or JIGS2), which examined neighbourhood associations, social associations and NPOs in Japan. With the exception of NPOs, our analysis suggests that an "associational revolution", defined as a rapid increase in associations, does not seem to be taking place across the nation. We can confirm such a revolution at a prefectural level, however, as is the case in Hyogo. Moreover, we find that associations closely tied to the profit sector still make up the majority of the social associations that exist and are also orientated towards economic development. As we expand our focus to include neighbourhood associations and NPOs, though, we find a Japanese civil society that has a strong grass-roots foundation.In addtion, we also seek for the answer to these quetions such as how influential civil society organizations are in different countries,how they perceive their efficacy.?. Surveys in each of these states ask CSOs to evaluate their own influence, as well as the influence of other political players. Interactions between state and society, or the characteristics of political regimes, history, culture, people’s awareness, and institutional legacies all affect organizations’ self-evaluation regarding influence. I analyze such differences among countries by comparing JIGS (Japan Interest Group Survey) survey data, collected by the JIGS project from over 10,000 organizations in 10 countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the ever growing international human rights norm against the death penalty, two advanced industrial democracies, Japan and the United States, shy away from global collaboration to abolish this "inhuman and degrading" punishment. I ask why the international human rights norm that prohibits capital punishment seems to have little impact on the United States and Japan. Why have these two advanced democracies been averse to implementing the international human rights norm? What are the salient similarities between these two cases that may help explain their divergence from other advanced democracies? How do these similarities play out in the particular context of noncompliance? In presenting these questions, I do not purport to revisit wider historical and sociological debates about why some countries exempt themselves from international human rights provisions. Instead, I highlight several of the most important characteristics. A careful comparative analysis of the similarities of these two cases may help to illuminate the forces that are likely to be brought to noncompliance of these countries beyond the area of human rights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares gender equality discourse in demographic planning in Japan and the European Union. Since the falling birth rate became a prime political problem in Japan in the early 1990s, the Japanese government has introduced a series of policies and established new institutions with which to tackle it. In the late 1990s, "gender equality" became the centre of Japan's demographic strategy. One of the first to employ a "gender equality" discourse to tackle demographic decline, however, was the EU in the 1970s, from which Japanese policies appear to draw. The continuing fall in birth rates in EU member states have led to new shifts in gender equality discourse in the 1990s and 2000s. They contrast starkly with the state of gender equality in Japan, where for example, gender mainstreaming remains marginal and issues of diversity are altogether absent. A comparison of current gender equality discourse in demographic context in Japan and the EU sheds light first, on the international mechanisms involved in shaping gender equality discourse; second, on the specificities of its localisation in the Japanese context; and third, on how different discursive approaches to falling birth rates result in different discourses of gender equality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are contradictory trends in Japan's security policy formulation today, with growing interest among policy makers and analysts in developing both hard and soft power in the pursuit of national security on the one hand and, on the other, recent signs of Japanese investment in hard power instruments of national security. This paper will first discuss Nye's hard and soft power formulation and its potential and limitations. It will then describe how the participants in the national security debate in Japan define and view hard and soft power as concepts and as policy instruments. This will be followed by a critical examination of the recent trends in Japanese security policy away from soft power toward hard power. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's North Korea policy throughout the postwar period was dictated by its need to maintain its alliance with the United States to secure its own peace. The U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework did not alter Japan's fundamental policy toward North Korea. The current nuclear crisis and the prospect of a nuclear North Korea is forcing Tokyo to review its approach to Pyongyang. Japan supports the six-party talks as a means to solve the nuclear crisis, but it is increasingly aware that the multilateral framework may not be able to produce an outcome acceptable to both North Korea (the source of Japan's security anxiety) and the United States (the most reliable security ally), as well as to the other regional powers. A nuclear North Korea would spell an end to the Pyongyang Declaration, in which Japan and North Korea stated that normalization of their bilateral relations would contribute to the broader regional peace and stability. It would force Japan to reconsider its security policy in a fundamental way, with far reaching implications for Japan's relations with the other neighboring countries. This paper will discuss Japan's current policy toward the North Korean nuclear crisis and the implications of a nuclear North Korea for Japan's relations with the United States and other neighboring countries. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT #1Japan's Post-Mahanian Maritime StrategyThis paper will assess the dynamics of maritime security in Northeast Asia using the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the U.S. naval officer who, writing around the turn of the nineteenth century, contended that "sea power" was founded on the "three pillars" of international commerce, naval stations scattered along the sea lanes to support the operations of fuel-thirsty warships, and, most importantly for him, a powerful battle fleet. Mahan's works exhibited a strong geographical hue, urging the United States to build a fleet capable of defending the Caribbean sea lanes against the largest concentration of naval forces likely to be hurled against it. Only by securing the Caribbean basin, its "Mediterranean," declared Mahan, could the United States dig an isthmian canal and wrest away its rightful share of the Asia trade.We have unearthed considerable evidence suggesting that China will pursue a Mahanian maritime strategy as its diplomatic, economic, and military power waxes. Influential Chinese strategists talk of "absolute control" over China's littoral waters, through which the shipments of raw materials upon which the nation's economic growth has come to depend must pass. In so doing, they routinely invoke Mahan's writings. If indeed Beijing follows Mahan's path to sea power, it will regard the Yellow, East China, and South China seas much as Mahan regarded the Caribbean: as an expanse in which naval dominance is vital to national prosperity.If so, an increasingly assertive Chinese maritime strategy will intersect with that of Japan, which has been rethinking its own approach to the uses of sea power, in large part because it relies on the same sea lanes for its own imports of oil, gas, and other commodities. Whether Tokyo would entrust the safety of its seaborne commerce to a China jealous of its "Caribbean" is an open question. Also problematic for Sino-Japanese relations are conflicting claims to islands whose adjacent sea beds purportedly contain major oil and gas reserves.Yet few, if any, Japanese strategists look to Alfred Thayer Mahan for guidance. They do not quote Mahan; nor do they urge Tokyo to found its maritime strategy on Mahanian precepts or some distinctively Japanese derivative thereof. Why is that so? Was Mahan discredited by association with the Japanese militarism of the 1930s and 1940s? Was he simply forgotten during the postwar years, when large segments of the Japanese populace looked with revulsion on the use of military force? Upon what maritime theories will Tokyo base its emerging naval strategy, if not those of Mahan? With what effect?By venturing some answers to these questions, the study will show how Japanese strategy may evolve over the next decade and how the strategies deployed by Tokyo and Beijing may interact. Our findings and recommendations will be of immediate use to policymakers in Tokyo, as well as to policymakers and alliance managers in Washington, which, if recent events are any guide, will depend increasingly on the U.S.-Japanese alliance to sustain its East Asia strategy in the coming years. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although U.S. policy toward Asia is often articulated in terms of the emergence and political evolution of China, the U.S.-Japanese relationship has been the primary means of effecting American policy in the region for over a century and a half. If Washington is to achieve a second "Pax Americana" in this century, the relationship with Japan will continue to be a major factor as U.S. policymakers attempt to best devise and implement diplomatic and defense policy in Asia. The rapid development of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance in the past decade indicate that it will continue to be a viable and valuable policy tool in this effort, although there are several areas where it remains deficient relative to the demands placed upon it. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan has been looking for a way to make "soft" non-military contributions to peace and security but events have turned Japan in the direction of Article Nine revision and enhancement of Japan's ability to use "hard" military power to support global order. Nevertheless, there still is widespread reluctance in Japan to shift emphasis in this direction. I would suggest that Japan can expand on the precedent set by the Self Defense Forces (SDF) deployment to Samara in Iraq in the direction of soft rather than hard power. Problems in the way of Japan's progress in this direction are conceptual, political, and practical, but are less daunting than those of persisting in a strategy that emphasizes national hard power/traditional security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This presentation examines nature of the Japanese state in the context of globalization. Analytical attention is shifting from convergence (more similarity) towards divergence (more difference) among political economies under globalization, and this shift renews our focus on the role of state policies vis à vis the changing international political economy. Although Japan was once seen as a model of economic development for other political economies in the region, there has been serious doubt about validity of the model because of Japan’s slow recovery after the recession that began in the late 1980s and since the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997. However, under deregulation, the state has not given up its roles. The state has instead been energized by elaborating policy without reference to whether or not they were successful. This study explores how and why the Japanese state revitalized regulating economic affairs and implications for other political economies in East Asia. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will analyse and discuss the recent development in the relationship between China and Japan and its implications for security in Northeast Asia and for international security. The argument is that the relationship between China and Japan constitutes a serious risk of developing into a dominating regional bipolarity with characteristics similar to the Cold War bipolarity. Such a development will not only have strong implications for security in Northeast Asia, but also for international security especially due to the United StatesÂ’ security alliance with Japan and the strong interest of the United States to maintain its strong role in Asian security. The development in the Sino-Japanese relationship towards a hostile dominating regional bipolarity is however not inevitable and by adopting a long-term policy focusing on balancing the American security relations to Japan and China, the United States can help pre-empt such a development. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]