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By highlighting the phenomenon of bandwagoning for profit, Randall Schweller has made important contributions to the literature of alliance formation, including the introduction of a balance of interest theory. Yet, the validity of his arguments has not received academic scrutiny. To fill this void, the present paper examines the case of Japan and the Axis Pact, which constitutes a most likely case of his "bandwagon for profit" argument. Schweller posits that Japan jumped on the German bandwagon, like a jackal seeking a wolf's spoils. The paper demonstrates that his "Japan as a jackal" thesis is unsustainable on empirical grounds. For Tokyo, evidence shows, the Axis Pact was first and foremost meant to be a military alliance for balancing against the United States, rather than for free-riding on German power. On the basis of its empirical findings, furthermore, the paper presents an improved version of balance of interest theory on alliance formation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1368 and 1841 - almost five centuries - there were only two wars between China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. These Sinicized states crafted the stable relations with each other, and the most violence and instability arose between these states and the "nomadic" peoples to the north and west of China and Korea. The nomads and the East Asian states both operated within a unipolar system, but whereas the states accepted Chinese authority, the nomads did not. This distinction is not important if Wohlforth's argument that associates unipolarity with stability prevailed in East Asia. Yet China's relations with the nomads were characterized by war and instability whereas relations with the Sinicized states were characterized by peace and stability. Unipolarity cannot account for both of these outcomes. What this paper demonstrates is that there is a hierarchical relationship in place in the context of China and the East Asian states that was generated by a common culture defined by a Confucian worldview. These Sinic states possessed a shared sense of legitimacy which presupposes, in the context of Confucianism, that relations operate within an accepted hierarchy. The research presented in this paper helps clarify the distinction between an international system based on polarity and an international society based on culture. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper purports to give a positive answer to the "Japanese IR Question", by analyzing some notable academic attempts arguing the concept of international society. Particular attention is paid to works between 1920s and 1940s, and the paper focuses on IR scholars, political theorists, and international lawyers.During this period, Japan was in a very peculiar place. While the country had accomplished the status of a major power in post WWI world, Japan had also struggled to identify the appropriate position between the European world of the colonizers and the world of the colonized. Thus clarifying the meaning of international society was an important part of academic activities for the country's scholars concerning international relations. In the paper, the author classifies major studies on international society into four groups or "views", namely (1) the Idealists; (2) the Kelsenians; (3) the Cosmopolitans; and (4) the Greater-Asians.The problem with these groups is that all four views were influenced by foreign theory and remained imported knowledge. However, Japanese vision of international society as a whole has one distinctive character which other countries' studies do not have. The paper points out that there are three types of arguments in the country's vision on international society, and argues that it is the third type of argument on autonomy which makes the vision of international society as "Japanese IR". ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines economic integration in East Asia with a focus on the key issues in harmonizing bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). Even though market forces, the Sino-Japanese rivalry, and functional cooperation may help drive regionalism forward, the foundation of any significant integration in the East Asian trading system will be the ASEAN+1 FTAs with China, Japan, and South Korea. It is therefore important to examine the way in which these agreements structure cooperation. This study examines some of the major choices made in the negotiation of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEPA) and the ways in which these choices might help or hinder the consolidation of economic regionalism. If AJCEPA is to be anything more than an umbrella for Japan's bilateral FTAs with ASEAN members, it must achieve greater uniformity in coverage of issues and, especially, rules of origin. The comparison of Japan's bilateral FTAs that closes the paper suggests the magnitude of this challenge. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine Japan’s relations with North Korea which have been deadlocked for a long time. Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made a visit to Pyongyang in September 2002 and held a summit meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-Il, and signed the “Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration”. Since then Japan has made a continuous effort to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea. It is Japan’s desire to put the abduction issue, the nuclear and security issue, and the normalization issue on the same table and solve all these problems in a comprehensive manner. To North Korea, on the other hand, the normalization issue is the top priority, as they demand a full apology and adequate compensation for Japan’s colonial past. Meanwhile, North Korea’s repeated nuclear testing and launching of missiles over the Sea of Japan has dampened the negotiating process. The Six-Party Talks intended to halt North Korea’s nuclear development are coming to a stalemate. Furthermore, U.S. economic sanctions and North Korea’s efforts to retrieve money once frozen in a Macau bank have complicated the whole situation.This paper will, first, examine differences in priorities in foreign policy between Japan and North Korea. Second, the paper will focus on the reasons why the Six-Party Talks are not making the progress expected toward North Korea’s denuclearization. Third, the conflicting interests and differences among the five countries toward North Korea will be analyzed. Finally, different alternatives regarding the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea will be considered. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines changes at the global level in the discourse of climate change, and changes in Japan regarding the climate change agenda, during the 1980s to 2000s. It also focuses on the ways in which Japan has attempted to influence - successfully and unsuccessfully - the global climate change agenda. Further, the paper examines the conditions for Japan's ability to make progress on its agenda at the global level, as well as at the domestic level. What factors have led to the successful adoption of Japan's climate agenda at the transnational level (i.e. domestically and internationally)? What factors have hindered it? The cases have been taken from the domestic and international processes towards the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol and the current post-Kyoto debates. The paper presents an analytical framework which can be used at both the international and domestic levels to explain Japan's way forward in mainstreaming climate change policies in world politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan and North Korea began their official talks for diplomatic normalization in 1991. Sixteen years have passed since then. Yet it is uncertain when they can finally reach diplomatic normalization. During their first summit meeting of September 2002, Japan has promised to provide a massive economic aid to North Korea after diplomatic normalization, estimated at approximately 1 trillion yen, virtually as a compensation for Japan's colonial rule of Korea. The money would be a great asset to the North Korean economy and can serve as a major incentive for DRPK's denuclearization. Thus, the normalization has a strong bearing on the regional security of Northeast Asia. However, diplomatic normalization is not yet in sight. The paper will focus on key factors for delaying normalized relations between the two countries. It will discuss changes in the eagerness of Japan and North Korea for normalization, with a greater focus on recent changes, analyzing the factors that prompted the changes, including domestic and international as well as historical, economic, military factors. The paper will also consider the future prospects for normalization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the scholarly literature, the effect of electoral structure on foreign policy making is a matter of some question. The 1994 electoral reforms in Japan that resulted in a dramatic change in the electoral power structures provide a unique natural experiment, offering the potential to understand how electoral structure influences foreign policy making. This paper examines Japanese WTO agricultural trade negotiations in light of the 1994 reforms, looking specifically at whether or not Japan's agricultural negotiating position changed before and after the 1994 electoral reforms by examining Japanese negotiating positions in the Uruguay and Doha WTO trade rounds. If democratic electoral structure has an impact on the Japan's trade negotiating position, it will do so by reconfiguring the domestic pressures against trade liberalization, producing a different equilibrium point between domestic and international pressures. As a consequence of this shifted equilibrium point, Japan's agriculture trade negotiating position should change with relation to its position before the electoral change. This paper finds that the Japanese negotiating position does not change after the 1994 reforms, raising questions regarding the impact of how democracy is structured on foreign policy. This seems contra to the expectation that the nature of political power should have an impact on the policy outputs. In the Japanese case, a shift from a highly parochial and agricultural to a more urban and cosmopolitan electoral power base produced no appreciable change in Japanese trade negotiating position. This finding has a range of implications that are explored in the paper and create an agenda for future research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immediately after liberation from Japanese occupation, numerous experts were deployed from the United States to survey the postwar landscape of the Philippines. They were sent to collect images of and collect statistical information on the extent of damages to Philippine agricultural and manufacturing industry, transportation and shipping facilities, urban and village structures, and natural resources. This collection of information urgently framed the Philippine Islands as "utterly devastated." Within the U.S. congress, immediate calls were made not for short term relief, as originally thought, but rather for long term plans of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the Philippines. From 1945 to 1946 discussions of a Rehabilitation Act were steadily pursued. By 1946 the "original Rehabilitation Bill had been expanded, the kinds and amounts of claimants had been extended and definitions broadened, the amounts appropriated had been multiplied over five times." Bundled along with the disappointing Bell-Trade Act of 1946, the Rehabilitation Act still ushered in a sense of optimism in the immediate postwar Philippines. By the sheer amount of money it provided, numerous projects and institutions were planned to aid in gaining the newly independent Republic the international recognition it deserved. Yet at the same time, inhabiting the shadows of optimism was the anxiety of mismanagement of money. In 1947, one particular group, the Joint Philippine American Finance Commission made up of both Philippine and American members reported their findings and recommendations. Their findings conclude that the initial years of Philippine independence was of critical importance in the "economic development" and stable future of the nation. Chief in their concerns was the potential mishandling of rehabilitation loan money entering the young nation. In response the joint commission makes several recommendations. Of utmost importance is the principle proposal of a Central Bank. The establishment of the Central Bank of the Philippines, as the chief authority on national currency, can ensure that all of their other recommendations are followed. This paper thus proposes to look at the emergence of the Central Bank as an object produced out of the uncanny postwar discourses of economists. These postwar discourses center on the anxiety over the twofold possibilities of misrecognition of money as well as a collapse into a non-modern economy. In the imaginary of economists, the existence of a Central Bank guided by techno-knowledge and sound management, acts as the bulwark against such devastating possibilities. Furthermore, the potential success of the Central Bank is demonstrative of the potential success of a sovereign Philippine political economy. Yet in order to legitimate the existence of a Central Bank, this paper asserts that through disciplined economic research, a recurring non-modern economic world is created by economists. This non-modern economic world is then historically presented as inhabiting the present postwar space of the Philippines. Furthermore, it also threatens to subsume it. It does so in two interrelated ways. The first is the potential misrecognition of money as speaking a language other than the value of capital. The second is the discourse created by economists in order to produce uncanny effects through the economy. These two methods intertwine in order to combine, what they imagine as a chaotic and fragmented space of islands: peasants, rebellions, decrepit banks, atrophied agricultural industries, and other non-modern elements, into a unitary and coherent whole. The name of this object is the Philippine national economy. And like any object, once solid and tangible, it can be continuously manipulated, managed, and exploited by both state and international banking institutions... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How effective leader can exercise his/her leadership depends on the support of people. The best indicator of the support of people is public opinion of the nation. This paper examines the relations between effectiveness of leadership and the support of public opinion and its impact on foreign policy in Japan since Koizumi administration. During Koizumi era, how did he utilize the support of public opinion when he formulated Japan's foreign policy after 911? Succeeding to Koizumi, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is now moving toward the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution to allow Japan to impair the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Can he successfully revise the Constitution? Can he utilize the support of the public opinion like his predecessor? How does Abe’s policy sextant influence Japan's foreign policy? What kind of impact does his policy have on Asian countries and U.S.-Japan alliance? Having these questions in mind, this paper compares and analyzes leadership, foreign policy and public opinion in Japan between Koizumi and Abe administrations ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study on Japan's informal political actors and networks will not only provide a foundation for us to further understand Japanese politics and foreign policy but will also enable us to get a better idea of how networks function in a larger context, namely between Tokyo, Beijing and Washington. Social network is not only an important part of Japanese policy making but also a crucial factor in the China-Japan-U.S. triangular relationship. Instead of providing equal attention to each parties of this triangle, this paper will focus on Japan's informal political actors and networks by examining the process of normalization in its relations with China. In addition to detailed analysis of political actors in Japanese politics and society, it also provides an account of Beijing's reaction in this significant process. In the concluding part, this paper also provides some preliminary analysis in making international comparisons particularly with the United States. Thus, it will also assist us in understanding the networks between the three powers in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper will analyze the ways that Japan has approached nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in recent years. More specifically, in addition to the diverse approaches that have been taken by Tokyo and Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations, my paper will examine the extent to which U.S. policies influence the disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives of the Japanese government in the international arena. Preliminary research suggests that Tokyo is placing more emphasis on nonproliferation than on nuclear disarmament, creating two major reasons for concern. First, the government of Japan, despite its continuing public campaign to promote nuclear disarmament while seeking the assistance of civil society organizations, would be especially sensitive to the policy concerns of Washington, which, as many critics argue, has developed hegemonic global interests. Second, Tokyo would be alienating itself from Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations that in recent years have increased their international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks into the evolution of regional co-operation in Europe and East Asia since the mid-1990s and at the policies of Germany and Japan in those contexts. Using role concepts as analytical tools for the comparative analysis, the paper assesses the specific role concepts of Germany and Japan with regard to regional co-operation, both in the economic and in the security context. It is widely assumed that East Asia represents an entirely different context for regional co-operation from Europe, and therefore has developed a new, specifically Asian way of regionalism. So far, less attention has been paid to Japan´s specific aims and policies in promoting and supporting regionalism in East Asia. Has Japan been important in promoting shallow forms of regional integration in East Asia, in contrast to Germany´s support for deep integration? If so, how should this be seen from the perspective of the civilian power role concept? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During Prime Minister Koizumi’s recent visit to the States, Prime Minister Koizumi had been invited to join CIA’s intelligence brief with President Bush for the first time among the Japanese prime ministers. The invitation had been recognized as President Bush’s way of thanking Koizumi for his timely staunchly statement to indicate Japan’s support for U.S. and British actions against Iraq without the U.N. resolutions. Between Bush and Koizumi, they seem to be enjoying the hey day of the alliance, but in reality, what is happening between two countries can be explained that Japan has been much more deeply placed in American Grand Strategy while Japan has not realized that it does not have its own. In this sense, the U.S.-Japan alliance has not the product of American and Japan’s grand strategies. It is a part of the American grand strategy, and Japan happens to be in the strategy. In the aftermath of 911, the United States changed its military policy from the threat based one to the capability based one. Under the circumstances, not having its grand strategy, Japan will soon face the problem of rationally deciding what Japan should do for the sake of Japan’s national interest whenever the United States calls for contribution. In this paper, I would argue that it will be high time to recognize the gap of the image and reality of the alliance between Washington and Tokyo. For the States, it might not become the issue as long as Japan has been following Washington’s order blindly, but for Japan, it means that Japan has missed another prime opportunity to establish its grand strategy after 911 and the swift victory of American and British war against Iraq. In this paper, I will trace back how the expectation and reality of the alliance has shifted since its establishment to the present. Then, I will point out the gap of the image and reality of the alliance between policy makers in Washington and Tokyo and its impact on the future U.S.-Japan security relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines whether Japan is emerging as a “normal” great power able to use military power as freely as other great powers do. Since its establishment, the U.S.-Japan alliance seems to have strengthened overtime. Among the postwar prime ministers ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Confronting an ugly past is often regarded as essential not only to achieving some justice for the victims but also for allowing those held historically responsible to move on. This is sometimes a prerequisite for the 'normalization' of relations between states whose shared histories may contain events in which one party believes they have been grievously wronged by the other. The paradigm case in which an almost permanent impasse exists in coming to terms with a difficult war past is Japan vis-à-vis its immediate neighbours in East Asia. The cycle of apologetics and denials will almost certainly continue as deep contestations over war memories continue within Japan while at the same time political leaders seek a more prominent role for their country as a 'normal' actor in international affairs. This paper assesses the problem of Japan's 'normalization' efforts with particular reference to issues of nationalism, state identity and normative theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasing economic and strategic clout of China and the vulnerability of the American power in the Gulf, the US policy makers are searching for a new strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Their ultimate purpose is to neutralize the preeminence of China.Pentagon is trying to forge a new alliance of three well-established democracies-US,India and Japan. On April 16,2007 all the three nations began a joint military drill in the Pacific. More or less at the same time, the first India-US Defence Joint Working Group met in New Delhi.These two develpments have certainly raised the temperature in Beizing.Recently China has raised its defence budget by 17.8 percent and successfully tested its antisatellite ballistic missile.No doubt the Pacific military exercise by US, India and Japan has been taken as an alarming signal by China.The proposed paper will try to explore the evolving strategy of the US in the Asia Pacific region.One has to explore as to what extent such a three nation joint exercise is addressing the unprecedented rise of China in the politico-economic and strategic affaires of the region. We will also examine as to how far the existing American policy of strategic engagement with China is being reexamined. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While most view China as the rising power in Asia, the future of the region will also be determined by India. Despite receiving less attention, India is a growing economic, military, and political power in the region and globally. India has the world’s 4th largest economy at $796 billion and for the past decade, has registered economic growth rates over 7 percent. India has the 3rd largest active duty armed force in the world behind China and the United States and is a nuclear power. Finally, India is a respected political player and often cited as a candidate for inclusion in the UN Security Council. Certainly, India faces significant obstacles including over 350 million living dire poverty and an economic infrastructure that needs significant repair. However, Indian leaders have ambitious aspirations and it is a country on the rise. Given India’s important and growing position in Asia, its relations with China and Japan, the other key players in region, will be crucial. This paper will examine India’s economic, political, and security relationship with these other two powers of Asia and the impact these relations have on Indian and regional security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trilateral security cooperation among Japan, Australia and the United States has accelerated over the last few years, with the first foreign ministerial meeting held in early 2006. Not unexpectedly, the new cooperation between Canberra, Tokyo, and Washington is often characterized as a revival of Containment (against China, this time) or a mini-NATO in Asia. The paper will examine this latest development in East Asia’s security relations, with a specific focus on Japanese policymaking. The concept of a democratic state as one form of state identity will be given particular attention for understanding Tokyo’s attitude toward trilateral security cooperation, as well as the new security order in Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the Cold War period the Japanese maintained a largely inflexible approach to their role and place in international affairs. Even now in 2007, the major security policies of Japan are based upon the Japan-US security alliance and the US remains the first and only interdependent security partner for Japan. However, in the post-9.11 world, much more accommodation with international norms will be required. Japan needs alternative security partners to work with. Australia, together with New Zealand, is considered an eligible candidate. Therefore, the paper will rationalize the prerequisites towards the complementary security arrangements within Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. The effectiveness of the ‘JANZUS’ is boldly examined from various points of view. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The logic of the democratic peace suggests that as two democracies, Japan and South Korea should not have militarized conflicts between them, while mutual recognition of their democratic systems should have a corresponding mutual reassurance effect. On the other hand, historical memories of Japan’s colonialization of Korea provide a basis for Koreans to mistrust Japan’s disposition, if not its intentions. This paper considers whether the 2006 Japanese-Korean dispute over maritime exploration near the disputed Tokdo/Takeshima was a militarized dispute, and whether Japan’s status as a democracy has been sufficient to reassure South Korea that Japan does not pose a military threat. The results of this case study will attempt to shed light on the question of whether, and if so under what conditions, historically rooted mistrust might trump the causal variables underpinning the democratic peace. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Copenhagen School's concept of securitisation is regarded as one of the most innovative, but also most controversially discussed approaches in IR and security studies. Located within the wider theoretical scheme formulated by the Copenhagen School, it provides a specific analytic in respect of examining security politics and, predicated on this, the evaluation of the prevailing pattern of security interactions on a given regional level. However, several commentators have pointed out a tension within the securitisation approach, which mainly stems from two different possible readings of this concept: one that puts more theoretical emphasis on language and a second that stresses the importance of considering context. By conducting a first-cut, preliminary analysis on one crucial issue of current Japanese foreign policy, the case of abducted Japanese citizens to North Korea, this paper highlights the challenges one encounters in trying to apply the securitisation approach to this specific case. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea is Japan’s most natural ally in East Asia. Both nations share the same primary military benefactor, the United States. Their geographic proximity makes them natural allies in offsetting China’s growing power and unknown intentions. In spite of this natural need to ally, relations remain strained primarily over Japan’s historical occupation of Korea. This paper examines the political issues that need to be resolved in order for Japan and South Korea to work together and the potential for such reconciliation in light of South Korea’s drift away from its American ally and Japan’s open embrace of the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea are the worse they have been in many years. Several major problems still impede the normalization of Japan-North Korea relations. These problems, but particularly the abduction of Japanese nationals during the 1970s and 1980s by North Korean agents and Japan's past annexation of Korea, continue to strain this bilateral relationship. Pyongyang's decisions in 2006 to launch a series of missiles and then to detonate a nuclear device created even more problems for the already bad relationship between Japan and North Korea. Caught in the middle of a these bilateral problems, which have palpably increased tension between Tokyo and Pyongyang, are the many thousands of Korean residents in Japan who have maintained their political allegiance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Represented by Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) for more than fifty years, these Koreans loyal to the DPRK, like all zainichi (Koreans permanently living in Japan), have long faced discrimination in Japanese society. However, of late the members of Chongryon also have had to contend with the political fallout from the visible deterioration in Japan-North Korean relations, which has been exacerbated by Tokyo's adoption of a hard-line policy toward the DPRK. This paper examines the politically connected problems that Chongryon Koreans have recently experienced in Japan, as well as the extent to which this ethno-political minority has been subjected to repression by the Japanese government, as claimed by these Koreans and by Pyongyang. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese have long been simultaneously fascinated and threatened by the international. Since the 1980s, the discourse of kokusaika (internationalisation) has promoted both a more open approach to the international but, at the same time, a defensive, nationalistic stance. These contradictions can be felt in the classroom. On the one hand, ‘education for international understanding’ classes have been part of the primary school curriculum since 2002. In terms of English, the government’s goal is that every high school student will be able to communicate in everyday English in normal communicative situations by the time they graduate. Also, more and more universities are switching from language classes (classes on English) to content based courses (classes in English). On the other hand, students themselves, steeped in nationalistic discourses of a ‘uniquely’ unique Japan, often find the leap from ‘English class’ to ‘class in English’ too difficult to bridge, with many dropping out of the course or even university itself. In this way, internationally minded citizens and perhaps future scholars and members of the international relations community are lost. As ‘international’ educators in a non-English speaking environment, a key part of our job is to provide students with the tools to bridge the linguistic, cultural, and pedagogical divides they inevitably encounter when studying about the world outside Japan in a foreign language. Drawing on years of experience teaching Australia and Japanese studies in Japan, this paper looks at (a) some of the barriers in the ‘internationalisation’ of the Japanese university classroom and (b) practical techniques to help overcome these problems, specifically drawing on the wide range of activities and strategies known as active learning that involve students in doing things and thinking about the things they are doing. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the time of its U.S-administered post-war reconstruction, Japan has had an aggressive population control program as part of national policy. At the same time, its pacifist posture, embedded in Article 9 of its constitution, has allowed the country to focus on economic development and to rely upon the United States as security guarantor. Now Japan faces a rapidly aging population and reached absolute population decline a year earlier than expected. Japanese policy makers have explicitly chosen the revolution in military affairs (RMA) in part to compensate for this reality. Meanwhile a rising China and the threat of a nuclear North Korea may further prod Japan to secure a nuclear option as its ultimate security hedge. But as Operation Iraqi Freedom has demonstrated, technological solutions to military force planning problems have limited utility. The current security environment reveals the continued need for human capital, and the paper draws conclusions about the efficacy of Japan's technological solutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of World War II. Special emphasis is placed on three major debates between China and Japan where the American role appears to have been critical: (1) the history issue; (2) the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; and (3) the Taiwan issue. The central argument is that a series of institutional innovations, in Sino-Japanese relations introduced by the United States after the end of World War II, reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan, and often rather indirectly accounts for the continuing tense relations between China and Japan. These developments, including the Tokyo War Crime Trials, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Okinawa reversion treaty in 1971, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, have had a major influence on Sino-Japanese relations that endures today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an examination of the dynamics of multilateral military alliances or 'coalitions'. Framed within the wider debate over the future security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region, it has the dual objective of both enriching the academic debate and offering guidance to policy-makers by investigating the theory and practice of coalition behaviour. The article expounds the case for the American-Japanese-Australian combination and analyses the issues that confront such an alliance-coalition using two competing theoretical perspectives of allied behaviour: 'balance of power' and 'intra-alliance politics'. The main propositions of these perspectives are empirically tested against policy statements based on American, Japanese and Australian foreign and defence policies and associated academic writings. The paper demonstrates the continued validity of realist-conceived approaches to security provision and concludes that both theoretical perspectives are useful tools of analysis in this case. Focusing on separate levels and therefore different aspects of allied behaviour, they can in fact be viewed as complementary, rather than competing, and clearly exhibit strong potential for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the meaning and significance of four key concepts heavily used to characterize the nature and essence and to reveal the core structural properties through Japanese diplomatic discourse for the last four centuries. They are anarchy, hierarchy, community and civilization. Some American theories of international relations are referred to in my discussion of how Japanese used these concepts in their understanding and discussion of international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a paper on Japan's quest for leadership in the Bretton Woods institutions discussed at the International Studies Association convention in Honolulu, Hawaii in 2005. The desire for international status and recognition is said to influenced Japanese foreign policy. The ability of Japan to secure greater leadership and influence should be more limited in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) compares to the World Bank. It stresses the need to look at Japanese influence in trade and security institutions.

It is frequently assumed that women bring different values to foreign policy making than men. These different values are also assumed to make a difference regarding foreign policy decision making. However, there is little work that seeks to establish the impact of gender on foreign policy in a systematic empirical manner. This study investigates whether gender makes a difference in a specific issue area in foreign policy. If it is indeed true that women bring different values to foreign policy making, then a greater presence of women in the political area should lead to a distinctive development cooperation policy - one that supports gender-related development and empowerment. This paper reports findings from two cases, the Netherlands and Japan. The former has a relatively high proportion of women in parliament, the latter a relatively low one. The Dutch case demonstrates some evidence of global sisterhood, while the Japanese case displays some concern with gender-related development, but not empowerment. A preliminary explanation for these findings is advanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper on the foreign policy of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. It examines the policy stance of Koizumi and analyzes if his initiatives marks watershed for postwar Japan. It also seeks to know whether the prime minister could depart from culturally bounded Japanese foreign policy.

The article presents the conference paper "Civil-Military Relations and Foreign Policy in Japan" prepared for the "International Studies Association Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. The assumptions which prevail about the military Self Defense Forces are that its officers have militaristic tendencies but are unimportant actors in the defense policymaking process. It examines the extent to which the Huntingtonian and Janowitzian models of civilian control help people to understand the case of the country.

The article presents a conference paper about antagonism between China and Japan. It offers a review and analysis of Japan's history revision and compensation denial controversy as well as an examination of the domestic political situations in both countries. It also discusses the attitude towards history and the possibility of the countries to jointly write a trans-national history for future generations.

This paper challenges the view that the Japanese state has been a leader in a drive toward new regional trade agreements in Asia. It acknowledges that Japan has forged pacts with Singapore and Mexico that lower overall tariffs, but suggests that these agreements -- and pending negotiations with other bilateral and plurilateral partners -- are driven more by an interest in "industrial harmonization" than in trade liberalization. This represents a continuation of Japan’s ongoing foreign policy, rather than a break from the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War world Japanese security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to "securitize" itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. Working from International Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Buzan et al., this paper examines Japanese security policy in light of Japan’s attempts to securitize itself in non traditional ways that impact traditional security, while focusing on the policy implications of Japan’s ongoing failure to securitize its economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should we teach International Relations in the aftermath of 911 and the war with Iraq? Does the swift victory of the war against Iraq symbolize the American answer to those responsible for 911? America won the war, so the case settled. In fact, the question concerning 911 is about to fade away in front of the victory of the war. For However, even so, it is still critical to think through 911 and the war with Iraq in the classroom of International Relations. Without this effort, it will be difficult to contemplate how the rest of the world should act in the era of America’s unilateralism and neoconservatism. At the same time, dealing with 911 and the victory of the war against Iraq will also provide students in the classroom with the opportunity to cultivate their media literacy. For example, comparing the views and programs of the Fox News Networks which had repeatedly called the U.S. forces as our forces in their broadcast and those of other networks, will challenge students’ beliefs and understanding of the events and the world. In this paper, I would like to accomplish two objectives. First, I would like to present a survey of course outlines of Introduction to International Relations at major universities in Japan and explore how scholars in Japan incorporate the impact of 911 and the war against Iraq in their courses. The results will be quite instructive because it should show how well Japanese professors incorporate the latest world affairs into their teaching, and also how their preferences or beliefs influence the content of their courses. Then, based on the findings, I will create one semester class of Introduction to International Relations, which covers the impact of 911 and the war against Iraq, and also touches upon the problem of media literacy, by including two recent videos; Why Us? An Insightful Look at the 9/11 Tragedy and What Makes the U.S. a Target (IIMCR) and The Long Road to War (WGBH). By the time of the conference, I will be able to share students’ evaluation of the class for review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American scholars might argue that Gaiatsu still plays an important role in the U.S.-Japan alliance in the aftermath of 911. However, the Constructivist’s analysis will show Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s trauma and his complacency are the key factors and weigh more than Gaiatsu in the current U.S.-Japan alliance. It will also mean that what the U.S. and Japan seem to enjoy might not be there once Prime Minister Koizumi stepping down and Japan will not be able to deliver what the U.S. expects. In the aftermath of 911, the U.S.-Japan alliance immediately faced the problem of show the flag incident, but it did not become too big a stumbling block between Washington and Tokyo after all. Washington owed big to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. His trauma concerning the Gulf War and his guts against Hashimoto, his enemy in the LDP, paved a way for Washington’s Gaiatsu (outside pressure) strategy to work. In face of the U.S. and British actions against Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi staunchly supported their actions even without the U.N. Security Council’s resolutions. On the surface, his decision signaled Japan’s departure from its postwar diplomacy, was welcomed by President George W. Bush, Jr. As a token of appreciation, during the recent bilateral summit, President Bush invited Prime Minister Koizumi for the first time to sit in on a secret meeting of the CIA. On the surface, as Shinzo Abe, Japan’s Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, secretary of the cabinet stated, In the century and a half since (Commodore Matthew) Perry came to Japan, Japan-U.S. relations have probably never been better. However, in reality, to the constructivists, Japan’s attitude toward the alliance has not changed at all; a dependent and blind follower. Otherwise, Japan should have made its position clearly and opted to turn the cold shoulder to the United States when the U.S. and Britain decided to act without the U.N. security resolutions. What Japan has done since 1945 is to go with the flow of the United States. Washington has no intention to comment on Japan’s action as long as Japan is in her side. However, as a result, Japan has not made an effort to develop an independent spirit and historical understanding. Dependence does not lead to mutual trust and respect. It is high time for Japan to have a realistic look at history to derive lessons that look to the future. For Japan to develop its own perspective, it is important to understand that the nature of the alliance has not changed a bit from the outset for Japan. In this paper, using the Constructivist’s approach, I will trace back Japan’s problem to the beginning of the U.S.-Japan alliance and explain why the problem remains intact more than a half century. By doing so, I will point out the way for Japan to develop an independent spirit to win stronger mutual trust and respect from the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent summits have sought to redefine Japan-China ties as a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" by "increasing political trust." Sino-Japanese trust is important because hedging in security affairs is expensive and can undermine stability. Lack of trust encourages worst-case assumptions about the other's motives, placing a ceiling on cooperation and making miscalculation and conflict more likely. Why is trust such a problem between Japan and China? Studies in international relations point to the power shift associated with China's rise and differences in regime type (democracy/authoritarianism). Research on contemporary Sino-Japanese ties often focuses on the significantly expanded and sometimes contentious trade relationship. Finding those explanations insufficient, this paper argues that trust problems are better understood as functions of national identity. The way that Japan and China perceive 'the other' in the context of their own national identities is the primary source of distrust. In Japanese perception, Japan tends to be seen as more developed and civilized than China and Chinese identity as obsessed with being at the center. In Chinese perception, China tends to be seen as morally and historically superior to Japan and Japanese identity as latently aggressive and disrespectful of natural order. These perceptions are traceable in Japanese views of China's human rights policies and regional diplomacy, and Chinese views of Japan's handling of history (including textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine) and military normalization. By explaining the link between identity conflicts and bilateral trust, this paper demonstrates why Sino-Japanese trust remains low and recent improvements in relations fragile. Peace and security in East Asia depend not only on how Tokyo and Beijing define and pursue their interests, but also on how they define and relate to each other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines public and elite attitudes toward security policy in Japan. While focusing on the US-Japan security alliance, Japan's relations with East Asian countries, and Japan's role in the United Nations, the paper addresses three questions: (1) How have public and elite views evolved since the 1990s?; (2) what is the relationship between mass and elite opinion?; and (3) how do mass and elite opinion relate to security policy? The paper argues that a particular group within the security elite has shaped national security policy and that the public has generally followed that group’s leadership. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that the traditional notion of Japan and the EU as the world’s two civilian powers is no longer sufficient to provide the conceptual glue for the EU-Japan Partnership. The EU and Japan both are gradually introducing harder defence mechanisms into their overall strategic outlook. The European Security Strategy (ESS) is evidence of a holistic concept of security that combines economic, civilian and, if needed, military means. Japan will also see the overhaul of its defence policy in the new strategic environment in Asia. However, neither the EU nor Japan will turn to traditional 20century power politics. In fact, both will continue to defend some of the values captured in the concept of civilian power while taking on larger and more difficult global responsibilities. The paper offers a conceptual framework of “shared global responsibility” that could provide a reference point for policy makers in Japan and Europe when revitalising and implementing enhanced co-operation between Japan and Europe. Older “lofty” notions of “civilian power” are perceived as outdated elsewhere. The new notion of “shared responsibility” is based on the unique capacities and historical trajectories that the EU and Japan posses. It combines civilian values with real capacities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sino-Japanese relationship has become increasingly complex, conflictive, and of global consequence. The relationship has reached a point that while the two governments increasingly tie their fate together economically, growing rancor among the Chinese public over WWII and contemporary issues threatens to tear them apart. Since the mid 1980’s, anti-Japanese mass protests in China have been conducted on the streets, college campuses, and, in recent years, on the Internet. This paper has two objectives: (1) to detail the growing anti-Japanese mass movements in China and (2) to study the linkages between Chinese domestic public opinion on Japan and foreign policy decision-making. While there are some notable exceptions, the vast majority of public opinion literature has used Western democracies as case studies when detailing the links between public opinion and foreign policy. Many scholars automatically assume that the affect of domestic public opinion on foreign policy in authoritarian societies is insignificant. However, recently there have been academics that study Sino-Japanese relations that challenge this view and contend that growing anti-Japanese sentiment has a constraining impact on the available foreign policy options regarding Japan. However, none of these scholars look at exactly how Chinese domestic pressure has influenced the government and to what extent this pressure has impacted foreign policy decisions. This paper will attempt to address this gap and assess the whether Chinese public opinion has a role in moving Sino-Japanese relations toward conflict or cooperation ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is there any Japanese IR? The purpose of this paper is, on opposite sides of the first and second speaker (IKEDA and SHIMIZU), to give a negative answer to the ‘Japanese IR Questions’.During the Cold War, especially in 1960s, there was the cut and thrust of debate between two leading IR scholars over whether or not Japan should re-consider the modality of Japan-U.S. alliance. Whereas Yoshikazu SAKAMOTO (University of Tokyo) argued that Japan should not form the alliance with the U.S. because of possible negative impacts of ‘balance of power’, Masataka KOUSAKA (Kyoto University) brought forward a counter-argument that Japan should maintain the military alliance taking into account of possible positive impacts of ‘balance of power’. Since then, Japanese IR scholars have labeled Prof. SAKAMOTO as an ‘idealist’ and Prof. KOUSAKA as a ‘realist’. Yet the paper tries to de-construct this dichotomy itself between ‘idealist’ and ‘realist’ that established in the debate, by pointing out that both Prof. SAKAMOTO and KOUSAKA can be classified into the category of ‘classical realism’. This paper would not deny that Japan has a peculiarity in the study of IR, but contend that there was no Japanese IR. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an effort to better understand the changing role of petro-diplomacy in China's and Japan's search for energy security, this paper draws upon analytical methods from the field of Science & Technology Studies to compare past thought with subsequent practice with respect to each of the states' petro-diplomacy. First, the paper investigates the ways in which policymakers and expert advisers in China and Japan have conceptualized and analyzed the advantages anddisadvantages of specific episodes petro-diplomacy (involving, for example, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria). Then, the paper compares these analyses with the policy tools and institutional capacities that were demonstrated through the practice of that petro-diplomacy. Finally, the paper argues that this comparison of thought with practice in China's and Japan's policymaking suggests that each state's experience offers lessons for the other about the role and utility of petro-diplomacy for managing energy security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given their economic capacity and tradition as the major providers of Overseas Development Aid, global development policy is an obvious field for much more advanced co-operation between Europe and Japan. However, while there are similar intentions and responsibilities, actual policies and preferences differ. Apart from different regional emphases, there are also different normative considerations that guide European and Japanese development assistance. Japan and Europe seem agree on a philosophy that emphasises humanitarian considerations, an appreciation of the concept of “human security”, the recognition of global interdependence, environmental conservation and potential for self-help as desirable conditions for development aid. When actual decisions on donations are made, many other considerations, among them traditional notions of regional hegemony and trade interest, seem to guide policy-makers in both regions. The paper looks at shared and differing concepts of Japanese and European development aid and asks whether better co-ordination between the poles could change the global debate on development aid. The paper has a normative agenda which is, however, rooted in a remarkably deep understanding of the practicalities of Japanese ODA. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By using the Koizumi’s administration foreign policy towards North Korea as a case study, this paper argues that a constructivism framework can bring a new perspective to the Japanese questions of security by linking them to the identity construction and its reproduction process. Exploring Japan’s relationship with North Korea in such a perspective challenges the dominant representation of Japanese identity. In the first part of my paper, I deal with the dominant representation of Japanese identity by defining the terms of this dynamic concept. I then focus on the recent structural changes such as the “North Korean threat” and the redefinition of the American security alliance, which take took place under the Koizumi administration.In the second part of my paper, I approach the recent right-wing turning point in Japan’s political spectrum as a redefinition of national security in relation to the balancing process of identity construction.Finally, I conclude by exploring a few definitions of “foreign policy” such as the one proposed by David Campbell which represents it as an exclusion process to bring under control parts of population who disagree or might be a threat to the dominant representation of national identity. This part will end our survey about the looping interactions established between identity construction and security policy, by examining how the latter can further influence the dynamic process of identity reproduction through domestic policies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how the dynamics of multiparty decision making in parliamentary coalition governments affect international conflict, peace, and the stability of governments. It examines the conflicting expectations on the role of coalition cabinet politics in decisions affecting governments? foreign relations in Dutch, Japanese, and Turkish comparative case studies of foreign policy in the Netherlands, Japan, and Turkey from the 1980s to the present day. These cases are all instances of disagreement between coalition partners over foreign policy and focus on the way in which coalition politics affected the policymaking process, the foreign policy decisions, and the quality of the decision making process. This paper is part of a broader project that is cross-national, multi-methodological, and focuses on the policymaking process to examine the assumptions often made about coalition politics. Its purpose is to provide an analytical framework on the conditions under which coalition cabinets are effective and the factors that affect how coalition politics influences foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of norms and ideas upon international relations are at the center of my research interests. In this paper, I seek to reposition the status of norms as merely intervening variables to independent variables and address how they shape the media as an institution and decide its relations with state actors. My paper examines how Japan's top two national dailies (also the world's top two in terms of circulation) have covered China since the mid-1990s, when the relations between these two Asian giants began to deteriorate, a trend that is still going on today. I argue that these portrayals are driven more by concerns about Japan than about China, and that Japanese journalists choose from a limited series of normative frames, explaining China so as to understand Japan's place and identity in the world. This suggests that international reportage is about how the press domesticates foreign countries: China?s image has been socially constructed as a mirror by the Japanese media to reflect Japan?s own successes and problems. This paper further argues that the ?China Mirror? is in the process of being transformed from a fun-house mirror to a real mirror: that is, the portrait of China and of bilateral relations is changing from simple and one-sided moral judgments to a more contextualized representation. Hence, at a time when prevailing views on China?s swift rise as a world power would suggest increasing Japanese hostility and suspicion toward the country, instead we see a more complex media portrayal of China and of Japan-China relations. This recognition points to the autonomy of the Japanese press vis-à-vis a democratic home country and an authoritarian host country. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northeast Asia (for the purpose of this paper, China, Japan, and South Korea) may be described as the most dynamic region today. Some Asian scholars like Cho Myungrae, Sum Ngai Ling and Tao Lai Po-wah assert that Northeast Asia is a potential bloc. Some Western scholars; Simon and Gartzke, Waltz to some extent, and especially Huntington lend support to the above. This paper attempted to investigate the truth to the above claim using variables like trade, cultural affinities, common memberships in IGOs, and the BOP/fear factor (of the hegemon). The findings of this paper question the strength of the Korea-US and Japan-US alliance. Does peace between China, Japan, and South Korea prove Huntington's "shared foundation of culture"/"cultural-consciousness" ideas or simply prove the liberal peace theory. Or is Northeast Asia a marvelous example of a combination of both ideas. Northeast Asia is a test of this. Can we refute formation of a bloc simply because there is no formal agreement? Could it be invisible, operating on oriental-styled informal, familiarity-based structures rather than western formal ways. If so, is this the beginning of a future alliance? The uniqueness of this paper is it takes into consideration both Asian and western scholars' views and discusses implications of a Northeast Asian alliance. In addition, the paper adresses implications of the above for American foreign policy - should the U.S. prevent the formation or prepare for it. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan?s quest for regional order-building has a mixed historical record. During the first half of the 20th century, the country pursued its vision of a Japan-centered regional order, termed as the Grater East Asia Co-prosper Sphere, excluding the United States, only to bring total catastrophe to the region. Four decades later in the early 1990s, it conceptualized the ?multi-tiered? structure of regional security, with the US-Japan alliance as the linchpin, and rather quietly promoted it with some success. Despite such stark contrasts, the two instances show one commonality?Japan was an ascending power. With this backdrop, the paper examines Japan?s current attitude toward the question of the emerging regional order. Is Japan, now far from being an ascending power thanks to decade-long economic stagnation, and in the face of a new, rapidly ascending power, China, still committed to regional order-building? If so, does Japan still maintain a ?multi-tiered? regional order, in which the position of China is unspecified. Or has the country conceived of a new kind of regional order to reflect the current power balance in Asia? Through addressing these questions, the paper seeks to articulate the factors that shape Japan?s perspective of a regional security order and assess the possible implications for the country?s relations with other regional countries, especially China, overall intra-regional relations, and the ongoing discussion on the recently proposed East Asian Community. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]