The consolidation of stable, democratic pluralist institutions is obviously a complex and precarious process. Waves of scholarship have attempted to identify both those conditions necessary for successful transformations as well as those factors and pressures that may disrupt or impede the road to democracy. The military is one actor or, more accurately, set of actors that has been repeatedly identified as potentially problematic for this transition. For the most part, responses to this threat have centered on the construction of robust civil-military institutions so that the military is unable or unwilling to derail the process. Obviously, this is not an easy or straightforward task. In many cases, the armed forces were/are well-organized and cohesive in comparison to other domestic institutions. What choices do political and military leaders have when it comes to addressing the extremely difficult, yet vital, challenge of determining the role of the military in the future democracy? The focus of this paper is to analyze four cases in which decision-makers were forced to construct new civil-military institutions in a manner that ensured that the armed forces did not disrupt democratic process while also remaining combat effective.My investigation will center on how four countries approached the delicate task of designing their armed forces as their states attempted to consolidate democratic institutions. In keeping with the conference?s theme, I will analyze two states from the ?North,? the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, as well as two states from the ?South,? South Africa and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The analysis will center primarily on the decision-making process in the early stages of the transition to democracy. At least four questions will be address. First, what choices and policies did political and military leaders make when it came to designing their states? civil-military institutions? At the most fundamental level, did they try to integrate the military with society or did they try to isolate the military from society? Second, what was the relative influence of domestic and international security concerns versus other considerations? The existence of allies and/or alliances is obviously related to this question. Third, how were the initial decisions adjusted or modified as domestic and international conditions changed? Finally, what lessons might these cases provide for Iraqi and Afghani decision-makers as they attempt to design their states? civil-military institutions? In the end, my analysis points to two basic choices ? either isolate the armed forces from domestic society (Japan and Bosnia-Herzegovina) or integrate them with the domestic society (Germany and South Africa). In the first option, decisions to isolate the military ascribe a more minimalist role for the military when it comes to the democratic consolidation process. With reference to the second choice, integration implies a more ambitious and proactive role for the military. However, my investigation also demonstrates that these initial choices have significant long-term consequences, ones that are not easily or inexpensively altered. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]