Search

Why do developed countries have such different financial systems? Some nations, such as Germany, France and Japan rely extensively upon bank lending for mobilizing new capital, while others, such as the US and UK, rely heavily on capital markets?why? At the beginning of the 20th century, however, Japan and France relied far more heavily on their capital markets?why did they change? Answering these questions has implications for understanding globalization’s varying effects on national economies, corporate governance, the nature of technological innovation, and for illustrating linkages among law, politics, and macroeconomics. Existing arguments focusing on legal systems and electoral systems fail to adequately answer this puzzle. I argue that the structure of a country’s financial system depends on the political power of farmers and labor relative to that of large firms, where farmers and labor prefer banks, while big firms prefer capital markets. I test the argument with data for 14 OECD countries from 1976 -1990. I also present evidence spanning the twentieth century for France and Japan. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about Great Britain's targeted appeasement policy towards Japan and Germany during the 1930s is presented. It discusses the need to incorporate both international politics and domestic distributive consequences in foreign policy models. It examines the Domestic Political Economy model and the competing security preferences of inward and outward oriented blocs within most states.

Between 1998 and 2001 Germany and Japan enacted pension and tax reforms as part of a broader effort to revive the economy and reduce unemployment. However, the German reform maintained fiscal discipline, a generous pension system (by increasing the role of private pensions), and passive labor market policy. In contrast, Japan resorted to deficit spending, while retrenching public pension and tailoring labor market policies to keep the elderly active. The recent reforms have reinforced the divergent policy paths of Germany and Japan, which can be explained by (a) the arrangements that facilitate coordinated wage moderation where the unions are intermediately strong or decentralized and (b) how different arrangements shape policies to reward wage moderation. By explaining the source of difference among the two top wage coordinated economies, this article cautions against analyses that treat Germany and Japan as similar regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article compares the political pressures and institutions in Great Britain, Japan and Germany. The three countries are said to have experienced various reforms in relation to domestic financial crises and global pressure to increase supervisory capabilities. The author analyzed the political institutions in each country. She confirmed the arguments concerning the political and institutional aspects of the convergence theory. She also revealed the political dimensions where reform must be evaluated.