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3D is an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-like cipher employed 3D structure proposed in 2008. The main innovation of 3D is the multi-dimensional state, generalizing the design of Rijndael and allowing block sizes beyond the 256-bit boundary. Saturnin, a lightweight block cipher has been selected as a second-round candidate in the National Institute of Standards and Technology standardization for lightweight cryptography. It also employs a 3D structure and provides high security against quantum and classic attacks. The exchange-equivalence attacks proposed by Bardeh and Rønjom consider how quadruples of plaintexts confirm distinguishable properties for AES. It is similar to the principle of yoyo attack, but it can find a longer number of rounds of distinguisher. In this paper, we investigate the exchange-equivalence attack on 3D and yoyo attack on Saturnin. Our new results turn out to be the first secret-key chosen plaintext distinguisher for 10-round 3D. The complexity of the distinguisher is about |$2^{364.2}$| in terms of data, memory and computational complexity. For Saturnin, we propose the first six-super-round impossible differential yoyo attack, which is suitable for the two-S-layer version. Compared with the previous impossible differential attacks in the design report of Saturnin, the attacks presented here are the best in terms of the complexity under the chosen-plaintext scenario. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To mitigate state exposure threats to long-lived instant messaging sessions, ratcheting was introduced, which is used in practice in protocols like Signal. However, existing ratcheting protocols generally come with a high cost. Recently, Caforio et al. proposed pragmatic constructions, which compose a weakly secure 'light' protocol and a strongly secure 'heavy' protocol, in order to achieve so-called ratcheting on-demand. The light protocol they proposed has still a high complexity. In this paper, we propose the lightest possible protocol we could imagine, which essentially encrypts and then hashes the secret key. We prove it secure in the standard model by introducing a new security notion, which relates symmetric encryption with key updates by hashing. Our protocol composes well with the generic transformation techniques by Caforio et al. to offer high security and performance at the same time. In a second step, we propose another protocol based on a newly defined integrated primitive, extending standard one-time authenticated encryption with an additional output block used as a secret key for the next message. We instantiate this primitive firstly from any authenticated encryption with associated data, and then we propose an efficient instantiation using advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption to update the key and AES-Galois/Counter mode of operation to encrypt and decrypt messages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the era of multimedia technologies and rapidly growing multimedia contents, secured information transfer needs to be ensured through robust cryptography techniques. This paper presents a bio-key-generation scheme in the local environment to transfer multimedia content over vulnerable networks. To encrypt the images, one user has to ensure his/her authentication and further needs to provide a secret key for bio-key generation. Secret key aids to fetch biometric features for key formation and key expansion. Thus, the user receives an expanded key from the template database to perform encryption of a plain image. Once the cipher image is delivered to the network, the user has to repeat the same steps for decryption. This paper experiments the proposed bio-key-generation scheme with advanced encryption standard algorithm. This encryption strategy can also be used to encrypt confidential or personal images in various digital systems such as mobile phones, personal digital gadgets and so on. Various analyses ensure the robustness and the performance of the bio-key-based AES encryption scheme. Entropy, correlation coefficient, number of pixel change rate and unified average changing intensity are evaluated to ensure the effectiveness of the proposed method over other key-based encryption techniques. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we present a methodology to evaluate the feasibility, effectiveness and complexity of a class of cache-based side-channel attacks. The methodology provides estimates on the lower bound of the required number of observations on the side channel and the number of trials for a successful attack. As a case study, a weak implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm is selected to apply the proposed methodology to three different categories of cachebased attacks; namely, access-driven, trace-driven and time-driven attacks. The approach, however, is generic in the sense that it can be utilized in other algorithms that are subject to the microarchitectural side-channel attacks. The adopted approach bases its analysis method partially on the conditional entropy of secret keys given the observations of the intermediate variables in software implementations of cryptographic algorithms via the side channel and explores the extent to which the observations can be exploited in a successful attack. Provided that the intermediate variables are relatively simple functions of the key material and the known inputs or outputs of cryptographic algorithms, a successful attack is theoretically feasible. Our methodology emphasizes the need for an analysis of this leakage through such intermediate variables and demonstrates a systematic way to measure it. The method allows us to explore every attack possibility, estimate the feasibility of an attack, and compare the efficiency and the costs of different attack strategies to determine an optimal level of effective countermeasures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose enhancing a reconfigurable and extensible embedded reduced instruction set computer (RISC) processor core with a protected zone for isolated execution of cryptographic algorithms. The protected zone is a collection of processor subsystems such as functional units optimized for high-speed execution of integer operations, a small amount of local memory for storing sensitive data during cryptographic computations, and special-purpose and cryptographic registers to execute instructions securely. We outline the principles for secure software implementations of cryptographic algorithms in a processor equipped with the proposed protected zone.We demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed zone by implementing the most-commonly used cryptographic algorithms in the protected zone; namely RSA, elliptic curve cryptography, pairingbased cryptography, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher, and secure hash algorithm (SHA)-1 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash functions. In terms of time efficiency, our software implementations of cryptographic algorithms running on the enhanced core compare favorably with equivalent software implementations on similar processors reported in the literature. The protected zone is designed in such a modular fashion that it can easily be integrated into any RISC processor. The proposed enhancements for the protected zone are realized on an field programmabel gate array (FPGA) device. The implementation results on the FPGA confirm that its area overhead is relatively moderate in the sense that it can be used in many embedded processors. Finally, the protected zone is useful against cold-boot and micro-architectural side-channel attacks such as cache-based and branch prediction attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]