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Therapeutic jurisprudence is an emerging field of law and social science inquiry that explores the role of the law in fostering therapeutic or antitherapeutic outcomes. This article considers the relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence and court performance goals, examines applications of therapeutic jurisprudence in court settings, discusses the steps involved in incorporating therapeutic jurisprudence principles into the work of courts, outlines the pros and cons associated with practicing therapeutic jurisprudence primarily in specialized courts, and offers suggestions for fostering continued experimentation by courts. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whatever happened to Alvin Ford? This paper describes the aftermath of the Supreme Court's 1986 ruling in Ford v. Wainwright. The Ford decision held that exempting the mentally incompetent from execution is a matter of constitutional right, and hence the determination of who is competent for execution cannot be left solely in the hands of the executive branch of the government. We describe the hearing in Ford's case in federal district court that occurred after the Supreme Court's decision, the judge's ruling, and Ford's subsequent (and final) appeal. We conclude that despite the decision in Ford, it remains all but impossible for defense attorneys to prove that psychotic death row clients are incompetent for execution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the collection of theoretical and empirical papers on criminal competencies. Theoretical reformulation of criminal competence; Consideration for both legal standards and the legal procedures in adjudicating competence; Evaluations for competency to stand trial.

Consultations to the courts often extend beyond criminal competencies and may include implicit statements regarding the diversion of mentally disordered offenders to treatment facilities. Arguments for diversion are based on humanitarian interests and treatment needs. Arguments opposing diversion recommendations emphasize (a) the variability of opinions regarding treatability, (b) the lack of sufficient outcome data, and (c) the potential for negative consequences in offering unsolicited opinions on diversion. Initial data from 271 pretrial evaluations underscore the range in psychiatric use of diversion recommendations, although inpatient referrals in particular appear to be based on clinical status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews and evaluates publications during 1986–1990 with relevance for assessments of competence to stand trial. The review focuses specifically on articles that provide new concepts or data supported by research or case studies. The studies are reviewed under the following headings; (a) the systemic context of competence to stand trial (CST) evaluations, (b) conceptual definitions of competence and models for CST assessment, (c) research on CST assessment methods, (d) characteristics of incompetent defendants, (e) interpretation of CST evaluation data, (f) issues in CST assessment of special populations, and (g) treatment to restore competence. Suggestions are offered for further research to advance the quality of clinical evaluations for competence to stand trial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article analyzes the concept of competency to be executed. It examines the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Ford v. Wainwright, discussing both its Eighth Amendment and procedural due process determinations. It then considers the standard that should be applied in determining competency in this context and the procedures that the states should utilize to insure a fair determination consistent with due process. The article then considers the perplexing problem of whether an incompetent death row prisoner may assert a constitutional or statutory right to refuse treatment designed to restore him to competency for execution, examining both the constitutional and therapeutic implications of involuntary treatment in this context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

“Competence” of criminal defendants is best viewed not as an open-textured single construct but rather as two related but separable constructs-a foundational concept of competence to assist counsel, and a contextualized concept of decisional competence. This approach has several advantages. First, it provides a useful explanatory framework for the settled features of existing law. Second, it helps to clarify the issues in areas where the law is unsettled or controversial, such as the circumstances under which incompetence bars adjudication and the abilities required for decisional competence. Third, it exposes the similarities between competencies in criminal defense and competencies in other legal contexts, and thereby helps to link what have been discrete literatures in both law and behavioral science. Fourth, because this approach is derived from a theoretical analysis of the purposes of the pertinent legal rules, it provides a framework for defining the “psycho-legal abilities” that are encompassed by each of the two competence constructs. In this respect, a relatively simple reconceptualization has surprisingly concrete implications for designing a program of empirical research and, eventually, for improving the scientific basis of competence assessments in criminal cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]