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This article maps the behaviours of two middle powers, Australia and Indonesia, as a response to the emergence and evolution of the Indo-Pacific concept. The background for this analysis is the emergence and development of the 'Indo-Pacific' concept as a response to crises of legitimacy enveloping the region and how countries in the region, including middle powers, respond to it. Using a minimalist definition which I have developed of a middle power as a country with a middle level of power capabilities and a penchant for cooperation, this article develops a framework based on two dimensions of outcome (ranging from status-quoist to reformist outlooks) and process (ranging from Lockean to Kantian strategies) to facilitate a more open-ended approach towards looking at middle-power behaviours beyond the common categorisation of traditional/emerging, and Western/non-Western. Using Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and 2023 National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, and Indonesia's 2015 Defence White Paper and 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, this article concludes that while Australia is exhibiting a status-quoist/Lockean approach, Indonesia is demonstrating a reformist/Kantian approach towards the Indo-Pacific. The outcome-process dimension framework developed in this article is useful as a tool to map other middle power behaviours in various contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the global interconnected economy, China-made information-collecting technologies such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance cameras have become popular products for routine video-based surveillance. Hikvision and Dahua are the two largest global suppliers of CCTV cameras, with both companies supplying their products to over 200 countries. Despite their popularity, national security concerns are commonly cited when adopting these cameras, citing manufacturer links with the Communist Party of China (CPC), cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and sales recorded in the Xinjiang region, that has records of human rights violations. This paper is structured in three parts: first, we explore the predominance of China-made information-gathering technologies in Australia; second, we summarise common national security concerns usually associated with China-based technology manufacturers; and third, we propose regulatory measures to regulating China-made CCTV cameras in Australia. The paper suggests that while state and Federal decision-makers are free to remove Chinese CCTV surveillance cameras, they should avoid overt politisation. Overall, a stronger focus should be placed on evaluating cybersecurity risks of Internet of Things (IoT) information-collecting technologies and considering their timely and effective regulation from the perspective of individual and national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes Australia's 2000 Defense White Paper. Development of a Defense Capability Plan on the basis of through-life costing, including personnel, operating, support and upgrade costs and initial investment; Setting realistic targets; Incorporation of short term, crisis-management tasks and the potential for deployments into the Asia-Pacific; Defining Australia's role; Limitations of the defense policies.

This article explores the role of public opinion in shaping Australian foreign policy. It emphasizes the need for an informed public and discusses the changing global landscape, with the decline of globalism and the rise of nationalism and protectionism. The article highlights the challenges Australia faces in navigating this changing world and the role of the recently released foreign policy White Paper. It emphasizes the importance of engaging the Australian public, including the new generation of policymakers and the diverse society, in foreign policy discussions and decision-making. [Extracted from the article]

Perceived threats to sovereignty stemming from trade exposure to China have led to calls for the Australian government to embrace the concept of 'trusted trade'. This involves using policy levers to drive trade towards markets that have capitals more geopolitically aligned with Canberra and finds practical expression in forms such as 'friend-shored' supply chains. A theme of 'trusted trade' advocacy is the conscription of existing security-oriented partnerships, including the ANZUS alliance, the Quad grouping and the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement, to take on economic dimensions. While holding superficial appeal, this paper details why pursuing this policy path would be to learn the wrong lessons from Beijing's campaign of trade disruption that began in May 2020, and make Australia both poorer and less secure. Three key data points are highlighted that collectively support an assessment that the Australian government's traditional trade policy approach, emphasising open regionalism, remains overwhelmingly fit for purpose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antarctica is a crucial regulator of the world's climate, and as environmental security permeates global security, using Antarctic science to better understand climate is becoming increasingly pressing. Although the Australian Government has recognised that climate change poses 'a current and existential national security' threat and has acknowledged Antarctica's importance regarding the earth's global climate system, the focus of Australia's intelligence community pertaining to Antarctica currently remains restricted to upholding the military-security and diplomatic goals of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). This current focus aims to hedge against the possibility of conflict on, or over, the frozen continent via 'working the ATS', however, this paper argues that Antarctic climate science holds a greater capacity to deliver security outcomes for Australia. Antarctic climate science offers opportunities regarding intelligence for Antarctica, that is, securing Australia's Antarctic interests, as well as regarding intelligence from Antarctica; by enhancing natural disaster preparedness, bolstering broader strategic planning, as well as furthering diplomacy and the legitimisation of Australia's leadership on, and over, the frozen continent. It is recommended that the Commonwealth Government establish a climate intelligence working group to ensure the utility of climate science to security and intelligence is realised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent 'trade war' between Australia and China has understandably sparked fear amongst Australian policymakers, voters and businesses. China's alleged economic coercion towards Australia has the strange property that Chinese leaders are not making any clear explicit demands of Australia. Moreover, this behaviour follows a pattern in recent Chinese dealings with other Asia-Pacific states. Why would a state initiate economic coercion without making clear demands? In this paper, I offer an explanation, building on the logic of audience costs in wars of attrition. I suggest that China's strategy of economic coercion without explicit demands serves a key strategic purpose. Omitting specific demands makes the outcome of any given dispute less clear and hence makes it easier for either side to claim victory. This negates a key advantage which democratic states have in bargaining with autocratic adversaries—the fact that their audience costs for backing down are usually higher, which makes them less likely to initiate but more likely to win international disputes. Implicit economic coercion should therefore be a strategy which is primarily targeted at China's democratic trading partners. I examine the record of Chinese uses of economic coercion in the past and find that this pattern finds much support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the concept of populism and how it is grounded in both democracy and nationalism, with a focus on the implications of its rise for the international trading system. The drivers of the demand for populist politics (economic, cultural, and political) are discussed. The factors facilitating the supply of populist politics are also reviewed. A synthesis is developed, with an interest in identifying common elements across different national experiences. The point is then made that populists are often opposed to 'globalism' but not necessarily to an active participation in trade. The conclusion considers the options for a response to populism, and the challenges populism poses for Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International Relations has become increasingly interested in maritime order as the oceans have emerged as a key site of strategic competition. The South China Sea has become totemic of contests between 'free' and 'closed' visions of the seas, and is viewed by some as a litmus test for China's efforts to re-write the 'rules-based order' in other maritime domains. This article examines the maritime 'rules-based order' in Antarctica, critically examining how and why the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) matters for the Antarctic region, the Southern Ocean and mechanisms of regional governance. This article contributes to understanding the complexity of maritime order in Antarctica by using Australia's maritime claims as a case study. Australia is the largest claimant state in Antarctica, with the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) constituting 42% of the landmass. This paper examines Australia's contentious maritime jurisdiction and its 'normative hedging' strategy that simultaneously asserts maritime claims and defends collective governance mechanisms, despite the apparent dissonance between these two positions. It argues that the Antarctic region has its own unique 'rules-based order' and geographic realities that complicate cross-regional comparisons, and that even so-called 'like-minded' states interpret maritime rules in different ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australian elections are digitising. Electronic ballots, electronic certified lists, electronic scrutiny, and electronic data are becoming part of the electoral status quo. The digitisation of elections in Australia induces new vulnerabilities that malign foreign entities can exploit to subvert the nation's democratic sovereignty. Problems such as inauthenticity, data insecurity, and disinformation are amplified in today's epoch of digital era governance. Since these problems have the potential to erode the legitimacy of Australian elections, it is imperative to deepen understanding of these risks to optimise the nation's democratic resilience. Through applying a conceptual framework derived from democratic theory and public policy, this paper assesses the vulnerability of Australia's elections to foreign interference based on the Australian electoral system irrespective of adversary capabilities. It finds that Australia's federal elections are relatively secure from hard cyber security risks due to digital-analogue hybridity in electoral processes, but they are vulnerable to soft cyber risks such as digital disinformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the July 2001 issue of the Australian Journal of International Affairs. Emphasis of the studies on Australian-American relations; Publication of the issue to mark the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty; Invitation for possible contributors for the issue.

Given current emissions trends an increase in global temperatures in excess of 2°C is highly likely in the coming century. In this context, it seems increasingly probable that states may consider solar geoengineering as a stop-gap climate response. Solar geoengineering refers to measures that aim to alleviate some measure of global warming by intentionally increasing the amount of the sun's energy that is reflected into space. Currently the two most discussed solar geoengineering techniques involve either marine cloud brightening or dispersing aerosols in the stratosphere. These techniques could be relatively inexpensive, are within the technological capacities (after a brief period of development) of technologically-advanced countries, and could have an almost immediate impact on temperatures. Yet, while solar geoengineering might potentially be utilised to manage some climate-linked security threats, it itself would create new security challenges. Consequently, this paper explores potential international security implications for Australia if a regional state, or group of states, initiates a solar geoengineering program. We conclude that since solar geoengineering is unlikely to become a first-order international issue, disputation over solar geoengineering will likely reflect, or act as a proxy for, wider patterns of state interaction. However, scenarios in which China and the United States take different positions, or in which there are divisions among regional powers, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, India and Singapore would pose the greatest threat to Australia's national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The security impact of illegal fishing is not well understood. Where illegal fishing is recognised as a security problem, the focus has been on fish as a natural resource, the depletion of which can have impacts on food security, individual livelihoods, and the economic survival of states relying on illegal fishing. We argue that a focus on fish as a natural resource obscures the other security challenges the crime of illegal fishing poses to Australia. As this paper explains, illegal fishing overlaps with drug, human, weapon and other contraband trafficking and smuggling; irregular maritime arrivals; and maritime piracy. In addition, like other easily transported, high value resources, illegal fish can fund insurgencies and other types of political violence. Understanding illegal fishing as a security challenge will improve Australia's national security policy. First, it acknowledges fish as a vital natural resource, implicated in economic, ecological, and human security; second, it analyses how illegal fishing interlinks with other maritime crimes; third, it challenges the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement of illegal fishing; fourth, it presents an opportunity for effective regional cooperation; and finally it highlights the benefits of regional cooperation in responding to illegal fishing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of several prominent disease outbreaks like Ebola and Zika, global health security is once again high on the international agenda. For its part, the Australian government has committed itself to strengthening regional health security. This policy direction - focusing on the Indo-Pacific region - is both consistent with Australia's traditional foreign policy approach of concentric circles informing strategic priorities, and is therefore understandable, even predictable. But given that local disease outbreaks in remote locations around the world now have the opportunity to travel rapidly internationally, is the adoption of an exclusively regional focus the most sensible one? This article considers the implications of Australia's new regional health security initiative, its focus and direction. The paper weighs the benefits and drawbacks of Australia's new programme and considers whether a wider focus is more appropriate for responding to the health threats of the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the origins of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) treaties and their implications for the Australian social contract. This analysis includes how and why ISDS emerged in NAFTA, was rebuffed with the failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), and became incorporated into most subsequent bilateral US trade and investment agreements. The paper considers Australia's exposure to ISDS—first through using it in bilateral investment agreements in nations with inadequate governance mechanisms to support the rule of law, then turning against it when a multinational tobacco company tried to use the mechanism to overturn scientifically endorsed, democratically approved and constitutionally validated tobacco plain packaging measures. The paper concludes by exploring the hypothesis that an alternative governance vision can be achieved in which the system of investment arbitration and trade law is made coherent with presumptively more democratically legitimate normative systems such as constitutional and international law. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

New generation trade agreements reach far behind borders, affecting many areas of domestic policy not previously associated closely with trade. One of the most uneasy of these areas is intellectual property, particularly patent monopolies. The USA has been a major force behind the extended reach of patent monopolies using preferential trade agreements. The patent and data exclusivity provisions of the AUSFTA were proposed by the USA. This paper provides detailed evidence about how such ‘TRIPS+’ policies compare to a balanced patent policy—one equally favouring creators and users of technology. Australia has never had an active patent agenda, but since AUSFTA has been willing to accept in its bilateral and regional trade deals highly prescriptive rules that tie the hands of future governments. The overall trend has thus been toward increasing imbalance, with Australian patent policy now having a very broad reach and very low eligibility standards. This particularly affects the cost of medicines, where large numbers of relatively uninventive patents surround a blockbuster drug and delay the market entry of generic alternatives. In addition to outlining the costs of Australia’s current patent policy approach, the paper concludes by highlighting a more balanced and less costly way forward. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) required extensive changes to Australian copyright law. This paper assesses the impact of these changes one decade on. It considers, first, whether the costs and/or benefits predicted in 2004 have eventuated, finding clear evidence that AUSFTA has undesirably constrained domestic copyright policy, but no clear evidence either of the feared financial costs to society, or, importantly, the touted benefits to copyright owners. The most significant impact of AUSFTA’s copyright provisions, however, appears to have been on Australia’s copyright trade policy. Pre-AUSFTA, Australia promoted multilateral standards and mostly sought to comply with, but not exceed, international IP standards. Post-AUSFTA, Australia has pursued an approach akin to that of the US: endorsing international copyright rules that are significantly stronger, and more detailed. The paper queries whether this shift has been in Australia’s national interest, and raises interesting questions of path-dependence in policymaking and trade negotiations that warrant more, and broader attention in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the Vietnam War, Australian defence policy has been based on the concept of self-reliance—the ability to defend Australia without allied combat forces. Self-reliance arose from concerns about US support in conflict with Indonesia. It has implications for Australian foreign policy, force structuring, joint operations and the defence industry, which were most coherently laid out in the 1987 White Paper. Later White Papers adapted this framework, but the 2013 White Paper seems to move towards a new approach to defence policy and strategy, which continued use of the term ‘self-reliance’ obscures rather than elucidates. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 2013 Australian Defence White Paper categorically termed Australia's zone of strategic interest the Indo-Pacific, the first time any government has defined its region this way. This raises questions about what the Indo-Pacific means, whether it is a coherent strategic system, the provenance of the concept and its implications for Asian security as well as Australian policy. Indo-Pacific Asia can best be understood as an expansive definition of a maritime super-region centred on South-East Asia, arising principally from the emergence of China and India as outward-looking trading states and strategic actors. It is a strategic system insofar as it involves the intersecting interests of key powers such as China, India and the USA, although the Indo-Pacific subregions will retain their own dynamics too. It suits Australia's two-ocean geography and expanding links with Asia, including India. The concept is, however, not limited to an Australian perspective and increasingly reflects US, Indian, Japanese and Indonesian ways of seeing the region. It also reflects China's expanding interests in the Indian Ocean, suggesting that the Chinese debate may shift towards partial acceptance of Indo-Pacific constructs alongside Asia-Pacific and East Asian ones, despite suspicions about its association with the US rebalance to Asia. Questions about Australia's ability to implement an effective Indo-Pacific strategy must account for force posture, alliance ties and defence diplomacy, as well as constraints on force structure and spending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of its economic diplomacy, Australia has directed intense effort into both bilateral and plurilateral trade negotiations such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. According to then Minister for Trade and Investment Andrew Robb, with no major multilateral trade deal in decades, you have to ‘row your own boat’ or risk missing out. With the fundamentals of trade and the nature of trade negotiations changing, trade liberalisation has become an increasingly sophisticated and difficult negotiating area. A case study of the controversial TPP shows the tensions for a middle power navigating this space. The benefits of the TPP are contested and the government faces criticism of the adverse impacts of the agreement, especially investor-state dispute settlement clauses, impact on human rights and suspicion that the TPP is motivated by geopolitical drivers. In order not to lose more than it gains in moving away from the multilateral trade system, Australia must ensure that trade agreements are consistent with WTO rules and have open and fair accession regimes as a basis for signing. Finally, there is the need for higher levels of transparency and democratic accountability than has historically applied. A new white paper is necessary to make the case for trade liberalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As a close US ally, Australia is often seen as a recipient of US extended deterrence. This article argues that in recent decades, Australian strategic policy engaged with US extended deterrence at three different levels: locally, Australia eschews US combat support and deterrence under the policy of self-reliance; regionally, it supports US extended deterrence in Asia; globally, it relies on the US alliance against nuclear threats to Australia. The article argues that in none of these policy areas does the Australian posture conform to a situation of extended deterrence proper. Moreover, when the 2009 White Paper combines all three policies in relation to major power threats against Australia, serious inconsistencies result in Australia's strategic posture—a situation the government should seek to avoid in the White Paper being drafted at the time of writing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of gender and development has been an important part of the development discourse since the Mexico City Women Conference in 1973. This concern has been very slow to transform itself into policy. For development agencies including AusAID it has been a subsidiary policy area or an add-on, as a recipe might say 'add women and stir'. The White Paper of 2007 brought gender to the centre of policy as an overarching principle. The question that arises is the extent to which these policies fit into or are driven by the neo-liberal paradigm underpinning the aid program, or if these policies can challenge it by positing a rights agenda. The 2007 Gender policy tries to sit between the two in that it focuses on the economic role that women can play in fostering growth on the one hand, and the denial of human rights that marginalisation and disempowerment represents. This paper will explore the development of gender policy in AusAID, and compare it with the development of policy of other agencies that follow the neo-liberal framework in particular the World Bank and ADB. Finally the paper will make some suggestions for the new Labor government to strengthen the Policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 27 June 2000, the Howard Government released a public information paper on defence which set in train a process of public consultation in which the people's views were sought on a range of defence and defence-related issues. This paper examines why the Government chose to go to the people, how and by whom the community consultation was conducted, who was consulted and listened to, and how what was heard at the public meetings component of the process was both interpreted and reported. The paper concludes that the public consultation process was more about politics than policy; it is inappropriate for the Government to claim or imply that it has heard from the 'Australian people' or even 'the majority of the community' on the issues raised; and the consultation process and its outcomes are not entirely risk-free for the Government and the defence establishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is under way a worldwide greening of industry, driven by the huge demand generated by China and India as emerging industrial giants whose growth cannot be accommodated by ‘business as usual’ fossil-fuelled development—for reasons having as much to do with energy security as concerns over global warming and climate change. While the role played in this process by fiscal and industry policies (e.g. carbon taxes and other market-based incentives) is well understood (even if not pursued currently in Australia), the potentially powerful leverage to be exercised by trade policy is under-recognised. There are some positive developments such as a proposed Environmental Goods Agreement being discussed in Geneva, while there are negative developments embodied in various bilateral and regional trade agreements such as the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, to which Australia has committed itself. There are rising levels of conflict over trade and climate change mitigation measures, in actions brought at the WTO against countries looking to promote green industries through measures like local content requirements being attached to foreign direct investment, or by countries imposing border tax adjustments against exporters who allegedly fail to implement carbon taxes. The issues involved are discussed in this paper and possible ways forward are proposed, along with some implications for Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper I examine the extent to which preferential trade agreements (PTAs) limit the Australian government's ability to use public procurement for local industry development ends. I do so not only by examining Australia's PTA obligations, but also by examining how other governments with similar obligations—such as Korea—are using public purchasing policies to promote local industrial advancement. I find that the PTA obligations of the Australian and Korean governments leave them both significant scope to use public purchasing strategically. Interestingly, however, Australian policymakers have been standing still in the room that remains, and even abandoning PTA-compliant procurement-linked development policies. South Korean policymakers on the other hand have been capitalising on every inch of space left open to them—and even experimenting with new forms of strategic public purchasing that nonetheless comply with their international obligations. I conclude by offering some suggestions as to how we might explain these countries’ radically different approaches to procurement policy, despite their very similar international obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) came into effect in 2005. It was the second preferential trade agreement that Australia signed, after its agreement with Singapore, and marked a departure from the primacy of Australia's previous trade policy of unilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation toward preferential liberalisation. This paper assesses the economic effects of AUSFTA by applying the Productivity Commission's gravity model of trade from its Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements review. The evidence reveals AUSFTA resulted in a fall in Australian and US trade with the rest of the world—that the agreement led to trade diversion. Estimates also show that AUSFTA is associated with a reduction in trade between Australia and the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Australian policymakers have always harboured a desire to ‘punch above their weight’. On occasions they have succeeded. At a time when Australia's strategic, economic and environmental future is inextricably bound up with that of its immediate neighbours and the wider world, there are compelling reasons for hoping that they still can. This paper explores some of the most important aspects of Australian foreign policy during the Rudd era and asks whether the Australian government can play a constructive—even an exemplary—role in finding solutions for some of the planet's most pressing problems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper aims to identify evidence of any potential costs of preferential liberalisation of trade in goods between the EU and Australia, notably trade diversion; move beyond Australia's exports of commodities to the EU to look for evidence of competitiveness in high-value-added manufactures; and identify evidence of the potential for deep integration that might be promoted by a formal FTA using the Sussex Framework for analysing economic integration and TradeSift software. It concludes that costs of trade Diversion are unlikely to be large; that there is the potential for a mutual recognition agreement to encourage deep integration in areas of high value added manufactures; but that it might require a formal free trade agreement to give the institutional framework to allow mutual recognition to work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the results of the world's largest ever survey of international relations (IR) scholars with an eye to establishing the particularities of the discipline in Australia and New Zealand. The survey covered the areas of teaching, research, the structure of the profession and scholars' views on foreign policy. From these results, this paper compares IR in New Zealand and Australia, and discusses the extent to which the discipline in these two countries is distinctive from its overseas counterparts, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. The particular areas of focus include the degree to which the field in Australasia conforms to or differs from US or Commonwealth identities; epistemological and gender divides; the distinctive foci of what IR scholars in both countries teach and research; which publications are favoured and disfavoured; and the contrasting linkages between academia and the world of government and policy. We conclude with some suggestions about how the field in both countries might be improved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is increasing recognition in the development literature that foreign aid can have malign effects on the recipient country, especially in failing states. This paper considers the impact of Australian aid on macro-level development in Papua New Guinea. After a review of official evaluations of the effectiveness of aid, the potential sources of 'aid failure' and 'aid accountability' in Papua New Guinea, it is argued that the current Australian macro-level aid program needs to be reassessed. In particular, the focus, coherence and impact on civil society of Australian aid should be modified in order to minimise its debilitating effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For a middle power with a relatively short history of framing a self determined foreign policy, Australia has actively sought to engage with both its immediate region and the wider world. Elite agreement on this external orientation, however, has by no means entailed consensus on what this orientation might involve in terms of policy. Consequently, two, often conflicting, traditions and their associated myths have informed Australian foreign policy-making. The most enduring tradition shaping foreign policy views Australia as a somewhat isolated bastion of Western civilisation. In this mode Australia's myth is pragmatic, but uncertain and sees Asia as both an opportunity and a potential threat which requires the support and counsel of culturally similar external powers engaged in the region to ensure stability. Against this, an alternative and historically later tradition crafted a foreign policy that advanced Australian independence through engagement with a seemingly monolithic and increasingly prosperous Asia. This paper explores the evolution and limitations of these foreign policy traditions and the myths that sustain them. It further considers what features of these traditions continue to have resonance in a region that has become more fluid and heterogeneous than it was during the Cold War and which requires a foreign policy flexibility that can address this complex and strategically uncertain environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines and analyses the main issues in the current bilateral economic relations between Australia and South Korea, particularly focusing on the Korean perspective. Above all, the trade imbalance continuously favouring Australia has been an issue of great concern on the part of South Korea. Australia and South Korea have shown disagreement over the lopsided trade issue, regarding attitude, approach and standpoint in addressing it. While the Korean side broadly converges on the view, that the bilateral trade imbalance needs to be redressed, there are four differing viewpoints on explaining the lopsided bilateral trade: (i) the Korean government's view; (ii) the Korean business sector's view; (iii) the relevance of culture; (iv) Korea's favourable perception of Australia. This paper seeks to answer an important question in the context of the two nations" economic/trade relationship: why South Korea has ever engaged with Australia on good terms, albeit with disadvantageous trade relations. In this case, the nexus of economics and politico-security is largely in action. That is, on one plane, South Korea is ranked as an important trading partner and a major export market of Australia. On another plane, South Korea politically needs strong allies like Australia which can give an unswerving support for it in both the regional and international arenas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Defence White Paper of December 2000 declares that the main task of the ADF is to maintain the capability to defend Australian territory from any credible attack without relying on the combat forces of any other country. Australia is unusual among contemporary Western states in affirming such a policy. Most other states are reordering their priorities to put less emphasis on conventional conflict and more on tasks such as peacekeeping and border protection, while assuming that in the event of major conventional conflicts they are likely to be involved as subsidiary members of a coalition led in most cases by the United States. Should Australia follow this trend? The article reviews this question in the light of a number of scenarios for the use of Australia's armed forces in the period ahead, and concludes that the arguments for change are not persuasive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article finds that the Australian government's perception of the threat of terrorism continues to be fundamentally flawed. Suggesting that it is imperative to clearly identify the sources and targets of the terrorist threat, the article concludes that terrorism does not pose an existential or even major objective threat to Western liberal democracies like Australia. At the same time, the political and psychological sensibilities surrounding terrorism, in combination with public demands for action, may require democratic governments to respond. Any response, however, needs to be carefully calibrated to meet the requirements of proportionality and (potential) effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]