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This paper focuses on examining the question of the utility of the dialogue among civilizations as a means for conflict avoidance in the post-Cold War era. It raises a number of research questions, namely: are dialogues among civilizations capable of curbing the emerging confrontations between the West and some Muslim states and movements? Why are some dialogues more effective than others in bringing about the declared objectives? And what are the main pre-requisites for launching effective dialogues among civilizations? In dealing with these research questions, the paper relies on the experience of the Japan-Muslim World Dialogue among Civilizations (JMDC) which was launched in 2002 and ended in 2012 with a view of drawing lessons from that dialogue model concerning the viability of dialogues among civilizations. The first section of the paper reviews major models of dialogue among civilizations, and the assumptions upon which they were initiated, followed by an outline of the historical-cultural context and the global and regional political contexts which resulted in the initiation of the JMDC. The record of JMDC is outlined, followed by a factual and evaluative assessment. The final section of the paper draws some lessons from the JMDC concerning the essential pillars necessary for engaging in a viable dialogue among civilizations, especially in the post-Arab Spring era. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

'Cool Japan' is an instance of Japanese government's nation branding exercise as part of its soft power projection in which the unique selling point is identified as Japanese national identity. In this paper, I examine the relationship between Cool Japan and Japanese national identity and highlight a tension in the construction. Cool Japan is about emphasizing Japan's attractiveness for public diplomacy, while the top-down nature of the branding undermines the imagery that the branding is designed to convey. I show that policy elites resolve this tension by invoking the traditional Japanese identity narratives that construct Japan into both a non-Western and an un-Asian entity, reproducing the myth of Japanese uniqueness. I argue that the elite narratives surrounding Cool Japan readily replicate the language reminiscent of prewar identity construction. Despite the contemporary popularity of manga and anime, the purported 'coolness' of these products are framed within older constructions of Japanese Self that can trace their pedigree back to the nineteenth century. Using the minutes of committee meetings, policy documents, as well as media interviews given by policy- and business elites, I show that Cool Japan is effectively a twenty first century rendition of the familiar Japanese identity construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inclusiveness in economic development has lately emerged as a critical factor for development. This paper adopts an analytical concept of inclusive growth to evaluate East Asia’s economic success. It contests the Western conceptualization of the critical role of public participation in development, and argues that it has played a limited role in terms of inclusive growth in East Asia. Several factors have influenced the outcome of research in this area including the choice of methodology adopted, the challenge of defining and measuring inclusive growth, and the unclear mode and impact of public participation in the process. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study examines the paradigm shift of Japan's technonationalism from a developmentalism-oriented inward-looking industrial policy to a security-oriented geostrategy involving multi-state collaboration with like-minded states. Using case studies of Elpida Memory and TSMC investment in Kumamoto, this research highlights how Japan has adapted its technonationalist approach to address contemporary challenges in the international political economy while ensuring its security alliance with the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores and compares the positions of two major powers in East Asia—China and Japan—towards the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) norm. R2P calls for collective international responsibility in the event that states are unwilling or unable to protect their people. Evaluating the mainstream argument in the literature that China and Japan have recently been welcoming the R2P norm, we ask the following questions: To what extent have China and Japan aligned themselves with R2P? How do international and national factors play out to influence their R2P stance? To summarize our findings up front: unlike what much of the current literature says, China and Japan's acceptance and practice of the R2P norm are largely pro forma. We argue that they both appear active in participating in the debates but only in order to remain inactive. In other words, they are active participants in the debates and discussions on R2P, but their aim is not to further its usage but to contain its effects. Their current stance on R2P is characterized by what we will call ‘Active in Not Being Active’ (AINBA). The article discusses the key sources and rationale for their AINBA policy with regard to R2P. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]