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The aim of the present paper is to study a one-point solution concept for bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao (Cooperative Games on Combinatorial Structures, ) , we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical Shapley value for cooperative games. The main result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The coordination of strategies in a cooperative game, when some players decide to act together, is the basis of the partnership notion. Nevertheless, in some situations, it may be more convenient to form an effective coalition or alliance. In this work, we consider the Banzhaf semivalue and use it to discuss the convenience to form either partnerships or alliances, especially in simple games. Throughout the paper, some mathematical properties of the Banzhaf semivalue, in relation with the partnership formation, are derived. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we analyze cooperative games whose characteristic function takes values in a partially ordered linear space. Thus, the classical solution concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined: the core concept, Shapley–Bondareva theorem and the Shapley value are extended for this class of games. The classes of standard, vector-valued and stochastic cooperative games among others are particular cases of this general theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The capacitated Economic Order Quantity problem (capacitated EOQ) is a well-known problem where products have to be shipped between two points with a vehicle of given capacity. Each shipment has a fixed cost, independent of the shipped quantity, and an inventory cost is generated in the two points. The problem consists in finding the optimal time between consecutive shipments, which minimizes the total cost. The problem is a capacitated variant of the EOQ problem and has a closed form solution. Since such solution is often irrational, it is often rounded to an integer value. In this paper we investigate the errors which are generated by rounding procedures to integer and powers-of-two values. We show that, although in the worst case a tight general relative error of 2 is generated by all the considered rounding procedures, the procedure which rounds to the best between the lower and upper values (integer or powers-of-two) has a performance of ½ (√2 + 1/√2) ≈ 1.06 on classes of instances of high practical relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]