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Despite Michel Serres's caution with figures of the limit, border, and boundary which philosophy and social theory put into play, his work can fruitfully be read as a proposal to rethink limits for a social and natural contract. By following up on the intimate connection between limits and law in his work, this paper shines a light on Serres's argument for a parallelism of limits and laws; and particularly highlights the partially underacknowledged role of entropy for this matter. First, attention will be drawn to the role of topological boundaries for Serres's structural consideration of a natural contract in a number of his works (e.g., The Natural Contract, Atlas, Hominescence), in order to demonstrate the indispensable connection between topological boundaries, a topologically conceived ethics, and a topological approach to law. This grounds the argument for a second step, which will focus on the role of entropy and entropic difference for his understanding of processes of social organization as well as a proposal of a "new natural contract." Similarly, this will emphasize the linkages between entropic figures of the limit and respective conceptions of a contract. This "new natural contract," as Serres calls it, not only goes a long way in connecting themes around thermodynamic and informational entropy of the early Hermès series to his later employments of entropy in social theory, but also integrates different criticisms of his earlier natural contract and critiques of a Western-centric form of naturalism. The aim of this paper is to show that Serres's approach to entropy engenders a reconsideration of a natural contract that not only thoroughly integrates his own non-essentialist and non-dualistic understanding of nature, but that opens up a horizon of resonances with feminist and postcolonial critiques of the Anthropocene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michel Serres proposes that we reform our relation to the non-human world by striking a new contract to extend democratic rights and legal protections to nature. Following Serres's lead, this has for the most part been understood in strictly legal terms. In this paper, I will show that the natural contract also has a narrative dimension, and moreover that taking this into account reveals an engagement with the Principle of Sufficient Reason that puts the relation of the natural contract with law in a new light. The natural contract appears not as a standalone, law-based response to the climate emergency but as part of an ongoing rational practice that involves the law, the sciences, and a wider narrative exploration of the human and the non-human. After outlining Serres's proposal for a natural contract, I will look briefly to his account of Lucretius in The Birth of Physics where both narrative and contract play an important part. Law is treated as a regularity arising from the connection between events, and further as a form of equilibrium modelled on the most advanced knowledge available. Serres's discussion of Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason in The Natural Contract shows that the composition of such an equilibrium is both narrative and rational. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper gives an account of the most significant elements of Derrida's ethical thought, drawing on the desert of the Hebrew Bible, which Derrida associates with a moral law that is ethically troubling. Partly with reference to Kierkegaard's account of the story of Abraham and Isaac, Derrida examines how ethical law can become subordinate to the sovereignty of the power apparently at the source of ethics which may then destroy moral law. The political equivalent of this is the decision proposed by Carl Schmitt, drawing on Kierkegaard. Derrida's famous statement that "deconstruction is justice" is the recognition that justice, and ethics in general, is caught between the formality of law and the violence of the sovereign power. One outcome of this is sacrifice as substitution, where ethics becomes recompense for violation through sacrifice. Sacrifice is the offering of a substitute. The substitution becomes repeated and itself is then the source of violence contravening some sense of ethics. Derrida's attempts to escape from these deserts include a poetics which recognises the subjective and the aesthetic in the interpretation of law. It also includes the development of a form of sacrifice which is the individual responding to violation in an individualised way which cannot be substituted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]