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The article discusses how bad economic choices affected the relationship of the U.S. and India and the rise of India. It cites the signing of the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal as the start of a dynamic partnership of the two countries with the potential to transform Asia and the world. According to an estimate by the US-India Business Council, Indian firms have invested 11 billion dollars in the U.S. and created more than 100,00 jobs. Recommendations for the U.S. and for India are enumerated.

The article presents a paper on the issues for U.S. Congress of U.S. international investment agreements prepared by the U.S. Congressional Research Service. It reviews the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in driving the global economy. The article also speculates that the conclusion of the Model BIT review may produce momentum to conclude negotiations with China and India or to start investment negotiations with other U.S. trading partners.

The article presents the outlook for India for 2009-2010, including the political outlook, its relations with Pakistan and the U.S., economic policy outlook, and economic forecast. It discusses the current political conditions in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Also provided is monthly, quarterly and annual financial data.

The article presets a political and economic analysis of India for the years 2007 to 2008. The robust economy will be used by the United Progressive Alliance coalition government as a springboard to futher continue economic reforms launched in 2007. However, the realities of coalition politics will constrain this effort, including the liberalization of the economy. India will remain a U.S. political and economic ally in the years to come.

The article focuses on India's foreign trade. In the first four months of 2006/07, the United States was the largest destination for India's exports. The country fairly maintains its complex procedures and documentation for both imports and exports. Trade policy in the country is subject to several abuses such as over-invoicing export or under-invoicing imports to evade import duties or to obtain incentives.

Reports the political and economic outlook in India for the years 2001-2002. Increased tensions between reformists and traditionalists due to economic slowdown; Cultivation of economic and political relations with the United States; Obstacle in the selling of public assets to raise India's revenue.

Unlike like property, water is not possessed in the traditional sense. Ownership comes in the form of rights to use water. In the United States, the types of water rights vary based on location. Eastern states are guided by the Riparian System, which gives the right to use water to the landowner who owns the adjacent land. West of the Mississippi River, the Approbations System applies. This gives priority use to the first person to divert the water. The System of Reserved Water Rights has given water-rights ownership to the federal government on Federal Reserve land. States that have varying climates may use a combination of the Riparian and Approbations systems. Water rights may be sold or transferred, but restrictions often apply, and determining the value of water rights can be a complex process. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on a 2012 report on economically developing countries and the U.S. trade policy. The rising economic powers (REPs) include China and India based on their part in the global economy and economic development. It also adds the involvement of REPs in World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations and in protests against U.S. economic and trade policies. It adds the impact of U.S. exports to the REPs on the U.S. economy and challenges related to free and fair trade.

The article observes that the U.S.-India security cooperation has flourished since September 2001, despite a concurrent U.S. rapprochement with Pakistan. It reviews the bilateral military-to-military cooperation between the two democracies, detailing joint U.S.-Indian naval exercises, the 'Cope India' air force cooperation and the annual 'Yudh Abhyas' army cooperation. The article also discusses bilateral counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation as well as bilateral defense trade.

The article observes that the U.S. and India have been pursuing a strategic partnership since 2004 that incorporates numerous economic, security and global initiatives. It speculates that increased U.S.-India security ties as providing a perceived hedge or counterbalance to growing Chinese influence in Asia. The article also reviews the major facets of the U.S.-India security relations with focus on military-to-military contacts, counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation, and defense trade.

The article discusses the U.S. legislation P.L. 109-401, which allows the U.S. President to exempt a U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with India from several requirements of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). It addresses the law's requirement of the provision of a credible separation plan for nuclear facilities in India and the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) approval of India's nuclear safeguards agreement. The key elements of India's nuclear separation plan are also outlined.

The article discusses the civil nuclear cooperation policy of the administrations of former U.S. President George W. Bush and current U.S. President Barack Obama with India. It addresses the intention of the U.S. to support India's full membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and other multilateral export control regimes. Nuclear cooperation issues facing the U.S. Congress are also discussed, including sensitive nuclear technology transfers and nuclear testing.

The article discusses the steps required by Public Law 109-401 to exempt the U.S. nuclear agreement with India from the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 requirements. It states that the U.S. and India agreed on the latter's separation plan in March 2006, while India gave the declaration of 14 nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on July 25, 2008. Also, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) granted exemption to India from some of its export rules in September 2008.

India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 (P.L. 95-242). However, P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, allows the President to waive several provisions of the AEA. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress, in addition to other required documents, a written determination that P.L. 109-401's requirements for U.S. nuclear cooperation with India to proceed had been met. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369, which approved the agreement, into law October 8, 2008. Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's then-External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement two days later, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. Additionally, the United States and India signed a subsequent arrangement in July 2010 which governs "arrangements and procedures under which" India may reprocess U.S.- origin nuclear fuel in two new national reprocessing facilities, which New Delhi has not yet constructed. The NSG, at the behest of the Bush Administration, agreed in September 2008 to exempt India from some of its export guidelines. That decision has effectively left decisions regarding nuclear commerce with India almost entirely up to individual governments. Since the NSG decision, India has concluded numerous nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign suppliers. However, U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India and may be reluctant to do so if New Delhi does not resolve concerns regarding its policies on liability for nuclear reactor operators and suppliers. Taking a step to resolve such concerns, India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force, October 27, 2010. However, many observers have argued that Indian nuclear liability legislation adopted in August 2010 is inconsistent with the Convention. The Obama Administration has continued with the Bush Administration's policy regarding civil nuclear cooperation with India. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States "intends to support India's full membership" in the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the provisions, reporting and certification requirements of the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. Stated is that India must have appropriate reactor operating requirements for any nuclear power fuel provided to it by the U.S. It is also said that the U.S. president must certify to U.S. Congress that India's safeguards are in place and the declared nuclear facilities are consistent with India's separation plan.

The article presents a report that discusses issues faced by the U.S. Congress regarding its nuclear cooperation with India. The topics discussed include discussions with International Atomic Energy Agency on safeguard agreement of deal signed in 2007, legislature proposed by U.S. President George Bush in 2006 for waiving nuclear cooperation with countries governed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, and Nuclear Suppliers Group created by the U.S. for guarding non proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The article describes the requirements of Public Law (P.L.) 109-401 allowing the U.S. president to exempt a U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement from some requirements of Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Several P.L. 109-401 provisions include a separation plan and Additional Protocol to safeguards agreement for the nuclear facilities of India, banning of fissile material production and support for international efforts of the U.S. It also notes the support of the National Suppliers Group (NSG).

The article discusses key provisions of Public Law (P.L.) 110-369 or the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act signed into law by U.S. president George W. Bush on October 8, 2008. It cites declarations of U.S. policy, provisions on fuel supply and fuel reserve for New Delhi and two certification requirements for the U.S. president on agreement consistency with U.S. obligations. It also notes subsequent arrangement procedures and reporting requirements.

The article presents an overview of issues for Congress regarding the nuclear cooperation of the U.S. with India. It mentions the Indian Nuclear Cooperation with the U.S., the India-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Discussions/Domestic Opposition and the Declaration of Nuclear Facilities. It also notes the Atomic Energy Act and Consultation with Congress, the issues for Congress including the Sensitive Nuclear Technology Transfers, Fuel Supply and Nuclear Testing/Right of Return.

The article discusses the issues on the proliferation and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons in view of the country's chronic political instability. It provides a historical background of Pakistan's nuclear program in relation to the security threat from India and examines its nuclear doctrine. It also discusses Pakistan's nuclear capability, its command and control, the security concerns regarding its nuclear control and the role of the U.S. in Pakistan's nuclear security.

The article focuses on U.S. strategies to foster pro-western orientations in Central Asia. By becoming responsible international community members and supporting integrative goals through bilateral aid, the U.S. policy goal is to discourage influence from radical anti-democratic regimes and terrorist groups. The State Department in 2006 included Central Asia in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs to encourage relations with nations to the south like India, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The article presents a Congressional Research Service report on the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. It discusses Pakistan's nuclear energy program and raises concern about the potential of India to refuse negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament under the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. It describes the nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, strategic nuclear doctrine and command and control of Pakistan over its weapons. The U.S. plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons.

The article looks at the key provisions of Public Law (P.L.) 110-369 or the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. The 30-day consultative period was said to be obviated by the act signed into law by former President George W. Bush on October 8, 2008. The fuel reserve provisions were clarified in the act. Also explained are the certification and reporting requirements, among others, under the law.

The article discusses the requirements for the exemption of a U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with India under Public Law (P.L.) 109-401 or Henry J. Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006. One of them was India's active support for the end of a treaty on fissile material production for nuclear weapons. It enumerates the elements of the separation plan agreed upon by the nations in 2006. Also cited is the approval of the exemption by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

The article presents a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report for the U.S. Congress on the nuclear cooperation of the U.S. with India as of 2011. The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) governs the nuclear cooperation of the U.S. The plan of India to engage in cooperation with companies based in the U.S. was expressed in a letter sent by then-foreign secretary Shivshankar Menon in September 2008. India was considered by the George W. Bush administration as an ally in its nonproliferation policy.

India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). It requires that several steps occur before nuclear cooperation can proceed. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a written determination that these requirements had been met. That same day, the President submitted the text of the proposed agreement, which had not yet been signed. The President also submitted a written determination (also required by the AEA) "that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security." In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State also submitted a report required by P.L. 109- 401 on various aspects of the agreement. On September 27, 2008, the House passed H.R. 7081, which approved the agreement. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation, S. 3548, September 23. The Senate passed H.R. 7081 October 1. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369 into law October 8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India and may be reluctant to do so if the government does not resolve concerns regarding its policies on liability for nuclear reactor operators and suppliers. India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), which has not yet entered into force, October 27, 2010. However, many observers have argued that India's Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill is not consistent with the CSC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India’s test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India” and would “also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,” in the context of a broader partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). It requires that several steps occur before nuclear cooperation can proceed. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a written determination that these requirements had been met. That same day, the President submitted the text of the proposed agreement, which had not yet been signed. The President also submitted a written determination (also required by the AEA) “that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.” In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State also submitted a report required by P.L. 109-401 on various aspects of the agreement. On September 27, 2008, the House passed H.R. 7081, which approved the agreement. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation, S. 3548, September 23. The Senate passed H.R. 7081 October 1. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369 into law October 8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India’s External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India. New Delhi had reportedly insisted that India and the United States conclude an agreement on a reprocessing facility in India before New Delhi would sign contracts with U.S. nuclear firms. However, the countries announced March 29 that they had concluded the agreement. The Administration submitted the subsequent arrangement to Congress May 11. The proposed arrangement shall not take effect if Congress adopts a joint resolution of disapproval. It is worth noting that U.S. firms will likely be very reluctant to engage in nuclear trade with India if the government does not become party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). It requires that several steps occur before nuclear cooperation can proceed. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a written determination that these requirements had been met. That same day, the President submitted the text of the proposed agreement, which had not yet been signed. The President also submitted a written determination (also required by the AEA) "that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security." In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State also submitted a report required by P.L. 109- 401 on various aspects of the agreement. On September 27, 2008, the House passed H.R. 7081, which approved the agreement. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation, S. 3548, September 23. The Senate passed H.R. 7081 October 1. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369 into law October 8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India. New Delhi had reportedly insisted that India and the United States conclude an agreement on a reprocessing facility in India before New Delhi would sign contracts with U.S. nuclear firms. However, the countries announced March 29 that they had concluded the agreement. The Administration must submit the subsequent arrangement to Congress, but has not yet done so. The proposed arrangement shall not take effect if Congress adopts a joint resolution of disapproval. It is worth noting that U.S. firms will likely be very reluctant to engage in nuclear trade with India if the government does not become party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). It requires that several steps occur before nuclear cooperation can proceed. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a written determination that these requirements had been met. That same day, the President submitted the text of the proposed agreement, which had not yet been signed. The President also submitted a written determination (also required by the AEA) "that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security." In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State also submitted a report required by P.L. 109- 401 on various aspects of the agreement. On September 27, 2008, the House passed H.R. 7081, which approved the agreement. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation, S. 3548, September 23. The Senate passed H.R. 7081 October 1. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369 into law October 8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. However, several steps remain before U.S. companies can start nuclear trade with India. For example, P.L. 110-369 requires that, before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can issue licenses for U.S. nuclear exports to India, the President must determine and certify to Congress that New Delhi's IAEA safeguards agreement has entered into force and that India's declaration of its nuclear facilities to the agency "is not materially inconsistent with the facilities and schedule" described in a separation plan that New Delhi provided to Washington. India's safeguards agreement entered into force in May 2009, and New Delhi has filed the declaration with the IAEA. The President submitted the required certifications to Congress February 3. Furthermore, U.S. firms will likely be very reluctant to engage in nuclear trade with India if the government does not become party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force. India also is reportedly insisting that New Delhi and Washington conclude an agreement on a reprocessing facility in India before New Delhi signs contracts with U.S. nuclear firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). It requires that several steps occur before nuclear cooperation can proceed. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a written determination that these requirements had been met. That same day, the President submitted the text of the proposed agreement, which had not yet been signed. The President also submitted a written determination (also required by the AEA) "that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security." In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State also submitted a report required by P.L. 109- 401 on various aspects of the agreement. On September 27, 2008, the House passed H.R. 7081, which approved the agreement. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation, S. 3548, September 23. The Senate passed H.R. 7081 October 1. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369 into law October 8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. However, several steps remain before U.S. companies can start nuclear trade with India. For example, P.L. 110-369 requires that, before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can issue licenses for U.S. nuclear exports to India, the President must determine and certify to Congress that New Delhi's IAEA safeguards agreement has entered into force and that India's declaration of its nuclear facilities to the agency "is not materially inconsistent with the facilities and schedule" described in a separation plan that New Delhi provided to Washington. India's safeguards agreement entered into force in May 2009, and New Delhi has filed the declaration with the IAEA. The President submitted the required certifications to Congress February 3. Furthermore, U.S. firms will likely be very reluctant to engage in nuclear trade with India if the government does not become party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force. India also is reportedly insisting that New Delhi and Washington conclude an agreement on a reprocessing facility in India before New Delhi signs contracts with U.S. nuclear firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). It requires that several steps occur before nuclear cooperation can proceed. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a written determination that these requirements had been met. That same day, the President submitted the text of the proposed agreement, which had not yet been signed. The President also submitted a written determination (also required by the AEA) "that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security." In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State also submitted a report required by P.L. 109- 401 on various aspects of the agreement. On September 27, 2008, the House passed H.R. 7081, which approved the agreement. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation, S. 3548, September 23. The Senate passed H.R. 7081 October 1. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369 into law October 8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. However, several steps remain before U.S. companies can start nuclear trade with India. For example, P.L. 110-369 requires that, before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can issue licenses for U.S. nuclear exports to India, the President must determine and certify to Congress that New Delhi's IAEA safeguards agreement has entered into force and that India's declaration of its nuclear facilities to the agency "is not materially inconsistent with the facilities and schedule" described in a separation plan that New Delhi provided to Washington. India's safeguards agreement entered into force in May 2009, and New Delhi has filed the declaration with the IAEA. The President, however, has not submitted the required certifications to Congress. Furthermore, U.S. firms will likely be very reluctant to engage in nuclear trade with India if the government does not become party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force. India also is reportedly insisting that New Delhi and Washington conclude an agreement on a reprocessing facility in India before New Delhi signs contracts with U.S. nuclear firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India’s test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India” and would “also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,” in the context of a broader, global partnership with India. U.S. nuclear cooperation is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). It requires that several steps occur before nuclear cooperation can proceed. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a written determination that these requirements had been met. That same day, the President submitted the text of the proposed agreement, which had not yet been signed. The President also submitted a written determination (also required by the AEA) “that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.” In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State also submitted a report required by P.L. 109- 401 on various aspects of the agreement. On September 27, 2008, the House passed H.R. 7081, which approved the agreement. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation, S. 3548, September 23. The Senate passed H.R. 7081 October 1. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369 into law October 8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India’s External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. However, several steps remain before U.S. companies can start nuclear trade with India. For example, P.L. 110-369 requires that, before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can issue licenses for U.S. nuclear exports to India, the President must determine and certify to Congress that New Delhi’s IAEA safeguards agreement has entered into force and that India’s declaration of its nuclear facilities to the agency “is not materially inconsistent with the facilities and schedule” described in a separation plan that New Delhi provided to Washington. India’s safeguards agreement entered into force in May 2009, and New Delhi has filed the declaration with the IAEA. The President, however, has not submitted the required certifications to Congress. Furthermore, U.S. firms will likely be very reluctant to engage in nuclear trade with India if the government does not become party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force. India also is reportedly insisting that New Delhi and Washington conclude an agreement on a reprocessing facility in India before New Delhi signs contracts with U.S. nuclear firms. This report will be updated as necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the security issues on the nuclear weapons of Pakistan. It notes that political instability in Pakistan posed threat of nuclear weapon proliferation. Meanwhile, it relates that expansion of nuclear weapon-related facilities in Pakistan may be in response to U.S.-India nuclear agreement. It discusses the move of Pakistan to enhance international confidence for its nuclear arsenal including personnel security program. It cites the confidence of U.S. for Pakistan's weapons.

After decades of strained political relations, the U.S. and Indian governments are currently pursuing a “strategic partnership” based on numerous overlapping interests, shared values, and improved economic and trade relations. India is in the midst of a rapid economic expansion, and many U.S. companies view India as a lucrative market and a candidate for foreign investment. For its part, the current Indian government sees itself continuing the economic reforms started in 1991, aimed at transforming a quasi-socialist economy into a more open, market-oriented economy. However, the U.S. government is concerned that India's economic reforms are progressing too slowly and unevenly. Bilateral merchandise trade has grown from $6 billion in 1990 to $33 billion in 2006. Although India was only the 21th largest export market for the United States in 2006, the United States has become India's leading trading partner, mostly due to the growth in India's exports to the United States. However, recent increases in trade with China have made it a close second to the United States. In 2006, the U.S.bilateral trade deficit with India totaled $13 billion. In 2006, India's gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 9.2%, a growth rate second only to China among Asian nations. India's economic growth has also brought about the emergence of a sizeable “middle class” and the largest number of billionaires in Asia, but the country's mostly rural population remains comparatively poor and largely isolated from the benefits of growth. In addition, there is growing concern that the economy is “overheated” as evidenced by rising rates of inflation. Moreover, despite several years of strong growth, investment in infrastructure is lagging, creating a potential bottleneck for long-term economic expansion. Finally, attempts at additional economic reforms aimed at resolving these and other economic problems are constrained by India's political dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the nuclear energy cooperation with India that would seek agreement from the Congress in the U.S. It explores the nuclear cooperation promoted by the U.S. with India as a way to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and India's dependence on oil to bring the country into a nonproliferation mainstream as well as create jobs for industry in the U.S. It also cites the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created by the U.S. as a direct response to India's nuclear exports and testing.

On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the creation of a "global partnership," which would include "full" civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. Such cooperation would reverse almost 30 years of U.S. nonproliferation policy. President Bush promised India he would persuade Congress to amend the pertinent laws to approve the agreement, as well as persuade U.S. allies to create an exception to multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines for India. India committed to, among other things, separating its civilian nuclear facilities from its military nuclear facilities, declaring civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEA safeguards, and signing an Additional Protocol. See CRS Report RL33016, US-India Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues for Congress, by Sharon Squassoni, for further details on the agreement. President Bush encouraged India to develop a separation plan that is credible, transparent, and defensible, and Administration officials have made a "credible" and "defensible" (from a nonproliferation standpoint) separation plan a prerequisite for proposing legislation to Congress that would create an exception for nuclear cooperation with India. The separation plan appears to serve two purposes: politically, it could help demonstrate India's commitment to nonproliferation, and legally, it must ensure U.S. compliance with Article I of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) -- that U.S. cooperation does not in any way assist a nuclear weapons program in a non-nuclear weapon state. On March 2, 2006, Prime Minister Singh and President Bush announced that the preparation of a separation plan had been successfully completed. Any peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with a state such as India that does not have comprehensive nuclear safeguards would require congressional approval. Approval could depend on many considerations, but a key one for this agreement could be the strength of assurances that U.S. cooperation with India will not enhance India's capability to produce nuclear weapons. The current U.S. legal standard, and, in fact, the international standard now, is that only comprehensive nuclear safeguards provide that level of assurance. In light of the Administration's expressed desire to ask Congress to adjust U.S. laws, the Administration appears poised to ask Congress to back a lower level of assurance, outlined in the separation plan. U.S. nonproliferation experts have suggested that a separation plan's credibility and defensibility rests not just on numbers of facilities, but also types of facilities, because certain facilities and processes pose greater proliferation threats. The separation plan agreed upon on March 2, 2006, appears to place 14 of 22 reactors under safeguards, equaling about 65% of India's total nuclear energy output. This report provides background on India's nuclear fuel cycle, a discussion of various issues involved in separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and potential concerns for Congress as it considers whether the United States has adequate assurances that its nuclear cooperation does not assist, encourage, or induce India's nuclear weapons development, production, or proliferation. This report will be updated as necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. relations with India depend largely on India's political leadership. India's2004 national elections ended governance by the center-right coalition headed byPrime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and brought in a new center-left coalition ledby Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Following the upset victory for thehistorically-dominant Indian National Congress Party led by Sonia Gandhi, Gandhideclined the post of Prime Minister in the new left-leaning United ProgressiveAlliance (UPA) coalition government, instead nominating her party lieutenant,Oxford-educated economist Manmohan Singh, for the job. As Finance Minister from1991-1996, Singh was the architect of major Indian economic reform andliberalization efforts. On May 22, the widely-esteemed Sikh became India's firstevernon-Hindu Prime Minister. The defeated Bharatiya Janata Party now sits inopposition at the national level, led in Parliament by former Deputy Prime MinisterLal Advani. A coalition of communist parties supports the UPA, but New Delhi'seconomic, foreign, and security policies are not expected to be significantly altered.The new government has vowed to continue close and positive engagement with theUnited States in all areas. This report, which will not be updated, provides anoverview of the elections, key parties, and U.S. policy interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This section presents international news briefs related to the artificial satellites industry. Alcatel-Lucent finished the transfer of the shares of Alcatel in Alcatel Alenia Space and Telespazio to Thales. A request was received by Sirius Satellite Radio and XM Satellite Radio from the U.S. Department of Justice for information about their proposed merger. Astro All Asia Networks of Malaysia signed a deal with Maran Group of India to provide direct-to-home television services in India.

The article offers news briefs on the aeronautics industry as of November 14, 2005. A contract was awarded by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration to Astronics Corp. to improve its Arcsafe wiring integrity tester. An anti-hijacking policy has been adopted by India.

The article offers news briefs for business enterprises. Indian equity benchmark Nifty has closed at higher records after the finalized rates introduced by country's GST Council. World Bank has issued a report in which amount of Indian rupee was stronger than the dollar. Manugraph Americas Inc. is planning to reorganize its business after filing for Voluntary Chapter 11 of United States Code.

The article discusses U.S.-Pakistan relations. According to the author, Pakistan is considered a strategically important country for U.S. policy makers. The 112th U.S. Congress will be faced with the challenge of balancing the importance of Pakistan to the national security interests and domestic budgetary concerns of the U.S. The author shares the threat on regional stability with the apparently accelerated nuclear weapons program of Pakistan and its dispute with India over Kashmir.