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The fear of falling behind has been a driving force of European integration. Historically, Europe's response to the looming angst of declining competitiveness has been more market-creation, not market-direction. Recently, however, Europe has – in the name of safeguarding Europe's technological sovereignty – taken on a much more active role in directing economic activity towards sectors and technologies deemed geopolitically or geoeconomically important. In this paper, we attempt to explain this 'geo-dirigiste' turn. We reconstruct the evolution of EU industrial policy through the lens of Europe's fear of falling behind, drawing not only on primary (including archival) and secondary sources, but also on original interviews and deep transfer learning applied to an original dataset of 66.548 documents. Focusing on Europe's changing technological and geopolitical context, its coalitional underpinnings, and the role of ideational politics, we document and explain the historic shift away from market-creation and towards supranational market-direction in EU industrial policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on an original protest event analysis (PEA) dataset covering 30 European countries, this paper provides three sets of results. Despite its unlikeliness due to lockdowns and social distancing measures, protest during COVID-19 has hardly been put to a halt even if, as a result of the restrictions imposed by the lockdown measures on the opportunities of public collective actions, protest occurred at significantly lower levels compared to pre-COVID-19 times, in terms of number of events and, above all, in terms of the number of participants. Moreover, protest was refocused on COVID-19-related issues, in particular on protest against the restrictions imposed by the government lockdowns, while non-COVID-19 issues, in particular economic issues, were crowded out. In addition, protest during the COVID-19-crisis also responded to highly contingent national context conditions which varied between the different regions of Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with the conflicts associated with the so-called 'Dieselgate' affair. It explains the interaction of civil society, law firms and political actors which reshapes the legal systems in Europe. Once the federal government in Germany had decided that European car owners should not get any kind of financial compensation, a transnational coalition of consumer organizations and law firms successfully initiated a legal mobilization campaign to counteract the political decision. As a consequence, collective litigation rights were strengthened in Germany and at the European level. Theoretically, the paper refers to the literature on adversarial legalism. Whether this judicialized style of conflict resolution is spreading to Europe ('Eurolegalism') has been a hotly debated topic in political science. Our main argument is that the Dieselgate case is a catalyst event to foster the transformation process towards 'Eurolegalism'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of trans-governmental policy regimes in Europe has fundamentally changed the role of National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs). Here we move away from the idea that there is a meaningful divide between the domestic and the European levels of governance and suggest that a different logic has emerged in recent decades, combining multiple chains of delegation and innovative coordination schemes. NRAs have come to occupy a 'broker' or intermediary position between domestic and European polities, that is no longer adequately described by the prevailing, mainly dyadic models of bureaucratic autonomy conceived just for national states. In this paper, we build the concept of entangled agencies to make sense of the linkages between NRAs and European Agencies (EAs) and provide some preliminary empirical evidence to show how they effectively articulate various levels of government, presenting empirical findings on the connections that ties NRAs representatives with EAs management boards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper follows European countries as they struggled through the first wave of the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic. We analyze when countries were confronted with the virus, how long it took until the number of new infections peaked and at what level of infections that peak was achieved via social distancing and lockdown policies. Most European countries were able to successfully end the first wave of the pandemic – defined as a two-week incidence rate smaller than 10 cases per 100,000 people. We find that countries in which the virus made significant landfall later in time enjoyed a latecomer advantage that some of these countries squandered, however, by not responding quickly enough and that an early lockdown was more effective than a hard lockdown. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the large literature on gender differences in politics, there have been relatively few empirical studies testing the effects of gender in public administration. This paper examines how male and female public managers show attitudinal differences toward innovation in the public sector. We hypothesize that male and female managers differ in three aspects. Firstly, female managers are more result-oriented than rule-following, and more oriented toward societal interests. Secondly, female public managers are more open to new ideas and creativity, and more willing to challenge the status quo. Yet, thirdly, female leaders are less eager to take risks when would-be innovations may put their organizations in peril. Thus, we argue that female managers are more prudent and entrepreneurial than their male counterparts. We test these hypotheses using a data set of 5,909 senior public managers from 20 European countries. The results of multilevel model analysis find statistically significant gender differences in attitudes toward innovation. Despite the small size of gender impacts, our findings challenge prevailing stereotypes on women's entrepreneurial attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union's response to the COVID-19 pandemic revealed changes and continuity in the structure and the functioning of the European project. In lieu of a conclusion to the Special Issue, this article discusses what those lessons tell us about how Europe responds to the following crisis. We compare European responses to the pandemic to those that followed the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We observe more differences than similarities. The same actors do not always play the central role, solidarity among Europeans is sometimes more challenging to engineer, and the requirements to make the overall project more resilient can point in different directions. Such findings show that any argument that Europe is forged through crisis is unlikely to tell us much about what Europe is or where it may be headed. In that sense, the EU is a sui generis multi-level, multi-faceted actor that can change shape in response to events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The free movement of people (FMP) was one of the first victims of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe. Calls for better coordination often remained unheard in the initial phase of hectic border closures and mostly resulted in soft EU recommendations. Nevertheless, most restrictions on the FMP were lifted after summer 2020 and could be largely avoided in later waves of the pandemic. We argue that the resilience of the FMP, a fundamental principle of the EU, ultimately depends on policies – borders, welfare, and health – that are still national competence and partly implemented at the regional level. We explain the resilience of the FMP and the observed variation between different border regions by the strength of pre-existing coordinative transgovernmental networks. Our analysis is based on a comparative case study of different German border regions and draws on quantitative data concerning cross-border workers and qualitative interviews with policy-makers and stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The crises of the European Union and the geopolitical shifts in its international environment have generated a backlash against the post-Cold War 'debordering' of European integration. Whereas integration theories focus almost exclusively on the EU's internal boundaries and developments, this framework paper conceptualizes and theorizes integration as a process of internal debordering and external rebordering. It sketches the history of European integration in a bordering perspective and proposes general assumptions about the EU's bordering process. Accordingly, rebordering pressures result from widening boundary gaps at the EU's external borders, exogenous shocks to cross-border transactions, growing community deficits of debordering, and their politicization. Whether external rebordering succeeds and how it interacts with internal boundary formation, depends on EU-level boundary negotiations and the relative costs and benefits of external vs. internal rebordering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies provide evidence that income inequality is a relevant driver for the electoral success of populist parties all over Europe. In this article, we aim to understand how exactly increasing income inequality can lead to support for populist parties. More specifically, we discuss four different attitudinal mechanisms from previous research: economic insecurities, trust in political elites, social integration, and national identity. We rely on eight waves of the European Social Survey and find that economic insecurities, trust in political elites, and national identity are linked to rising income inequality and populist support as expected. However, a causal mediation analysis shows that these mechanisms are not sufficient to fully understand the impact of income inequality on support for populists. This finding raises questions regarding the empirical support of existing theories to explain how macroeconomic changes in inequality became a pre-condition for the rise of populist parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since they first entered the European Parliament in 1979, the EU has proven to be a strong legitimising tool for far right parties, providing them with funding, visibility and a higher degree of credibility and respectability. While recent literature has explored some of these dynamics, the role of the far right's ideological positioning on Europe as a source of public legitimacy has been neglected. This paper argues that as a relatively new and contentious political issue, Europe can function as a powerful ideological resource for far right parties by allowing them to convey a more acceptable political message. This argument is illustrated through a case study of two key aspects of the Rassemblement National's ideological approach to the European Union: the party's claim to be pro-European but anti-EU and its opposition to EU integration on grounds of sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 outbreak in Europe has brought attention to EU health policy as a focal point for solidarity, particularly as it concerns access to medicines. Against the backdrop of policy proposals for EU joint procurement of medicines, this article expands our understanding of public opinion towards this particular aspect of European integration. Drawing on data from a conjoint experiment in five EU countries, the study investigates the extent to which citizens' preferences concerning alternative policy designs for EU joint procurement of medicines are either structured along a pro-EU versus anti-EU or ideological divide, or are crisis driven by the perceived COVID-19 threat. The analysis reveals that individual preferences over the design of EU risk pooling for medicines are most strongly explained by Euroscepticism, while egalitarian ideology plays only a modest role. How citizens' perceived threat of COVID-19 affects their preferences for this form of EU risk pooling is dependent on the national context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thirty years after 1989 Europe is once again divided, despite 15 years of integration within the European Union. In contrast to the West's liberal conception of internationally constrained democracy rooted in the protection of individual human rights, Central Europe has developed an illiberal version centred on the popular sovereignty of the nation. I argue that these divergent understandings of democracy and the nation-state are rooted in collective memory. Whereas the West's historical imaginary is based on the traumas of Nazism associated with 1945, Central Europe's is dominated by the legacy of communism symbolically signified by 1989. These differing understandings of past teach strikingly different lessons for the present: one focused on the dangers of nationalism, the other on protecting national self-determination from external interference. The future of the EU depends on its ability create a broader historical narrative that can incorporate both the lessons of 1945 and 1989. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sheds light on an unexplored phase and a neglected actor in EU constitutional politics: the preparation of Treaty reform by the Group of Government Representatives. Striving to explain whether and under which conditions constitutional decisions in Europe were de facto taken by officials, the paper proceeds in three steps. First, possible functions of preparation in complex negotiations are conceptualized and two conditions for effective preparation are proposed: a preparatory body's issue and process resources as well as consensual pre-agreement. A second section introduces the role of government representatives in preparing EU reform, checks their collective resources against the criteria developed in section 1 and assesses their preparatory agency as strong. Third, I analyse the effectiveness of preparing for Amsterdam, using the negotiations on free movement and flexibility as plausibility probes. The analysis demonstrates that officials play a key role even in the bastion of high politics that is Treaty reform, where the final European Council is only the 'tip' of a long-term negotiation process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The open method of co-ordination (OMC) has received much attention in the recent EU literature. The predominant view claims that the OMC is not only a new but also an effective policy-making instrument. This paper raises doubts about both claims by offering a comparison of soft law policy co-ordination in three international organizations. More specifically, this paper compares the European Employment Strategy to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the EU, the OECD Economic Surveys, and the IMF Article IV Consultations. Based on expert interviews, it seeks to demonstrate that these procedures are forms of multilateral surveillance that do not differ in kind. Such a comparative analysis of the OMC refutes claims to its novelty. Having compared the four procedures, a more general model of multilateral surveillance consisting of six elements is generated that facilitates further comparisons. This paper concludes that governments select voluntarist procedures mainly to secure their own competencies rather than to realize common goals. Effective problem-solving is therefore not necessarily the dominant objective of soft law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents information on the collection of papers 'Political Economy and European Integration,' on the economic basis for European integration. Topics discussed in the paper; Focus of the article; Analysis of European integration issues in the paper.

When states over- and under-react to perceived transboundary threats, their mistakes can have equally harmful consequences for the citizens they mean to protect. Yet, studies of intelligence and conventional foreign policy tend to concentrate on cases of under-reaction to threats from states, and few studies set out criteria for identifying cases of under- and over-reaction to other kinds of threats or investigate common causes. The paper develops a typology of over- and under-reaction in foreign policy revolving around threats assessment, response proportionality and timeliness. Drawing on pilot case studies, the contribution identifies combinations of factors and conditions that make both over- or under-reaction more likely. It is hypothesized that three factors play significant causal roles across the cases: (1) institutions have learned the wrong lessons from previous related incidents; (2) decision-making is organized within institutional silos focused on only one kind of threat; and (3) actors have strong pre-existing preferences for a particular outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The idea that internal inclusion requires external exclusion features prominently in many theoretical accounts of modern statehood and citizenship. In a similar vein, it has been argued that internal freedom of movement in the European Union requires strict immigration control at its external borders. This article sheds light on the relationship between internal de-bordering and external re-bordering, making two main contributions. First, we theorise the idea of an integration-demarcation conditionality based on the European Union's symbolic legitimacy and functional needs. Second, we test the common belief that public support for free movement within Europe depends on a restrictive border regime for non-European immigration. For this purpose, we assess how the external shock of the 2015 refugee crisis shaped the bordering preferences of European citizens. We find that the crisis primarily increased citizens' support for external re-bordering, and did not substantially undermine their support for internal free movement. Thus, the large-scale arrival of refugees has not led to a general backlash against open borders and immigration but has, rather, increased public support for the European model of combining internal freedoms with external controls. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the consequences and implications of the rise of European populist parties for European defense cooperation. Focusing on six of the most prominent populist parties in Europe today, we examine their positions along three important defense-related issues: recommended national force posture; integrated military forces; and main national security threats. To determine their position on these three issues, we examine every party manifesto and, if available, official party document on security and defense policy since 2010. We argue that the rise of populism in Europe does not represent an inflection point for the future of European defense cooperation. Instead, our analysis reveals the following three findings: European defense cooperation will continue to be essentially ad hoc, functionally driven, and issue specific; populist parties' attitudes and preferences regarding European defense cooperation both overlap with and diverge from those of other populists and non-populists in the EU; and populism over time may contribute to a shift in domestic preferences toward a Europe that more readily embraces military power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The right of citizens to live and work in any member state is a foundational pillar of the European Union. The views of EU citizens on free movement are characterized by a puzzle: the border-free Europe is seen as the most important achievement of European integration but also appears as a main driver of Euroscepticism. In this article, I argue that this is because of a tension between citizens' own mobility rights and the mobility rights of citizens from other EU countries. This idea of ambivalence towards free movement is tested with observational data and a survey experiment across 28 EU countries. The results suggest that many citizens hold ambivalent views towards free movement due to a tension between the value of one's own mobility and the fear of immigration. Their effective support depends on the relative salience of inward and outward mobility. This finding has important implications for the public support of international integration more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, several European states have moved to ban or restrict the wearing of Islamic face veils. Supporters of these bans maintain that they are necessary to ensure national security and cultural assimilation. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that prohibitions on the veil unjustly restrict the religious liberty of Muslim women. Interestingly, though, despite the controversy surrounding restrictions and bans on the veil and conflicting expectations on the effects of these limitations, little research has attempted to rigorously analyze their effect on radicalization. We seek to address this gap through a statistical analysis of the effects of these laws on Islamist terrorism in the states of Europe. We find that states that enforce veil bans are indeed statistically much more likely to experience more and more lethal Islamist terrorist attacks than countries where such laws do not exist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Parliament (EP) has often criticized the agencification of the European Union. Yet in practice it often uses its legislative powers to strengthen the powers and independence of European agencies. To explain this paradox, this paper analyses the six cases where the 2004-2009 EP legislated to create a new European agency. It argues that the Parliament overcame some of its doubts about agencification by proposing amendments which brought the legislation closer to its own legitimation beliefs. Moreover, the EP has developed a substantial repertoire of amendments which it now more or less repeats every time it is confronted with a proposal for a new agency. Many of these amendments are designed to shore up control of agencies, sometimes in novel ways which suggest that the Parliament has in part made its peace with agencification by becoming more amenable to the control of agencies by methods involving multiple principals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Its monopoly power to formulate policy proposals and set the European Union's (EU's) legislative agenda guarantees the European Commission considerable prominence in EU legislative studies. It is commonly conceptualized as a unitary actor, acting cohesively - often in its own supranational interest - in EU decision-making. Recent theoretical developments and empirical studies, however, cast doubt on this conceptualization. This paper takes up these matters and investigates the decision-making mechanisms and dynamics of the Commission's executive politics. Two case studies show that the formal division of power along portfolios puts formally responsible Commissioners in a privileged position to influence the content of legislative proposals in internal decision-making. This influence, however, is circumscribed by the opposition of other Commissioners. At least in the cases studied here, Commissioners' position-taking and conflict in internal decision-making follow a national and, to some extent, a sectoral rather than a partisan pattern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The indicators developed for the open method of co-ordination (OMC) in social inclusion might, according to their authors, serve to establish a common language for the discussion of social inclusion issues, set the agenda for inclusion policies, and provide benchmarks for the identification of best practices. To examine whether ‘learning by numbers’ is taking place, this paper scrutinizes the use of the indicators in the area of child poverty and exclusion. The discussion uses a theoretical account of the institutional preconditions for the transmission of OMC-based learning into the policy processes of member states which distinguishes between ‘normal policy-making’ and ‘paradigm shifts’. The indicators are designed to contribute to the advance of knowledge about normal policy-making, but it is shown that the OMC/inclusion disseminates a new policy paradigm which bears little relationship to the indicators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the claim that there is a problem with delayed transposition of directives within the EU, using a new dataset on the transposition of directives in the fields of utilities and food safety regulation in the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, Spain and Greece. This dataset overcomes most of the problems that have plagued previous data. In 65 per cent of the cases transposition was delayed, and the average delay was seven months. There is thus indeed a problem with delayed transposition. In order to explain this problem, a sociological institutionalist approach is used. The findings point to the importance of administrative routinization. Whether or not transposition is accomplished with little delay depends on whether there are administrative departments with the explicit task to specialize in transposition, and whether they have had the time and resources to develop routines or standard operating procedures for doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A co-ordinated approach to fiscal policy in the euro area is desirable from a political economy standpoint if it protects against the harmful side effects which can arise from member states' fiscal policies. At the same time, however, closer economic co-ordination between national governments is perceived by some as a threat to the independence of the European Central Bank and with it the credibility of its price stability mandate. A variant of the open method, which is known as multilateral surveillance, has been assigned the unenviable task of minimizing the costs of macroeconomic co-ordination, while at the same time delivering the benefits. Whilst the open method poses little threat to the independence of the ECB, its effectiveness is contingent, in the absence of legal obligation and the threat of financial penalties, on the impact of peer pressure and consensus-building mechanisms. This paper assesses the potential of these mechanisms and then draws lessons about the scope and limits of the open method in the light of Portugal's recent breach of the Stability and Growth Pact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the solidarity discourse in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis and examines how meanings of solidarity are framed and which political parties participate in these debates. The discourse coalition and coalition magnet approaches are combined to study the two discourse dynamics of demanding solidarity (migration crisis) or being criticised for not showing solidarity (Euro crisis) in the German media discourse. By applying the discourse network methodology, the interdependence of framing and actor visibility is analysed. It is demonstrated that solidarity is linked to austerity by a conservative party discourse coalition in the Euro crisis. The migration crisis discourse is shaped by one large discourse coalition, arguing for political solidarity. In 2015, political solidarity is challenged by security and demarcation claims in the migration crisis. The study contributes to the ideational research framework and demonstrates the different trajectories of solidarity in Europe in hard times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interaction between bargaining and monetary policy involves three relationships: the interaction of the bargainers with (a) each other; (b) the monetary regime; and (c) their rank and file. Research has centred on (a) and (b) and neglected (c). However, in practice, interaction (c) gains in importance, since bargaining is a multi-level process in the eurozone. Analytically, this interaction should not be neglected, since the monetary regime can target the bargainers more effectively than their rank and file. This paper conceptualizes the interaction between bargaining and monetary policy in a way which includes all three relationships. Based on a comparison of fifteen European countries, it is shown that the responsiveness of alternative bargaining institutions to the monetary regime depends on their capacity for making the rank and file comply, and that these institutions also differ in which monetary parameter they are sensitive to. The implications of these findings for EMU are discussed in the paper's final section. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classic partisan theory posits that political parties translate their electorates' preferences into policies. Accordingly, the recent changes in left parties' voter base, from predominantly working-class to middle-class voters, should have resulted in changing policy positions and policy effects of left parties. We test this expectation for economic policies (i.e., subsidies, product market regulation, and privatization) in 16 European countries between 1980 and 2012. We find the expected relationships for subsidies but not for regulation and privatization. This can be explained by the fact that only with regard to subsidies, preferences substantially differ between the working- and the middle-class. Thus, economic policy preferences of voters of left parties diverge less than could be expected. Methodologically, the study suggests that empirically testing the complete causal mechanism of classic partisan theory, assessing voters' preferences and investigating more than one issue area, are promising ways to study partisan effects on public policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2006, the European Commission released its Global Europe Communication, in which it announced a shift from a multilateral to a bilateral trade strategy. One of the key pillars of this new strategy was to strengthen the bilateral trade relations with key Asian countries. In contrast to existing analyses that focus on European Union (EU) decision-makers’ agency, we propose an explanation for this notable shift in the EU's trade policy that stresses the political role of import-dependent firms. In light of the increasing integration of such firms into global value chains, the article argues that a plausible case can be made, both theoretically and empirically, that import-dependent firms had a clear stake in the signing of preferential trade agreements between the EU and Asian countries and that their lobbying efforts significantly affected the EU's decision to start negotiations on such agreements with South Korea, India and Vietnam. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Designing political institutions is a balancing act between upholding democratic ideals and accommodating constraints. Advocates of deliberative governance in the European Union live this tension in a particularly polarized manner, torn between the deliberative ideal of consensual decision-making and the reality of power politics. To which extent does deliberative governance provide a suitable conceptual framework as well as a mode of governance in its own right for European policy-making? This paper applies five features of deliberative governance suggested by Teague (2001) in his study of European social policy to the genesis of the Bologna Process and subsequent domestic reforms. The Bologna Process has, since the Sorbonne declaration of 25 May 1998, aimed at creating a European Higher Education Area. This study concludes that deliberative governance has the potential to start a long-term process of progressive domestic policy change and therefore deserves further investigation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

European regulatory networks (ERNs) constitute the main governance instrument for the informal co-ordination of public regulation at the European Union (EU) level. They are in charge of co-ordinating national regulators and ensuring the implementation of harmonized regulatory policies across the EU, while also offering sector-specific expertise to the Commission. To this aim, ERNs develop 'best practices' and benchmarking procedures in the form of standards, norms and guidelines to be adopted in member states. In this paper, we focus on the Committee of European Securities Regulators and examine the consequences of the policy-making structure of ERNs on the domestic adoption of standards. We find that the regulators of countries with larger financial industries tend to occupy more central positions in the network, especially among newer member states. In turn, network centrality is associated with a more prompt domestic adoption of standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Union (EU)-level agencies have emerged as important actors on the EU's policy-making scene. To date, we know relatively little about the personnel working in EU agencies: what attitudes do EU agency staff members hold on issue-dimensions relevant for the EU integration process? How do they perceive of their role in EU policy-making? Moreover, we know little about the cohesiveness of attitudes of agency staff within and between different EU agencies. The aim of this contribution is conceptually and empirically descriptive. It draws on original data from an online survey of professionals working in EU agencies to gain insights into the attitudes held by EU agency staff on three substantive attitudinal dimensions: conceptions relating to legitimate and accountable EU governance, conceptions about the preferred level of centralization of political authority in the EU, as well as views on economic governance in the EU. While the conceptual focus of this paper is on attitudes and not on behaviour, the attitudes held by EU agency staff and their relative homo- or heterogeneity is likely to affect perceptions and evaluations of the political environment and interpretations of the challenges agency staff members face in their substantive area of work. The findings of the survey will enable us to draw broader conclusions about the type and quality of accountability relationships as well as of the EU's democratic legitimacy. Moreover, the data will permit to inform arguments about the actor quality of EU agencies, which are often conceived as efficient institutional solutions to overcome credibility problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agency creation at the European Union (EU) level differs from that at the national one. European regulatory agencies (ERAs) have limited formal powers and separation from other actors, resembling networks rather than stand-alone agencies. ERAs for economic regulation have been created later and in smaller numbers than for social regulation. Using a historical rational analysis, this paper argues that past delegations to other non-majoritarian institutions at the EU and national levels condition the creation of European agencies. The Commission has defended its existing role and powers, accepting ERAs when they aid its strategy to increase its own reach and ensuring that it has many controls over them. When member states have created independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), those IRAs have defended their autonomy and resisted strong ERAs. Formalized EU networks of IRAs have hindered the establishment of powerful ERAs and when created, ERAs have involved layering and conversion of those networks. Hence formal delegation to ERAs has been limited and uneven. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European regulatory space has been expanding rapidly since the 1990s. The double movement towards a single market on the one hand and a Single European Regulatory Space on the other is evident almost everywhere. A new regulatory architecture is emerging and is expressed in the extension of regulatory capacities beyond the European Commission via two major forms of institutionalization: agencies and networks. This paper explores the politics and architecture of the institutionalization and administrative rationalization of the EU regulatory space and demonstrates (a) how agencies replace networks in a process that might best be called 'agencification'; (b) how agencies compete with networks and are often able to create, employ, and control them, creating what might best be called 'agencified networks'; and (c) how networking empowers agencies creating a new type of regulatory organization that might best be called a 'networked agency'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the role of experts in shaping European transport policies and the transport clauses in the Treaty of Rome in the formative post-war years of European integration. It argues that transport experts had a specific understanding of how to work together on the international level that clashed with the idea of creating a High Authority of independent experts without intimate knowledge of transport. Moreover, their ideas had been embedded in a policy network which co-ordinated the work of a number of international organizations. This network worked hard to prevent that a newly to be established Common Transport Policy would get off the ground. The paper explores the usefulness of the epistemic community concept to understand the activities of the network and what it accomplished. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Union (EU) negotiations take place within the framework of a set of formal and informal institutions. Member states negotiate in the organizational context of the Council and the European Council, take decisions through alternative procedures and decision rules, and sustain a set of norms for the conduct of negotiations. While the effects of these institutions on negotiation behaviour and outcomes have received extensive attention, the question of why these particular institutions have been established or evolved remains underexplored. This contribution makes an argument in favour of systematic attention to the design of negotiation institutions in the EU, and suggests that we should draw on general theoretical approaches to institutional design for these purposes. Moreover, rather than engaging in the exercise of trying to prove or falsify theoretical approaches, we should exploit the potential for explanatory complementarities in concrete empirical domains. To this end, the paper advances a domain-of-application approach to institutional design and illustrates its applicability to EU negotiation institutions through four empirical illustrations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been an expansion of research on policy learning in different subfields. The methodological and empirical work continues to face challenges in determining the constitutive elements that foster such transformations in governance through learning. Careful attention needs to be paid to the regularities and patterns, as well as the limits, contingencies and incongruities that shape or hinder the diffusion of cross-national and cross-temporal rules, norms and institutions. In looking at the policy cycle, the process of policy learning focuses predominantly on the organizational environment, the modes of learning, and the implementation effects, without acknowledging the normative implications in terms of accountability and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the main temporal factors impacting on the European Commission and sheds light on its particular relationship to time. By way of illustration, it discusses two relatively recent, but increasingly significant, features of the Commission's work: its planning and programming cycle and its use of impact assessments. These two techniques are at the core of the Commission's quest for exemplary management and of its endeavour to promote 'better regulation' principles. Taken together, they can transform EU policy-making and bring about a greater predictability and transparency of EU action. They cannot, however, fully capture the more political and discretionary role of the Commission, which must adapt to a diverse and changing EU agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the umbrella of Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD), the EU provides equipment and infrastructure to the armed forces of partner countries. The 2017 reform of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) to implement CBSD represents a remarkable integrative step at the interface of EU security and development policy. This article explains the IcSP reform through a neofunctionalist lens. It argues that the extension of the Commission's competences in EU security affairs can be explained by the interaction of functional and cultivated spillover pressures. Functional discrepancies between the CSDP framework and EU development policy created strong pressures for further integrative steps. Moreover, the Commission exerted strong pressures for adopting its proposal for implementing CBSD through the IcSP by drawing on a combination of strategic coalition-building, bargaining tactics and community framing. The case illustrates neofunctionalism's potential to explain external policy integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does media coverage of European Union (EU) politics affect the process of European integration? This contribution investigates the nature and logic of media coverage of EU affairs and identifies the news value criteria that underpin it. It subsequently confronts the key causal mechanisms and processes of grand theories of European integration with this media logic. This generates several key insights in which media impact the EU and European integration. Importantly, it functions to empower the intergovernmentalist nature of the EU, by providing a platform for member state governments, focusing on conflicts between them, reinforcing the primacy of national identity, and by amplifying the European Council as the main locus of EU decision-making. But media also create opportunities for new supranational entrepreneurship that is executive in nature, in policy fields where the EU has significant powers, facilitates action in public interest fields such as consumer policy and supports majoritarian rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While strong voices in the academic literature and real-world politics regard interest groups as biased representatives of the public, we know little about the scope and consequences of such biases for democratic governance. We conduct the first cross-national comparison of group and public preferences analyzing a new dataset of 50 issues in five West European countries. Despite the negative image of interest groups in politics, we find that their positions are in line with public opinion more than half the time. Moreover, while firms and business associations enjoy weaker support for their positions among citizens than public interest groups, they still enjoy the backing of a sizable share of the public. Additionally, we find no general pattern that communities with low interest group diversity are less likely to represent public opinion. Our findings have implications for democratic governance and discussions of how to conceptualize and measure biases in interest representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A decade ago parties were largely absent from research on and theories of EU politics. The role of parties is now a central part of the research agenda, particularly in the area of EU legislative politics. The new research on parties in EU politics has made significant theoretical contributions, led to the collection and dissemination of new datasets, and employs some of the most advanced statistical methods in contemporary European political science. What is still missing, however, is a general theory of the role and impact of political parties, which helps to explain actors' behaviour in EU politics in a range of situations. This paper sketches some of the basic elements of what might be called a 'partisan theory of EU politics', starting from a discussion of how the policy and office incentives of national parties are shaped by the EU's 'upside-down polity'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europe's 'political space', its dimensionality and its impact on European policies have received increased academic attention lately. Yet, one very basic element of this political space, the party composition of EU member states' governments, has never been studied in a systematic way in the rich literature on European integration. In this paper we explain why the EU literature should pay more attention to the analysis of Europe's party-political 'centre of gravity'. We give a systematic overview of the party composition of member governments from 1957 to 2003. This includes analyses of how the support for integration, the left/right political conviction, and the ideological homogeneity or heterogeneity of the member states affected the Council over the course of time. We draw on expert surveys, the data of the Comparative Manifesto Project, and data about government composition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing body of research on the impact of the electoral system ‘ballot structure’ on the behaviour of politicians. We offer a clear, ordinal and rules-based three-way coding (closed, flexible, open) of the electoral systems used in European Parliament elections, taking into account both the ballot type and the intra-party seat-allocation rules. For the notoriously difficult group of flexible list-systems, we show how these operated in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections, and introduce an additional behavioural distinction between ‘weakly flexible’ and ‘strongly flexible’ subtypes at the party-list-level. We then illustrate how the type of ballot used in an election can influence individual policy representation by looking at the vote-splits between Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the European People’s Party in a vote on tackling homophobia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically analyses whether 'Futurum', the online discussion forum linked to the Convention on the Future of Europe, constituted a public sphere - and, if so, what kind. Although the debates were discursive and had an institutional context, they were not filtered into the convention process and had an unrepresentative group of participants and thus they sit ill at ease with established conceptualizations of the public sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper summarizes the state of affairs regarding formal and quantitative studies on decision-making in the Council of the European Union. We compare recent empirical studies in the field and distinguish between work that utilizes actors' ideal preferences, their revealed positions in the bargaining process, and their subsequent voting records in the area of EU legislative politics. We argue that document analysis remains an underemployed tool that could help formal modellers in confronting their theories with quantitative empirical information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This concluding paper sets the special issue in the broader context of literature on Europeanization. I consider what sort of empirical picture emerges from the issue and other literature, and highlight some puzzles in domestic politics to which that portrayal directs our attention. We see disjunctures between the EU's policy importance and low political mobilization around it, between general demobilization and bursts of activity around referenda, and between variation in citizens' views of the EU and little variation in mainstream political parties' programs. Then I consider the main ways in which Europeanization scholars explain these puzzles. I argue very briefly for an analysis that stresses the cross-cutting nature of pro- and anti-EU views in French (and other countries') politics, which leads to reactions from political parties to muffle internal dissent. To conclude I modestly extend this analysis to hypothesize a little-noticed mechanism of indirect EU effects on national politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France's resistance to CAP reform has widely been attributed to the weakness of the state vis-à-vis organized farm interests. This paper argues that weak state theories overstate the role of administrative centralization and the organizational capabilities of farm groups and underestimate the role of ideas and of European politics in determining the transformative capacity of the French state. This argument is based on the observation that farm conservatism has persisted in the last two decades in spite of the growing autonomy of the French state vis-à-vis farm client groups. This article argues that we must pay more attention to the way European policy-making impinges upon the resources of the state and the organizational cohesion of farm groups and how the ideas held by domestic reform entrepreneurs determine their ability to win EU support for their blueprint and harness much-needed resources for carrying them out in the face of vested interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I take issue with the services directive, commenting on the article by Nicolaïdis and Schmidt (2007). Unrestrained services trade, I argue, would broaden competition and benefit Central Eastern and Western Europe alike, in the presence of compensating factors or in the long run. Despite the welfare-enhancing effects, the services directive did not succeed in realizing the home-country principle. Instead the host-country retains its rights with regard to freedom of establishment, to posted workers and to self-employed persons temporarily crossing European borders. For employees, moreover, abolishing the host-country rule was never considered. I explain this result drawing on Machiavelli's, Rawls' and Olson's insight that numerically few losers can successfully oppose benefits for the whole economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]