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The present paper is an exploratory study of the anchoring bias among individuals with autism. Anchoring bias is one of the most robust choice heuristics. The anchoring bias is measured and compared among adults with autism and age‐, gender‐, and education level‐matched, neurotypical controls. The study differentiates between high and low anchors. Results show that individuals with autism are generally equally susceptible to the anchoring bias as neurotypical individuals in judgment and decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Choice blindness is the finding that participants both often fail to notice mismatches between their decisions and the outcome of their choice and, in addition, endorse the opposite of their chosen alternative. But do these preference reversals also carry over to future choices and ratings? To investigate this question, we gave participants the task of choosing which of a pair of faces they found most attractive. Unknown to them, we sometimes used a card trick to exchange one face for the other. Both decision theory and common sense strongly suggest that most people would easily notice such a radical change in the outcome of a choice. But that was not the case: no more than a third of the exchanges were detected by the participants. We also included a second round of choices using the same face pairs, and two stages of post-choice attractiveness ratings of the faces. This way we were able to measure preference strength both as choice consistency and by looking at measures of rating differences between chosen and rejected options. We found that the initially rejected faces were chosen more frequently in the second choice, and the perceived attractiveness of these faces was increased even in uncoupled individual ratings at the end of the experiment. This result is discussed in relation to Chen and Risen's recent criticism of the Free Choice Paradigm, as it shows that choices can affect future preferences. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The seven papers in this special issue represent the breadth and complexity of approaches to the study of affect in judgment and decision processes. Four papers examine the role of arousal or specific emotions in decision making. The three other papers investigate the impacts of uncertainty, time course, and thinking about mood. We briefly describe four functions of affect in decision making (affect as information, as a spotlight, as a motivator, and as common currency) and relate them to the seven special-issue papers. The role of affect in decisions and decision processes is quite nuanced and deserves careful empirical study in basic and applied research. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Behavioral Decision Making is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The study of multi‐cue judgment investigates how decision makers aggregate cues to predict the value of a criterion variable. We consider a multi‐cue judgment task in which decision makers have prior knowledge of inter‐cue relationships but are ignorant of how the cues correlate with the criterion. In this setting, a naive judgment strategy prescribes weighting the cues equally. Although many participants are well described via an equal weighting scheme, we find that a substantial minority of participants make predictions consistent with a weighting scheme based on a low‐dimensional projection of the cue space that optimally takes into account inter‐cue correlations. The use of such a weighting scheme is consistent with minimizing maximal error in prediction when the cue‐criterion relationships are unknown. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Rubinstein and Leland have both demonstrated that many observed violations of expected and discounted utility can be explained if people employ similarity judgments to make choices. In this paper, I show that this decision process also explains which equilibria will be selected in single-shot games with multiple equilibria and implies that play in games will be associated with anomalies in risky choice. Data supporting these predictions are presented. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Research has demonstrated that individual differences in numeracy may have important consequences for decision making. In the present paper, we develop a shorter, psychometrically improved measure of numeracy-the ability to understand, manipulate, and use numerical information, including probabilities. Across two large independent samples that varied widely in age and educational level, participants completed 18 items from existing numeracy measures. In Study 1, we conducted a Rasch analysis on the item pool and created an eight-item numeracy scale that assesses a broader range of difficulty than previous scales. In Study 2, we replicated this eight-item scale in a separate Rasch analysis using data from an independent sample. We also found that the new Rasch-based numeracy scale, compared with previous measures, could predict decision-making preferences obtained in past studies, supporting its predictive validity. In Study, 3, we further established the predictive validity of the Rasch-based numeracy scale. Specifically, we examined the associations between numeracy and risk judgments, compared with previous scales. Overall, we found that the Rasch-based scale was a better linear predictor of risk judgments than prior measures. Moreover, this study is the first to present the psychometric properties of several popular numeracy measures across a diverse sample of ages and educational level. We discuss the usefulness and the advantages of the new scale, which we feel can be used in a wide range of subject populations, allowing for a more clear understanding of how numeracy is associated with decision processes. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper the Brunswikian framework provided by the theory of Probabilistic Mental Models (PMM), and other theoretical stances inspired by probabilistic functionalism, is combined with the Thurstonian notion of a stochastic component of judgment. We review data from 25 tasks with representative selection of items collected in our laboratory. Over/underconfidence is close to zero in most domains, but there is a moderate hard-easy effect across task domains that is inconsistent with the original assumptions of the Brunswikian framework. The binomial model modifies PMM-theory by allowing for sampling error in the process of learning the ecological probabilities and the response-error model takes error in the process of overt probability assessment into account. Both models predict a moderate hard-easy effect across task environments that differ in difficulty or predictability, but it is also demonstrated that the two interpretations of random error lead to different predictions. The response error model predicts format dependence, with more overconfidence in full-range than in half-range assessment, and the phenomenon is illustrated with empirical data. It is proposed that a model that combines the Brunswikiati fratnework with both sampling error and response error captures many of the important phenomena in the calibration literature. For illustrative purposes, a combined model with four parameters is fitted to empirical data suggesting good fit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines two dimensions of concurrent verbal protocol validity. First, whether verbalization affects process and outcome (reactivity) was examined by comparing concurrent verbal protocol traces with those from a computer search process tracing method, the latter being a complete trace of information acquisition from experimental materials. Earlier findings that verbalization affects time were confirmed. However, verbalization did not affect amount and pattern of acquisition or accuracy of judgments. Second, whether concurrent verbal protocols are complete was examined by comparing concurrent verbal protocol and computer traces that were simultaneously obtained in a treatment in which subjects verbalized as they acquired information from the computer. The verbal traces less completely captured information acquisition behavior than computer search. This suggests that, although concurrent verbal protocols provide greater insight into decision behavior than computer search, the latter is a more reliable information-acquisition trace. Thus, if information acquisition is of primary interest and if computer search activities can be naturally integrated into performing the primary task, computer search is preferred to concurrent verbal protocols. However, if information use or retrieval from long-term memory is of primary interest, concurrent verbal protocols are preferred to computer search. Finally, this paper examined whether the simultaneous use of concurrent verbal protocols and computer search provides traces of information acquisition and use that are as complete as when each method is independently applied. Although computer search tended to limit subjects' verbalizations of evaluative operators, this effect may be eliminated by practice on the computer prior to collecting data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge a conjunctive statement B-and-A to be more probable than a constituent B, in contrast to the law of probability that P(B ∧ A) cannot exceed P(B) or P(A). Researchers see this fallacy as demonstrating that people do not follow probability theory when judging conjunctive probability. This paper shows that the conjunction fallacy can be explained by the standard probability theory equation for conjunction if we assume random variation in the constituent probabilities used in that equation. The mathematical structure of this equation is such that random variation will be most likely to produce the fallacy when one constituent has high probability and the other low, when there is positive conditional support between the constituents, when there are two rather than three constituents, and when people rank probabilities rather than give numerical estimates. The conjunction fallacy has been found to occur most frequently in exactly these situations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge a conjunction B-and-A as more probable than a constituent B, contrary to probability theory's ‘conjunction rule’ that a conjunction cannot be more probable than either constituent. Many studies have demonstrated this fallacy in people's reasoning about various experimental materials. Gigerenzer objects that from a ‘frequentist’ standpoint probability theory is not valid for these materials, and so failure to follow the conjunction rule is not a fallacy. This paper describes three experiments showing that the conjunction fallacy occurs as consistently for conjunctions where frequentist probability theory is valid (conjunctions of everyday weather events) as for other conjunctions. These experiments also demonstrate a reliable correlation between the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy and the disjunction fallacy (which arises when a disjunction B-or-A is judged less probable than a constituent B). This supports a probability theory + random variation account of probabilistic reasoning. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Identifying discrepancies between normative prescriptions and actual behavior constitutes an important facet of studying judgment and decision making. Notwithstanding, alleged normative violations should be submitted to the most stringent tests before their existence is recognized. The present paper centers on participants' understanding of instructions and comprehension of the experimental task. As an example, we examine the “uncertainty effect” which, supposedly, violates canonical requirements of the theory of rational choice. Following this effect, people often value a lottery less than its worst possible realization, due to the uncertainty associated with the lottery. We empirically demonstrate that Gneezy et al.'s instructions were ambiguous. We show that only participants who miscomprehended the instructions exhibited a response pattern consistent with the uncertainty effect. Removing the ambiguity results in the elimination of the effect. Broader implications for the judgment and decision making literature are briefly discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although many researchers use Wagenaar's framework for understanding the factors that people use to determine whether a process is random, the framework has never undergone empirical scrutiny. This paper uses Wagenaar's framework as a starting point and examines the three properties of his framework—independence of events, fixed alternatives, and equiprobability. We find strong evidence to suggest that independence of events is indeed used as a cue toward randomness. Equiprobability has an effect on randomness judgments. However, it appears to work only in a limited role. Fixedness of alternatives is a complex construct that consists of multiple sub-concepts. We find that each of these sub-concepts influences randomness judgments, but that they exert forces in different directions. Stability of outcome ratios increases randomness judgments, while knowledge of outcome ratios decreases randomness judgments. Future directions for development of a functional framework for understanding perceptions of randomness are suggested. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports on the role of error in confidence judgment. It presents an outline of the problem with technical approach to separating error from real confidence. When applied to confidence judgment data, such a procedure will happily remove overconfidence effects regardless of their source. Their procedure gives unrealistically large estimates of the extent of such error and can lead to erroneous conclusions which cannot be used to support such arguments as there being little or no evidence for an information-processing bias in human judgment.

This paper reviews the impact of anger on judgment and decision making. Section I proposes that anger merits special attention in the study of judgment and decision making because the effects of anger often diverge from those of other negative emotions. Section II presents an Appraisal-Tendency Framework for predicting and organizing such effects. Section III reviews empirical evidence for the uniqueness of anger's relations to judgment and decision making. Section IV connects the Appraisal-Tendency Framework to associated mechanisms and theories. Drawing on the evidence, Section V presents the question of whether anger should be considered a positive emotion. It also proposes the hypothesis that anger will be experienced as relatively unpleasant and unrewarding when reflecting back on the source of one's anger but experienced as relatively pleasant and rewarding when looking forward. Section VI synthesizes the evidence into a new portrait of the angry decision maker. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper concerns the evaluation and combination of subjective probability estimates for categorical events. We argue that the appropriate criterion for evaluating individual and combined estimates depends on the type of uncertainty the decision maker seeks to represent, which in turn depends on his or her model of the event space. Decision makers require accurate estimates in the presence of aleatory uncertainty about exchangeable events, diagnostic estimates given epistemic uncertainty about unique events, and some combination of the two when the events are not necessarily unique, but the best equivalence class definition for exchangeable events is not apparent. Following a brief review of the mathematical and empirical literature on combining judgments, we present an approach to the topic that derives from (1) a weak cognitive model of the individual that assumes subjective estimates are a function of underlying judgment perturbed by random error and (2) a classification of judgment contexts in terms of the underlying information structure. In support of our developments, we present new analyses of two sets of subjective probability estimates, one of exchangeable and the other of unique events. As predicted, mean estimates were more accurate than the individual values in the first case and more diagnostic in the second. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu (1994) demonstrated that over- and underconfidence can be observed simultaneously in judgment studies, as a function of the method used to analyze the data. They proposed a general model to account for this apparent paradox, which assumes that overt responses represent true judgments perturbed by random error. To illustrate that the model reproduces the pattern of results, they assumed perfectly calibrated true opinions and a particular form (log-odds plus normally distributed error) of the model to simulate data from the full-range paradigm. In this paper we generalize these results by showing that they can be obtained with other instantiations of the same general model (using the binomial error distribution), and that they apply to the half-range paradigm as well. These results illustrate the robustness and generality of the model. They emphasize the need for new methodological approaches to determine whether observed patterns of over- or underconfidence represent real effects or are primarily statistical artifacts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu (1994) and Budescu, Erev, and Wallsten (1997) demonstrated that over- and underconfidence often observed in judgment studies may be due, in part, to the presence of random error and its effects on the analysis of the judgments. To illustrate this fact they showed that a general model that assumes that overt responses representing (perfectly calibrated) true judgments perturbed by random error can replicate typical patterns observed in empirical studies. In this paper we provide a method for determining whether apparent overconfidence In empirical data reflects a systematic bias in judgment or is an artifact due solely to the presence of error. The approach is based, in part, on the Wallsten and Gonzalez-Vailejo (1994) Stochastic Judgment Model (SJM). The new method is described in detail and is used to analyze results from a new study. The analysis indicates a clear overconfidence effect, above and beyond the level predicted by a model assuming perfect calibration perturbed by random error. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effect of uncertainty and inconsistency on the judgment of human performance. The results indicate that the effect of inconsistency on judgment is not mediated by subjective uncertainty. We find that both the level and the extremity of judgment decrease with uncertainty. These effects are explained, respectively, by uncertainty aversion and by regressiveness. We also find that both the level and the extremity of judgment of human performance increase with inconsistency. These effects are explained by reliance on integration rules in which judgment is based primarily on some aspects of the information, while other aspects are, to some extent, ignored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stressful situations hinder judgement. Effects of stress induced by anticipated public speaking on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) were examined. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was used to examine the relationship between reflective thinking and IGT performance. The stress manipulation increased blood pressure and was associated with poorer IGT and CRT performance. Stressed participants were slower to avoid the disadvantageous decks. Moreover, CRT scores correlated with optimal deck selections indicating the importance of reflective thinking for good performance on the IGT. These correlations were observed in relatively early trials, which challenges the view that analytic thinking is not important when card contingencies are being learned. Data revealed that IGT performance in healthy individuals is not always optimal; stress levels impair performance. A mediation analysis was consistent with the proposal that the stress manipulation reduced IGT performance by impeding reflective thinking. Thus, reflective processing is an important explanation of IGT performance in healthy populations. It was concluded that more reflective participants appear to learn from the outcomes of their decisions even when stressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Offers perspectives on overconfidence phenomenon in the studies of probabilistic judgment and decision making. Theoretical proposals addressing the source of confidence judgments; Manifestations of underconfidence evident in the judgment literature; Distinction between the accuracy of probability estimates and the diagnosticity of estimates.

The article focuses on expert clinical judgment and decision making that illuminates some of the strengths and problems of naturalistic decision making (NDM). It also has striking similarities to findings with other groups of experts. Researchers from psychology who became interested in medical judgment, problem solving and decision making were motivated initially by educational considerations. Medical practice is a highly skilled set of cognitive and motor acts that are learned by a combination of didactic teaching and repeated practice with feedback. The clinical decisions studied by applying concepts and principles of behavioral decision theory, classical decision theory, and social judgment theory have typically been situations where practice variation abounds. One choice might be better than others, but none qualifies as a disaster or terrible mistake.

ABSTRACT Despite ample evidence that numeracy is an important influence on patient understanding and use of health-related information, there is a dearth of studies examining the concept's relationship to other individual differences measures that may underlie complex judgments in the health domain. In this study, we compared the relative contributions of selected extant numeracy measures and general intelligence and other measures to varied judgment and decision-making outcomes. Two hundred participants completed numeracy items, subscales of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales, the need for cognition scale, and four relevant outcome measures including risk estimation and medical data interpretation. A numeracy scale constructed using item response and confirmatory factor analyses was consistently the strongest predictor across all outcome measures and accounted for unique variance over and above general intelligence. The results support the concept of numeracy as an independent construct that merits consideration in patient communication. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Attitudes toward four types of decision-making strategies-clinical/fully rational, clinical/heuristic, actuarial/fully rational, and actuarial/heuristic-were examined across three studies. In Study 1, undergraduate students were split randomly between legal and medical decision-making scenarios and asked to rate each strategy in terms of the following: (i) preference; (ii) accuracy; (iii) fairness; (iv) ethicalness; and (v) its perceived similarity to the strategies used by actual legal and medical professionals to make decisions. Studies 2 and 3 extended Study 1 by using a more relevant scenario and a community sample, respectively. Across the three studies, the clinical/fully rational strategy tended to be rated the highest across all attitudinal judgments, whereas the actuarial/heuristic strategy tended to receive the lowest ratings. Considering the two strategy-differentiating factors separately, clinically based strategies tended to be rated higher than actuarially based strategies, and fully rational strategies were always rated higher than heuristic-based strategies. The potential implications of the results for professionals' and those affected by their decisions are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three studies explored both the advantages of and subjects' preferences for a disaggregated judgment procedure and a holistic one. The task in our first two studies consisted of evaluating colleges; the third study asked participants to evaluate job applicants. Holistic ratings consisted of providing an overall evaluation while considering all of the characteristics of the evaluation objects; disaggregated ratings consisted of evaluating each cue independently. Participants also made paired comparisons of the evaluation objects. We constructed preference orders for the disaggregated method by aggregating these ratings (unweighted or weighted characteristics). To compare the holistic, disaggregated, and weighted-disaggregated method we regressed the four cues on the participant's holistic rating, on the linearly aggregated disaggregated ratings, and on the average weighted disaggregated rating, using the participant's “importance points” for each cue as weights. Both types of combined disaggregated ratings related more closely to the cues in terms of proportion of variance accounted for in Experiments 1 and 2. In addition, the disaggregated ratings were more closely related to the paired-comparison orderings, but Experiment 2 showed that this was true for a small set (10) but not a large set (60) of evaluation objects. Experiment 3 tested the “gamesmanship” hypothesis: People prefer holistic ratings because it is easier to incorporate illegitimate but appealing criteria into one's judgment. The results suggested that the disaggregated procedure generally produced sharper distinctions between the most relevant and least relevant cues. Participants in all three of these studies preferred the holistic ratings despite their statistical inferiority. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explored the potential for a sunk-cost effect in the realm of time. Questionnaire studies (Experiments 1–4) obtained a sunk-time effect that was robust to manipulations of prospective value, individual versus group consequences, and the effort or enjoyment inherent in the time. Behavioral experiments (Experiments 5–7) also suggested a sunk-time effect and found support for a personal responsibility by sunk-cost interaction on choice behavior. We discuss theoretical implications and a potential connection to animal sunk-cost phenomena. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In four studies, student and nonstudent participants evaluated the possible outcomes of binary decisions involving health, safety, and environmental risks (e.g., whether to issue a dam-failure evacuation order). Many participants indicated that false positives (e.g., evacuation, but no dam failure) were better than true negatives (e.g., no evacuation and no dam failure), thereby implying that the more protective action dominated the less protective action. A common rationale for this response pattern was the precautionary maxim “better safe than sorry.” Participants apparently evaluated outcomes partly on the basis of the decisions that might lead to them, in conflict with consequentialist decision models. Consistent with this explanation, the prevalence of implied dominance decreased substantially when the emphasis on decisions was reduced. These results demonstrate that an initial preference for a decision alternative can alter the evaluation of possible consequences of both the preferred alternative and a competing alternative, suggesting positive feedback loops that reinforce the initial preference. The rationality of considering the decision itself as an attribute of possible outcomes is discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that preferences depend on the attributes that can be directly manipulated when people need to integrate multiple sources of information because direct manipulation causes focusing bias. This effect appears even when all relevant information is simultaneously and explicitly presented at the time the decisions are made. Participants decided how much to save, what investment risk to take and observed the future financial consequences in terms of the mean and variability of the expected retirement income. Participants who manipulated only the future income distribution saved more and took less risk. This effect disappears when the risk-related variables are removed, which indicates that task complexity is a mediator of such focusing effects. A more balanced trade-off between the choice attributes was selected when all attributes were manipulated. However, when there is a dichotomy between manipulating versus observing choice attributes, then decisions were based mostly on the manipulated attributes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the social importance of decisions taken in the “heat of the moment,” very little research has examined the effect of sexual arousal on judgment and decision making. Here we examine the effect of sexual arousal, induced by self-stimulation, on judgments and hypothetical decisions made by male college students. Students were assigned to be in either a state of sexual arousal or a neutral state and were asked to: (1) indicate how appealing they find a wide range of sexual stimuli and activities, (2) report their willingness to engage in morally questionable behavior in order to obtain sexual gratification, and (3) describe their willingness to engage in unsafe sex when sexually aroused. The results show that sexual arousal had a strong impact on all three areas of judgment and decision making, demonstrating the importance of situational forces on preferences, as well as subjects' inability to predict these influences on their own behavior. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two experiments tested the influence of three task factors on respondents' tendency to use normative, heuristic, and random approaches to making likelihood judgments about polychotomous cases (i.e., cases in which there is more than one alternative to a focal hypothesis). Participants estimated their likelihood of winning hypothetical raffles in which they and other players held various numbers of tickets. Responding on non-numeric scales (vs. numeric ones) and responding under time pressure (vs. self-paced) increased participants' use of a comparison-heuristic approach, resulting in non-normative judgment patterns. A manipulation of evidence representation (whether ticket quantities were represented by numbers or more graphically by bars) did not have reliably detectable effects on processing approaches to likelihood judgment. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for the further development of likelihood judgment theories, and they discuss parallels between contingent processing in choice and contingent processing in likelihood judgment. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that people's overconfidence in the quality of their intuitive judgment strategies contributes to their reluctance to use helpful actuarial judgment aids. Participants engaged in a judgment task that required them to use five cues to decide whether a prospective juror favored physician-assisted suicide. Participants had the opportunity to examine the judgments of a statistical equation that correctly classified 77% of the prospective jurors. In all experiments, participants infrequently examined the equation, performed worse than the equation, and were highly overconfident. In Experiments 1 and 2, outcome feedback and calibration feedback failed to reduce overconfidence. In Experiment 3, enhanced calibration feedback reduced overconfidence and increased reliance on the equation, thus leading to improved judgment performance. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Teigen and Brun have suggested that distinct from their numerical implications, most probability phrases are either positive or negative, in that they encourage one to think of reasons why the target event will or will not occur. We report two experiments testing our hypotheses that (a) the direction of a phrase can be predicted from properties of its membership function, and (b) this relation is invariant across contexts, and (c) —originally formulated by Teigen and Brun (1999)—that strong modifiers intensify phrase directionality. For each phrase, participants encoded membership functions by judging the degree to which it described the numerical probabilities 0.0, 0.1, ..., 1.0, and also completed sentences including the target phrase. The types of reasons given in the sentence completion task were used to determine the phrase's directionality. The results support our hypotheses (a) and (b) regarding the relation between directionality and the membership functions, but we found only limited support for hypothesis (c) regarding the effects of modifiers on directionality. A secondary goal, to validate an efficient method of encoding membership functions, was also achieved. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent decision-making research claims to establish that, in violation of Savage's normative sure-thing principle, individuals often wait to acquire noninstrumental information and subsequently base their decisions upon this information. The current research suggests that characterizing individuals as pursuing noninstrumental or useless information may be overstated. Through a series of experiments we establish, first, that many people choose to wait, even when waiting provides no additional information at all. Second, the longer people are allowed to wait before having to decide, the more people prefer to wait rather than decide immediately. Third, those individuals who choose to wait are the ones less confident about committing themselves to a decision. For them, the benefit from waiting may be especially valuable by allowing them to come to terms with a less-than-ideal decision. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a procedure for subconscious priming of risk attitudes. In Experiment 1, we were reliably able to induce risk-seeking or risk-averse preferences across a range of decision scenarios using this priming procedure. In Experiment 2, we showed that these priming effects can be reversed by drawing participants' attention to the priming event. Our results support claims that the formation of risk preferences can be based on preconscious processing, as for example postulated by the affective primacy hypothesis, rather than rely on deliberative mental operations, as posited by several current models of judgment and decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The hypothesis that the physical size of an object can influence aesthetic preferences was investigated. In a series of four experiments, participants were presented with pairs of abstract stimuli and asked to indicate which member of each pair they preferred. A preference for larger stimuli was found on the majority of trials using various types of stimuli, stimuli of various sizes, and with both adult and 3-year-old participants. This preference pattern was disrupted only when participants had both stimuli that provided a readily accessible alternative source of preference-evoking information and sufficient attentional resources to make their preference judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Time series found in areas such as marketing and sales often have regular established patterns which are occasionally affected by exogenous influences, such as sales promotions. While statistical forecasting methods are adept at extrapolating- regular patterns in series, judgmental forecasters have a potential advantage in that they can take into account the effect of these external influences, which may occur too infrequently for reliable statistical estimation. This suggests that a combination of statistical method and judgment is appropriate. An experiment was conducted to examine how judgmental forecasters make use of statistical time series forecasts when series are subject to sporadic special events. This was investigated under different conditions which were created by varying the complexity of the time series signal, the level of noise in the series, the salience of the cue, the predictive power of the cue information and the availability and presentation of the statistical forecast. Although the availability of a statistical forecast improved judgment under some conditions, the use the judgmental forecasters made of these forecasts was far from optimal. They changed the statistical forecasts when they were highly reliable and ignored them when they would have formed an ideal base-line for adjustment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sequential processing of evidence may lead to recency effect, a potential bias in judgment. The present research seeks to extend the literature on recency effects by assessing the potential moderating influence of team work: whether group decision making moderates the severity of recency effects predicted by Hogarth and Einhorn (1992), and whether group processing influences the accuracy of, and confidence in memory for evidence. Experienced auditors from a Big-6 accounting firm made audit judgments, either individually or as groups. They were randomly assigned to one of two levels of evidence presentation order. After performing the judgment task, participants completed two evidence recognition tests. Consistent with prior findings, recency effects on judgments were observed, but only for individuals. Group judgments or audit reports were not affected by recency. Order effects, however, did not translate into different choices of audit reports, and did not persist in memories of either individuals or groups. As expected, group memory was more accurate than individual memory and groups were more confident than individuals. Overall, confidence in accurate memories was greater than in inaccurate ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Offers perspectives on the calibration of probability judgments and decision making. Main criteria by which probability judgment could be assessed and evaluated; Problems that have been raised with regard to research on calibration; Difficulties associated with the concept of a relevant reference set.

Consider two judgment procedures for selecting an answer from a set of multiple alternatives. One could answer a question either by including likely alternatives from the initial set of alternatives or by eliminating the least likely alternatives from that same initial set. An interesting question is whether the two judgment processes are equivalent and yield the same final selection. The results from two studies indicate that Individuals generate significantly larger sets of candidates in an elimination process than in an inclusion process, with concurrent increase in accuracy. We show that this finding is a logical consequence of the non-complementarity of elimination and inclusion, and suggest a screening model with two criteria to explain the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We report three experiments comparing confidence judgments made by actors and by observers. In Experiment 1, actors generated qualitative answers (countries of the world) in a country-identification task: in Experiment 2, actors generated quantitative answers (years) in a historical event-dating task. Both actors and observers indicated their confidence in the actors' answers. Actors were significantly less confident in their answers than were observers in the first experiment. This effect was substantially reduced in the second experiment, whether confidence was measured by judged probability or by credible interval width. Experiment 3 used a control task in which actors attempted to bring an outcome variable into a desired range. In contrast to the first two experiments, actors in the control task were more confident than observers. Because subjects were generally overconfident in all three experiments, the present results demonstrate that the use of observers can reduce or exacerbate overconfidence depending on the kind of task and the nature of the event or possibility under evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas probabilistic calibration has been a central normative concept of accuracy in previous research on interval estimates, we suggest here that normative approaches for the evaluation of judgmental estimates should consider the communicative interaction between the individuals who produce the judgments and those who receive or use them for making decisions. We analyze precision and error in judgment and consider the role of the accuracy-informativeness trade-off (Yaniv and Foster, 1995) in the communication of estimates. The results shed light on puzzling findings reported earlier in the literature concerning the calibration of subjective confidence intervals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A study was conducted to examine the factorial validity of the Flinders Decision Making Questionnaire (Mann, 1982), a 31-item self-report inventory designed to measure tendencies to use three major coping patterns identified in the conflict theory of decision making (Janis and Mann, 1977): vigilance, hypervigilance, and defensive avoidance (procrastination, buck-passing, and rationalization). A sample of 2051 university students, comprising samples from Australia (n = 262), New Zealand (n = 260), the USA (n = 475), Japan (n = 359), Hong Kong (n = 281) and Taiwan (n = 414) was administered the DMQ. Factorial validity of the instrument was tested by confirmatory factor analysis with LISREL. Five different substantive models, representing different structural relationships between the decision-coping patterns had unsatisfactory fit to the data and could not be validated. A shortened instrument, containing 22 items, yielded a revised model comprising four identifiable factors -- vigilance, hyper-vigilance, buck-passing, and procrastination. The revised model had adequate fit with data for each country sample and for the total sample, and was confirmed. It is recommended that the 22-item instrument, named the Melbourne DMQ, replace the Flinders DMQ for measurement of decision-coping patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anchoring and adjustment is a pervasive bias in which decision makers are influenced by random or uninformative numbers or starting points. As a means of understanding this effect, we explore two limits on anchoring. In Experiments 1 and 2, implausibly extreme anchors had a proportionally smaller effect than anchors close to the expected value of the lotteries evaluated. In Experiments 2 and 3, anchoring occurred only if the anchor and preference judgment were expressed on the same scale. Incompatible anchors and response modes resulted in no anchoring bias. A confirmatory search mechanism is proposed to account for these results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study examines the relative merits of a noncompatibility and a restructuring explanation of the recurrent empirical finding that a prominent attribute looms larger in choices than in judgments. Pairs of equally attractive options were presented to 72 undergraduates who were assigned to six conditions in which they performed (1) only preference judgments or choices, (2) preference judgments or choices preceded by judgments of attractiveness of attribute levels, or (3) preference judgments or choices accompanied by think-aloud reports. The results replicated the prominence effect for choices, but a prominence effect was also found for preference judgments. In accordance with the restructuring explanation, the think-aloud protocols indicated that options were more often restructured in choices than in preference judgments. However, restructuring could not explain the prominence effect observed for preference judgments. A modified compatibility hypothesis is offered as an alternative explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study investigates the visual salience of information in making differential predictions for alpha-numeric versus graphic displays in consumer decision making. The experiment partially supports predictions that with alpha-numeric displays, information is acquired in correspondence with the importance weights of the attributes, whereas under graphic conditions, information is acquired in correspondence with the visual salience of the attributes. The information display form appears to have some effect not only on the temporal order in which information on attributes is acquired, but also on the relative attention given to information on attributes during the early phases of decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the art of making decisions with limited time, knowledge, and other resources. The study of bounded rationality is accordingly the analysis of the heuristics people use, the analysis of the structures of environments in which people make decisions, and the match between the two. Perhaps the most important feature of naturalistic decision making (NDM) is that it deals with real-world tasks rather than with the stock-in-trade of classical decision experiments, such as choice between hypothetical gambles. New clear and precise predictions will also become possible, rather than reliance on fuzzy constructs such as mental models and typicality judgments; in particular, greater precision can engender surprising predictions of the sort that can give the strongest support to NDM theories.

Argues against the comments of Gordon F. Pitz of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale on a study by Ziva Kunda and Rasyid Sanitioso about motivation and judgment. Information on existing research on judgment; Methodology of the study by Kunda and Sanitioso; Discussion of the aggregation principle and its role in the study.

Comments on a study by Ziva Kunda and Rasyid Sanitioso on motivation and judgment. Summary of the study; Argument against the conclusion of Kunda and Sanitioso regarding the lack of motivational constructs in contemporary research in judgment; Basic assumption of the theory of motivation in relation to cost-benefit terms; Limitations of the study.