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The present paper is an exploratory study of the anchoring bias among individuals with autism. Anchoring bias is one of the most robust choice heuristics. The anchoring bias is measured and compared among adults with autism and age‐, gender‐, and education level‐matched, neurotypical controls. The study differentiates between high and low anchors. Results show that individuals with autism are generally equally susceptible to the anchoring bias as neurotypical individuals in judgment and decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research suggests that algorithms—based on artificial intelligence or linear regression models—make better predictions than humans in a wide range of domains. Several studies have examined the degree to which people use algorithms. However, these studies have been mostly cross‐sectional and thus have failed to address the dynamic nature of algorithm use. In the present paper, we examined algorithm use with a novel longitudinal approach outside the lab. Specifically, we conducted two ecological momentary assessment studies in which 401 participants made financial predictions for 18 days in two tasks. Relying on the judge‐advisor system framework, we examined how time interacted with advice source (human vs. algorithm) and advisor accuracy to predict advice taking. Our results showed that when the advice was inaccurate, people tended to use algorithm advice less than human advice across the period studied. Inaccurate algorithms were penalized logarithmically; the effect was initially strong but tended to fade over time. This suggests that first impressions are crucial and produce significant changes in advice taking at the beginning of the interaction, which later tends to stabilize as days go by. Therefore, inaccurate algorithms are more likely to accrue a negative reputation than inaccurate humans, even when having the same level of performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decision‐making competence is a skill that is associated with numerous positive life outcomes. Even though multiple cognitive abilities have been shown to predict decision‐making competence, few studies have incorporated a large test battery tapping into several cognitive abilities concurrently in the same models. The current paper presents a study that sought to investigate which cognitive abilities predicted overall decision‐making competence in adults using hierarchical regression analysis. A cognitive test battery, comprising abilities such as general intelligence, executive functions, numeracy, visuospatial ability, and time perception, was administered to 182 participants. Results indicate that both general intelligence, which was consistently the strongest predictor, and numeracy contributed independently to overall decision‐making competence. Executive functions did predict overall decision‐making competence, while all predictors were included in the models. A novel finding concerns the relationship between time perception and decision‐making competence. The complementary roles of these cognitive abilities are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is one of the most popular measures of individual differences in rational thought and decision making. To overcome the issue of overlap with numeracy, a novel measure of cognitive reflection less related to numeracy and math anxiety than Numerical CRT was developed—Verbal CRT. The present research had two main aims: first to investigate the generalizability of Verbal CRT in cultural contexts outside the United States/United Kingdom and second to test the factor structure linking traditional—numerical—CRT, Verbal CRT, numeracy, and fluid intelligence. In Studies 1a and 1b, we adapted and tested the validity and psychometric properties of Polish versions of tasks and scales. Next, using a large and diverse sample of Polish adults, we tested five models of the factor structure of cognitive abilities and thinking dispositions (Study 2). The most parsimonious and best‐fitted model contained three latent variables: Verbal CRT, numeracy (composed of the items from the Berlin Numeracy Test and traditional—numerical—CRT), and fluid intelligence. In line with previous research, our results show that Verbal CRT is a valid cognitive reflection measure that provides a clearer interpretation than traditional CRT, even in a different language and cultural context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context effects in decision making refer to any influence on options evaluation resulting from its relational properties with other available alternatives. Over the last 40 years, a large corpus of research showed that decision makers are sensitive to irrelevant options and tend to modify their preferences depending on choice architecture. The attraction effect is a well‐known example of context effect, which describes an increase in preferences for an option when a dominated alternative is inserted in the choice set. Sequential sampling models (SSM) interpret decision biases as the result of a dynamic comparative process between the available options that alters subjective values attribution. Recently, SSM received empirical support from eye‐tracking studies that documented a decoy‐dependent allocation of attention. In this study, we integrate previous process‐tracing results using a new hidden‐attribute protocol, in which decision makers have to explore products' attributes, keep in mind their values, and deliberately compare the options. This new methodology allows this study to offer additional evidence on the role of decoys in the dynamic process of choice. In a consumer‐choice task, the addition of an asymmetrically dominated decoy first focused the attention on the target during attributes exploration, which in turn led to an increase in the dominant option preferences at the choice stage. This suggests that adding irrelevant options affects the information sampling procedures, insofar as the comparative process is influenced by the dominance relationship of the alternatives. These results are consistent with past eye‐tracking studies and verify previous connectionist theories of the attraction effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies four attentional processes that increase efficiency and accuracy in repeated lexicographic tasks using an instructed strategy approach. We propose a framework to decompose attentional effort used to make a decision into four components: Orientation, Wrong Target, Duration, and Repetition. Orientation assesses attention to decision rules and the location of relevant information. Wrong Target measures wasted effort on unneeded information. Duration gauges time spent on each piece of needed information. Repetition measures the number of views on each relevant item. Greater Orientation is associated with lower effort in other components and increased accuracy. Repetition is most variable across individuals but generates the greatest improvement with practice. Duration is less affected by the other components and shows minimal improvement with experience. Finally, Wrong Target is similarly resistant to practice, but it is the only component strongly and positively associated with making errors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the same decision to act can occur in multiple contexts, how these contexts differentially influence behavior is not well understood. In this paper, we investigate whether contextual framing affects individuals' behavior in spatial decision making. Although previous research suggests that individuals' judgments are sensitive to contextual (and particularly moral) factors of a scenario, no work has addressed whether this effect extends to spatial decisions. To investigate the impact of context on perceptual sensorimotor behavior, we superimposed two moral dilemmas (which we call help and harm) on a spatial decision‐making paradigm. The basic task required participants select a target area while avoiding an overlapping nontarget area. Although the visuospatial task was constant, the moral context was changed when participants had to execute either a drone missile strike on enemies in the harm context or deliver ammunition to allies in the help context. Participants more strongly avoided losses in the harm context, reflected by a greater selection bias away from the nontarget (i.e., allies) on drone strike trials. These findings suggest that the contextual framing of a subjective perceived loss on a spatial decision can drive avoidant motor execution behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Choice blindness is the finding that participants both often fail to notice mismatches between their decisions and the outcome of their choice and, in addition, endorse the opposite of their chosen alternative. But do these preference reversals also carry over to future choices and ratings? To investigate this question, we gave participants the task of choosing which of a pair of faces they found most attractive. Unknown to them, we sometimes used a card trick to exchange one face for the other. Both decision theory and common sense strongly suggest that most people would easily notice such a radical change in the outcome of a choice. But that was not the case: no more than a third of the exchanges were detected by the participants. We also included a second round of choices using the same face pairs, and two stages of post-choice attractiveness ratings of the faces. This way we were able to measure preference strength both as choice consistency and by looking at measures of rating differences between chosen and rejected options. We found that the initially rejected faces were chosen more frequently in the second choice, and the perceived attractiveness of these faces was increased even in uncoupled individual ratings at the end of the experiment. This result is discussed in relation to Chen and Risen's recent criticism of the Free Choice Paradigm, as it shows that choices can affect future preferences. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies have investigated moral decision‐making by using moral dilemmas that involve a single decision. This article extends this paradigm, introducing two‐stage scenarios to examine how moral decision‐making is influenced by previous decisions in the same narrative—especially whether people tend to stay consistent or to reconsider within a morally challenging situation. It further compares decision‐making between two‐stage and one‐stage scenarios. In Study 1 (N = 239), participants read scenarios requiring two successive decisions of harming one person to spare multiple people (utilitarian action), or vice versa (deontological action), within the same narrative. Second decisions were mostly found to be consistent with first decisions. Remarkably, inconsistent responding (switching) was robustly observed in about 29% of cases. Study 2 (N = 63), using one‐stage scenarios, showed that having made a previous decision in the same narrative generally decreased utilitarian responding. Potential explanations for these phenomena are discussed. The present article concludes that prior choices within the same setting significantly influence decision‐making. It also reveals the potential of gaining new insights using multiple‐stage scenarios in moral decision‐making research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charitable giving entails the act of foregoing personal resources in order to improve the conditions of other people. In the present paper, we systematically examine two dimensions integral to donation decisions that have thus far received relatively little attention but can explain charitable behavior rather well: the perceptions of cost for the donor and benefit for the recipients. In line with current theories in judgment and decision making, we hypothesize that people weigh these dimensions subjectively and perceive them asymmetrically, consistent with prospect theory. Costs for the donor are typically perceived as losses, whereas benefits for recipients are perceived as gains. In four studies, we presented several scenarios to participants in which both donation amounts (costs) and number of lives helped (benefits) were manipulated while keeping the ratio of costs and benefits constant. Results from Studies 1 and 2 showed that willingness to help decreased as donation amounts and number of lives helped increased. Additionally, Studies 3 and 4 provide evidence for a solution to reduce the asymmetry and increase donation amounts as the number of lives at risk increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper, we provide a domain‐general scoping review of the nudge movement by reviewing 422 choice architecture interventions in 156 empirical studies. We report the distribution of the studies across countries, years, domains, subdomains of applicability, intervention types, and the moderators associated with each intervention category to review the current state of the nudge movement. Furthermore, we highlight certain characteristics of the studies and experimental and reporting practices that can hinder the accumulation of evidence in the field. Specifically, we found that 74% of the studies were mainly motivated to assess the effectiveness of the interventions in one specific setting, while only 24% of the studies focused on the exploration of moderators or underlying processes. We also observed that only 7% of the studies applied power analysis, 2% used guidelines aiming to improve the quality of reporting, no study in our database was preregistered, and the used intervention nomenclatures were non‐exhaustive and often have overlapping categories. Building on our current observations and proposed solutions from other fields, we provide directly applicable recommendations for future research to support the evidence accumulation on why and when nudges work. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper tests whether the dimensions involved in preferential choice tasks are evaluated independently from one another. Common decision heuristics satisfy dimensional independence, and multi‐strategy models that assume that decision makers use a repertoire of these heuristics predict that they are unable to represent and respond to dimensional dependencies in the decision environment. In contrast, some single‐strategy models are able to violate dimensional independence, and subsequently adapt to environments that feature interacting dimensions. Across five experiments, this paper documents systematic violations of the assumption of dimensional independence. This suggests that decision makers are able to modify their behavior to respond to dimensional dependencies in their environment, and in turn those models that are unable to do this do not provide a full account of human strategy selection and behavior change. This paper ends with a discussion of ways in which some existing models can be modified to incorporate violations of dimensional independence. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite abundant literature theorizing societal implications of algorithmic decision making, relatively little is known about the conditions that lead to the acceptance or rejection of algorithmically generated insights by individual users of decision aids. More specifically, recent findings of algorithm aversion—the reluctance of human forecasters to use superior but imperfect algorithms—raise questions about whether joint human‐algorithm decision making is feasible in practice. In this paper, we systematically review the topic of algorithm aversion as it appears in 61 peer‐reviewed articles between 1950 and 2018 and follow its conceptual trail across disciplines. We categorize and report on the proposed causes and solutions of algorithm aversion in five themes: expectations and expertise, decision autonomy, incentivization, cognitive compatibility, and divergent rationalities. Although each of the presented themes addresses distinct features of an algorithmic decision aid, human users of the decision aid, and/or the decision making environment, apparent interdependencies are highlighted. We conclude that resolving algorithm aversion requires an updated research program with an emphasis on theory integration. We provide a number of empirical questions that can be immediately carried forth by the behavioral decision making community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large body of research has found evidence that hiring decisions are frequently subject to strong gender bias and has explored factors that help to predict and prevent such a bias from occurring. In this paper, we explore a novel factor that has received only little attention: the composition of the choice set. Drawing on prior research on the attraction effect of decoys in consumer choice and personnel decisions, we posit that when decision makers need to decide whether to hire a male or a female applicant for a stereotypically male position, the presence of a third applicant whose profile is asymmetrically dominated by one of the two applicants can in many circumstances strongly increase the odds that the male applicant will be selected, but will not be beneficial for the female applicant. We test our hypotheses in five experimental studies with different designs, experimental settings, and participant pools—including managers with professional experience in hiring decisions. Our results provide robust evidence demonstrating the strong effects of choice set composition on the emergence of gender bias. In addition, we found that the presence of asymmetrically dominated applicants makes decision makers more confident in their biased decisions and more likely to implement them immediately without searching for further information. Finally, our results also provide some initial evidence that our results for stereotypically male positions will be reversed when hiring decisions are made for stereotypically female positions where the presence of decoys instead gives an advantage to female over male applicants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors promote or hinder volunteering within organizations and groups? This paper simultaneously explores the impact of individual, contextual, and sociocultural variables on decision making in a special type of social dilemma: the volunteer's dilemma game (VDG). The VDG provides a controlled experimental method for studying volunteering behaviors in an anonymous interactive environment. We developed six variations of the VDG and administered them to economics students in five different cultures (Ntotal = 603). Among other things, these VDGs varied whether the potential benefits of volunteering were certain or uncertain. Although the overall level of volunteering did not vary substantially across most cultural groups, we found that culture interacted with the size and (un)certainty of the benefits associated with volunteering, to influence volunteering decisions. We also found that religiosity (but not religious affiliation per se) increases volunteering and that men are less likely to volunteer when the returns to doing so are certain. These results extend our knowledge of behaviors in the VDG, and their potential drivers, with clear implications for understanding how culture, individual characteristics, and context jointly influence prosocial behavior and coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals often turn to others for decision‐making advice, which has the potential to improve decision‐making outcomes when advice is drawn from a reliable source. Because seeking advice is a kind of information seeking, it is likelier to occur when decisions involve ambiguity or when full information about outcomes is unavailable. We examined whether experimentally induced incidental fear, known to increase information seeking, increased intentions to seek decision‐making advice and whether this effect was stronger for decisions involving ambiguity. In Study 1, fear increased the likelihood of seeking advice about an ambiguous decision in which both options carried some risk, compared to neutral emotion (and anger). In Study 2, a 2 (emotion) by 2 (minimal vs. extensive information) design, fear increased the likelihood of seeking advice about palliative care only after a simple definition of palliative care (minimal information), but not after more comprehensive (extensive) information about its nature, benefits, and efficacy. These findings suggest that incidental fear may encourage people to seek advice about decisions involving ambiguity or when full information to make the decision is not available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Everyday life is full of self-control problems. The economist's favorite explanation for self-control problems is present bias. This paper tests whether experimentally elicited present bias predicts self-control problems in everyday life. We measure present bias by using a standard incentivized delay discounting task and everyday self-control by using the day reconstruction method (DRM). Because this is the first study to measure everyday self-control by using the DRM, we also validate the method by showing that its data replicate key results from the seminal Everyday Temptation Study. We find that present bias does not predict everyday self-control. This points to a distinction between decreasing impatience (as measured in delay discounting tasks) and visceral influences (as occurring in everyday life) as determinants of self-control problems. We argue that decision making research can benefit from the DRM as a cost-effective tool that complements lab and field experiments to better understand economic preference measures and their correlates in everyday life decision making. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Iowa gambling task (IGT) was developed as a neuropsychological assessment of "real‐life" decision making in a laboratory setting by Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson in. The IGT was originally implemented as a manual task during which the participants selected paper cards. The task has since evolved into a computerized assessment tool (Psychological Assessment Resources IGT or PAR™IGT) that uses only virtual cards and reinforcement schedules that are somewhat different from those in the original version. Caution should be used when psychological assessments change from manual to virtual formats. Such changes may unintentionally introduce confounds that render the 2 tests nonequivalent as shown with the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task by Steinmetz, Brunner, Loarer, and Houssemand in. In this study, we compared IGT performance when participants used either a laptop computer or a touchscreen tablet. Each device was used in 2 conditions: "involved" and "noninvolved." Participants in the involved condition turned over physical cards and mimicked their own selections by clicking (laptop) or reaching out and touching (tablet) the corresponding virtual cards. Participants in the noninvolved condition only made selections of virtual cards, whereas an adjacent experimenter turned over the corresponding physical cards. Results showed that performance systematically and significantly improved as degree of physical involvement increased in the following order: laptop noninvolved (lowest performance), tablet noninvolved, laptop involved, and tablet involved (highest performance). In addition, participants' verbalized understanding of the task was significantly more accurate with increased physical involvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper, we explore the relationships between psychometric and behavioral measures of maximization in decisions from experience (DfE). In two experiments, we measured choice behavior in two experimental paradigms of DfE and self‐reported maximizing tendencies using three prominent scales of maximization. In the repeated consequentialist choice paradigm, participants made repeated choices between two unlabeled options and received consequential feedback on each trial. In the sampling paradigm, participants freely sampled from two options and received feedback on their sampling before making a single consequential choice. Individuals exhibited different degrees of maximizing behavior in both paradigms and across different payoff distributions, but none of the maximizing scales predicted this behavior. These results indicate that maximization scales address constructs that are different from the maximization behavior observed in DfE, and that these measures will need to be improved to reflect behavioral aspects of choice and search from experience. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Decision‐making competence (DMC) is the ability to follow normative principles when making decisions. In a longitudinal analysis, we examine the robustness of DMC over time, as measured by two batteries of paper‐and‐pencil tasks. Participants completed the youth version (Y‐DMC) at age 19 and/or the adult version (A‐DMC) 11 years later at age 30, as part of a larger longitudinal study. Both measures are composed of tasks adapted from ones used in experimental studies of decision‐making skills. Results supported the robustness of these measures and the usefulness of the construct. Response patterns for Y‐DMC were similar to those observed with a smaller initial sample drawn from the same population. Response patterns for A‐DMC were similar to those observed with an earlier community sample. Y‐DMC and A‐DMC were significantly correlated, for participants who completed both measures, 11 years apart, even after controlling for measures of cognitive ability. Nomological validity was observed in correlations of scores on both tests with measures of cognitive ability, cognitive style, and environmental factors with predicted relationships to DMC, including household socioeconomic status, neighborhood disadvantage, and paternal substance abuse. Higher Y‐DMC and A‐DMC scores were also associated with lower rates of potentially risky and antisocial behaviors, including adolescent delinquency, cannabis use, and early sexual behavior. Thus, the Y‐DMC and A‐DMC measures appear to capture a relatively stable, measurable construct that increases with supportive environmental factors and is associated with constructive behaviors. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How people choose gifts is a widely studied topic, but what happens next is largely understudied. In two preregistered studies, one field experiment, and an analysis of secondary data, we show that giving gifts has a dark side, as it can negatively affect subsequent interpersonal behavior between givers and receivers. In Study 1, we found that giving a gift to one's romantic partner changes givers' interpretation of which behaviors constitute infidelity. Specifically, we found that givers (vs. nongivers) classified their questionable behaviors (e.g., sending a flirtatious text to someone other than their partner) less as a form of cheating on their partner. In Study 2, we examined how politely participants behave when delivering bad news to a friend. We found that givers (vs. nongivers) wrote significantly less polite messages to their friend. In Study 3, we tested real gifts that people give to friends and found givers (vs. nongivers) subsequently made more selfish decisions at their friends' expense. In all, our research refines the oft‐cited axiomatic assumption that gift giving strengthens relationships and illuminates the potential for future research to examine how decision making can alter interpersonal, romantic relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important steps in formulating and solving a multiattribute decision‐making (MADM) problem is weighting the attributes. Most existing weighting methods are based on judgments by experts/decision‐makers, which are prone to several cognitive biases, making it necessary to examine these biases in MADM weighting methods and develop debiasing strategies. This study uses experimental analysis to look at equalizing bias—one of the main cognitive biases, where decision‐makers tend to assign the same weight to different attributes—in MADM methods. More specifically, we look at AHP (analytic hierarchy process), BWM (best‐worst method), PA (point allocation), SMART (simple multiattribute rating technique), and Swing methods under two structuring formats, hierarchical and non‐hierarchical. To empirically examine the existence of equalizing bias in these methods, we formulate several hypotheses, which are tested using a public transportation mode selection problem among 146 university students. The results indicate that AHP and BWM have less equalizing bias than SMART, Swing, and PA, and that the hierarchical problem structuring leads to a reduction in the equalizing bias in all five methods and that such a reduction significantly varies among the methods. Our findings prove some debiasing strategies suggested in existing literature, which could be used by real decision‐makers (when selecting a method) as well as researchers (when developing new methods). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most studies investigating interindividual differences in the context of social decision making have focused on the decision maker. Considerably less empirical attention has been paid to interindividual differences in how recipients react both affectively and behaviorally. In two preregistered studies (total N = 667), we examined whether heightened levels of trait social anxiety are associated with higher levels of forecasted and experienced negative affective reactions in response to uneven resource allocations by an interaction partner in a dictator game and an ultimatum game as well as corresponding hypothetical and actual behavioral reactions. In accordance with our predictions, social anxiety levels correlated with negative affective reactions; these correlations were stronger the more unevenly the resources were allocated by the other individual. The observed effects remained robust when controlling for expectations and basic personality traits and across two different economic social decision‐making tasks. This suggests that social anxiety level is an important contributor to interpersonal differences in affective reactions to another individual's uneven resource allocations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Age differences in monetary decisions may emerge because younger and older adults perceive the value of outcomes differently. Yet, age‐differential effects of monetary rewards on decisions are not well understood. Most laboratory studies on aging and decision making have used scenarios in which rewards were merely hypothetical (decisions did not have any real consequences) or in which only small amounts of money were at stake. In the current study, we compared younger adults' (20–29 years) and older adults' (61–82 years) decisions in probabilistic choice problems with real or hypothetical rewards. Decision‐contingent rewards were in a typical range of previous studies (gains of up to ~4.25 USD) or substantially scaled up (gains of up to ~85 USD per participant). Reward type (real vs. hypothetical) affected decision quality, including value maximization, switching between options, and dominance violations (choices of an option that was inferior to another option in all respects). Decision quality was markedly better with real than hypothetical rewards in older adults and correlated with numeracy in both age groups. However, we found no evidence that reward type affected people's risk preferences. Overall, the findings portray a fairly positive picture regarding the use of hypothetical scenarios to assess preferences: With carefully prepared instructions, people from different age groups indicate preferences in hypothetical scenarios that match their decisions with real and much higher rewards. One advantage of using real rewards is that they help to reduce decision noise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effects of self–other decision‐making on intertemporal choice have been revealed in many studies using a monetary outcome. However, the outcome of intertemporal choice is not restricted to money; time is also a scarce and nonrenewable resource outcome. Thus, we conducted a series of experiments to address the effects of self–other decision‐making on time‐based intertemporal choice, a type of intertemporal choice that uses time as an outcome. Over the course of three experiments, differences in self–other decision‐making were evidenced. Participants who made decisions for others were more likely to prefer the smaller but sooner (SS) option over the larger but later (LL) option and considered the gain of the SS option to be significantly greater than that of the LL option. Participants who made decisions for themselves were likely to prefer the LL option over the SS option. However, they considered the gains of the LL and the SS option to be indifferent. Changing the role of decision‐making could affect the ability of individuals to consider the future consequences of their decisions. The effects of self–other decision‐making on time‐based intertemporal choice could be explained by the accounts of economic reasoning and construal level theory. The findings indicated that the effects of self–other decision‐making on time‐based intertemporal choice, which could be generated simply by rewording questions, can help individuals make optimal long‐term choices without the need for increased control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper presents a simple formal analytical model delivering qualitative predictions for response times in binary‐choice experiments. It combines a dual‐process/multi‐strategy approach with the standard diffusion model, modeling a utility decision process and a heuristic decision process as diffusion processes of evidence accumulation. For experiments with objective alternatives (including many tasks in judgment and decision making), the model predicts that errors will be quicker than correct responses in case of process conflict and slower in case of alignment, capturing a well‐documented asymmetry regarding slow or fast errors. Further, the model also predicts that correct responses are slower in case of conflict than in case of alignment, capturing the well‐known Stroop effect. The model is also extended to cover experiments with subjective alternative evaluations, that is, preferential choice. In this case, results depend on whether trials are hard or easy, that is, on whether the heuristic can be interpreted as relatively automatic or not. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we merge research related to experiential learning, temporal perception, and the value of time and money by examining decisions where the timing of action (response) determines the outcome received. We predicted that time-saving preferences and impatience would decrease maximization (i.e., taking action when it returned the largest reward), and that the constraints of temporal perception would compound their effects. Across three studies, participants undershot on average (i.e., responded earlier than the period of time during which a response would return the maximal reward) showed a preference for shorter-delay options and often did not find the maximal reward. In addition, participants' reliance on temporal perception increased undershooting, increased preferences for shorter-delay options, and reduced maximization. Nevertheless, participants who found the maximal reward continued to maximize at a high rate rather than opting for shorter delays and smaller rewards. Thus, while most participants appeared to have a preference for saving time, most behaved as reward maximizers rather than temporal discounters. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Allais common ratio effect is one of the most robust violations of rational decision making under risk. In this paper, we conduct a novel test of the common ratio effect in which we elicit preferences for the common ratio choice alternatives in choice, pricing, and happiness rating tasks. We find large shifts in preference patterns across tasks, both within and between subjects. In particular, we find that both the consistency and distribution of responses differ systematically across tasks, with modal choices replicating the Allais preference pattern, modal happiness ratings exhibiting consistent risk aversion, and modal prices maximizing expected value. We discuss the predictions of various cognitive explanations of the common ratio effect in the context of our experiment. We find that a dual process framework provides the most complete account of our results. Surprisingly, we also find that although the Allais pattern was the modal behavior in the choice task, none of the 158 respondents in our experiment exhibited the Allais pattern simultaneously in choice, happiness, and pricing tasks. Our results constitute a new paradox for the leading theories of choice under risk. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Probability information is regularly communicated to experts who must fuse multiple estimates to support decision making. Such information is often communicated verbally (e.g., "likely") rather than with precise numeric (point) values (e.g., ".75"), yet people are not taught to perform arithmetic on verbal probabilities. We hypothesized that the accuracy and logical coherence of averaging and multiplying probabilities will be poorer when individuals receive probability information in verbal rather than numerical point format. In four experiments (N = 213, 201, 26, and 343, respectively), we manipulated probability communication format between subjects. Participants averaged and multiplied sets of four probabilities. Across experiments, arithmetic accuracy and coherence was significantly better with point than with verbal probabilities. These findings generalized between expert (intelligence analysts) and non‐expert samples and when controlling for calculator use. Experiment 4 revealed an important qualification: Whereas accuracy and coherence were better among participants presented with point probabilities than with verbal probabilities, imprecise numeric‐probability ranges (e.g., ".70 to.80") afforded no computational advantage over verbal probabilities. Experiment 4 also revealed that the advantage of the point over the verbal format is partially mediated by strategy use. Participants presented with point estimates are more likely to use mental computation than guesswork, and mental computation was found to be associated with better accuracy. Our findings suggest that where computation is important, probability information should be communicated to end users with precise numeric probabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Would you prefer $50 now or $100 in 6 months? What if you made this decision for someone else—would you be more impulsive or more self‐controlled? Some studies suggest we are more impulsive when deciding for ourselves, whereas others suggest the reverse. This might be because some researchers ask participants what they would do whereas others ask what they should do. We investigated the impact of should/would decision type on delay discounting rate in choices for the self and for another person. We also examined the effect of condition order. In Experiment 1 (using a student sample), discounting rates were affected by the combination of decision frame and condition order. Decision frame had a bigger effect on choices in the second condition, perhaps because instructions became clearer when they could be contrasted with the previous set. Experiment 2 (using a Mechanical Turk sample) investigated this possibility by including all possible frames at the beginning of the session; this produced a more consistent would/should difference for choices for the self, but an order effect remained. Experiment 3 isolated task order by having participants complete the same choice task twice. Decisions were significantly more self‐controlled for the second iteration. Together, these results suggest that people are more self‐controlled when making should decisions and (less consistently) decisions for others and that having recently made delay‐amount trade‐off decisions also promotes self‐control. Rates of unsystematic data were unexpectedly high in Experiment 2, particularly among nonmaster Turk workers and those located in India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quick decision making under risk is ubiquitous in modern times, yet its consequences are not fully understood. Time pressure might change people's risk preferences, lead to less consistent choices, or change people's decision strategy. With the present work, we make the novel contribution of testing all hypotheses against each other in a unifying hierarchical Bayesian model. In two studies, participants decided repeatedly between two risky gambles either with or without high time pressure. We found a significant increase in risky choices under time pressure. With modeling, we show that time pressure decreased choice consistency but did not systematically affect people's risk preferences. In addition, the number of participants using simple, noncompensatory strategies increased slightly under time pressure. Finally, participants did not systematically choose easier gambles more often under time pressure. Thus, a reliable analysis of the effect of time pressure on preferential choice requires a model framework that allows for the distinction between the various effects time pressure can have. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sometimes, we must choose between obtaining an immediate reward or foregoing it in favor of searching for a better reward elsewhere. Such decisions have been characterized as involving exploration‐exploitation trade‐offs. Here, we studied the reliability and basis of individual differences in tasks involving choices between exploration and exploitation. In Studies 1, 2, and 4, we found little evidence for a stable individual difference in tendency to explore (vs. exploit). Additionally, we tested delay discounting as a potential predictor of individual differences in exploration. In Studies 3 and 4, we found that delay discounting was inconsistently predictive of exploration behavior. Our results support the claim that people adapt their exploration behavior to the environment in which they find themselves. This adaptation overrides any general preference to explore environments more or less than other people. Our results also suggest that predictors of exploration may be exclusively restricted to the particular environment in which they were observed. Implications for past and future research of exploration‐exploitation decision making are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Near‐miss events, which occur when failure is avoided by chance, can lead to subsequent risky decisions due to base‐rate neglect. According to construal level theory, a lower level construal increases the neglect of base rates by giving more weight to case‐specific information. In four studies, I empirically test the hypothesis that low‐level construals moderate evaluations and decisions following near‐miss events by increasing the reliance on case information. In Study 1, I find that a higher construal correlates with negative assessments of a project manager responsible for a near‐miss incident. In Study 2, I prime participants to have a high‐ or low‐level construal and find that the manager evaluations in the low construal group are higher than evaluations of those in the high construal group. In Study 3, I examine whether construal levels impact decision making in personal contexts regarding natural disasters and provide evidence for the underlying mechanism of base‐rate neglect. In Study 4, I show that the construal levels affect decision making given that near‐miss information extends to variations in the temporal distance to near‐miss information. Thus, I find support that construal levels systematically influence evaluations and decision making following near‐miss events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The tradeoff between absolute and comparative utilities is a central topic in research on judgment and decision making. The current research investigates the different levels of importance that individuals attach to absolute and comparative utilities when making decisions for themselves versus others. We hypothesize that people will prefer options high in comparative utility for others more than for themselves because people believe others value social comparison more than themselves. This belief stems from the low accessibility of others' behaviors with respect to not making social comparisons. Across four studies, the self–other differences were observed in hypothetical and realistic settings; the differences were caused by individuals' beliefs that they valued comparative utility less than others; when others' behaviors of not making social comparisons were made accessible, the self–other differences disappeared. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The seven papers in this special issue represent the breadth and complexity of approaches to the study of affect in judgment and decision processes. Four papers examine the role of arousal or specific emotions in decision making. The three other papers investigate the impacts of uncertainty, time course, and thinking about mood. We briefly describe four functions of affect in decision making (affect as information, as a spotlight, as a motivator, and as common currency) and relate them to the seven special-issue papers. The role of affect in decisions and decision processes is quite nuanced and deserves careful empirical study in basic and applied research. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Working in a group requires coordination. The current paper examines coordination in terms of member-level behavioral choices. Extending expectancy theory to a collaborative group setting, we interpret past findings on expertise and hypothesize that component features (specifically their difficulty and worth relative to each other) impact member behavior and hence coordination both directly and by moderating the role of expertise. Findings were largely as predicted, suggesting that an expectancy theory perspective may be a useful tool for the study and understanding of coordination. An exploratory examination of recordings of group interaction suggested that although most of our groups discussed coordination strategies, the strategies discussed did not generally map to the behavioral choices observed. Implications for coordination in general and transactive memory specifically are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This paper investigated decision pattern analysis (DPA) as a general and standard framework for studying individuals' consistent decision making behavior within and between contexts. DPA classifies decisions on the basis of judgement accuracy and the goal orientation of the decided-upon action. Over repeated decisions, patterns of individuals' decision behavior are described by five variables: competence, optimality, recklessness, hesitancy and decisiveness. A fictitious medical decision making test and three standard cognitive ability tests (extended with confidence ratings and a 'submit answer for marking' decision) were used to investigate the psychometric properties of these DPA variables. Internal consistency of the decision patterns ranged from good to excellent. Convergent validity was assessed via cognitive abilities, metacognitive confidence and a control criterion imposed on confidence that determines the decision to be made: the point of sufficient certainty. Personality variables were included to assess discriminant validity. As hypothesised, cognitive abilities showed positive correlations with competence and optimality. High confidence, low points of sufficient certainty and a greater discrepancy between them were associated with higher decisiveness and recklessness, and lower hesitancy. Personality measures showed mixed and generally weak correlations with the DPA variables. These convergent and discriminant results also held after controlling for all variables in regression. The results provide preliminary psychometric support for DPA as a general framework of behavioral decision making. DPA has the potential to be exploited in many contexts for uses that, to date, have been unachievable in a psychometrically valid manner. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effect of framing is well established: Decision makers' preferences are influenced by how outcomes or attributes are phrased. In the financial domain, individuals often make decisions for themselves and for others. Therefore, decisions in a two‐person context with the outcome equally allocated can be framed in two ways defined as the allocation framing: (1) self‐allocation frame: making a decision for oneself, with half the payoffs shared by another person; and (2) other‐allocation frame: making a decision for the other person and sharing half the payoffs. The results of six studies provided consistent evidence that people are more risk seeking in the self‐allocation frame than in the other‐allocation frame, and the effect was only noteworthy in the gain domain—not the loss domain. Our findings on allocation framing provide a meaningful contribution to studies of self–other decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When allocating resources, people often have to resolve a conflict between equity and efficiency concerns. That is, sometimes for everyone to receive the same amount of resources, some resources must be used suboptimally. However, it is unclear whether and how people account for the impact their allocation decisions would have on the recipients' outcome. In three experiments, we examine how the amount of resources allocated to the recipients influences allocators' decisions and use mouse tracking techniques to assess their conflict during the decision process. The results reveal that when an equitable allocation of resources led to neither recipients receiving anything nor imposed losses, people tended to prefer efficient allocations. Such allocations between recipients who may end up with no resources also evoke a greater conflict compared with allocations in which both recipients have some secured gains, suggesting that, in general, people want to be equitable but not when equity means that nobody gets anything. When maintaining equity can only be done by leaving recipients with no resources at all, equitable allocations evoke a greater conflict, and people are more likely to refrain from them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of children's decision making increases with age and has relatively increased through time. Although a lot is known about cognitive development, less is known about how this development impacts decision accuracy in economic situations. This study builds on revealed preference theory to study the impact of cognitive aptitude on economic decision‐making accuracy and explores the intervening role of decision heuristics. In a study (n = 100) where children from three age groups had to make choices between combinations of products, we found that decision accuracy was lower for kindergarteners than for children from the third and sixth grade, replicating and validating older findings. We found that one aspect of cognitive aptitude, namely, verbal aptitude, hurts rather than helps decision accuracy. Further explorations suggested that this relation was due to the decreased use of the "more is better" heuristic, a child's preference for options with many units, which decreased with increasing verbal aptitude but increased rational decision making. We discuss the implications of the negative effect of verbal aptitude on economic decision‐making accuracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT A central assumption of neoclassical economics is that reservation prices for familiar products express people's true preferences for these products; that is, they represent the total benefit that a good confers to the consumers and are, thus, independent of actual prices in the market. Nevertheless, a vast amount of research has shown that valuations can be sensitive to other salient prices, particularly when individuals are explicitly anchored on them. In this paper, the authors extend previous research on single-price anchoring and study the sensitivity of valuations to the distribution of prices found for a product in the market. In addition, they examine its possible causes. They find that market-dependent valuations cannot be fully explained by rational inferences consumers draw about a product's value and are unlikely to be fully explained by true market-dependent preferences. Rather, the market dependence of valuations likely reflects consumers' focus on something other than the total benefit that the product confers to them. Furthermore, this paper shows that market-dependent valuations persist when - as in many real-life settings - individuals make repeated purchase decisions over time and infer the distribution of the product's prices from their market experience. Finally, the authors consider the implications of their findings for marketers and consumers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Risky decisions based on the combination of different sources of information (e.g., decisions from description‐plus‐experience) have mostly been ignored, as research has focused on examining each source separately. Across three experiments, we explore the intricate relationship between experience and description by manipulating when descriptive information about risky options is made available during an experience‐based task. The results show that the amount of prior experience moderates the way that descriptive information is considered and integrated in the decision‐making process: Descriptions affected behavior more when participants had little experience with the task, whereas their effect was less pronounced with extended experience. This relationship reversed when participants had access to foregone payoffs, with descriptions being considered more when participants had more time to interact with the task. Potential mechanisms and theoretical accounts are discussed with an emphasis on how the results and conclusions of the present work can be applied to the effective design of warning labels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Odors are strong elicitors of affect, and they play an important role in guiding human behavior, such as avoiding fire or spoiled food. However, little is known about how risky decision making changes when stimuli are olfactory. We investigated this question in an experimental study of risky decision making with unpleasant odors and monetary losses in a fully incentivized task with real outcomes. Odor and monetary decisions were matched so that monetary losses corresponded to the amount of money participants were willing to pay to avoid smelling an odor. Hierarchical Bayesian analyses using prospect theory show that participants were less sensitive to probabilities when gambling with odors than when gambling with money. These results highlight the importance of taking the sensory modality into account when studying risky decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attention‐Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is related to suboptimal decision making in experimental tasks and to real‐life risk‐taking behavior (RTB) such as substance abuse and unsafe traffic conduct. In this preregistered study, we tested whether these associations are mediated by need for cognition—the extent to which one tends towards, and enjoys, analytical thought. In a large sample of young adults (N = 463, Mage = 19.7 years), we tested whether need for cognition mediated the association between self‐reported ADHD symptoms on the one hand and decision‐making strategy complexity on an experimental gambling task and self‐reported real‐life RTB on the other hand. Preregistered confirmatory analyses indicated first that ADHD symptoms were positively associated with real‐life RTB, but the association was not mediated by need for cognition. Second, ADHD symptoms were not related to decision‐making strategy complexity, and need for cognition was not a significant mediator. Explorative analyses revealed that (a) need for cognition was associated with higher decision‐making accuracy and slower reaction time; (b) need for cognition was related to inattentive but not to hyperactive/impulsive ADHD symptoms; (c) need for cognition was associated with health‐related RTB but not interpersonal RTB; and (4) only the association between inattention and health‐related RTB was mediated by need for cognition. We conclude that need for cognition is not a mediator in the association between ADHD symptoms and RTB. Additionally, we conclude that neither ADHD symptoms nor need for cognition predict decision‐making strategy complexity. Implications for both future research and clinical practice are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A striking finding has emerged recently in the literature: When decision makers are faced with essentially the same choice, their preferences differ as a function of whether options are described or are “experienced” via observation and feedback. For example, when presented the described choice: (A) A 90% chance of $0 and a 10% chance of $10 or (B) $1 for sure, people tend to prefer (A). But when those same two options are experienced through observation of “draws” from two payoff distributions that match the described options, the modal preference reverses. Why? This is just one question that the papers in this special issue address. In addition, they address the rich repertoire of issues that arise when one considers experience-based choices. The decisions-from-experience paradigm—with its focus on the acquisition and integration of information prior to choice, as well the choice itself—taps many of the fundamentals of psychology (learning, memory, encoding, knowledge representation, modelling) thus inspiring novel and fruitful avenues for research. This paper reviews recent research on experience-based choice, and highlights the contribution of the papers in the special issue. The paper introduces a framework that places different types of decisions along a continuum of uncertainty about what one is choosing between, which emphasizes the rich and varied role of “experience” in decision making. It ends by identifying important unsolved questions that are ripe for future research. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attacks one of the chief limitations of the field of behavioral decision research—the past inability to use this literature to improve decision making. Building on the work of Thompson, Gentner, Loewenstein and colleagues (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Gentner, 1999; Thompson, Gentner, & Loewenstein, 2000; Gentner & Markman, 1997), the current paper finds that it is possible to reduce bias in one of the most robust problems in the decision literature, the Acquiring a Company Problem (Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985). Past research has shown that individuals make suboptimal offers as a result of the failure to think about the decisions of others and to incorporate a clear understanding of the rules of the game. In the current study, we find that by allowing study participants to see and understand differences in seemingly unrelated decision problems—versions of the Monty Hall Game (Nalebuff, 1987; Friedman, 1998) and Multiparty Ultimatum Game (Messick, Moore, & Bazerman, 1997; Tor & Bazerman, 2003)—study participants can learn to focus more accurately on the decisions of other parties and the rules of the game, the keys to solving the Acquiring a Company Problem. This research offers a new piece of evidence that comparative and analogical processes may be a successful direction for improving decision making. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented which discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the use of eye movements in behavioral decision making, the use of eye-tracking methodologies in judgment and decision-making research, and challenges while using eye tracking in research.

Decisions vary. They may vary in both content and complexity. People also vary. An important way that people vary is how much they think. Some prior research investigating thinking and decision making largely conflicts with most traditional decision theories. For example, if considering an array of products to choose from, thinking more about the alternative's attributes should lead to a better decision. However, some research indicates that thinking more may also lead to focusing on irrelevant aspects of the decision and a less optimal outcome. We propose that this conflict in the literature exists because of a failure to consider the interaction between the individual and the decision task. To test this, we used separate methodologies that enhance or attenuate a person's thinking. In Study 1, we selected people who were especially high or low in need for cognition and had them complete a robust decision‐making inventory, which included both complex and simple tasks. In Study 2, we manipulated participant's level of glucose, which acts as the brain's fuel to enhance or attenuate thinking ability. Both studies provide insight for understanding our central tenant that more thought leads to better decisions in complex tasks but does not influence simple decisions. These findings show how the individual's thinking can interact with the constructive elements of the task to shape decision choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Older adults have been found to favor positive stimuli over negative stimuli; further, developing a negative preference may be a cognitively demanding process. In the present study, we focused on the joint effects task self‐relevance and cognitive load have on older adults' emotional information preferences when performing decision‐making. To examine this, we used multi‐attribute decision tasks and process‐tracing procedure to measure their searching process. The study composed of a 2 (age: young/old) × 2 (cognitive load: load/non‐load) × 3 (attribute valence: positive/neutral/negative) × 3 (task self‐relevance: high/medium/low) mixed design. Sixty‐one young adults and 62 older adults viewed 5 (alternatives) × 5 (attributes) decision matrices that contained positive, negative, and neutral information, with the total views and mean time spent viewing each different valence (positive, negative, and neutral information) set as dependent variables. The results indicated that both young and old adults have no emotional information preference in regard to self‐relevance. When under no cognitive load, both positive and negative information were viewed more than neutral information; however, under cognitive load, preference for negative information decreased; this effect size was more robust in older adults. There was also a main effect of self‐relevance on total views and mean checking time, with attributes concerning higher self‐relevance tasks being more likely to attract attention. Older adults exhibited a consistent hedonic focus, even in highly self‐relevant contexts; however, this effect disappeared under cognitive load. Overall, the findings suggest that cognitive resources play an important role in emotional information processing during decision processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After making decisions, we often get feedback concerning forgone outcomes (what would have happened had we chosen differently). Yet, many times, our exposure to such feedback is systematically biased. For example, your friends are more likely to tell you about a party you missed if it was fun than if it was boring. Despite its prevalence, the effects of biased exposure to forgone outcomes on future choice have not been directly studied. In three studies (five experiments) using a simplified learning task, we study the basic influence of biased exposure to forgone outcomes in the extreme case in which decision makers can easily infer the missing information such that the biased exposure carries almost no informational value. The results in all studies suggest that nevertheless, the biased exposure to forgone outcomes affected choice. Exposure to forgone outcomes only when they were better than the obtained outcomes (Only‐Better‐Forgone) increased selections of the forgone option compared with exposure to forgone outcomes only when they were worse than the obtained outcome (Only‐Worse‐Forgone). Moreover, relative to an unbiased exposure to all forgone outcomes, the effect of exposure to Only‐Worse‐Forgone was larger than the effect of exposure to Only‐Better‐Forgone feedback. However, these effects were not universal: In environments that include rare negative events ("disasters"), biased exposure to forgone outcomes had very little effect. We raise potential explanations and further discuss implications for marketing and risk awareness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]