Search

There is ongoing debate over the usefulness of and need for attention checks in online experiments. This paper investigates the value of these tests in decisions‐from‐experience (i.e., multi‐trial repeated choice) tasks. In five studies (Ntotal = 1519), we comprehensively compared the behavior of attentive and inattentive participants (i.e., those who passed or failed a simple attention check) among online participants; and also compared those results to the results of lab studies reported elsewhere. We found meaningful differences between the behavior of attentive and inattentive participants even at the first trial. Overall, attentive participants were more likely to notice less‐obvious average values of the different alternatives, while inattentive participants exhibited higher sensitivity to typical outcomes. The findings show that even one simple attention test is sufficient to differentiate between attentive and inattentive participants in repetitive tasks. Importantly, our results fully replicated three previously run lab studies among attentive participants, but not inattentive ones. This finding highlights the importance of using attention tests to avoid spurious conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a meta‐analysis of experimental studies dealing with the impact of incidental emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, and anger) on financial risk‐taking, so as to explain traditional heterogeneity of outcomes in the literature. After devising a standard search strategy and including studies that comply with a list of eligibility criteria, we code 114 effect sizes at the treatment level from 26 selected articles, and a battery of moderator variables representing design and sample characteristics. Meta‐regressions with adjusted predictions find causal impact of fear on risk aversion, albeit to a small extent. On the contrary, average null effects characterize happiness, sadness, and anger. It also turns out that when studies provide financial incentives, country‐level individualism moderates the relationship between emotions and risk‐taking by increasing risk propensity. We discuss possible interpretations of our findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the present research was to investigate the involvement of mental imagery in people's choices under risk. We tested the general idea that decision makers can use visual mental images (visual mental simulations) to pre‐experience how rewarding or threatening future outcomes of risky behavior will be and try out the potential consequences of their risky activities. The paper reports the results of three preregistered studies (including one experiment) showing that the valence of mental imagery is related to the willingness to take risky actions and that people spontaneously use mental imagery as an informative decision input. In Study 1, we found that the more positive mental images people produced when faced with risk, the more willing they were to take risky actions representing different risk domains. Study 2 extended the results of Study 1, indicating that the valence of mental imagery has a causal effect on participants' risk taking willingness. Qualitative analysis based on independent judges' evaluations conducted in Studies 1 and 2 documented that, when requested, participants could easily generate visual mental images illustrating the consequences of their risky choices. Finally, with Study 3, we found that participants declared using mental imagery as a decision input (i.e., a source of information that helps them make choices) even when they were not instructed to do so. However, the frequency of reporting images as decision inputs differed across risky activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People exhibit scope insensitivity: Their expressed valuation of a problem is not proportionate with its scope or size. To address scope insensitivity in charitable giving, Hsee et al. (2013) developed the (Classical) Unit Asking technique, where people are first asked how much they are willing to donate to support a single individual, followed by how much they are willing to donate to support a group of individuals. In this paper, we explored the mechanisms, extensions, and limitations of the technique. In particular, we investigated an extension of the technique, which we call Sequential Unit Asking (SUA). SUA asks people a series of willingness‐to‐donate questions, in which the number of individuals to be helped increases in a stepwise manner until it reaches the total group size. Across four studies investigating donation judgments (total N=2045), we did not find evidence that willingness to donate (WTD) judgments to the total group increased with larger groups. Instead, our results suggest that Unit Asking (sequential or classical) increases donation amounts only through a single one‐off boost. Further, we find evidence in three out of four studies that the SUA extension increases WTD judgments over Classical Unit Asking. In a fifth study (N=537) using a contingent valuation design (instead of donation judgments), we find scope sensitivity using all asking techniques. We conclude that, while it is difficult to create scope sensitivity in WTD judgments, SUA should be considered a promising approach to increase charitable donations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper is an exploratory study of the anchoring bias among individuals with autism. Anchoring bias is one of the most robust choice heuristics. The anchoring bias is measured and compared among adults with autism and age‐, gender‐, and education level‐matched, neurotypical controls. The study differentiates between high and low anchors. Results show that individuals with autism are generally equally susceptible to the anchoring bias as neurotypical individuals in judgment and decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research suggests that algorithms—based on artificial intelligence or linear regression models—make better predictions than humans in a wide range of domains. Several studies have examined the degree to which people use algorithms. However, these studies have been mostly cross‐sectional and thus have failed to address the dynamic nature of algorithm use. In the present paper, we examined algorithm use with a novel longitudinal approach outside the lab. Specifically, we conducted two ecological momentary assessment studies in which 401 participants made financial predictions for 18 days in two tasks. Relying on the judge‐advisor system framework, we examined how time interacted with advice source (human vs. algorithm) and advisor accuracy to predict advice taking. Our results showed that when the advice was inaccurate, people tended to use algorithm advice less than human advice across the period studied. Inaccurate algorithms were penalized logarithmically; the effect was initially strong but tended to fade over time. This suggests that first impressions are crucial and produce significant changes in advice taking at the beginning of the interaction, which later tends to stabilize as days go by. Therefore, inaccurate algorithms are more likely to accrue a negative reputation than inaccurate humans, even when having the same level of performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attribute framing effect, where people judge a quantity of an item more positively with a positively described attribute (e.g., "75% lean") than its negative, albeit normatively equivalent description (e.g., "25% fat"), is a robust phenomenon, which may be moderated under certain conditions. In this paper, we investigated the moderating effect of the characteristics of the quantifier term: its format (verbal, e.g., "high," or numerical, e.g., "75%") and magnitude (i.e., if it is a small or large quantity) using positive or negative synonyms of attributes (e.g., energy vs. calories). Over five pre‐registered studies using a 2 (synonym, between‐subjects: positive or negative) × 2 (quantifier format, between‐subjects: verbal or numerical) × 2 (quantifier magnitude, within‐subjects: small or large) mixed design, we manipulated quantifier format and magnitude orthogonally for synonyms with differing valence. We also tested two mechanisms for the framing effect: whether the effect was mediated by the affect associated with the frame and whether participants inferred the speaker to be positive about the target. We found a framing effect with synonyms that was reversed in direction for the small (vs. large) quantifiers, but not significantly moderated by quantifier format. Both the affect associated with the frame and the inferred level of speaker positivity partially mediated the framing effect, and the level of mediation varied with quantifier magnitude. These results suggest that the magnitude of the quantifier modifies one's evaluation of the frame, and the mechanism for people's evaluations in a framing situation may differ for small and large quantifiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decision‐making competence is a skill that is associated with numerous positive life outcomes. Even though multiple cognitive abilities have been shown to predict decision‐making competence, few studies have incorporated a large test battery tapping into several cognitive abilities concurrently in the same models. The current paper presents a study that sought to investigate which cognitive abilities predicted overall decision‐making competence in adults using hierarchical regression analysis. A cognitive test battery, comprising abilities such as general intelligence, executive functions, numeracy, visuospatial ability, and time perception, was administered to 182 participants. Results indicate that both general intelligence, which was consistently the strongest predictor, and numeracy contributed independently to overall decision‐making competence. Executive functions did predict overall decision‐making competence, while all predictors were included in the models. A novel finding concerns the relationship between time perception and decision‐making competence. The complementary roles of these cognitive abilities are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When participants are shown a series of stimuli, their responses differ depending on whether they respond after each stimulus or only at the end of the series, in what we call a measurement effect. These effects have received paltry attention compared with more well‐known order effects and pose a unique challenge to theories of decision‐making. In a series of two preregistered experiments, we consistently find measurement effects such that responding to a stimulus reduces its impact on later stimuli. While previous research has found such effects in noncumulative tasks, where participants are instructed only to respond to the most recent stimulus, this may be the first demonstration of these effects when participants are asked to combine information across either two or four stimuli. We present modeling results showing that although several extant classical and quantum models fail to predict the direction of these effects, new versions can be created that can do so. Ways in which these effects can be described using either quantum or classical models are discussed, as well as potential connections with other well‐known phenomena like the dilution effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many situations involving exploration, such as businesses expanding into new products or locations, expose the explorer to the potential for subjective losses. How does the potential to experience losses during the course of a search affect individuals' appetite for exploration? In three incentivized studies, we manipulate search outcomes by presenting participants either with a gain‐only environment or a gain‐loss environment. The two environments offer objectively identical incentives for exploration: Using a framing manipulation, we decrease gain‐loss payoffs and provide participants an initial endowment to offset the difference. Participants decide how to explore a one‐dimensional space, receiving payoffs based on their location each period. We predict and find that participants are motivated to avoid losses, which increases exploration when they are incurring losses but decreases exploration when they face the potential for losses. We conclude that exploration is driven by hope of potential gains, constrained by fear of potential losses, and motivated by avoidance of experienced losses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People regularly make sense of distributions that are complicated by noise. How do individuals determine whether an outlying observation should be incorporated into one's understanding of the true distribution of the population or considered a fluke that ought to be disregarded? In a simple prediction task, we examine how individuals incorporate outliers and compare their behavior to various prescriptive models (e.g., averaging and tests of discordancy). We find that, on average, individuals do discount outlying values and that their outlier detection strategies approximate approaches that statisticians have recommended for Gaussian distributions, even when the observed distributions are not Gaussian. However, there are notable differences in treatment of outliers across individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Investors are often inclined to keep losing stocks too long, despite this being irrational. This phenomenon is part of the disposition effect ("people ride losers too long, and sell winners too soon"). The current research examines the role of hope as a potential explanation of why people ride losers too long. Three correlational studies (1A, 1B, and 2) find that people's trait hope is positively associated with their inclination to keep losing stocks, regardless of their risk‐seeking tendency (Study 2). Further, three experimental studies (3, 4, and 5) reveal that people are inclined to hold on to losing (vs. not‐losing) stocks because of their hope to break even and not because of their hope to gain. Studies 4 and 5 provide process evidence confirming the role of hope and indicate potential interventions to decrease people's tendency to keep losing stocks by reducing the hope. The findings contribute to the limited empirical literature that has investigated how emotions influence the disposition effect by providing empirical evidence for the role of hope. Moreover, the findings add to the literature of hope by revealing its role in financial decision‐making and show a "dark side" of this positive emotion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing inequality rate within countries worldwide makes social comparisons more evident. In seven experiments, we demonstrate that people comparing themselves to others in a superior socioeconomic position (upward comparison) judge that wealthier others should donate more time and money to charity. However, social comparison to others in an inferior position (downward comparison) does not always increase monetary donations. This discrepancy in prescriptions for monetary donations between those who make upward and downward social comparisons is driven by judgments about relative spare money; while people making upward comparisons believe that others have more spare money, people making downward comparisons only think they have more spare money, and should donate more, when reminded of their hierarchical position at the time of judgment. Low meritocracy beliefs exacerbate the difference between the prescriptions of how much oneself and others should donate given their socioeconomic position. This differential pattern among individuals making upward and downward social comparisons helps to propagate economic inequality. People making upward comparisons prescribe to wealthier others the responsibility to donate to charity, who in turn may not think they should donate more money. These findings have implications for charitable and non‐profit organizations and contribute to research on social comparison, inequality, and judgments about monetary and time donations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Meta‐information is information about information that can be used as cues to guide judgments and decisions. Three types of meta‐information that are routinely used in intelligence analysis are source reliability, information credibility, and classification level. The first two cues are intended to speak to information quality (in particular, the probability that the information is accurate), and classification level is intended to describe the information's security sensitivity. Two experiments involving professional intelligence analysts (N = 25 and 27, respectively) manipulated meta‐information in a 6 (source reliability) × 6 (information credibility) × 2 (classification) repeated‐measures design. Ten additional items were retested to measure intra‐individual reliability. Analysts judged the probability of information accuracy based on its meta‐informational profile. In both experiments, the judged probability of information accuracy was sensitive to ordinal position on the scales and the directionality of linguistic terms used to anchor the levels of the two scales. Directionality led analysts to group the first three levels of each scale in a positive group and the fourth and fifth levels in a negative group, with the neutral term "cannot be judged" falling between these groups. Critically, as reliability and credibility cue inconsistency increased, there was a corresponding decrease in intra‐analyst reliability, interanalyst agreement, and effective cue utilization. Neither experiment found a significant effect of classification on probability judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientific reasoning ability, the ability to reason critically about the quality of scientific evidence, can help laypeople use scientific evidence when making judgments and decisions. We ask whether individuals with greater scientific reasoning ability are also better calibrated with respect to their ability, comparing calibration for skill with the more widely studied calibration for knowledge. In three studies, participants (Study 1: N = 1022; Study 2: N = 101; and Study 3: N = 332) took the Scientific Reasoning Scale (SRS; Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017), comprised of 11 true–false problems, and provided confidence ratings for each problem. Overall, participants were overconfident, reporting mean confidence levels that were 22.4–25% higher than their percentages of correct answers; calibration improved with score. Study 2 found similar calibration patterns for the SRS and another skill, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), measuring the ability to avoid intuitive but incorrect answers. SRS and CRT scores were both associated with success at avoiding negative decision outcomes, as measured by the Decision Outcomes Inventory; confidence on the SRS, above and beyond scores, predicted worse outcomes. Study 3 added an alternative measure of calibration, asking participants to estimate the number of items answered correctly. Participants were less overconfident by this measure. SRS scores predicted correct usage of scientific information in a drug facts box task and holding beliefs consistent with the scientific consensus on controversial issues; confidence, above and beyond SRS scores, predicted worse drug facts box performance but stronger science‐consistent beliefs. We discuss the implications of our findings for improving science‐relevant decision‐making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals often face financial incentives that challenge their desire to behave honestly. Strategically making excuses to justify dishonesty allows them to give in to the temptation of financial benefit and retain their moral self‐image. In the context of insurance underwriting, the stakes are high, as providing false information or redacting information allows customers to reduce premiums. This is particularly true for smoking disclosures that carry great weight in life insurance. We conduct a field study with a large insurance company with the aim of neutralizing justification strategies that individuals deploy for reducing the costs of dishonest smoking disclosures to insurers. First, we raise awareness of the negative consequences dishonesty could have on other policy holders to counteract that individuals could attenuate or ignore such adverse consequences. Second, we make salient the pro‐social efforts of the insurer to work against a potentially negative perception of the insurance industry that may feed the excuse of insurance companies being deserving of harm. The study presents field evidence that messages containing information about the social consequences of one's actions or the pro‐social behavior of a second party can influence normative behavior, particularly honesty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how measured intelligence, referred to as IQ, predicts a consumer's decisions on whether to participate in online horse wagering, how much to spend on those bets, and which horserace betting products to consume. We combine three individual‐level archival data sets from Finland, including all online horse bets during a 1‐year period from the state‐sanctioned monopoly operator, the Finnish Defence Forces' IQ test scores from male conscripts born between 1962 and 1990 (N = 705,809), and administrative registry data on socioeconomic status, income, and education for these men. An analysis of male bettors (N = 15,488) shows that IQ is a positive predictor of participation and spending. In addition, high IQ is associated with choosing more complex (high variance) betting products. We find that these results are driven primarily by numerical IQ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context effects in decision making refer to any influence on options evaluation resulting from its relational properties with other available alternatives. Over the last 40 years, a large corpus of research showed that decision makers are sensitive to irrelevant options and tend to modify their preferences depending on choice architecture. The attraction effect is a well‐known example of context effect, which describes an increase in preferences for an option when a dominated alternative is inserted in the choice set. Sequential sampling models (SSM) interpret decision biases as the result of a dynamic comparative process between the available options that alters subjective values attribution. Recently, SSM received empirical support from eye‐tracking studies that documented a decoy‐dependent allocation of attention. In this study, we integrate previous process‐tracing results using a new hidden‐attribute protocol, in which decision makers have to explore products' attributes, keep in mind their values, and deliberately compare the options. This new methodology allows this study to offer additional evidence on the role of decoys in the dynamic process of choice. In a consumer‐choice task, the addition of an asymmetrically dominated decoy first focused the attention on the target during attributes exploration, which in turn led to an increase in the dominant option preferences at the choice stage. This suggests that adding irrelevant options affects the information sampling procedures, insofar as the comparative process is influenced by the dominance relationship of the alternatives. These results are consistent with past eye‐tracking studies and verify previous connectionist theories of the attraction effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is one of the most popular measures of individual differences in rational thought and decision making. To overcome the issue of overlap with numeracy, a novel measure of cognitive reflection less related to numeracy and math anxiety than Numerical CRT was developed—Verbal CRT. The present research had two main aims: first to investigate the generalizability of Verbal CRT in cultural contexts outside the United States/United Kingdom and second to test the factor structure linking traditional—numerical—CRT, Verbal CRT, numeracy, and fluid intelligence. In Studies 1a and 1b, we adapted and tested the validity and psychometric properties of Polish versions of tasks and scales. Next, using a large and diverse sample of Polish adults, we tested five models of the factor structure of cognitive abilities and thinking dispositions (Study 2). The most parsimonious and best‐fitted model contained three latent variables: Verbal CRT, numeracy (composed of the items from the Berlin Numeracy Test and traditional—numerical—CRT), and fluid intelligence. In line with previous research, our results show that Verbal CRT is a valid cognitive reflection measure that provides a clearer interpretation than traditional CRT, even in a different language and cultural context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When people see that others lie for financial profit, they are more likely to lie themselves. But do people search for information about others' behavior in ethically tempting situations? And among those who search, what type of information do they search for? Specifically, do people search for information about others' dishonesty in particular, to justify their future transgressions, or do they search for information about others' behavior in general to learn about the descriptive social norm? Across four financially incentivized experiments (Ntotal = 2642), participants engaged in a task in which they could lie for profit. Before starting their task, participants could search for information about others' behavior in the same task. Results reveal that when people search for information, they do so in order to learn about the descriptive norm, not to intentionally learn about others' dishonesty. When the decision to search for information results in observing more dishonest others, participants become more dishonest themselves. Testing a boundary condition revealed that when information search is costly (vs. free), people search for less information, observe less dishonest others, and subsequently are less dishonest themselves. Findings suggest that in settings where people may act dishonestly, information about others behavior should be costly to obtain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has shown that when people combine verbal probabilistic forecasts from two sources, they are not simply averaged but can reinforce each other; so when two advisors both said an event was "rather likely," some listeners concluded that the event was "quite likely". Conversely, when both said the event was "rather unlikely," people concluded that it was "quite unlikely." The present studies demonstrate that the direction of this effect is not evoked by high versus low probabilities, but by the directionality of verbal probability expressions. Some phrases are affirmative, directed towards occurrences ("there is a chance"), whereas others are negations, pointing to the possibility that the event might not occur ("it is not certain"). Two positive phrases are perceived to reinforce each other, even when they convey low probabilities, resulting in a higher combined probability estimate, whereas two negative phrases do the opposite, regardless of the probabilities they convey. We show that this effect occurs both for equal and unequal verbal phrases, regardless of the probability equivalents of the expressions. We also found a positive, but weaker, reinforcement effect of numerical probabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dishonesty erodes society. Although much is known about dishonesty, the process leading up to the decision of whether to be honest or dishonest is often assumed to be homogenous and is not well understood. In this paper, we take a more nuanced approach and explore more closely the process of deciding whether to cheat or be honest when an opportunity to cheat arises. We do this in two laboratory eye tracking experiments. In our first experiment (n = 193), we identify heterogeneity in the decision to cheat. Some decisions on whether to cheat or be honest exhibit relatively little variation and appear to be oriented towards cheating (or honesty) with apparently little consideration of the alternative, whereas other decisions seem to be characterized by a higher degree of consideration for both decision alternatives. Our second experiment (n = 299) demonstrates that a gaze dependent intervention in the choices process is able to affect the behavioral outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies four attentional processes that increase efficiency and accuracy in repeated lexicographic tasks using an instructed strategy approach. We propose a framework to decompose attentional effort used to make a decision into four components: Orientation, Wrong Target, Duration, and Repetition. Orientation assesses attention to decision rules and the location of relevant information. Wrong Target measures wasted effort on unneeded information. Duration gauges time spent on each piece of needed information. Repetition measures the number of views on each relevant item. Greater Orientation is associated with lower effort in other components and increased accuracy. Repetition is most variable across individuals but generates the greatest improvement with practice. Duration is less affected by the other components and shows minimal improvement with experience. Finally, Wrong Target is similarly resistant to practice, but it is the only component strongly and positively associated with making errors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Choice blindness is the finding that participants both often fail to notice mismatches between their decisions and the outcome of their choice and, in addition, endorse the opposite of their chosen alternative. But do these preference reversals also carry over to future choices and ratings? To investigate this question, we gave participants the task of choosing which of a pair of faces they found most attractive. Unknown to them, we sometimes used a card trick to exchange one face for the other. Both decision theory and common sense strongly suggest that most people would easily notice such a radical change in the outcome of a choice. But that was not the case: no more than a third of the exchanges were detected by the participants. We also included a second round of choices using the same face pairs, and two stages of post-choice attractiveness ratings of the faces. This way we were able to measure preference strength both as choice consistency and by looking at measures of rating differences between chosen and rejected options. We found that the initially rejected faces were chosen more frequently in the second choice, and the perceived attractiveness of these faces was increased even in uncoupled individual ratings at the end of the experiment. This result is discussed in relation to Chen and Risen's recent criticism of the Free Choice Paradigm, as it shows that choices can affect future preferences. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the same decision to act can occur in multiple contexts, how these contexts differentially influence behavior is not well understood. In this paper, we investigate whether contextual framing affects individuals' behavior in spatial decision making. Although previous research suggests that individuals' judgments are sensitive to contextual (and particularly moral) factors of a scenario, no work has addressed whether this effect extends to spatial decisions. To investigate the impact of context on perceptual sensorimotor behavior, we superimposed two moral dilemmas (which we call help and harm) on a spatial decision‐making paradigm. The basic task required participants select a target area while avoiding an overlapping nontarget area. Although the visuospatial task was constant, the moral context was changed when participants had to execute either a drone missile strike on enemies in the harm context or deliver ammunition to allies in the help context. Participants more strongly avoided losses in the harm context, reflected by a greater selection bias away from the nontarget (i.e., allies) on drone strike trials. These findings suggest that the contextual framing of a subjective perceived loss on a spatial decision can drive avoidant motor execution behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A persistently pressing issue identified in the decision‐making literature is that people not only fail to recognize the risks entailed in a near‐loss event but also subsequently engage in further risk‐taking. We contend in this paper that prevention motivation critically regulates decision‐makers' responses to a near‐loss. Across three studies, we found that high prevention‐focused individuals perceive greater risks in a near‐loss event and are subsequently less likely to take risks, compared with low prevention‐focused individuals. This finding highlights the significance of applying a motivational perspective to studying decision‐making and risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research provides evidence for a new moderator of the endowment effect: having a memento of the endowed object. Three studies adapting classic endowment effect paradigms and using a variety of endowment objects and mementos demonstrate that having a memento of an endowment increases willingness to trade the endowment and decreases selling prices for the endowment. We provide evidence that mementos attenuate the endowment effect regardless of whether the memento is a separate small gain when facing the loss of the endowment or a small part of the original endowment that is kept. Examining mementos in context of the endowment effect not only provides insight into the psychology underlying the reluctance to part with one's endowment but also other consumer disposition behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Five experiments examined the role of resource evaluability on giving. We systematically varied participants' resources they and another potential donor received and whether they could donate to a recipient either by themselves or with the other donor. Participants in the relative advantage condition received more resources than the other donor, and those in the relative disadvantage condition received fewer resources than the other donor. The presence of the other donor made participants' resources evaluable and shaped giving: Relatively disadvantaged participants were proportionally more generous than advantaged participants but only when they could evaluate their resources. Neither the mere presence of others nor reputational concerns could explain the results. Exploratory mediation and moderation analyses further showed that relatively disadvantaged participants give proportionally more the higher and the more equal they perceive their status to the advantaged donor. This shows that the generosity of those who have less does depend on how they evaluate their status compared to other donors. Our results provide insights into the question of why and when resource asymmetries between donors result in prosocial giving and can influence fundraising strategies of charitable organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most studies of ambiguity aversion rely on experimental paradigms involving monetary bets. Thus, the extent to which ambiguity aversion occurs outside of such contexts is much less understood, particularly when the situation cannot easily be reduced to numerical terms. The present work seeks to understand whether people prefer to avoid ambiguous decisions in a variety of different qualitative domains (e.g., work, family, love, friendship, exercise, study, and health), and, if so, to determine the role played by prior beliefs in those domains. Across three studies, we presented participants with 24 vignettes and measured the degree to which they preferred risk to ambiguity in each. We also asked them for their prior probability estimates about the likely outcomes in the ambiguous events. Ambiguity aversion was observed in the vast majority of vignettes, but at different magnitudes. It was predicted by whether the vignette involved gain or loss as well as by people's prior beliefs; however, the heterogeneity between people meant that the role of prior beliefs was only evident in an individual‐level analysis (i.e., not at the group level). Our results suggest that the desire to avoid ambiguity occurs in a wide variety of qualitative contexts but to different degrees for different people and may be partially driven by unfavorable prior estimates of the likely outcomes of the ambiguous events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effect of performance‐based incentives on judgment biases is a controversial issue. A recent extensive meta‐analysis of Brañas‐Garza et al. (2019, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2019.101455) found no effect of incentives on performance in the cognitive reflection test (CRT), a test commonly used for assessing heuristic versus deliberative judgments. We conducted a meta‐analysis of studies that directly compared an incentive versus no‐incentive conditions (n = 2836) and found a small positive effect of incentivization (Cohen's d =.21) on CRT performance. In addition, we re‐examined the Brañas‐Garza et al. (2019) dataset (n = 39,385), taking into consideration not only whether incentivization was used but also the nominal and fiscal size of the incentive. The results show that surprisingly when including only studies that used monetary incentives, the effect of incentivization and incentive size are significant, even when taking into consideration other aspects of the studies. The results thus suggest a small but robust effect of incentives on judgment biases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past research has found that people treat advice differently depending on its source. In many cases, people seem to prefer human advice to algorithms, but in others, there is a reversal, and people seem to prefer algorithmic advice. Across two studies, we examine the persuasiveness of, and judges' preferences for, advice from different sources when forecasting geopolitical events. We find that judges report domain‐specific preferences, preferring human advice in the domain of politics and algorithmic advice in the domain of economics. In Study 2, participants report a preference for hybrid advice, that combines human and algorithmic sources, to either one on it's own regardless of domain. More importantly, we find that these preferences did not affect persuasiveness of advice from these different sources, regardless of domain. Judges were primarily sensitive to quantitative features pertaining to the similarity between their initial beliefs and the advice they were offered, such as the distance between them and the relative advisor confidence, when deciding whether to revise their initial beliefs in light of advice, rather than the source that generated the advice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This manuscript proposes a novel mechanism of multi‐issue bilateral bargaining under incomplete information. A single seller and single buyer negotiate the prices of multiple items by submitting offers and counteroffers in which the items are traded as a package deal. Trade occurs if the sum of the individual profits across all items is non‐negative. We experimentally compare a simultaneous protocol, where the two sets of price offers are submitted simultaneously, to a sequential protocol, where traders exchange offers and counteroffers with a deadline before submitting independently their final asks and bids. Our results show that the participants concluded more trades under the sequential protocol, that they shaved their price offers considerably, and that they often traded‐off price offers, sustaining negative profit on one or more of their items to increase their expected total profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper tests whether the dimensions involved in preferential choice tasks are evaluated independently from one another. Common decision heuristics satisfy dimensional independence, and multi‐strategy models that assume that decision makers use a repertoire of these heuristics predict that they are unable to represent and respond to dimensional dependencies in the decision environment. In contrast, some single‐strategy models are able to violate dimensional independence, and subsequently adapt to environments that feature interacting dimensions. Across five experiments, this paper documents systematic violations of the assumption of dimensional independence. This suggests that decision makers are able to modify their behavior to respond to dimensional dependencies in their environment, and in turn those models that are unable to do this do not provide a full account of human strategy selection and behavior change. This paper ends with a discussion of ways in which some existing models can be modified to incorporate violations of dimensional independence. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charitable giving entails the act of foregoing personal resources in order to improve the conditions of other people. In the present paper, we systematically examine two dimensions integral to donation decisions that have thus far received relatively little attention but can explain charitable behavior rather well: the perceptions of cost for the donor and benefit for the recipients. In line with current theories in judgment and decision making, we hypothesize that people weigh these dimensions subjectively and perceive them asymmetrically, consistent with prospect theory. Costs for the donor are typically perceived as losses, whereas benefits for recipients are perceived as gains. In four studies, we presented several scenarios to participants in which both donation amounts (costs) and number of lives helped (benefits) were manipulated while keeping the ratio of costs and benefits constant. Results from Studies 1 and 2 showed that willingness to help decreased as donation amounts and number of lives helped increased. Additionally, Studies 3 and 4 provide evidence for a solution to reduce the asymmetry and increase donation amounts as the number of lives at risk increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large body of research has found evidence that hiring decisions are frequently subject to strong gender bias and has explored factors that help to predict and prevent such a bias from occurring. In this paper, we explore a novel factor that has received only little attention: the composition of the choice set. Drawing on prior research on the attraction effect of decoys in consumer choice and personnel decisions, we posit that when decision makers need to decide whether to hire a male or a female applicant for a stereotypically male position, the presence of a third applicant whose profile is asymmetrically dominated by one of the two applicants can in many circumstances strongly increase the odds that the male applicant will be selected, but will not be beneficial for the female applicant. We test our hypotheses in five experimental studies with different designs, experimental settings, and participant pools—including managers with professional experience in hiring decisions. Our results provide robust evidence demonstrating the strong effects of choice set composition on the emergence of gender bias. In addition, we found that the presence of asymmetrically dominated applicants makes decision makers more confident in their biased decisions and more likely to implement them immediately without searching for further information. Finally, our results also provide some initial evidence that our results for stereotypically male positions will be reversed when hiring decisions are made for stereotypically female positions where the presence of decoys instead gives an advantage to female over male applicants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite abundant literature theorizing societal implications of algorithmic decision making, relatively little is known about the conditions that lead to the acceptance or rejection of algorithmically generated insights by individual users of decision aids. More specifically, recent findings of algorithm aversion—the reluctance of human forecasters to use superior but imperfect algorithms—raise questions about whether joint human‐algorithm decision making is feasible in practice. In this paper, we systematically review the topic of algorithm aversion as it appears in 61 peer‐reviewed articles between 1950 and 2018 and follow its conceptual trail across disciplines. We categorize and report on the proposed causes and solutions of algorithm aversion in five themes: expectations and expertise, decision autonomy, incentivization, cognitive compatibility, and divergent rationalities. Although each of the presented themes addresses distinct features of an algorithmic decision aid, human users of the decision aid, and/or the decision making environment, apparent interdependencies are highlighted. We conclude that resolving algorithm aversion requires an updated research program with an emphasis on theory integration. We provide a number of empirical questions that can be immediately carried forth by the behavioral decision making community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates whether sharing behavior is multidimensional and embedded in social organization and modes of economic production. It uses a modified dictator game varying social distance to the recipient and varying the resource (money vs. six in‐kind resources) being shared among the pastoral Maasai of Kenya. Results show that both social distance and the nature of the resource matter for sharing as well as their combination. The discussion argues that these findings are consistent with the nature and role of these resources in the pastoral livelihood among the Maasai. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors promote or hinder volunteering within organizations and groups? This paper simultaneously explores the impact of individual, contextual, and sociocultural variables on decision making in a special type of social dilemma: the volunteer's dilemma game (VDG). The VDG provides a controlled experimental method for studying volunteering behaviors in an anonymous interactive environment. We developed six variations of the VDG and administered them to economics students in five different cultures (Ntotal = 603). Among other things, these VDGs varied whether the potential benefits of volunteering were certain or uncertain. Although the overall level of volunteering did not vary substantially across most cultural groups, we found that culture interacted with the size and (un)certainty of the benefits associated with volunteering, to influence volunteering decisions. We also found that religiosity (but not religious affiliation per se) increases volunteering and that men are less likely to volunteer when the returns to doing so are certain. These results extend our knowledge of behaviors in the VDG, and their potential drivers, with clear implications for understanding how culture, individual characteristics, and context jointly influence prosocial behavior and coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In charitable advertisements, organizations often display the image of a person in need with different facial emotional expressions. Prior research showed the positive effect of using a sad‐ (vs. happy‐ or neutral‐) faced image in evoking sympathy from viewers. Across five studies (N = 2141), we demonstrate that a sad‐faced image evokes not only sympathy but also an inference about the organization's manipulative intent. Moreover, we show that inference of manipulative intent and sympathy simultaneously mediate the effects of facial expression on donation and on attitude toward the advertising campaign, but in opposing directions. While greater sympathy leads to larger donation, greater inference of manipulative intent lowers donation, together contributing to a null effect of facial expression on donation. In contrast, using a sad‐faced image reduces attitude toward the advertising campaign because the mediating effect of inference of manipulative intent tends to be larger than the mediating effect of sympathy in absolute size. The negative effect of a sad‐faced image on attitude toward the advertising campaign is attenuated when the prominence of the image is low (vs. high). Finally, we show that these effects also emerge in the cause‐related marketing advertising context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research shows that investors check their portfolios less frequently when they believe negative returns on investments are likely. This so‐called ostrich effect is accounted for by belief‐based utility theories that suggest that information demand is determined by the potential of information to evoke or maintain pleasant beliefs. An alternative is that information matters as there are more courses of action that investors would take with positive than negative portfolio returns. Across three experiments, we adapt a non‐instrumental sampling paradigm to verify whether people are more likely to seek out information when expecting small gains as compared to losses when the instrumental utility of outcome information is 0. We also explore whether the effect can be attenuated by making outcome information easier to find. Our findings suggest that people are more likely to initiate and persist in search for prospective financial gains than losses, and for unknown than known financial outcomes, even though confirming any given outcome is effectively useless. The magnitude of the ostrich effect increased with increased certainty of a financial gain and loss. Making outcome information easier to find increased the likelihood that an outcome would be discovered but did not strongly modify intent to seek it out or moderate ostrich effects. We discuss how the findings are consistent with non‐instrumental utility frameworks for information demand, inconsistent with literature showing greater attention to financial loss than gain outcome information, and propose testable hypotheses for resolving the discrepancy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies have investigated moral decision‐making by using moral dilemmas that involve a single decision. This article extends this paradigm, introducing two‐stage scenarios to examine how moral decision‐making is influenced by previous decisions in the same narrative—especially whether people tend to stay consistent or to reconsider within a morally challenging situation. It further compares decision‐making between two‐stage and one‐stage scenarios. In Study 1 (N = 239), participants read scenarios requiring two successive decisions of harming one person to spare multiple people (utilitarian action), or vice versa (deontological action), within the same narrative. Second decisions were mostly found to be consistent with first decisions. Remarkably, inconsistent responding (switching) was robustly observed in about 29% of cases. Study 2 (N = 63), using one‐stage scenarios, showed that having made a previous decision in the same narrative generally decreased utilitarian responding. Potential explanations for these phenomena are discussed. The present article concludes that prior choices within the same setting significantly influence decision‐making. It also reveals the potential of gaining new insights using multiple‐stage scenarios in moral decision‐making research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent do countries and people within countries vary in their perceptions about the risks and benefits of engaging in risky activities? And to what extent are these variations influenced by risk domains? We used generalizability theory to identify and quantify the variance components in perceived risk and benefit ratings that are attributable to differences between cultures, across raters within cultures, and across risk domains. Our results, based on two archival datasets from the United States and Japan, revealed that, although there is nontrivial variability in risk and benefit perceptions between American and Japanese raters, the amount of variability was smaller between cultures compared with across raters within cultures. Moreover, investment risk perceptions and gambling benefit perceptions were predominantly influenced by differences across raters within cultures, and hence, large numbers of raters would be needed to properly represent ratings of the corresponding populations. Our findings suggest that variability in risk and benefit judgments across raters from different cultures should not be simply attributed to pure cultural differences. Rather, a multi‐faceted approach, where multiple sources of variance are simultaneously considered, should be adopted to properly understand and effectively influence judgments of risk and benefit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a large dataset from the COVIDiSTRESS Global Survey Consortium spanning 49 countries (N = 102,830), we examined the robustness of Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) framing effect within each country using a variation of the classic Asian Disease Scenario. Results indicated that the framing effect—where respondents are more likely to take the safe option (i.e., a known number of lives saved or lost) than the risky option (i.e., a probability of saving lives) when framed as a gain (i.e., number of lives saved) instead of a loss (i.e., number of lives lost)—was replicated in 100% of the countries examined (h = 0.612, 95% CI [0.568, 0.656]). Results showed that societal collectivism was negatively associated with individual propensity to select the safer option in both the gain and loss framed conditions. Collectivism was also partly related to smaller framing effect sizes at the country level. Implications and future directions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The highly influential Allingham and Sandmo model of income tax evasion assumes that taxpayers are driven by utility maximization, choosing evasion over compliance if it yields a higher expected profit. We test the main assumptions of this so‐called deterrence approach considering both compliance decisions and the process of information acquisition using MouselabWEB. In an incentivized experiment, 109 participants made 24 compliance decisions with varying information presented for four within‐subject factors (the four central model parameters: income, tax rate, audit probability, and fine level). Additionally, explicit expected value information was indicated in one of two conditions. The results reveal that participants attended to all relevant information, a prerequisite for expected value‐like calculations. As predicted by the deterrence model, choices were clearly influenced by audit probability and fine level. Against the model assumptions, the presented parameters were not integrated adequately, indicated by a non‐monotonic increase of evasion with rising expected rate of return from evasion. Additionally, more transitions between information necessary for calculating expected values did not result in higher model conformity, just as presenting explicit information on expected values. We conclude that deterrence information clearly influences tax compliance decisions in our setting but observed deviations from the deterrence model can be attributed to failures to properly integrate all relevant parameters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A robust finding in psychological research is that combining information with a mechanical rule results in more valid predictions than combining information holistically in the mind. Nevertheless, information is typically combined holistically in practice, resulting in suboptimal predictions and decisions. Earlier research showed that decision makers are more likely to use mechanical prediction procedures when they retain autonomy in the decision‐making process. However, it remains largely unknown how different autonomy‐enhancing features affect predictive validity. Therefore, in two preregistered studies (total N = 342), we investigated if and how prediction procedures can be designed such that they satisfy decision makers' autonomy needs and acceptance without reducing predictive validity. Based on archival application data from a university admission procedure, participants predicted applicants' first‐year grade point average and chance of dropout. The results of Bayesian analyses showed that participants preferred prediction procedures in which they retained autonomy by choosing consistent predictor weights of a mechanical rule or by holistically adjusting the predictions of an optimal regression model. In general, these prediction procedures resulted in slightly higher predictive validity compared with fully holistic prediction. Providing participants with predictor validity information slightly increased predictive validity when participants could choose predictor weights but not when making holistic predictions or adjusting optimal model predictions. Giving decision makers a role in designing mechanical rules through choosing weights based on explicit predictive validity information could help promote the implementation and validity of mechanical prediction in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In interpersonal relations, it is known that expressing self‐conscious emotions such as guilt and shame following a transgression is beneficial to reconciliation. In the current research, we examine whether this also applies to intergroup relations. Groups of three persons played an intergroup version of the "centipede game," in which one party can cooperate with or exploit another party. In Study 1, two groups played six rounds of this game in each of two phases. Between phases, groups rated how much guilt, shame, and pride they experienced in relation to how they had performed in Phase 1; these ratings were shared with the opposing group. Groups expressing high levels of guilt and shame were associated with greater cooperation in Phase 2, whereas groups expressing high levels of pride were associated with lower cooperation in Phase 2. In Study 2, all groups played against a "group" programmed to behave in an exploitative way in Phase 1. This group then expressed shame, pride, or no emotion (control) about its performance. Cooperation in Phase 2 was significantly higher in the shame than in the pride condition, and altruistic punishment was highest in the pride condition and lowest in the shame condition. Between them, these studies show that emotional expression plays an important role in repairing intergroup relationships and in particular that expressing shame about a transgression enhances intergroup cooperation following a transgression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Brunswik lens model typically represents a judge's accuracy using parameters derived from linear regression. This is not optimal if the judgment or the ecological criterion is dichotomous. Alternative approaches, modeling dichotomies using logistic regression, or linearizing judgments with confidence ratings, have not been compared with the same data. Four techniques for deriving lens model equation parameters were compared: (i) linear and (ii) logistic regression applied to dichotomous patient outcomes and judgments; (iii) linear regression with confidence-adjusted judgments but dichotomous patient outcomes; and (iv) a hybrid with a linear model of the confidence-adjusted judgments and a logistic model of the patient outcomes. Judgment accuracy (ra) was slightly higher with confidence adjustment of the categorical judgments. The logistic lens model accounted for a higher proportion of ra than the linear lens model; the confident-linear and hybrid lens models were intermediate. For up to a quarter of participants, different methods identified different cues as most important. Display condition differences in achievement ra and in lens model components are similar with all lens model methods. Each of the three alternative lens model equation methods improves on the linear lens model equation's decomposition of the accuracy of dichotomous judgments. Confidence adjustment improves achievement although it requires additional work from the subjects. The logistic lens model equation explains the highest proportion of achievement, but with a small stimulus set, it is more vulnerable to cue intercorrelations than either the linear or the confident linear lens model equation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper, we provide a domain‐general scoping review of the nudge movement by reviewing 422 choice architecture interventions in 156 empirical studies. We report the distribution of the studies across countries, years, domains, subdomains of applicability, intervention types, and the moderators associated with each intervention category to review the current state of the nudge movement. Furthermore, we highlight certain characteristics of the studies and experimental and reporting practices that can hinder the accumulation of evidence in the field. Specifically, we found that 74% of the studies were mainly motivated to assess the effectiveness of the interventions in one specific setting, while only 24% of the studies focused on the exploration of moderators or underlying processes. We also observed that only 7% of the studies applied power analysis, 2% used guidelines aiming to improve the quality of reporting, no study in our database was preregistered, and the used intervention nomenclatures were non‐exhaustive and often have overlapping categories. Building on our current observations and proposed solutions from other fields, we provide directly applicable recommendations for future research to support the evidence accumulation on why and when nudges work. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Everyday life is full of self-control problems. The economist's favorite explanation for self-control problems is present bias. This paper tests whether experimentally elicited present bias predicts self-control problems in everyday life. We measure present bias by using a standard incentivized delay discounting task and everyday self-control by using the day reconstruction method (DRM). Because this is the first study to measure everyday self-control by using the DRM, we also validate the method by showing that its data replicate key results from the seminal Everyday Temptation Study. We find that present bias does not predict everyday self-control. This points to a distinction between decreasing impatience (as measured in delay discounting tasks) and visceral influences (as occurring in everyday life) as determinants of self-control problems. We argue that decision making research can benefit from the DRM as a cost-effective tool that complements lab and field experiments to better understand economic preference measures and their correlates in everyday life decision making. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The bundling literature largely holds that a person's reaction to a given product bundle depends only on the characteristics of the products contained in the bundle. This paper, instead, proposes that people evaluate bundles in reference to other bundles that they have seen. Prior research indicates that people are sensitive to a bundle's "attribute inventory" or the aggregate level of comparable attributes possessed by its constituent products. We show that when people evaluate a bundle, they compare the attribute inventories that it offers to those offered by other bundles that they have seen. The resulting compositional comparisons can occur without changes to the products that comprise the target and contextual bundles, vary by attribute comparability and attentional focus, and coexist with (and at times reverse the effects of) well‐established product‐specific context effects, which are determined solely by the products and their attributes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]