Search

The article presents questions and answers related to archival records of the U.S. Congress, including a description of archival records in the Congressional context, the laws and customs governing the records of Congress, and guidance on managing these records.

The article discusses the force structure transformation initiative of the 2024 Army. Topics include reasons that U.S. Army has reorganized or transformed its force structure on several occasions, the transformation of the force structure of the Army on four major occasions since 2000, and potential considerations for Congress.

The article focuses on the management of historical materials by congressional offices and committees, with archivists preserving these files to benefit future Congresses and researchers. Topics include variations in recordkeeping rules for different office types, status of materials in Members' offices as personal property, and the closure periods for public access to House and Senate records, along with guidance from the House and Senate archivists on accessing and managing archival records.

The article focuses on the U.S. Congressional Research Service's it reports on design and features of U.S. paper currency. It describes the history of paper money in the U.S., it mentions the introduction of greenbacks during the Civil War and the establishment of the Secret Service Division to combat counterfeiting. It discusses the current design of U.S. currency, including the portraits featured on bills, and the three levels of security features to guard against counterfeiting.

The article provides information on the Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) system that is being developed by the U.S. Army. Details are presented on M-SHORAD requirements, variants or increments, fiscal year 2024 M-SHORAD budget request, and oversight considerations for the U.S. Congress such as the Russo-Ukraine conflict and the 2024 "Army Force Structure Transformation" white paper which proposes additional M-SHORAD battalions.

The article focuses on the U.S. Congress might use the process of amendment exchange and proposing alternatives in the form of amendments, until both chambers have agreed to the same text. It mentions decision to use the amendment exchange route has procedural implications and opportunity that is generally assured on initial consideration of a bill or joint resolution. it also mentions amendments between the houses are not subject to the same procedures as conference reports.

In the second half of the 19th century, the federal government pursued a policy of confining Indian tribes to reservations. The federal statutes and treaties reserving such land for Indian reservations typically did not address the water needs of these reservations, a fact that has given rise to questions and disputes regarding Indian reserved water rights. Dating to a 1908 Supreme Court ruling, courts generally have held that many tribes have a reserved right to water sufficient to fulfill the purpose of their reservations and that this right took effect on the date the reservations were established. This means that, in the context of a state water law system of prior appropriations, which is common in many U.S. western states, many tribes have water rights senior to those of non-Indian users with water rights and access established subsequent to the Indian reservations' creation. Although many Indian tribes hold senior water rights through their reservations, the quantification of these rights is undetermined in many cases. Since 1990, the Department of the Interior's policy has been that Indian water rights should be resolved through negotiated settlements rather than litigation. These agreements allow tribes to quantify their water rights on paper, while also procuring access to water through infrastructure and other related expenses. In addition to tribes and federal government representatives, settlement negotiations may involve states, water districts, and private water users, among others. After congressional approval, federal projects associated with approved Indian water rights settlements generally have been implemented by the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) or the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), pursuant to congressional directions. Approval and implementation of Indian water rights settlements typically requires federal action-often in the form of congressional approval. As of October 2023, 39 Indian water rights settlements had been federally approved, with total estimated costs in excess of $8.5 billion (nominal dollars). Of these, 35 settlements were approved and enacted by Congress and 4 were administratively approved by the U.S. Departments of Justice and the Interior. One new settlement was approved in the 117th Congress, and another existing settlement was amended. Additional new and amended settlements have been proposed in the 118th Congress. Historically, federal funding for settlements generally has been provided through discretionary appropriations; Congress also has approved mandatory funding for some settlements. The Reclamation Water Settlements Fund was created in 2009 under P.L. 111-11 as a source of additional funding for existing and future settlements. It is scheduled to provide $120 million per year in mandatory funding for settlements through FY2029, with the availability of these funds set to expire in FY2034. In 2021, Congress approved and appropriated $2.5 billion for another Indian water rights fund, the Indian Water Rights Settlement Completion Fund, in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58). Primary issues for Congress may include the cost, contents, and sufficiency of federally authorized efforts to settle tribal water rights claims, as well as the circumstances under which these settlements are considered, approved, and funded. Many have noted that the resolution of Indian water rights settlements is a mutually beneficial means of resolving long-standing legal issues. Although there is little opposition to the generally stated principle that negotiated settlements are preferable to litigation, in some cases the executive branch and/or other water users oppose individual settlements (or elements thereof). Other questions include how to manage cost overruns associated with these settlements and what entity should have primary responsibility for settlement implementation and oversight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the transcripts of interviews with more than 400 U.S. and other policymakers that were carried out between 2014 and 2018 by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. It mentions the U.S. policies in Afghanistan often were poorly planned, resourced; and also mentions that anti-corruption, counternarcotics, and other mission priorities rarely fit neatly under one agency or department's purview.

The article focuses on the state of the U.S. economy during the 118th Congress, highlighting the severe shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic,imbalanced by supply disruptions leading to high inflation and a tight labor market. Topics include the Federal Reserve's response to high inflation through interest rate increases, the risk of recession amid post-pandemic rebalancing, and the potential need for fiscal policy adjustments to ensure a soft landing.

The article focuses on poverty in the U.S. in 2022, comparing the official poverty measure with the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM). Topics include the differences between these measures, their impact on poverty statistics, and how they reflect varying definitions of income and need. It mentions the official measure showed no significant change in poverty rates, the SPM revealed a notable increase, highlighting the importance of considering factors like after-tax income.

The article focuses on federal data management, highlighting the importance of data standards in enhancing data usability, consistency, and interoperability across government agencies. Topics include the various types of data standards, their implications for policymaking, challenges in implementing them effectively, and the role of chief data officers in managing data standards within agencies. It mentions U.S. Congress's role in enacting policies requiring data.

The article focuses on the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and its implications for federal voter registration processes. Topics include the NVRA's requirements for voter registration, its implementation through agencies like the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and later the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), and the ongoing interest of Congress in voter registration legislation, as evidenced by the introduction of numerous bills. Was this response.

The article focuses on U.S. naturalization policy, outlining the process for lawful permanent residents (LPRs) to obtain citizenship, the benefits of naturalization, and concerns regarding processing backlogs for naturalization applications. Topics include the eligibility criteria, the significance of naturalization for immigrants, and potential legislative interests such as addressing processing delays and supporting language and civics education initiatives.

The article focuses on the regulations surrounding the naming of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facilities, which are primarily determined by Congress through legislation. Topics include the legal authority for naming facilities, the transfer of facility names, and the rules established by the House and Senate Committees on Veterans' Affairs for naming VA facilities after individuals, with specific criteria outlined for eligibility.

The article focuses on the transition to Next Generation 911 (NG911) infrastructure, highlighting its potential to improve emergency response services by enabling multimedia transmissions and interoperability among Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs). Topics include the funding landscape for NG911 upgrades, estimated costs for nationwide implementation, legislative proposals for federal funding, and policy considerations for Congress regarding grant programs, and integration with FirstNet.

The article focuses on the Navy's Constellation (FFG-62) class frigate program, detailing its procurement plans and potential oversight issues for Congress, such as delays in delivery, cost growth concerns, and regarding shipyard involvement and technical risks. It also provides background information on the Navy's force of small surface combatants (SSCs), including frigates, littoral combat ships (LCSs), and mine warfare ships, outlining the Navy's force-level goals and shipbuilding plans.

The article focuses on the U.S. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, addressing common inquiries regarding its funding, expenditures, assistance caseload, benefit amounts, and work requirements. It highlights the fixed federal funding provided to states, the utilization of funds for various benefits and services, and the impact of inflation on the value of the TANF basic block grant.

The article focuses on the evolving adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in the financial services industry, driven by technology advancements and automation. It discusses how AI/ML technologies have been integrated into various financial functions, such as customer service, investment identification, lending models, and fraud prevention, while policymakers grapple with regulatory challenges to ensure compliance and address potential risks.

The article focuses on pensions and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) as vital sources of retirement income for American households, with recent congressional interest centering on various investment issues. Topics include the role of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing in pension plans, regulatory responses to private sector pension issues, and legislative activity concerning the investment practices of the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) and other retirement accounts.

The Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer program is one of the longest-running shipbuilding programs in Navy history. The Navy began procuring DDG-51s, also known as Aegis destroyers, in FY1985, and a total of 94 have been procured through FY2024, including two in FY2024. From FY1989 through FY2005, DDG-51s were procured in annual quantities of two to five ships per year. Since FY2010, they have been procured in annual quantities of one to three ships per year. (The Navy did not procure any DDG-51s in FY2006-FY2009. Instead, the Navy in FY2007-FY2009 procured three Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers. The Navy plans no further procurement of DDG-1000s.) The Navy's proposed FY2025 budget requests the procurement of two more DDG-51s in FY2025. The Navy's FY2025 five-year (FY2025-FY2029) shipbuilding plan includes 10 DDG-51s, to be procured at a rate of two ships per year. As part of its FY2023 budget submission, the Navy requested authority for using a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2023-FY2027. Congress, as part of its action on the Navy's proposed FY2023 budget, approved this request. Four previous MYP contracts for the DDG-51 program covered DDG-51s procured in FY1998-FY2001, FY2002-FY2005, FY2013-FY2017, and FY2018-FY2022. The first DDG-51 entered service in 1991, and a total of 73 have been delivered as of March 2024. The DDG-51 design has been updated multiple times over the years; the version currently being procured, called the Flight III DDG-51 design, incorporates a new and more capable radar called the SPY-6 radar. DDG-51s currently cost about $2.5 billion each to procure. The Navy's proposed FY2025 budget estimates the combined procurement cost of the two DDG-51s requested for procurement in FY2025 at $4,958.8 million (i.e., about $5.0 billion). The two ships have received $233.0 million in prior-year Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding, which is a kind of advance procurement (AP) funding that can occur under an MYP contract. The Navy's proposed FY2025 budget requests the remaining $4,725.8 million needed to complete the two ships' estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy's proposed FY2025 budget also requests $41.7 million in EOQ funding, $1,683.4 million in procurement funding to cover cost growth on the five DDG-51s procured in FY2023 and FY2024, and $233.5 million in cost-to-complete (CTC) procurement funding to cover cost growth on five DDG-51s procured in FY2016-FY2018. Combining all these funding requests, the Navy's proposed FY2025 budget requests a total of $6,684.4 million (i.e., about $6.7 billion) in procurement funding for the DDG-51 program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Required number of polar icebreakers. A 2023 Coast Guard fleet mix analysis concluded that the service will require a total of eight to nine polar icebreakers, including four to five heavy polar icebreakers and four to five medium polar icebreakers, to perform its polar (i.e., Arctic and Antarctic) missions in coming years. Current operational polar icebreaker fleet. The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, and one medium polar icebreaker, Healy. A second Coast Guard heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. Polar Sea, suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then. Polar Star and Polar Sea entered service in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard plans to extend Polar Star's service life until the delivery of at least the second Polar Security Cutter (PSC; see next paragraph). Polar Security Cutter (PSC). The Coast Guard PSC program aims to acquire four or five new PSCs (i.e., heavy polar icebreakers), to be followed at some later point by the acquisition of new Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs) (i.e., medium polar icebreakers). The Coast Guard in 2021 estimated PSC procurement costs in then-year dollars as $1,297 million (i.e., about $1.3 billion) for the first ship, $921 million for the second ship, and $1,017 million (i.e., about $1.0 billion) for the third ship, for a combined estimated cost of $3,235 million (i.e., about $3.2 billion). The procurement of the first two PSCs is fully funded. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2024 budget requested $170.0 million in continued procurement funding for the PSC program. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2025 budget requests no procurement funding for the PSC program. The Coast Guard originally aimed to have the first PSC delivered in 2024, but the ship's estimated delivery date has been delayed repeatedly and may now occur no earlier than 2028. Another potential issue concerns the accuracy of the PSC's estimated procurement cost, given the PSC's size and internal complexity as well as cost growth in other Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding programs. The PSC's estimated procurement cost per weight is roughly half that of the Navy's LPD-17 Flight II and LHA amphibious ships. These amphibious ships are equipped with expensive combat system equipment that is not included in the PSC design, but whether this would account for all of the difference in cost per weight between the PSC design and the two amphibious ship designs is not clear. If substantial cost growth occurs in the PSC program, it could raise a question regarding whether to grant some form of contract relief to the PSC shipbuilder. Commercially available polar icebreaker (CAPI). The Coast Guard's proposed FY2024 budget requested $125.0 million in procurement funding for the purchase of an existing commercially available polar icebreaker (CAPI) that would be modified to become a Coast Guard polar icebreaker. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2025 budget requests no procurement funding for CAPI, but the Coast Guard's FY2025 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) includes an item for $25.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. Great Lakes icebreaker (GLIB). The Coast Guard's proposed FY2024 budget proposed to initiate a new procurement program for procuring a new Great Lakes icebreaker (GLIB) that would have capabilities similar to those of Mackinaw, the Coast Guard's existing heavy Great Lakes icebreaker. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2024 budget requested $55.0 million in initial procurement funding for the ship, and the Coast Guard's FY2024 UPL included an item for an additional $20.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2025 budget requests no procurement funding for GLIB, but the Coast Guard's FY2025 UPL includes an item for $25.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an overview of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and considerations for the U.S. Congress. Information is provided about the scope and application of FACA, federal advisory committee establishment and termination, committee management secretariat and resources, agency roles and funding, nomination process and appointments of committee members, membership balance and types of members, compensation and staff, and meeting requirements.

The article discusses the domestic programs and operations of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Topics explored include the commitment of CDC to health promotion in addition to disease prevention, the support being extended by the CDC to public health research and education, and the legislative reform of the CDC considered by some members of the U.S. Congress due to its performance during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

The article discusses the financial assistance programs of the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which aim to help disaster survivors. Topics explored include the way both agencies share real-time information on grant and disaster loan approvals, the eligibility for SBA's Disaster Loan Program, and the application process for the Individual Assistance (IA) and Individuals and Households Program (IHP) of FEMA.

The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region's future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. The seven other Arctic states are Russia, Canada, Iceland, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland), Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 1984) "provide[s] for a comprehensive national policy dealing with national research needs and objectives in the Arctic." The National Science Foundation (NSF) is the lead federal agency for implementing Arctic research policy. The Arctic Council, created in 1996, is the leading international forum for addressing issues relating to the Arctic. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets forth a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world's oceans, including the Arctic Ocean. The United States is not a party to UNCLOS. An array of climate changes in the Arctic is now documented by observing systems, with more expected with future greenhouse gas-driven climate change. Observed physical changes in the Arctic include warming ocean, soil, and air temperatures; melting permafrost; shifting vegetation and animal abundances; and altered characteristics of Arctic cyclones. A monitoring report of the Arctic Council concluded in 2019 that "the Arctic biophysical system is now clearly trending away from its previous state [in the 20th century] and into a period of unprecedented change, with implications not only within but also beyond the Arctic." Following the end of the Cold War, the Arctic states sought to maintain the Arctic as a region of cooperation, low tension, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for international law. Over the past 10 to 15 years, the emergence of great power competition between the United States, Russia, and China has introduced elements of competition and tension into the Arctic's geopolitical environment. Russia's war in Ukraine beginning on February 24, 2022, has further affected the region's geopolitical environment by prompting the seven Arctic states other than Russia to suspend most forms of Arctic cooperation with Russia, by prompting Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership (they are now NATO members), and in other ways. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Coast Guard are devoting increased attention to the Arctic in their planning, budgeting, and operations. Whether DOD and the Coast Guard are taking sufficient actions for defending U.S. interests in the region is a topic of congressional oversight. The Coast Guard has two operational polar icebreakers and through FY2023 has received funding for procuring the first two of four or five planned new heavy polar icebreakers. The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes-the Northern Sea Route close to Russia, and the Northwest Passage close to Alaska and through the Canadian archipelago-though the rate of increase in the use of these routes might not be as great as sometimes anticipated in press accounts. International guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters have been updated. Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more onshore and offshore exploration for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to onshore exploration activities. Increased vessel traffic (e.g., oil and gas exploration, cruise ships, expanded fishing activities) in the Arctic increase the risk of pollution in Arctic waters. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies for cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters have yet to be developed. Changes in the Arctic could result in migration of fish stocks to new waters, and could affect protected species. The United States is working with other countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on social security coverage of local government and state employees in the U.S. Topics discussed include the beneficiaries of social security, the source of funding for the social security program of the federal government, the expansion of coverage under the program by the U.S. Congress, the debate on proposals to make social security coverage for state and local government employees, and major categories of work not covered by the program.

This article presents information on the role of the federal government in dam removal in the U.S. Topics discussed include reasons for dam removal by dam owners and stakeholders, and the dam removal process. It also tackles factors that influence the federal government's role in dam removal, such as ownership, location and purpose.

Social Security spousal benefits were established in the 1930s to help support wives who are financially dependent on their husbands. It has since become more common for both spouses in a couple to work, leading to more cases in which both members of a couple are entitled to Social Security or other government pensions based on their own work records. Social Security does not provide both a full retired-worker and a full spousal benefit to the same individual. Two provisions are designed to reduce the Social Security spousal benefits of individuals who are not financially dependent on their spouses because they receive benefits based on their own work records. These are • the dual entitlement rule, which applies to spouses who qualify for both (1) Social Security spousal benefits based on their spouses' work histories in Social Security-covered employment and (2) their own Social Security retiredor disabled-worker benefits, based on their own work histories in Social Security-covered employment; and • the Government Pension Offset (GPO), which applies to spouses who qualify for both (1) Social Security spousal benefits based on their spouses' work histories in Social Security-covered employment and (2) their own retirement or disability government pensions, based on their own work in government employment that was not covered by Social Security. The dual entitlement rule requires that 100% of a Social Security retirement or disability benefit as a covered worker is subtracted from any Social Security spousal or widow(er)'s benefit an individual is eligible to receive. The GPO reduces Social Security spousal or widow(er)'s benefits by two-thirds of the retirement or disability pension from noncovered government employment. The GPO does not reduce the benefits of the spouse who was covered by Social Security. In December 2023, 745,679 Social Security beneficiaries (about 1% of all beneficiaries) had spousal or widow(er)'s benefits reduced by the GPO. Opponents contend that the GPO is imprecise and can be unfair. Defenders argue it is the best method currently available for preserving the spousal benefit's original intent of supporting financially dependent spouses and for eliminating an unfair advantage for spouses working in non-Social Security-covered employment compared with spouses working in Social Security-covered jobs (who are subject to the dual entitlement rule). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the annual rate of Navy ship procurement, the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans, the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry to execute the Navy's shipbuilding plans, and Navy proposals for retiring existing ships have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years. In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-ship goal was made U.S. policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 2017). The 355-ship goal predates the Trump and Biden Administrations' national defense strategies and does not reflect the new, more distributed fleet architecture (i.e., new mix of ships) that the Navy wants to shift toward in coming years. The Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have been working since 2019 to develop a successor for the 355-ship force-level goal that would reflect current national defense strategy and the new fleet architecture, but have not been able to come to closure on a successor goal. A July 18, 2023, press report stated that the Navy on June 20, 2023, had submitted to the congressional defense committees a congressionally mandated Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement (BFSAR) report that calls for a future fleet with 381 manned ships. It is not clear whether the Administration endorses the 381-ship fleet as the new force-level goal for the Navy. The Navy's proposed FY2024 budget requests $32.8 billion in shipbuilding funding for, among other things, the procurement of nine new ships, including one Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine, two Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines, two Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers, two Constellation (FFG-62) class frigates, one AS(X) submarine tender, and one John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler. The Navy's proposed FY2024 budget also proposes retiring 11 ships, including two relatively young Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs). The Navy's FY2024 five year (FY2024-FY2028) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 55 ships, or an average of 11 per year. Given a 35-year average surface life for Navy ships (a planning factor that assumes that all Navy ships would be kept in service to the end of their expected service lives), an average shipbuilding rate of 11 ships per year, if sustained for 35 years, would increase the size of the Navy to 385 ships over a 35-year period (i.e., by the 2060s). The Navy fell below 300 battle force ships (the kind of ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy and the Navy's 355-ship force-structure goal) in August 2003, and has generally remained between 270 and 300 battle force ships since then. As of November 6, 2023, the Navy included 291 battle force ships. The Navy projects that under its FY2024 budget submission, the Navy would include 293 battle force ships at the end of FY2024 and 291 battle force ships at the end of FY2028. The FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan, similar to the FY2023 30-year (FY2023-FY2052) shipbuilding plan, includes three potential 30-year shipbuilding profiles and resulting 30-year force-level projections, referred to as PB2024 (President's budget for FY2024), Alternative 2, and Alternative 3. PB2024 and Alternative 2 assume no real (i.e., above-inflation) growth in shipbuilding funding, while Alternative 3 assumes some amount of real growth in shipbuilding funding. Under PB2024, the Navy would increase to a peak of 331 manned ships in FY2039-FY2040 and then decrease to 319 manned ships in FY2053. Under Alternative 2, the Navy would increase to a peak of 331 manned ships in FY2039, and then decrease to 328 manned ships in FY2053. Under Alternative 3, the Navy would increase to 356 manned ships in FY2042 and continue increasing to 367 manned ships by FY2053. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the U.S. Congressional Research Service and discusses the Internal Revenue Service's Free File Program (FFP), which enables eligible individuals to electronically (e-file) their federal income tax returns. Topics include the evolution of e-filing since its pilot program in 1986, the structure and history of the FFP, and ongoing policy issues such as low usage rates and proposed reforms like return-free filing or free direct e-filing.

In the second half of the 19th century, the federal government pursued a policy of confining Indian tribes to reservations. The federal statutes and treaties reserving such land for Indian reservations typically did not address the water needs of these reservations, a fact that has given rise to questions and disputes regarding Indian reserved water rights. Dating to a 1908 Supreme Court ruling, courts generally have held that many tribes have a reserved right to water sufficient to fulfill the purpose of their reservations and that this right took effect on the date the reservations were established. This means that, in the context of a state water law system of prior appropriations, which is common in many U.S. western states, many tribes have water rights senior to those of non-Indian users with water rights and access established subsequent to the Indian reservations' creation. Although many Indian tribes hold senior water rights through their reservations, the quantification of these rights is undetermined in many cases. Since 1990, the Department of the Interior's policy has been that Indian water rights should be resolved through negotiated settlements rather than litigation. These agreements allow tribes to quantify their water rights on paper, while also procuring access to water through infrastructure and other related expenses. In addition to tribes and federal government representatives, settlement negotiations may involve states, water districts, and private water users, among others. Approval and implementation of Indian water rights settlements typically requires federal action-often in the form of congressional approval. As of March 2023, 39 Indian water rights settlements had been federally approved, with total estimated costs in excess of $8.5 billion (nominal dollars). Of these, 35 settlements were approved and enacted by Congress and 4 were administratively approved by the U.S. Departments of Justice and the Interior. One new settlement was approved in the 117th Congress, and another existing settlement was amended. Additional new and amended settlements have been proposed in the 118th Congress. After congressional approval, federal projects associated with approved Indian water rights settlements generally have been implemented by the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) or the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), pursuant to congressional directions. Historically, federal funding for settlements generally has been provided through discretionary appropriations; Congress also has approved mandatory funding for some settlements. The Reclamation Water Settlements Fund was created in 2009 under P.L. 111-11 as a source of additional funding for existing and future settlements. It is scheduled to provide $120 million per year in mandatory funding for settlements through FY2029, with the availability of these funds set to expire in FY2034. More recently, in 2021, Congress approved and appropriated $2.5 billion for another Indian water rights fund, the Indian Water Rights Settlement Completion Fund, in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58). The FY2024 President's budget request for Reclamation proposed additional changes in funding for these settlements. At issue for Congress is under what circumstances new Indian water rights settlements should be considered, approved, and amended, and to what extent Congress should fund existing settlements. Many have noted that the resolution of Indian water rights settlements is a mutually beneficial means of resolving long-standing legal issues. Although there is little opposition to the generally stated principle that negotiated settlements are preferable to litigation, in some cases the executive branch and/or other water users oppose individual settlements (or elements thereof). Other questions include how to manage cost overruns associated with these settlements and who should be in charge of settlement implementation and oversight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honor in the United States, awarded by the President to individuals for significant achievements in various fields. Topics include the history and design of the medal, the criteria for its award, and the process for nominating and selecting recipients. The report also provides a comprehensive list of honorees from 1963 to 2022, including those who received the medal "with distinction."

The article discusses the potential implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on the international security environment and highlights assessments by the U.S. intelligence community. It identifies various areas where the pandemic could bring about changes, including shifts in global governance, impacts on U.S. global leadership, alterations in great power competition, changes in democratic and authoritarian governance, economic effects, and shifts in military operations.

The article presents the report by the Congressional Research Service regarding the Section 199A deduction's economic effects. It examines the deduction's impact on investment and employment, horizontal and vertical equity in the federal income tax, and taxpayer compliance and tax administration, along with policy options for Congress as it considers whether to retain the deduction beyond 2025.

The emergence over the past decade of intensified U.S. competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) and the Russian Federation (Russia)-often referred to as great power competition (GPC) or strategic competition-has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was during the post-Cold War era: Counterterrorist operations and U.S. military operations in the Middle East-which had been more at the center of discussions of U.S. defense issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001-are now a less prominent (but still present) element in the conversation, and the conversation now focuses more on the following elements, all of which relate largely to China and/or Russia: • grand strategy and geopolitics as a starting point for discussing U.S. defense issues; • the force-planning standard, meaning the number and types of simultaneous or overlapping conflicts or other contingencies that the U.S. military should be sized to be able to conduct-a planning factor that can strongly impact the size of the U.S. defense budget; • organizational changes within the Department of Defense (DOD); • nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear arms control; • global U.S. military posture; • U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region; • U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe; • new U.S. military service operational concepts; • capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare; • maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies; • innovation and speed of U.S. weapon system development and deployment; • mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict; • supply chain security, meaning awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on components, subcomponents, materials, and software from non-allied countries, particularly China and Russia; and • capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics. The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense planning and budgeting should respond to GPC and whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden Administration's defense strategy and proposed funding levels, plans, and programs for addressing GPC. Congress's decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. defense industrial base. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the report regarding history and rationale behind the creation of The House Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE), its relationship with the House Committee on Ethics, and funding. It highlights options potentially available for Congress, including creating a statutory OCE and reform committee on ethics to allow public input, and amending OCE authority such as subpoena power and OCE follow up.

Social Security is a work-based, federal insurance program that provides cash benefits to workers and their eligible family members in the event of the worker's retirement, disability, or death. A worker's employment or self-employment is considered covered by Social Security if the services performed in that job result in earnings that are taxable and creditable for program purposes. Although participation in Social Security is compulsory for most workers, about 6% of all workers in paid employment or self-employment are not covered by Social Security. The windfall elimination provision (WEP) is a modified benefit formula that reduces the Social Security benefits of certain retired or disabled workers who are also entitled to pension benefits based on earnings from jobs that were not covered by Social Security and thus not subject to the Social Security payroll tax. Its purpose is to remove an unintended advantage or "windfall" that these workers would otherwise receive as a result of the interaction between the regular Social Security benefit formula and the workers' relatively short careers in Social Security-covered employment. In December 2023, about 2.1 million people (or about 3% of all Social Security beneficiaries) were affected by the WEP. Those workers mainly include state and local government employees covered by alternative staff-retirement systems as well as most permanent civilian federal employees hired before January 1, 1984, who are covered by the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). WEP's supporters argue that the formula is a reasonable means to prevent overgenerous payments and unintended benefits to people who have earnings not covered by Social Security and receive pensions from noncovered work. Opponents argue that the provision substantially reduces a benefit that workers may have included in their retirement plans, and it reduces benefits disproportionately for lower-earning households. Others criticize the current WEP formula as an imprecise way to determine the actual windfall when applied to individual cases. Recent legislation has generally proposed either to eliminate the provision for all or some affected beneficiaries, or replace the current-law provision with a new proportional formula based on past earnings from both covered and noncovered employment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the projected financial shortfall of Social Security and various proposals to address it, including raising revenues through tax increases or reducing costs through benefit cuts. It discusses hypothetical scenarios presented by the Social Security Board of Trustees, such as immediate tax increases or benefit reductions, and examines their potential impact on different demographic groups and birth cohorts.

This report provides background information and issues for Congress on shipboard solid state lasers (SSLs) that the Navy is developing for surface-ship self-defense. The Navy's proposed FY2024 budget requests continued research and development funding for these efforts. The Navy installed its first prototype SSL capable of countering surface craft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on a Navy ship in 2014. The Navy since then has been developing and installing additional SSL prototypes with improved capability for countering surface craft and UAVs. Higher-power SSLs being developed by the Navy are to have a capability for countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Current Navy efforts to develop SSLs include • the Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) effort; • the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN); • the Surface Navy Laser Weapon System (SNLWS) Increment 1, also known as the high-energy laser with integrated optical dazzler and surveillance (HELIOS); and • the High Energy Laser Counter-ASCM Program (HELCAP). The first three SSL efforts listed above are included in what the Navy calls the Navy Laser Family of Systems (NFLoS). The issue for Congress is whether to modify, reject, or approve the Navy's acquisition strategies and funding requests for shipboard laser development programs. Decisions that Congress makes on this issue could affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the defense technology and industrial base. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on economic projections, which are predictions about future economic and financial indicators, including gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment rate, and inflation. It mentions policymakers and financial-market participants use these forecasts to assess the likelihood of events like inflation rise or economic downturns, while long-range projections help lawmakers evaluate broader economic or budget challenges.

The article focuses on the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) Project, exploring the issues surrounding the establishment of the outer limits of the U.S. ECS in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Topics include the process of delineating the outer limits of the ECS, the federal initiative involving the Department of State, NOAA, and USGS, and the recent announcement of the outer limits of the U.S. ECS in various ocean regions.

The article focuses on depreciation allowances under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 179 and Section 168(k), explaining their current law, economic impacts, and relevant policy issues. Topics include the mechanics of expensing, limits on allowance use, and the potential effects on business investment and tax revenue. The article examines recent legislative changes and concludes with a discussion on policy considerations regarding the extension of bonus depreciation beyond 2026.

Many wars or conflicts in U.S. history have federally designated "periods of war," dates marking their beginning and ending. These dates are important for qualification for certain veterans' pension or disability benefits. Confusion can occur because beginning and ending dates for "periods of war" in many nonofficial sources are often different from those given in treaties and other official sources of information, and armistice dates can be confused with termination dates. This report lists the beginning and ending dates for "periods of war" found in Title 38 of the Code of Federal Regulations, dealing with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). It also lists and differentiates other beginning dates given in declarations of war, as well as termination of hostilities dates and armistice and ending dates given in proclamations, laws, or treaties. The dates for the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are included along with the official end date for Operation New Dawn in Iraq on December 15, 2011, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan on December 28, 2014, and Operation Freedom's Sentinel on September 30, 2021. Operation Inherent Resolve continues along the Syrian-Iraqi border effective October 15, 2014. Operation Enduring Sentinel, initiated on October 1, 2021 to counter terrorist threats from Afghanistan, remains ongoing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aircraft carriers CVN-78, CVN-79, CVN-80, and CVN-81 are the first four ships in the Navy's new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). The Navy's proposed FY2024 budget requests $2,540.4 million (i.e., about $2.5 billion) in procurement funding for Ford-class ships, including $624.6 million for CVN-79, $1,115.3 million for CVN-80, and $800.5 million for CVN-81. CVN-78 (Gerald R. Ford) was procured in FY2008. The ship's procurement final cost was $13,316.5 million (i.e., about $13.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship was commissioned into service on July 22, 2017, and achieved initial operational capability in December 2021. The ship's first deployment was delayed by a need to complete work on the ship's weapons elevators and correct other technical problems aboard the ship. The first deployment-a two-month "service-retained deployment" in Atlantic waters that served as an operational stress test-reportedly began on October 4, 2022, more than five years after the ship was commissioned into service, and ended on November 26, 2022. The ship reportedly will make its first full-length deployment in 2023. CVN-79 (John F. Kennedy) was procured in FY2013. The Navy's proposed FY2024 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,700.0 million (i.e., $12.7 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship is being built with an improved shipyard fabrication and assembly process that incorporates lessons learned from the construction of CVN-78. CVN-79 is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in July 2025. CVN-80 (Enterprise) was procured in FY2018. The Navy's proposed FY2024 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,812.9 million (i.e., about $12.8 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in March 2028. CVN-81 (Doris Miller) is treated in this report as a ship that was procured in FY2019, consistent with congressional action on the Navy's FY2019 budget. (The Navy's FY2024 budget submission, like its FY2021-FY2023 submissions, shows CVN-81 as a ship that was procured in FY2020.) The Navy's FY2024 budget submission estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,929.1 million (i.e., about $12.9 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in February 2032. CVN-80 and CVN-81 are being procured under a two-ship block buy contract that was authorized by Section 121(a)(2) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018). The use of the two-ship block buy contract reduced the combined estimated procurement cost of the two ships. Oversight issues for Congress for the CVN-78 program include the following: • the future aircraft carrier force level; • cost growth in the CVN-78 program, Navy efforts to stem that growth, and Navy efforts to manage costs so as to stay within the program's cost caps; • the delay in CVN-78's first deployment; • additional CVN-78 program issues that were raised in a January 2023 report from the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and a June 2023 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on DOD weapon systems; and • the procurement of aircraft carriers after CVN-81. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past 10 to 15 years, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition. China's actions in the SCS-including extensive island-building and baseconstruction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China's claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam-have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China's maritime forces at the Japanadministered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China's near-seas region-meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea-could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. Potential broader U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and resisting the emergence of an alternative "might-makes-right" approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia; and pursing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China. Potential specific U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: dissuading China from carrying out additional baseconstruction activities in the SCS, moving additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it occupies in the SCS, initiating island-building or base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, declaring straight baselines around land features it claims in the SCS, or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS; and encouraging China to reduce or end operations by its maritime forces at the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, halt actions intended to put pressure against Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands, provide greater access by Philippine fisherman to waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal or in the Spratly Islands, adopt the U.S./Western definition regarding freedom of the seas, and accept and abide by the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China. The issue for Congress is whether the Administration's strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on China's extensive naval modernization effort, which has transformed its navy into a formidable force, surpassing the U.S. Navy in the number of battle force ships. The U.S. Navy, in response, has taken various measures, including shifting a higher percentage of its fleet to the Pacific, developing new technologies, and signaling a shift towards a more-distributed fleet architecture.