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This paper focuses on childlessness in Germany and Japan and its sociological meanings in family formation in postmodern societies. First, it shows the trends of fertility decline and increasing childlessness, and clarifies the similarities and differences in both countries, by comparing parity composition, educational attainment, and other socioeconomic correlates of childlessness. Second, using the data of attitudinal surveys, such as the 2003 Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS) in Germany and the 13th National Fertility Survey (JNFS; 2005) in Japan, the reasons for having no children are observed. Third, referring to the discussions of German scholars, it tries to explain the sociological meanings of childlessness and to describe the development toward a childless society (even if it's demographically not sustainable) as one of the possible consequences of the Second Demographic Transition. Important findings are as follows: (1) In Germany the fertility decline began early in the mid-1960s but in Japan later from mid-1970s so that the increase of childlessness has been a little delayed. The proportion of childless women in Western Germany increased to 28% for the 1967 cohort. In Japan, it has increased to 12.7% for the 1960 cohort, but is expected to reach 30% for the 1970 cohort. (2) The educational gap in childlessness is clearly observed in Germany; however, this is not so simple in Japan. Corresponding with the increase of childlessness, the desired number of children in average is declining. The emergence of a child-free culture is observed in Germany by PPAS, but not yet in Japan by JNFS. (3) Polarization may proceed further in both countries, between childless people and people with many children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper places the story of the overworked American in context by examining mismatches between preferred and actual work hours among Japanese, Swedish, West German, and U.S. workers. Although many full-timers in all four countries want to work fewer hours, mismatches come in many forms, and their distributions and determinants vary cross-nationally. The United States, for instance, has an unusually large number of full-time workers who want to work more hours, and a workforce that is especially motivated by opportunities for advancement and a desire for high incomes. Ultimately, the prevalence and determinants of hour mismatches are found to reflect cross-national differences in social, political, and economic environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]