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Why do some leaders choose foreign policies that flout the constraints posed by international structures? This paper argues that leaders possess varying beliefs about their state's proficiency in different areas of foreign policy, or "national efficacy beliefs." When sufficiently strong, these beliefs inspire leaders to act boldly, even when international structures offer incentives for restraint. Strong martial efficacy beliefs inspire leaders to challenge more powerful opponents on the battlefield, while strong moral efficacy beliefs prompt leaders to engage in costly forms of cooperation even when the relevant international institutions are weak. In constrast, weaker senses of martial and moral efficacy produce policies that are much more sensitive to structural constraints. The paper outlines how this framework can explain why the foreign policies of both China and India have become more conservative over the past six decades. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the implications of the April 2005 Sino-Indian statement of strtegic partnership on the tripartite relations among Russia, China, and India. Less than a decade after Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov called for a strategic triangle among Russia, China, and India, the three countries have signed bilateral strategic partnerships with one another and regualarly meet in trilateral groups. The paper hypothesizes that the ties that bind these countries are tactical rather than strategic and therefore the long-term health of these partnerships will depend on whether changing identities and self-conceptions of leaders in each of these countries lead to a focus on absolute gains through cooperation versus an emphasis on relative gains leading to competition for influence and status in the Asian/Eurasian region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the implications for the rise of China have been debated in the global or systemic contexts, as well as regional or bilateral contexts, thin scholarly attention has been devoted to the rise of the other great power - India, and how these two Asian great powers - India and China - perceive the ascendancy of the other state. Yet how these two very different Asian giants with a complex relationship view each other and consequently negotiate their paths in substantially changed international milieus will be important for scholarly interest and policy making. This paper examines how Indian elites - in political, security, and economic arenas - perceive the rise of China and their assessment of the feasibility of Indo-Chinese partnership ("Chindia") or rivalry by employing a mixed-method research strategy, combining secondary literature research, elite interviewing, and direct observation conducted over the summer of 2008. It analyzes the Indo-Chinese relationship through three paradigms - geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocivilizational. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasing economic and strategic clout of China and the vulnerability of the American power in the Gulf, the US policy makers are searching for a new strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Their ultimate purpose is to neutralize the preeminence of China.Pentagon is trying to forge a new alliance of three well-established democracies-US,India and Japan. On April 16,2007 all the three nations began a joint military drill in the Pacific. More or less at the same time, the first India-US Defence Joint Working Group met in New Delhi.These two develpments have certainly raised the temperature in Beizing.Recently China has raised its defence budget by 17.8 percent and successfully tested its antisatellite ballistic missile.No doubt the Pacific military exercise by US, India and Japan has been taken as an alarming signal by China.The proposed paper will try to explore the evolving strategy of the US in the Asia Pacific region.One has to explore as to what extent such a three nation joint exercise is addressing the unprecedented rise of China in the politico-economic and strategic affaires of the region. We will also examine as to how far the existing American policy of strategic engagement with China is being reexamined. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While most view China as the rising power in Asia, the future of the region will also be determined by India. Despite receiving less attention, India is a growing economic, military, and political power in the region and globally. India has the world’s 4th largest economy at $796 billion and for the past decade, has registered economic growth rates over 7 percent. India has the 3rd largest active duty armed force in the world behind China and the United States and is a nuclear power. Finally, India is a respected political player and often cited as a candidate for inclusion in the UN Security Council. Certainly, India faces significant obstacles including over 350 million living dire poverty and an economic infrastructure that needs significant repair. However, Indian leaders have ambitious aspirations and it is a country on the rise. Given India’s important and growing position in Asia, its relations with China and Japan, the other key players in region, will be crucial. This paper will examine India’s economic, political, and security relationship with these other two powers of Asia and the impact these relations have on Indian and regional security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two papers will focus on creations of “new enemies/rivals” by the Westphalian logic of competition and anarchy: Banerjee and Ling will look at constructions of India and China by mainstream defense intellectuals in the US; Hwang and Chen will examine how defense intellectuals in Taiwan respond to such attempts at “triangulation.” ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "China-India Bonhomie: An Harbinger of Multilateralism" prepared for the "46th Annual Convention of International Studies Association" held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the mutual political and economic interactions between the two nations. It discusses an agreement, called Declaration of Principles, which was created during the visit of former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China with the aim of peacefully solve conflicting issues.

Study will determine the external and internal influences on the Eisenhower adminstration in its making of U.S. policy toward Tibet. Using the Kegley-Wittkopf model, research will focus on foreign influence from external sources such as China, India, Taiwan and the Tibetans themselves. Internally, the study will determine which governmental, societal, role and individual sources influenced Eisenhower in determining policy outcomes. It is hoped that the study will further illuminate U.S. foreign policy deliberations and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regressive globalization and global change have created new threats for global and local food security. Reductions in crop yields, drought and floods have limited food supply, while the demand for biofuels, food imports in China and India, and speculative ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increased South-North migration is resulting in ever-more significant levels of ‘brain drain’. While large countries such as China and India are arguably able to withstand, and even benefit from, migration, many less developed countries have suffered grea ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Japan are the world’s second- and third-largest energy consumer respectively. Sino-Japanese energy relations have been characterised by stiff and even dangerous competition. The two countries have engaged in a fierce rivalry for an oil pipeline ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A long line of literature focuses on the political foundations of foreign direct investment (FDI). The majority of the empirical literature examines national level data and only a few studies analyze international capital formation at the provincial level ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The economic ascent and political self-assertion of a set of newly emerging powers holds the potential to transform the established institutional hierarchies of capitalist world order in the coming decades. There appears to be a growing consensus on the part of 'Western' elites that the increasing economic and political weight of countries such as China and India merits their integration into the upper echelons of international organization. The debate over reform of the Group of Eight (G8)—a powerful informal grouping of major capitalist countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and, since 1998, Russia)—epitomizes recent attempts to include emerging market economies in the structures of global governance. Membership in this exclusive forum has been a point of contention ever since, and problems of legitimacy and efficiency have been long-standing concerns. Against the backdrop of what seems to be an impending global power shift, the expansion of G8 membership has become a matter of utmost urgency. Unless extended to include at least some of the major emerging market economies, it is argued, the G8 can no longer contribute to the management of the global political economy. Numerous organizational schemes have been proposed, and important steps towards G8 expansion have been taken (for a comprehensive overview, see Hajnal 2007a). After two decades of fixed membership, the original Group of Seven (G7) officially admitted Russia in 1998. One year later, a joint 'Group of Twenty' (G20) of the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors and their counterparts from 'systemically significant' countries was established. Consultations with emerging market economies have become regular fixtures of the G8 summits, and since 2003 a permanent 'outreach group' including Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa has formed. At the most recent summit in Heiligendamm, a two-year, issue-specific dialogue between the G8 and the 'outreach five' was initiated. Some observers have argued that the G8+5 process may conclude with the admission of these countries into the G8 and give impetus to the reform of other international organizations such as IMF, World Bank and OECD (Kirton 2007; Gnath 2007). These developments raise the fundamental question of whether a more closely coordinated, globally integrated form of political-economic regulation is in the making. The specialized literature on the G8 seems to answer this question in the affirmative. Approaching the issue of institutional reform almost exclusively from the point of view of how the legitimacy and efficiency of the G8 can be enhanced, most scholars tend to view the increasing involvement of emerging market economies in the G8 system as necessary and desirable steps towards a more inclusive and effective form of global governance. While providing a wealth of information and detailed political analysis, the extant literature can be said to be guided by a 'problem-solving' approach: it takes the existing social relations in which the G8 is embedded as given, and seeks to give policy advice on what adjustments are necessary for the governance mechanism to operate under changing conditions (Cox 1981). Such an approach, however, takes for granted what is arguably the most striking institutional feature of the G8. More than a preference of summit leaders (Garavoglia 1984, 5) or unavoidable trade-off between efficiency and breadth of participation (Bayne 2002, 26), the informal and exclusive institutional format of the G8 architecture points to an underlying power relationship between 'insiders' and 'outsiders'... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In studying national and state identity, scholars have primarily focused on official or political discourses as evidence of identity construction. More recently, Ted Hopf has underlined the importance of popular culture in examining societal discourses of Soviet and Russian state identity. By looking at portrayals of minorities in Chinese and Indian movies and visual arts we extend Hopf's framework in two ways. First, both China and India have significant heterogeneous, illiterate and poor parts of their population, rendering textual sources less useful as the primary means to study identity. Second, we want to see what types of culture are generated by the state as opposed to internal and external others. By looking at popular culture in a democracy and a non-democracy, we can assess to what extent popular culture is manufactured by the state or is representative of societal discourses. Through an analysis of significant films and art in the post-cold war period, we show how popular culture both reflects and is used as a means to carve out state identity with relation to 'internal' others, such as Muslims and the rural poor. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American hegemony has passed its peak. The twenty-first century will see a more multi-polar international system. Yet Western European countries may not be the United States' main foils in decades to come. Four new poles of the international system are now widely known in the business and financial press as the "BRICs economies" (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Does the concept of "the BRICs" have meaning within a rigorous political science framing? From the perspective of an economic liberal employing neoclassical assumptions to understand the world economy, the category's justification is surprisingly weak. In contrast, a political or economic realist's framing instructs us to focus on states that are increasing their relative material capabilities—as each of the four is. Finally, within a liberal institutionalist's mental model, the BRICs countries are a compelling set, yet one with a deep cleavage between two sub-groups: large emerging powers likely to remain authoritarian or revert to that state, and those that are securely democratic. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article probes into the official Chinese and Indian perspectives on the first and second rounds of post-Cold War North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion. The outline of the debate over NATO expansion in the West and its theoretical implications are explored. It presents a comparison of the assessments in Beijing and New Delhi of the first and second rounds of the expansion. The implications of the serial expansions for the role and functions of the organization and the type and nature of alignments that may emerge are cited.

The article compares the results of the transitions to modernization of China and India. Modernization programs delved in the economy and the political system. In terms of gross domestic product (GDP) indicators, China's GDP has increased ninefold while that of India increased threefold. China has performed better than India regarding human development indicators including fertility rates and life expectancy at birth. China was able to reduce its population growth rate as India ignored its population growth.

Tibetan positions and strategies have gone through many changes since 1959 when the Dalai Lama escaped to India. From 1959 until the mid-1970s, the Tibetan exile leadership consistently cast its chief objective as regaining Tibet’s independence. In 2007, the same Tibetan leadership is calling for a sincere, letter-and-spirit implementation of the provisions of the Chinese constitution and national regional autonomy laws, albeit, in a re-unified Tibetan administrative entity within the People’s Republic of Chinaâ€"a far-cry from the independence agenda of only three decades ago. Tibetan strategy has also evolved from the CIA-backed guerrilla movement to a completely non-violent form of activism. Inside Tibet itself, the Tibetans have deployed various strategies ranging from collaboration with the communist regime to open rebellion for national survival. Beijing’s policies inside Tibet have also oscillated from the violent, oppressive and assimilationist strategies of the Maoist years to the ethnically-sensitive policies of the Hu Yaobang era in the 1980s and back to the hard-line integrationist policies prevalent today. Chinese efforts to engage the Dalai Lama and exile Tibetans have also had an on-again, off-again quality. What drives these fluctuations? This paper attempts to answer this question by examining if, and how, the international campaigns and diplomacy of the Tibetan Diaspora effect these fluctuations. How do the activities, successes and failures of the Tibetan exiles shape the activities of the Tibetans inside Tibet? How do the fortunes and misfortunes of the Tibetan Diaspora shape Chinese policies towards Tibet? Equally importantly, how does Tibet’s place in some of China’s most important foreign relations, such as the US-China relations and Sino-Indian relations influence Sino-Tibetan relations? This paper will provide a dispassionate analysis of these important linkages that have direct bearings on a people struggling to survive and a state rising in power but struggling with its international image and domestic legitimacy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International scholars are fascinated by what determines international actors’ influence on state behaviors. Existing perspectives emphasize either the power or ideational appeal of international actors. This paper adopts a social network theory that conceptualizes the linkages between international and domestic actors as the key to the effectiveness of foreign influence. As Diasporas tend to have denser ties with domestic actors in recipient countries than multinational corporations, Diasporas can influence the state’s behavior more effectively than MNCs. Diasporas also have better ties with domestic actors based on trust, empathy, and mutual understanding than MNCs whose relationships are based on self interest and rational calculation. The paper presents sectoral policies toward foreign capital in China and India. In Chinese sectors, where diaspora networks are salient, policies toward foreign capital are more liberal than other sectors. Similarly in India, diaspora networks are more conspicuous in some sectors than others and lead to various sectoral policies. Detailed case studies of informatics and automobiles in China and India reveal the processes in which Diasporas facilitate policy making. They also illustrate difficulties that MNCs face in dealing with domestic actors. China and India have large economies and complex domestic politics. Both meanwhile have sizeable Diaspora communities. They thus offer excellent contexts to observe the interactions between international and domestic actors. The observations systematically demonstrate different effects of Diasporas and MNCs, both as agents of global capitalism. China and India have different political regimes. Findings based on them are therefore more robust and generalizable. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the divisions within the Western alliance over the rise of new powers, most notably China and India, from what we used to know as the third world. The paper sets out two lenses- an American and a European- through which these developments are perceived, processed, and acted upon. Americans tend to see the emergence of China and India in military-strategic terms: increased economic wealth can be translated into military power and given that future intentions are inherently uncertain this power could pose a serious threat to the United States. Thus, the American discourse on challenges in Asia is dominated by the need to address a potential threat, both by identifying possible crisis points, weakening the potential adversary, and creating countervailing coalitions. Engagement is not excluded as an option but over time the general tendency is towards containment. By contrast, Europeans see rising Asian powers through their experience, in Eastern Europe and with Russia, as fragile entities undergoing a period of rapid development and radical change. Thus, European states endeavor to provide assistance to facilitate a transition from this fragility to a prosperous and responsible member of the international community. This paper develops and critiques both of these perspectives and offers the argument that neither is an adequate response to this shift in the distribution of power. Instead I outline a third lens based on regional reassurance. This model draws on theories of hegemonic order and argues that the West should think of itself as having the potential to act as the guarantor of stability in Asia, comforting China and India?s neighbors about their rise with a mixture of security alliances and the provision of collective goods while also creating a regional framework in which a stronger China and India can be accommodated as partners as long as their intentions remain benign. This logic operated effectively in Europe and Asia during the Cold War and may offer the best opportunity now to manage the peaceful rise of new powers. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to explore the nature of the Sino-Indian maritime relationship in the Indian Ocean Area (IOA). Both China and India are rapidly industrializing states and undoubtedly the next major powers in international politics. The Indian Ocean itself and its sea-lanes of communication have become increasingly important for China over the decades and have always been important to India. Both countries now rely heavily on petroleum and natural resources to safely transit the Indian Ocean. The Sino-Indian maritime relationship will be assessed with a particular focus on the Indian perspective. The paper will seek to answer how increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is being interpreted and framed by elites in India. This will involve a qualitative exploration of Indian security and naval strategy and the Indian reaction to Chinese involvement in the IOA. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the efforts of developing nations to gain access to the economic, security, and political benefits of space. The analysis in this paper compares the efforts of several developing nations and identifies the extent to which developing nations have been successful in gaining access to the many benefits of space. In measuring ?success? the analysis focuses on whether developing countries individually and/or collectively have been able to develop space capabilities and thus the essential elements of national ?space power.? Particular attention is given to the cases of India, Brazil, and China. However, attention is also given to the efforts of several other developing nations in regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. The paper concludes by identifying several common factors that have constrained the respective efforts of developing nations and ensured that they have remained dependent upon the space capabilities and assistance of more developed nations. This dependency undercuts the ability of these aspiring space powers to improve their respective positions vis-à-vis the more developed nations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Established disciplines such as International Relations (IR) & International Political Economy (IPE), and even more explicitly interdisciplinary ones like Development Studies & Strategic Studies, are not always adroit in recognizing, let alone anticipating major trends. This deficiency is highlighted by the lamentable gaps in scholarship concerning the continuing reverberations from the end of bipolarity. Symptomatically, it was not scholars but a donor agency (DFID) which noticed in early 2005 that a quarter of the world's +/-200 states were 'fragile'. This paper explores whether a small group of 'emerging' economies might impact global politics, economics & societies through the first quarter of the new century as the NICs did towards the end of the last one. It is an early, experimental product of a novel collaborative project at CIGI on Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, ASEAN & Mexico (BRICSAM). The paper focuses on four interrelated aspects of the emergence of BRICSAM on the world stage:i)non-state as well as state impacts on - local to global - governance;ii)regionalisms, institutional as well as 'new' informal modalities;iii)orthodox as well as 'new' (human) security; &iv)implications for various forms of multilateralism as a possible antidotes to US inclinations towards unilateralism. The paper concludes by reflecting on such a possible shift in geopolitics for the analysis & practice of IR & IPE, Development & Security Studies. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the significance of the bilateral strategic partnerships between Russia and China, Russia and India, and China and India by analyzing how the complex interactions among these countries influence their attempts to carve out an enhanced role in the world during a period of American dominance. Chinese aspirations for world leadership are more immediate than those of India, while Russia is engaged in reviving its lost status by reclaiming at least a strong regional role in Eurasia. Their attempts at developing bilateral ties with each other define both the challenges and opportunities facing these countries as they position themselves for a stronger presence in Eurasia under the shadow of the United States. The central question this paper seeks to address is whether the security dynamic will trump the many economic synergies among these countries or whether they will seek common cause in retraining the overweening power of the United States. This paper will argue that the policies of the United States toward each of these countries will play a vital role in shaping the geopolitical landscape in Eurasia. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and India are two major rising powers in Asia. The two countries fought a border war in 1962 and since then border negotiations have been going on. Studying the relationship between these two major powers in Asia has significant implications for the future of Asia. This paper focuses on three major Chinese foreign policy decision makers –Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping—their operational code beliefs and belief changes during the 1960s and examines their belief changes and the impact of belief changes on the Chinese decisions to fight a war with India after breaking up with the Soviet Union. The 1960s was a hard time for the newly founded PRC, however, the Chinese leaders made the hard decision to break up with its ally and big brother, and fight a war with India who was the head of the non-aligned movements. As three major decision makers, do they have the same belief changes in making those strategic moves? This is an interesting question in helping us to understand the Chinese foreign policies during the Cold War time and also to look into the future of Sino-Indian relations. By examining the international and domestic situations of the Sino-Indian War in 1962, this paper compares the results of the narratives with an operational code analysis of three Chinese leaders and their subjective games. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explore a reasonable model for security cooperation in an “East Asian community.” Today, the countries of Asia â€" including the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, Japan and India â€" are eag ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North-South divide is the divide which separates the rich North from the poor South. But today we find the digital divide in terms of 'information-rich' and 'information-poor' more prominent than the North-South divide. In knowledge-based and technology-driven economies the top 20-25% of the population, that is very well informed and interconnected at the global level through latest devices of information and communication , is in a position to reap all the economic and political advantages at the cost of the rest of the 75-80% of the population. Moreover, today we live in a world where the national and multinational, very rich and very poor, 'haves' and 'have nots' in terms of access to latest information and technology co-exist.My paper seeks to explore the prospects of the bridging of North-South divide by bridging the gap between digital divide. For instance, in future the consumers in China and India are likely to exercise more power through access to Internet than the consumers in some of the countries in the North. One thing certain about globalization process is that it has helped in transferring power from the nation state to global consumers, having far reaching consequences on the international relations where economic politics dominates political markets. The latest innovations in the information and communication technology have also helped in broadening the political base of power, on the one hand, and increasing public accountability to the grass roots, on the other. The political and economic hegemons face tough resistance from the women's groups, environmentalists, human right advocates and all those engaged in social and peace movements. The technology has gone a long way in empowering the marginalized sections of society worldwide. If it becomes more accessible, cost effective and fast, it can play an increasingly vital role in bridging not only the North-South divide but also digital divide.The methodology adopted is analytical, comparative and empirical. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pace at which greenhouse emissions are rising together with the strengthening scientific consensus that emissions must be dramatically reduced mean that the recently implemented Kyoto Protocol is already obsolete; the fulfillment of all Kyoto obligations will reduce global emissions only minimally. The U.S.--the world's biggest emitter--and future emissions giants including China and India must be brought into a substantial emissions-limitation regime within a very short time. Unless their legitimate needs for development are addressed, developing countries have little incentive to participate in such a regime. Climate-equity NGOs argue that global emissions trading on the basis of per capita (or per capita plus) allowances, which would give large numbers of saleable permits to the world's low-emission majority, could supply the incentive for developing-country participation and counter the U.S. argument about 'unfair favorable treatment' for developing countries under the Kyoto regime. Such a strategy would represent a dramatic departure from the 'grandfathered' Kyoto emissions allowances, which base reductions requirements on 1990 emissions and thus help to 'lock in' the position of developed countries. In this paper, I evaluate the potential of "climate equity" per capita and per capita plus regime proposals to attract developed and developing countries, and to achieve their stated goals of climate adequacy and equity in the present growth-oriented global political economy. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing role of India, alongside the other so called BRICSA countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), in the global economy is one of the most significant and talked about issues in contemporary IPE. Much has been written about India’ ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some scholars argue that foreign capital liberalization fosters development by providing the needed capital and knowledge and technology transfers for industrial development. Others argue that foreign portfolio and direct investment export gains abroad r ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, China and India have liberalized foreign direct investment (FDI) after years of restricting it. These countries depart from the experience of the developmental states of East Asia, which had restricted FDI to protect domestic industry. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As populations have grown and nations industrialized, the demand on a fix supply of water has grown exponentially, leading world leaders and international organizations to warn of increasing potential for conflict over shared water. Yet, our understandin ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A World Bank report finds that China and India exhibit similar governance outcomes despite their distinct political institutions. The implementation of SEZ policies provides a useful lens to examine the impact of political institutions on governance outco ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two regional protracted conflict rivals of Asia, India and China, have found ways to become strategic partners in the twenty-first century. This research probes what explains this change and whether or not the engagement strategies employed by them can produce similar results if used in the India-Pakistan bilateral relations? I argue that although at the strategic level nuclear weapons detonation by India in 1998 was instrumental in developing a strategic balance between the rivals and within a few years a stable security environment emanated in the conflict offing, creating a setting stage for the exploration of possibilities of partnership in the economic, trade, and political realms, one of the major contributing factors in the partnership has been the soft power that both China and India possess. While the two Asian giants share common attributes such as strong military, population, economy, and information technology, among others, soft power in the form of culture, education, and values/ideas pertaining to open economies has forced them to look beyond the dynamics of the intractable conflict and find a common ground to work together. Both are mature states in all of these domains due to which the domestic political/institutional differences did not create an impediment to substantive strategic cooperation. There is political resolve in both countries in maintaining long-term friendship, enhancing cooperation, and achieving common developments. This is the exact opposite of the India-Pakistan case. While India is strong in soft power capabilities, Pakistan lacks strength in this domain and remains even less interested in developing the attribute. Consequently, even though both India and Pakistan realize that cooperation on different levels is possible, attainable, and beneficial to both parties and have progressed in attaining some of their stated goals of cooperation as part of the composite dialogue, in the presence of asymmetry in soft power resources, they are unable to comprehensively tap the unexplored opportunities to becoming strategic partners in this century. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Origins of Audacity: National Efficacy Beliefs, International Structures, and the Curious Rises of China andIndia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A dramatic transformation has occurred in India-US relations in the last decade. The interactions between the two democracies have expanded enormously and their impact is beginning to be felt beyond the bilateral realm. This evolving partnership holds the potential to shape not only the regional politics of South Asia but the international relations of the wider Asia-Pacific region. Some analysts project an even grander vision, claiming that this relationship may play a decisive role in determining the future global order. Taking these projections as a point of departure, and recognizing the impressive strides that have been made in Indo-US ties, this research focuses on the strategies, outputs and consequences of this foreign policy engagement. Its impact on Asian stability in the context of a rising China is also analysed. The research also studies the dynamics between the three major Asian powers, India, China and Japan, whose bilateral equations with the US are divergent and therefore of concern to the smaller powers of the region. How these major powers relate to one another and whether their mutual interactions can be autonomous are some of the questions that this research explores while charting the course of Indo-US relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My overarching objective is to understand if Christian believers in the United States adhere to the Articles of Faith and compare such outcomes to the religiosity studies from the most recent research in sociology (Barro, McCleary, Finke, Stark). Overall, I want to know if the increases in religion adherence rates mean anything in relation to the practice of such faith. Secondly, I want to know if any doctrinal changes occurred because of the free market system in the United States and what impact has such changes made to the economic framework of the believer. Thirdly, I am going to explore how such changes altered the philosophical moral position of Christian believers and how it has impacted their actions in general over the past one hundred years. Lastly, I want to see if changes that have taken place in the United States have had a similar impact on countries such as India and China who have recently adopted free market principles. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

S Y N O P S I SThe recent presence of America in Afghanistan and Iraq has further enhanced the need for China to have strategic relations with India. It is felt India and China must play their role against unilateralism through political and economic unity. Since 1990, Sino Indian economic relations have made a good progress..For about a decade both countries have been suitably maintaining peace and tranquility on 4100 km long disputed border. The current effort of delineating the line of Actual Control which made the good beginning in Central Sector , by exchange of maps, has been stalled in the western sector. The special representatives of appropriate standing nominated by India and China are expected to provide a new political dimension and expedite the work of experts and officials. However, there has not been satisfactory progress in the resolution of complicated border issue. April 05 ?Agreement on the Parameters and Principles for Settlement of Boundary Question? may lead the way.?The agreement sets out for the first time ever, principles for an overall settlement of the of the India-China boundary question.?(1)HistoryAfter historic Shimla agreement of 1913, which was signed by British and Tibet plenipotentiaries and initialed by Chinese plenipotentiary, McMahon line was delimited between India and Tibet in Arunachal Pradesh (NEFA) and a boundary was also delimited between Outer and Inner Tibet. Chinese had later repudiated the 1913 Agreement. British Indian Govt itself preferred to ignore this international frontier for decades in a bid to obtain Chinese acquiescence to McMahon line. McMahon line was activated only in 1936 when an attempt was made to exercise British influence in areas beyond inner line in ?NEFA.? ?We forgot for a long time that Tawang was ours (after 1913 Shimla Agreement.) to develop? (2) ?Tibet tax collectors appeared in Tawang and at one or two points on the upper Subansiri and Siang and as far as Walong?(3) Unlike in the east, in Aksaichin there is no treaty with Tibet or China . In 1959, Prime Minster had stated in the Parliament ?It is a matter of argument as to what part of it (Aksaichin) belongs to us and what part of it belongs to someone else., the point is there has never been an delimitation there in that area and it has been a challenged area?(4) In March 1899 first definite boundary proposal known as McDonald line ,who was a British Minister in Beijing, was presented by British to China. The defined boundary from Wakham to Lanak la, the entire NE portion of Ladakh, was based on ?better known topographical features?(5) North East Aksaichin through which the road from Xinjiang to Tibet passes was left beyond Kashmir. The Southern Aksaichin , called Lingzhitang plain, was included as part of Kashmir. ?The British note of 14 mar 1899 represents, so far as the available records show, the only formal proposal on a boundary between India and China in the Karakoram, that is to say from Wakham to Lanak la at the head of the Changchenmo Basin which the British ever made to the Chinese during the course of their rule in India.(6). There were ,over the years eleven different variations and three basic alignments which the British had favoured. However, the line offered in 1899 was the best hope of resolving the boundary question.. The Chinese Govt has never replied to the note of Sir Claude McDonald, thus leaving the issue to the posterity. The boundary in NE Ladakh as shown in Indian maps is based on survey conducted by WH Johnson, a civil assistant, in 1859 in which he had shown entire plateau area between Karakoram and Kuenlun in the Maharaja of Kashmir?s province of Ladakh. Johnson later joined the service of Maharaja. There is controversy on adequacy of his survey keeping in view the quick dash he made in Aksaichin terrain and time he had. Johnson survey has been criticised by number of western authors like Alistair Lamb, Neveille Maxwell... ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]