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This paper considers the problems of re-legitimating the state in the aftermath of its politicization by communism - assuming that the state and democracy in a modern economy are inextricably linked. The paper argues that the anti-state, neo-liberal economics of transition reinforced rather than converted the inherited understanding of the state as a monolithic and venal actor, and this transition strategy is contrasted with those of western and southern Europe where the state was activated to redeem the political system as a whole. The paper illustrates why serious problems emerge for would-be democrats when the state as such remains ideologically persona non grata, and why the difficulties of implementing the neo-liberal strategy as a new social contract in the majority of post-communist states induces, instead, a ‘re-traditionalisation’ of the state’s position in society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to analyze Moldovan and Romanian foreign policy behavior(with emphasis on Moldova)at the United Nations between 1992-2001, from a neorealist perspective.It also is a study of small state diplomact in an international organization.Recent domestic political developments , such as the election of the leader of the Party of Moldovan Communists ,Vladimir Voronin ,to the Presidency of the country in 2001, has resulted in a new foreign policy concept that advocates a realignment of Moldovan foreign policy towards Russia, while at the same time maintaining a policy of neutrality or dealignment.The paper analyzes this development from both a theoretical and empirical point of view;first by discussing neorealism and Moldovan foreign policy concepts(1995 and 2002),and then by analyzing trends in Moldovan voting behavior in the UN General Assembly over the past ten years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper moves the question of ethnic minority policies in Europe beyond the traditional domestic-homeland analysis and locates it within the larger topic of the domestic effects of international institutions. Based on detailed case studies and quantitative analysis, the paper examines the unique strategies employed by the EU and other European institutions to influence the formation of ethnic minority policies within the Baltic and East European countries during the 1990s. The paper argues that political membership conditionality has operated as a ?managed enforcement? strategy, and that this has been very effective at fostering policy compliance in spite of considerable domestic opposition. It further nuances the study of political conditionality by examining ex-anti vis-?-vis ex-post conditionality, and incremental vis-?-vis ?either/or? conditionality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accession appears to be both a blessing and a curse to transition countries. On the one hand, EU membership supports their transformation from authoritarian regimes with centralized planning economies into liberal democracies with market economies. On the other hand, the accession countries face great difficulties in restructuring their economic and political institutions in order to meet the conditions for EU membership. The systematic involvement of non-state actors in the adoption of and adaptation to EU requirements was thought to be a remedy for the problems of European Enlargement towards "weak" transition countries. Companies and civil society organizations could provide the governments of the accession countries with important resources (money, information, expertise, support) that are necessary to make EU policies work. The paper explores the role of non-state actors in governing the double challenge of transition and accession. A comparative study of implementation of environmental policies in Poland, Hungary and Romania shows that the accession of the three transition countries was mainly shaped by the shadow of the past. State actors were harking back on command and control regulation that left little room for the involvement of non-state actors. Even where the policy process was successfully opened up for new actors the shadow of hierarchy always loos in the background. The paper argues that both state and non-state actors in transition countries are often too weak to make cooperation work. The double weakness of transition countries seriously constrains the empowering of non-state actors by "Europeanization through accession". ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The North Korean regime under Kim Il-Sung and later Kim Jong-Il has been widely regarded as an inexplicable anomaly shrouded in secrecy, even among communist regimes. Such a perception of the DPRK as sui generis is clearly not conducive to theoretically relevant research based on contextualized comparisons. This paper argues that as unusual as the DPRK may seem, there is striking regime affinity between the DPRK and Ceausescu's Romania. Both were pariah low-status communist regimes with highly personalistic dictatorships that attempted to blend a strong nationalist ideology with a rigid Stalinist developmental model. The source of this rather peculiar nation-building strategy could be traced to both regimes' weak initial legitimacy and their insignificant status in the international communist movement. Both regimes nevertheless persisted despite relentless repression and appalling living conditions their citizens had to endure. In the case of Romania, the Ceausescu regime was the last to fall among non-indigenous Eastern European communist regimes, and it was the only instance of violent regime transition in 1989. This paper argues that unlike in most reform communist regimes, in both Ceausescu's Romania and the DPRK, the role of strong anti-liberal ideology that combined both far left and far right nationalist elements was highly significant in sustaining the regime and therefore should not be underestimated. While the Gorbachev reform and the revolutions elsewhere in Eastern Europe effectively deprived the Ceausescu regime of potential nationalist cards it could play and thus precipitated regime change in Romania, the DPRK regime was able to hold on to power by using imagined and real external threats, such as the recent nuclear and missile crises, to justifying its ongoing domestic repression and reinforce its nationalist claims. Consequently, it could be predicted that short of a total economic collapse, the North Korean regime is unlikely to break down very soon and is instead likely to survive for some time as long as there is no dramatic change in the international environment that facilitates internal regime change. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years we have witnessed significant electoral successes of radical nationalist parties across Europe. This paper seeks to shed light on an important aspect of the emergence of these parties: the rise of radical nationalist constituencies. I focus on two of the most visible examples of success of such parties, the French National Front and the Greater Romania Party. This provides a type of most-different cases design: I identify explanatory variables (most importantly, economic transition) that account for the success of radical nationalism in both countries, notwithstanding many important differences between the two polities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of observers have noted that ethnically mixed states may be limited in their prospects for democratic stability. Ethnic cleavages constitute ?hard? boundaries that are unlikely to fluctuate with each election ? particularly where groups maintain strong ethnic parties. If such cleavages produce a salient and permanent majority, it would seem that the minority group should have a strong incentive to reject democratic institutions. These logical arguments seem to apply quite well to the Central European states that experienced violent ethnic conflict during the 1990s, in the context of democratic transition. However, protracted violent conflict did not emerge in other nearby states such as Romania and Slovakia, even though they contain significant Hungarian minorities with strong ethnic parties. The lack of significant violence in these states, as well as their clear steps toward democracy, present grounds for more optimism on the democratic prospects for mixed states. Previous research may overestimate the potential for conflict due to an emphasis on the activities of elites. However, a focus on mass contention demonstrates how routines of contention became a vital component in the forging of laws and institutions on which groups disagree. To examine these dynamics, this paper uses an event analysis of ethnic mobilization and the creation of laws to regulate language use in Romania during the 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given their recent history, domestic economic and political factors, and their primary foreign policy goal of joining the European Union, there may appear to be little incentive for sub-regional cooperation among the Southeast European (SEE) countries. Yet, such cooperation began shortly after the fall of communism, and has flourished ever since, with numerous trilateral and sub-regional cooperation initiatives and organizations established by and for SEE countries to work together on a wide variety of issues. This paper explores the relationship between intra-regional cooperation in the Balkans and the objective of European integration since 1989. I consider how and why Southeast European states have chosen to cooperate; how EU and NATO membership incentives, requirements, and expectations have influenced the formation and depth of these relationships; and what are the future prospects for cooperation in the region given the external environment. Romania’s role in the region is given particular attention because, along with Bulgaria, it is the only official EU candidate country in SEE which is destined to be left out of a first round of EU enlargement which is expected in 2004. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parties of the radical right have gained electoral support in European Union countries in recent years. Explanations of this support tend to focus on these parties' ability to tap into citizen attitudes and fears related to globalization issues: immigration, global competition, and loss of cultural identity. In many cases, the EU itself becomes a symbol of these globalizing tendencies which the radical right uses to delineate political space between themselves and other pro-European parties. Does this apply to the radical right political parties of Romania? The paper evaluates this question by tracking the evolution of radical right parties in Romania (PRM and the New Generation Party) in terms of each party's electoral base supporters. It finds that the PRM is in a much weaker position based on its trajectory concerning EU integration than the New Generation Party which can (and has) distanced itself form support of Romania's EU accession. Thus, the New Generation Party poses the greater challenge to pro-European parties and its future electoral success will depend on its ability to mobilize Romanian voters dissatisfied with the European Union. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1990s, there was a lot of concern in studies of post-communism about communist-era managers stalling institutional reforms due to their ability to gain long-term advantages through institutional capture. By influencing market governance rules (corporate governance, contract, bankruptcy, competition laws), managers could protect and amplify initial economic gains from liberalization, entrenching economic inequality. Yet in the 2000s, even the laggards of transition have implemented significant market governance reforms and have enjoyed rapid economic growth. Moreover, business perceptions of state capture (from BEEPS) have dropped substantially. The paper examines this surprising turnaround with evidence from the Romanian case. I argue that contrary to expectations, business interests have failed to capture market governance institutions. In spite of benefiting from shady privatization deals and other advantages based on political connections, the new Romanian entrepreneurs were not threatened by sophisticated market governance laws. This argument based on the preferences of business actors is a necessary addition to explanations of institutional reforms that rely on external conditionality or on economic crisis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of theorists have described ethnic identity as the maintenance of a social boundary between one group and an "other" group in relation to which a group may be defined. However, a full understanding of the processes by which these boundaries are established and maintained requires some attention to their unfolding over time. Informed by a research project that examines competing ethnic narratives on politics, this paper outlines how a relational approach to this complex evidence helps us to better understand these processes of boundary creation and maintenance. The evidence is drawn from daily newspapers over a 10-year period, allowing for a comparison of discourse streams over time in 1) Romanian and Hungarian local newspapers in two cities and 2) Slovak and Hungarian newspapers at the state level. An approach that allows for an examination of the relational and incremental nature of identity can help us to better explain oscillations between extremism and moderation in ethnic politics over time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses an approach inspired by Alexander Wendt's constructivism in order to analyze the rise and fall of three post-Communist "soft" authoritarian regimes responsible for Romania's, Bulgaria's, and Slovakia's difficult democratization: the neo-Communist regime of president Ion Iliescu (1990-1996) that used ultra-nationalism in order to legitimize itself as well as to hamper the development of democratic values; the ultra-nationalist regime of Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar in newly independent Slovakia (1993-1998); and the neo-Communist regime of Prime Minister Jan Videnov in Bulgaria (1995-1997).The three authoritarian regimes were able to hamper but not to eliminate the influence of external factors. Bucharest, Sofia, and Bratislava were members of three institutional structures - the CSCE/OSCE, European Union's Europe Agreements, and NATO's Partnership for Peace - that facilitated the diffusion of Western democratic values. This led to the progressive development of vibrant civil societies, which in turn seriously eroded political support for neo-Communists and ultra-nationalists. In 1996-1998, electoral "revolutions" brought the fall of the three regimes. The new, democratic ruling forces took resolute steps toward democratization that allowed the three countries to finally join the rest of CEE-10 states in their NATO and EU accession efforts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper actually presents a (very) first version of the introduction to the planned edited book Romania in the European Union: Challenges, Pathways, and Prospects (working title). As such, it presently also doubles as a larger project description. Four general issues actually need to be faced and taken into consideration when approaching Romania as a EU member: 1) Romania's (traditional) position as a "special case" in the political and social science literature and the (continuing) vagaries of its post-1989 internal development; 2) the general problematic of EU membership after "1989"; 3) the institutional and policy-relevant issues and terms that are presently available for tracking Romania's EU membership; and 4) the possible implications that Romania's EU membership can have on the general development of the EU and the possible impact that the study of Romania's EU membership can have on the study of European integration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we explore the results of a comparative survey on political attitudes and behaviors among adolescents in Belgium, Canada and Romania. The results show that while political interest and trust is highest among Canadian adolescents, it is lowest among Romanian respondents. A preliminary analysis suggest that the impact of parents and of schools remains overwhelming. Despite the rise of a new and more autonomous youth culture, therefore, most of the findings from the older literature of the 1970s still is confirmed. The study also points to the possible effects of civic education in schools.Multivariate models prove to be most performative for Canada and for Belgium and least for Romania. This might be due to the fact that political trust and engagement levels are lowest in Romania. This hints at the fact that, even 17 years after the end of the authoritarian regime in Romania, political socialization of young adolescents is still being influenced by the impact of a previous political era.We close with a number of suggestions for further and more stringent analyses of the current data. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main question addressed in this paper is how the great variation in the level of social trust between different countries can be explained? Most empirical research on this question has been based on survey data which has limits when it comes to capturing the causal mechanisms. Building on theories that point at the importance of trustworthy governmental institutions for creating social trust, two parallel experiments were conducted in two countries were the levels of corruption and social trust are very different. One group of 64 Swedish and one group of 82 Romanian undergraduate students responded to a number of scenarios in which another person's efforts to try to receive immediate assistance from an authority were described. These encounters varied within groups in terms of (1) whether or not a bribe was used in order to receive immediate assistance, (2) whether the other person or the official took the initiative to request/offer immediate assistance in exchange for the bribe, and (3) outcome in terms of whether immediate assistance was approved or declined as a result of the offer or demand for a bribe. Type of authority (police vs. doctor) was a between-groups factor. Subsequent to each scenario, participants' levels of various aspects of vertical and horizontal trust were measured. As hypothesized, the Romanian sample had reliably lower initial levels of horizontal trust than the Swedish sample. For both samples, however, the results showed the expected effects of bribe, initiator, and outcome on all dependent trust measures. The main results showed that bribe, initiator, and approved assistance decreased both vertical and horizontal trust. As such, the results supported the idea that trust in authorities influences the perceptions of the trustworthiness of others in general. Even though some of the effects were stronger for one sample than for the other, the influence of vertical trust on social trust was true for both the high- and the low-trusting sample. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Romanian electoral systems is one of the most complex electoral systems in the world. Using a full hare quota at the district level (provinces), the rest votes and rest seats at district level are aggregated at the national level. The rest seats at the national level are distributed by applying the D'Hondt method. Then these assigned national party seats have to redistributed at the district level. This last step in the electoral matrix is so complicated that the legitimacy of the system can be questioned. Besides its complexity the system is characterized by anomalies in its application. In this paper we will discuss the Romanian electoral system in all its complexity and clarify its anomalies. Finally we will propose and alternative logical system using the same basic principles as the current electoral system. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil society has proven outstanding capacities of involvement in 2004 general elections in Romania, and put a remarkable pressure on the political society. This paper aims to discuss the consequences of such involvement for both the political and civil society. We also investigate the conditions that have favoured a successful challenge of the main political actors by the most visible civic advocacy organizations. Further, we search how far can go an actor from the civil society into the lands of the political society. In the end, we hang in a balance the achievements and the failures of the civil society active involvement in the game of elections. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Romania and other new democracies began the process of regime consolidation, it was unclear whether initial rates of non-voting forms of political participation would continue or if we would witness a decline in participation. In this paper, I evaluate the pattern of Romanian political participation (1995-2004). Using data collected in 1996, 2001, and 2004, I develop a model of political participation that evaluates resources, engagement/ attitudes and membership to civil society organizations. Overall, rates of participation have declined. Application of the model overtime shows that correlated factors with political activity move from resource-based to recruitment-based (civil society membership). However, the decline in participation is proportional among members and non-members of civil society suggesting that political representation through non-voting forms of participation has not reached the ideals set forth in liberal democratic theory. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evaluates party system accountability to voters and the extent of popular support for antisystem alternatives in the 2004 elections in Romania. Changes in Romania's international relations which may deprive presidential candidate Corneliu Vadim Tudor and the Greater Romania Party (PRM) of the support of the voters; Information on risky strategic choices taken by Tudor and PRM that have not produced benefits in terms of electoral mobilization; Stance of Tudor and PRM on the issue of corruption.

Rothstein has argued that we can create "trust from above" through a strong legal system. We might presume that countries with high levels of corruuption would have low levels of trust--and this is in fact true. Yet, the correlation between perceived corruption and trust across countries is highest where corruption is lowest. We argue that people in countries with high levels of corruption blame elites and not ordinary citizens for such corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new regimes of Eastern Europe vary considerably with regard to their level of democracy (e.g., Bunce 1999). The level of social capital among the polities contributes to the explanation of this cross-national variance. Social capital is said to facilitate the formation of civil society (Stolle 1998; Newton 1999; Uslaner 2002) which in turn promotes political participation and pro-democratic attitudes (e.g. Putnam 2000). The hallmarks of democratic citizenry include regular political participation and civil society involvement (e.g., Tóka 1995; Fuchs and Roller 1998). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the main partisan divisions in Romania, and what accounts for them? What isthe sociological, demographic and attitudinal profile of the main constituencies in thiscountry? These are the questions that I seek to answer. I argue that political life in post-Communist Romania was characterized until recently by the existence of three majorblocs: left, right, and extreme right, and that the constituents of each of these blocs are, inone way or another, a product of modernization. The left is representing mostly ruralRomania, one that has yet to modernize. The right is a product of successfulmodernization - an urban, young, well-educated, dynamic constituency. The extremeright constituency, the voters of Greater Romania Party (PRM), emerged after thetransition from the prior regime as the side effect of a kind of "defective modernity," theprocess of rapid urbanization and industrialization imposed from above duringCommunism. As new generations of voters come of age, voters who were socializedunder very different conditions from previous generations, conditions became ripe for theemergence of a new extreme right party - the Party of the New Generation (PNG). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines why ostensibly anarchic violence can accompany transition, even where the period of regime change is not marked by a temporary absence of central government, or a weakening of state institutions. I argue that belligerent transitional elites sometimes choose to play-off the assumption that anarchy and violence regularly follow transition, by employing state-led anarchy as strategy of anti-opposition violence. In this three-phase process, elites create riots on the streets, isolate state security forces and then employ third-party thugs to attack nascent opposition groups amidst the ensuing chaos. By articulating the violence as an unfortunate structural by-product of transition, the elites absolve themselves of responsibility for the whole set of events. To illustrate the mechanisms of the phenomenon, I treat the violence that unfolded in Romania in June 1990, and draw comparisons with the transitions in Albania, Bulgaria and Serbia. I reach two major conclusions. First, internationally-shared norms and assumptions tied to democratization actively increase the likelihood of violence during transition. Second, a temporary absence of authority is not the driving cause of all cases of "anarchic" transition violence. On the contrary, the strength of a government and its grip on extensive state capacities is a necessary condition for the generation of state-led anarchy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political processes such as democratization, mobilization, and conflict escalation provide rich analytical material for social science. They also pose a set of interesting theoretical and methodological questions. Processes and trajectories such as these lend themselves to methodological approaches that can incorporate timing into the analysis, such as event data and event history approaches. Sophisticated statistical methods have developed to assess such data. These methods often require a set of assumptions, such as event independence, that may be problematic for processes that are recursive and that contain feedback effects and path dependence, concepts quite developed in the literature on historical institutionalism. Attempting to control for such effects as a statistical nuisance may remove the most interesting and revealing aspects of event data. Here I propose a means of applying the logic and standardization aspects of event analysis without explicit statistical models. This technique applies logic and some techniques of event analysis in ways that can transparently represent interdependence between events, rather than regarding it as a nuisance. Using the complex narrative of an ethnic riot between Romanians and Hungarians in Tⲧu Mureş, Romania, in 1990, I demonstrate how we might apply these techniques to reveal interdependent event trajectories the interactive causal mechanisms that serve as components of a riot. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]