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The Zimbabwean government at the turn of the 2000 New Millennium received widespread ostracization by some sections of the international community particularly the West. As a fairly small state and weak vis-à-vis its erstwhile adversaries who are powerful, the clear expectation based on conventional wisdom is that the regime would collapse instantly. For Zimbabwe the course of events did not turn as expected. On the contrary, emerging has been the ability of Zimbabwe to influence the international community not only those in the developing world but also the Western world itself for support largely through diplomatic efforts. The regime has stood the test of time and has not altered its behavior in the international system; its objectives have remained the same confronting its adversaries. The paper therefore, seeks to analyze the ways through which the regime has been able to use diplomacy as a tool in international relations to achieve its objective in the face of a heavy onslaught by the powerful section of the international community. In essence, the paper will largely provide the basis through which weak states in the developing world can successfully use diplomacy to achieve their foreign policy objectives in the face of the powerful global actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the extent to which South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe under the Mbeki administration was shaped by economic and commercial considerations. Given the extensive involvement and growing influence of the South African business sector in Zimbabwe, the potential link between the South African government's policy stance towards Zimbabwe and South Africa's commercial interests in Zimbabwe is intuitively appealing. This paper argues, however, that although South African firms have exploited the commercial opportunities that have emerged from the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe, it is not clear from the available evidence if commercial interests have been a primary consideration in South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe. It concludes that the Mbeki government's policy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe was not principally shaped by economic objectives, but was instead driven predominantly by political and ideological concerns, which related closely to perceptions about South Africa's role on the African continent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The continuing crisis over Zimbabwe raises a variety of issues of considerable interest to both the theorist and the practitioner of foreign policy: the merits or otherwise of contemporary attempts at state classification; the utility and morality of intervention in a state's internal affairs by economic or military means; the notion of hegemony; the assumptions underpinning African diplomacy; the incentives and constraints attendant on South Africa's foreign policy. In attempting to explain South Africa's role in the Zimbabwean crisis this paper will—where appropriate—make reference to these theoretical concerns on the assumption that the interaction between South Africa and Zimbabwe provides some revealing insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Commission for Africa (CFA) and its report launched on 11 March 2005 has been described as a significant global development initiative and, from the British perspective, as one of the most complicated processes in public policy making seen in recent times. It sought to mobilize and reconfigure global power and in particular to shape global thinking and actions on development policy towards Africa. However, the CFA (and the G8 Gleneagles Summit, whose agenda it sought to influence) were silent on one of today's political, diplomatic and development challenges—Zimbabwe. Cynics would say that, if it could not handle this issue, it has nothing to offer on Africa. This paper argues that, despite this apparent silence on and marginalization of Zimbabwe, the CFA process was pregnant with issues Zimbabwean, and that it adopted and succeeded in using what one may call ‘President Mbeki's principle of silent diplomacy on Zimbabwe’, only to lose the plot at the last minute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]